Judgment Crl. A. No. 710 of 1978 is against the order of the learned Sessions Judge of Madurai Division directing the return of bus TNR 306, which was concerned in S.C. No. 17 of 1978 on the file of the Court of Session, Madurai Division to Rengasami Reddiar, the first accused in the aforesaid Sessions case. The appellant Chinna Naidu was examined as P.W. 6 in the aforesaid case. Cr.R.C. No. 651 of 1978 has been preferred by P.W. 6 Chinna Naidu against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Madurai Division acquitting the respondent-accused in the aforesaid criminal case. In the aforesaid criminal case all the accused persons were tried by the learned Sessions Judge for an offence punishable under section 148, Indian Penal Code, for having along with 50 others formed themselves into an unlawful assembly on 22nd June, 1976 at about 9-25 p.m. armed with knives and velsticks and committed rioting in prosecution of the common object of the assembly which was to cause the destruction of the bus TNR 306, and accused 2 to 6 were tried for an offence punishable under section 427, Indian Penal Code, for having during the cause of the same transaction on the same day at about 10-15 p.m. committed mischief by causing damage of the bus TNR 306 belonging to Chinnu Naidu and accused-2 was tried for an offence punishable under section 324, Indian Penal Code, for having during the course of the same transaction voluntarily caused hurt to one Savariar by stabbing him with a knife on his right shoulder while acused-3 was tried for an offence punishable under section 323, Indian Penal Code, for having voluntarily caused hurt to Savariar by hitting him with a stick on his left leg and accused 1 was tried for an offence punishable under section 323, Indian Penal Code, for having during the course of the same transaction voluntarily caused hurt to Savariar by hitting him with a stick on the back side of his left leg and also for having abetted the commission of mischief by accused 2 to 6, which offence was committed in consequence of suck-abetment and accused 3 and 4 were tried for an offence punishable under section 392 read with section 397, Indian Penal Code, for having during the course of the same transaction committed robbery of a sum of Rs. 260 and odd and some invoice books while armed with deadly weapons. 2. The prosecution case was as follows: P. W. 6, Chinnu Naidu, the appellant in Crl.A. No. 7-10 of 1978 and the revision petitioner in Cr.R.C. No. 651 of 1978 owned three buses and was carrying on a bus transport business at Dindigul. In 1974 he was in straitened financial circumstances and had borrowed money from a number of persons and his creditors took steps to attach the buses for the realisation of the debts due to them and hence he entered into an agreement with Ramaswami Reddiar the maternal uncle of accused-1 Rangasami Reddiar whereby it was agreed that P.W. 6 should handover the buses to Ramasami Reddiar who should maintain them and run them and pay off from the earnings through these buses the debts incurred by P. W. 6 and thereafter Ramaswami Reddiar was running the three buses and after his death, accused-1, Rangasami Reddiar, claiming to be an heir of Ramaswami Reddiar was running; those buses but was not maintaining the buses properly and was not rendering accounts to P.W. 6 in regard to the earnings through those buses and hence P.W. 6 took possession of the bus MDA 5778 on 10th June, 1976 and the Bus TNR 306 on 18th June, 1976 and aggrieved by that accused-1 threatened P.W. 6 and on 22nd June, 1976 at about 9-05 p.m. when the bus TNR 306 was proceeding from Pilathi to Dindigul accused-1 along with a number of persons went in a lorry, obstructed the bus and caused damages to the bus and accused-2 stabbed P.W. 1, the driver of the bus and accused 3 and 4 also beat him with sticks and further beat P.W. 2 with sticks and’ took away the bus. In support of such a case, 27 witnesses were examined of whom P. W. 1 was the driver of the bus. P.W. 5 was a passenger in the bus while P.Ws. 7 and 8 were persons who were residing near the scene of the occurrence. P.Ws. 1 to 8 however were treated as hostile by the prosecution for they have stated that none of the accused were there at the occurrence which was alleged to have taken place on the road between Thennampatti and Vadamadurai. 7 and 8 were persons who were residing near the scene of the occurrence. P.Ws. 1 to 8 however were treated as hostile by the prosecution for they have stated that none of the accused were there at the occurrence which was alleged to have taken place on the road between Thennampatti and Vadamadurai. P.W. 4 alone supported the prosecution case in regard to that occurrence but he stated that he saw only acused-3 in that crowed. The learned Sessions Judge has pointed out that the occurrence took place at night time and P.W. 4 did not speak to his having seen any weapon in the hands of accused-3 and P.W. 4 further admitted that he had not seen accused-3 prior to the occurrence or after that and in the identification parade held by P.W. 23, P.W. 4 identified only accused-5 and “not accused-3 and P.W. 4 had not told P.W. 25 that he saw accused-5 in the crowd and did not even testify before the Court that he saw accused-5 at the time of the occurrence. The learned Sessions Judge has further pointed out that P.W. 4 identified accused 3 and 5 in the identification parade held by P.W. 23 on 21st January, 1977 but that identification parade was held 8 months after the occurrence and during those 8 months the accused persons were on bail and were coming to the Court for every hearing and as such the identification parade held on 21st January, 1977 was quite useless. For these reasons he held that an offence under section 148, Indian Penal Code has not been proved against the accused persons. He then proceeded to consider the charge against accused-2 for having voluntarily caused hurt to P.W. 1 by stabbing him with a knife and found that even P.W. 1 had stated in his evidence that nobody stabbed him “with a knife and no witness spoke to the presence of accused-2 in the crowd or to accused-2 stabbing anybody and hence he acquitted accused-2 of an offence under section 324, Indian Penal Code. With regard to the charge against accused-3 for an offence under section 323, Indian Penal Code, the learned Sessions Judge found that except for P.W. 1 none of the other witnesses have testified to accused-3 beating P.W. 1 and as such that charge had not been established. With regard to the charge against accused-3 for an offence under section 323, Indian Penal Code, the learned Sessions Judge found that except for P.W. 1 none of the other witnesses have testified to accused-3 beating P.W. 1 and as such that charge had not been established. With regard to the charge against accused-1 for having voluntarily caused hurt to P.W. 1 by beating him with a stick, the learned Sessions Judge has pointed out that no witness had spoken to the presence of accused-1 at the scene and even in Exhibit P-23 given by P.W. 1 it is not mentioned that accused-1 beat him with a stick and consequently that charge had not been established. With regard to the charge against accused 3 and 4 that they committed robbery of a sum of Rs. 260 and some invoice books, the learned Sessions Judge has pointed out that P.W. 2 the conductor himself had stated that he did not know who beat him and who wrested away the conductor's bag from him and further P.W. 2 denied that M.O. 3 was the bag which he was having and contended that he was having another bag. The learned Sessions Judge pointed out that that will render doubtful the evidence to the effect that P.W. 26 arrested accused 2 and 3 and in pursuance in the statements given by them M.O. 3 as well as some other M.Os. were recovered. He has also pointed out that according to P.W. 14,M.O. 3 and M.Os. 4 to 9 were recovered from a bush to the South of the Balasubramaniam Roadways Shed, but P.W. 26 has testified that those M.Os. were recovered from a corner of the compound of the Balasubramaniam Roadways Workshop. He therefore found that that charge had not been established against accused 3 and 4. Then with regard to the charge for an offence under section 427, Indian Penal Code, against accused 2 to 6 for having accused damage to the bus, P.Ws. 6, 9 and 10 were examined. The learned Sessions Judge has pointed out that P.Ws. He therefore found that that charge had not been established against accused 3 and 4. Then with regard to the charge for an offence under section 427, Indian Penal Code, against accused 2 to 6 for having accused damage to the bus, P.Ws. 6, 9 and 10 were examined. The learned Sessions Judge has pointed out that P.Ws. 9 and 10 claimed to have looked through the window in the Balasubramaniam Roadways building and to have seen a crowd which was damaging the bus and in that crowd they saw accused 2 and 3 while P.W. 6 stated that when he looked he saw accused-1 there and yet P.W. 6did not state during the investigation that he so saw accused-1 there. The learned Sessions Judge has further pointed out that the evidence of P.W. 20 who gave a report of the damages which he found on the bus does not show that any part of the bus was damaged or dented by that part having been beaten with a stick and yet P.Ws. 6, 9 and 10 have testified that the crowd beat the bus with sticks. He further pointed out that it is highly improbable that when accused-1 was running the bus and claims to have spent Rs. 18,000 for the bus, he would have with a crowd of persons caused damage to the bus. Consequently, he found that that charge had not been established against accused 2 to 6 as also the charge against accused-1 for having abetted accused 2 to 6 in the commission of the offence of mischief. He therefore acquitted the accused of all the charges. Against that acquittal, Crl.R.C. No. 651 of 1978 has been preferred by Chinnu Naidu who was examined as P.W. 6 in that case. The State has not preferred an appeal against that acquittal. 3. The limits of the propriety of interference in revision against orders of acquittal at the instance of a complainant to the police where the State has not preferred an appeal against the acquittal have been defined by the Supreme Court in number of decisions. It is the practice of the High Court not to interfere ordinarily in revision with orders of acquittal. That an order of acquittal is not based on merits does not make any difference in this respect. It is the practice of the High Court not to interfere ordinarily in revision with orders of acquittal. That an order of acquittal is not based on merits does not make any difference in this respect. There is, however, no doubt about the ‘jurisdiction’ of the High Court to interfere on an application or suo motu and in exceptional and proper cases it will interfere. As regards the exceptional cases in which the High Court should interfere the Supreme Court has observed in Chinnaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh as follows: “It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may however indicate some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revisions. These cases may be when the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal Court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial Court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial Court or by the Appeal Court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law”. 4. This view has been reiterated in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. The High Court will interfere only where serious injustice has been caused by an error of law and would not ordinarily interfere with the findings of fact of the lower Courts; and hence an order based upon an appreciation of evidence will not be interfered with, unless the finding is based on an erroneous view of the law. Where the applicant in revision against an acquittal is a private complainant the case against interference is much stronger. The reason is that the revisional jurisdiction is not intended to be used for the benefit of a vindictive complainant who desires to persist in some charge which he has failed to substantiate on inquiry and trial. The High Court will interfere only in the most serious cases and where the setting aside of the acquittal is urgently demanded in the interests of public justice. 5. The High Court will interfere only in the most serious cases and where the setting aside of the acquittal is urgently demanded in the interests of public justice. 5. In D. Stephens v. Nosibolla the Supreme Court has observed: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under section 439, Criminal Procedure Code, is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal against which the Government has a right of appeal under section 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record”. 6. This view has been reiterated in later decisions of the Supreme Court. Examining the instant case in the light of these principles, I find that this is not a case where such interference is called for. The matter turns purely on an appreciation of the evidence adduced in this case. The weighty reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge after a careful consideration of the evidence of the witnesses to the occurrence are fully justified on the evidence on record. Therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that interference with the order of acquittal of the accused is called for in this case. Hence the criminal revision petition (Crl. R.C. No. 651 of 1978) is dismissed. 7. The learned Sessions Judge after so acquitting the respondents proceeded to consider the question as to whom the Bus TNR 306 should be returned and eventually directed the return of the bus to the first accused Rengasami Reddiar on the ground that it was from his possession that the bus was seized by the police during the investigation and also on the ground that the contention of the applicant herein that he took possession of the bus on 18th June, 1976 cannot be believed. It is that order which has been challenged in this criminal appeal. 8. The principles laid down by various decisions on the question of disposal of property by return of the same to any person after the enquiry or trial is over are as follows: 9. It is that order which has been challenged in this criminal appeal. 8. The principles laid down by various decisions on the question of disposal of property by return of the same to any person after the enquiry or trial is over are as follows: 9. The general principle is that where the police seized the property from a person who is not shown to have committed any offence in relation to the property, the property should be returned to the person from whom it is seized. This principle has been affirmed in a number of decision. 10. In V.K. Vaiyapuri Chetty v. Sinnian Chetty. it has been observed: “where no crime is made out, the Magistrate should return the property to the party from whom it was taken unless there are special circumstances which would render such a course unjustifiable. Though the Magistrate has a discretion to decide the question of possession, he cannot be allowed to try the civil cases, to weigh evidence, and to estimate probabilities”. 11. In In re, Lakshmana Dorai and others, it was held: “Under section 517, Criminal Procedure Code (1898), except in exceptional cases, the simple rule should be that if no crime is made out the Magistrate should return the property to the party from whom it was taken”. 12. In that decision, the ratio decidendi laid down in Vaiyapuri Chetty v. Sinnian Chettyand some earlier decisions have been affirmed. In M. Savudi Karuppannan v. Guruswami Pillal and another it was held: “When the property is seized from a person who is afterwards acquitted of stealing it the property should ordinarily be returned to that person”. 13. In Lakshmichand Rajmal v. Gopikisan Balmukund it was held: “Under section 523 that the Magistrate has to consider is, who is entitled to the possession of property which has been seized by the police. Where it is proved that the person from whose possession the property was seized came by it dishonestly, the Magistrate may have to consider questions of title in order to determine the best right of possession. But where it appears that the police have seized property from a person who is not shown to have committed any offence in relation to that property, then the Magistrate can only hold that that person is entitled to possession of the property. But where it appears that the police have seized property from a person who is not shown to have committed any offence in relation to that property, then the Magistrate can only hold that that person is entitled to possession of the property. If any other person claims the property, his remedy is in a civil Court and the burden will be upon him to prove his title”. 14. In Pushkhar Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat and another it was held that in a case whose money was found in possession of the accused, which money was alleged to have been stolen from the complainant and the Magistrate found that no offence was committed in respect of that money and, that the money did not belong to the complainant, unless it was found that an offence was committed in respect of that money, there was no jurisdiction to the High Court to order the payment of the amount to the complainant. 15. Latterly, the decisions in a series of cases with reference to Motor Vehicles made a departure from the aforesaid general principle. In Mohd. Ismail Noor Mohammed v. Fehmada Nahid and others it was held that a distinction will have to be made between cases where property generally is involved and other cases where property involving licence or permit for its possession or use is required under law and a slightly different principle will have to be adopted in cases of the latter to decide as to who is best entitled to possession of such property. It was pointed out in that decision that the provisions of section 42, section 59 and section 123 of the Motor Vehicles Act are very clear to show that a permit is not transferable and any person who is not a permit-holder would be liable for an offence if he tries to ply a bus without such permit; and therefore that will be a material consideration while deciding the question of return of the property under section 523, Criminal Procedure Code, and therefore where a bus was taken by the accused, who was running the bus service on the basis of an arrangement with the permit-holder, from the possession of the permit-holder the accused is not entitled to possession and it is for him to enforce his claim, if any, in the civil Court. In that decision, a reference was made to Nalluswami Reddi v. Nallammal where it was held down that a question of title as toproperty cannot be satisfactorily decided by a criminal Court; but where property prima facie is taken by violence by one person under the colour of a civil claim the criminal Court should ordinarily order the property so taken by violence to be returned to the person from whom it was taken. A reference to another case Emperor v. Haribanthu Patro was also made. In that case, one Kantaya had purchased a bus and had held the licence and the route permit and was actually plying the same. But the accused was had contributed some portion of the money for purchasing the bus forcibly took away the bus from the possession of Kantaya's driver; and the question arose as to who was entitled to possession of the bus, it having been admitted that the bus had been seized from the possession of the accused. It was however held that the bus ought to be returned to the permit-holder, particularly in view of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and also because Kantaya's possession was lawful, while possession of the accused was based on violence. It was observed that if the petitioner had any civil claim or had by claim to be in management of the affairs of the permit-holder in the matter of running the bus service, it would be for him to enforce those rights through a civil Court, and he can in no case be considered to be the proper person so as to be entitled to return of the bus under section 523 of the Criminal Procedure Code. A reference was made in that decision to the decision of this Court in Maniam Hiria Gounder v. M.G. Mistry It might be noted that on behalf of the appellant great reliance is placed on this decision and it has been argued that the instant case is very similar to the one which gave rise to the aforesaid decision. 16. In Inder Singh Sunder Singh v. Jaswant Singh Sethi and others the property in dispute was a truck which had been purchased by the petitioners therein who stated that they had given it to one of the respondents on hire purchase but the latter sold it fraudulently to the other respondent. 16. In Inder Singh Sunder Singh v. Jaswant Singh Sethi and others the property in dispute was a truck which had been purchased by the petitioners therein who stated that they had given it to one of the respondents on hire purchase but the latter sold it fraudulently to the other respondent. It was observed that although the presumption was that the person in actual possession of the property was its owner until facts were proved otherwise, since the petitioners were the original purchasers of the property and so the ostensible owners of it, even though the property was in the possession, of the respondent at the time of its seizure by the police, the property should be returned to the petitioners as the ostensible owners entitled to the possession of the property. 17. In Nandiram v. State of Gujarat and others it was observed as follows: “Now, section 22 of the Motor Vehicles Act makes the registration obligatory before any such motor vehicles could be driven either by the owner hereof or by some other person on his behalf. As provided therein, no person shall drive any motor vehicle and no owner of motor vehicle shall cause or permit the vehicle to be driven in any public place or in any other place for the purpose of carrying passengers or goods unless the vehicle is registered in accordance with this Chapter and the certificate of registration of the vehicle has not been suspended or cancelled and the vehicle carries a registration mark displayed in the prescribed manner. Section 24 then provides as to how registration has to be made. An application by or on behalf of the owner of a motor vehicle for registration shall be given in certain form set out in the schedule and it shall contain certain information required therein. The proviso there to then says that where a motor vehicle is jointly owned by more persons than one, the application shall be made by one of them on behalf of all the owners and such applicant shall be deemed to be the owner of the motor vehicle for the purposes of this Act. It is thereafter that the registration certificate is being issued. Such a registration certificate has been issued in favour of the complainant alone and nowhere does the name of accused No. 1 appear in respect thereof. It is thereafter that the registration certificate is being issued. Such a registration certificate has been issued in favour of the complainant alone and nowhere does the name of accused No. 1 appear in respect thereof. Section 28 of the Act then says that such a certification of registration issued in respect of any such vehicle shall be effective throughout India. Then section 31 of the Act provides for a transfer of ownership of any such vehicle. Where the ownership of any motor vehicle is transferred, the transferor shall within fourteen days of the transfer, report the transfer to the registering authority and shall simultaneously send a copy of the said report to the transferee. Then clause (b) says that the transferee shall, within thirty days of the transfer, report the transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction he resides and shall forward the certificate of registration to that registering authority together with the prescribed fee and a copy of the report received by him from the transferor in order that particulars of the transfer of ownership may be entered in the certificate of registration. It follows from the provisions referred to here above that the registration certificate is an essential necessity before any such motor vehicle can be made use of and that any person in whose favour this certificate of registration is issued, obviously would be the owner thereof. In case of any transfer of ownership in respect of that motor vehicle the procedure is contemplated under section 31 of the Act and till any such transfer of ownership is entered in the certificate of registration, one has to take it that the person in whose favour such a certificate of registration is issued by the motor transport authorities is the owner and that way entitled to remain in possession thereof. Non-compliance of certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, sometime makes the owner responsible. In those circumstances, it should be ordinarily prudent and in consonance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act to allow such a motor vehicle to remain in possession of such a person in whose name the certificate of registration stands. Any other person can be taken to be a person at the most as making use of it on his behalf or if there is no consent on his part, as against his interest. Any other person can be taken to be a person at the most as making use of it on his behalf or if there is no consent on his part, as against his interest. In cases of this character, possession by itself would not be a true criterion for the return of the same to a person from whom it has been seized or attached by the police in relation to a case against him. In my view, the person on whose name the motor vehicle stands with the registering authority, would be entitled to remain in custody thereof and not any other person, unless he is able to establish his superior title or claim it”. 18. In Smt. Mahamaya Dasi v. Samat Kumar Lal and others a car was stolen from the complainant who was shown to be the registered owner thereof having the blue-book, tax-token, insurance certificate and other relevant documents in proof of ownership. It was held that the car should be returned under section 516-A to the complainant, because the mortor-car is a subject with regard to which there are specific provisions in the statute containing certain obligations and any non-conformance thereto will bring the offender within the ambit of the penalties provided for under the relevant Act and the Rules; and motor vehicles are not just ordinary ”chatties personal“ and the owner thereof has got right as well as liabilities under the statute. 19. In M.N. Sahadevan v. N.P. Sudhakaran the property in question was a motor cycle. It was observed by a single Judge of the Kerala High Court as follows: “In normal circumstances, on an acquittal or discharge, the property would be returned to the person from whom it was seized. Where there are circumstances showing that the person concerned has not claimed the property as his property specifically or where there are no grounds to hold that the property should belong to the, accused, and the evidence in the case would suggest that the property belonged to the complainant or when the discharge or acquittal is passed upon doubtfulness of the proof offered, the Magistrate has certainly got a discretion to return the property to the complainant and in such case it may be unreasonable to return the property to the accused. But there are circumstances which depend upon the facts of each case. But there are circumstances which depend upon the facts of each case. That the property should be given to the person from whom it is seized is not an invariable rule. The Court is bound to return the property to the person who is entitled to be in possession of the same. While deciding as to the person who is entitled to be in possession of the property the Court is bound to go into the ownership of the property to decide the person who is entitled to be in possession of the same”. 20. In this case, the petitioner had produced the certificate of registration of the vehicle in his name, the relevant insurance certificate and also tax receipt to show that the quarterly tax had been paid by him. Under those circumstances, it is open to the Court to decide the person as to who is the owner of the vehicle without recourse to any other circumstance. It is not correct to say in such cases that the Court is deciding title to the property. Ultimately, it may be the petitioner or the 1st respondent who would be entitled to the vehicle in question on a determination of the same in a civil Court. That title need not be gone into in this proceeding. It is sufficient for this Court to decide the person who is entitled to be in possession of the property and in respect of a motor vehicle the person in whose name the registration certificate stands is the person who would be entitled to be in possession of the vehicle under the provisions of section 517, Criminal Procedure Code. 21. In Deo Dutta Sharma v. Manohar Lal and others a single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dealing with the question of the custody of a vehicle under section 516-A, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 observed as follows: “It is evident from the provision of Chapter III of Motor Vehicles Act, that the Certificate of Registration is the primary if not conclusive evidence, that the holder thereof is the owner of the motor vehicle specified therein. Equally axiomatic it is that a presumption of being in possession flows from the factum of rightful ownership. Equally axiomatic it is that a presumption of being in possession flows from the factum of rightful ownership. Therefore the holder of the certificate of registration is entitled to claim in his favour the strongest presumption that he is the rightful owner in physical possession (either actually or constructively) of the motor vehicle. Unless there is the clearest and well nigh conclusive evidence to the contrary to rebut this presumption the registered owner of a motor vehicle ought not to be denied his right to custody, and possession of the same”. 22. Another Judge of the same High Court in Hardam Singh v. Vidya Sagar and another has held as follows: “The person in whose name the vehicle stands registered with the registering authority under the Motor Vehicles Act is prima facie the owner of the vehicle and is entitled to its custody unless any other person establishes his superior title or claim over it. Possession by itself does not establish title. Till any transfer of ownership is effected in the certificate of registration, one has to take it that the person in whose favour such a certificate is issued by the Motor Transport Authorities, is the owner and thus is entitled to remain in possession thereof. It is, therefore, essential that the Court should consider the effect of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, in finding out the true claimant”. 23. In Gopalan Nair v. Kelu and State of Mysore a single Judge of the Mysore High Court has held as follows: “From the provisions relating to the registration of motor vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act, it is clear that the registration certificate is an essential necessity before any such motor vehicles can be made use of and that any person in whose favour this certificate of registration is issued, obviously would be the owner thereof. In case of any transfer of ownership in respect of that motor vehicles the procedure is contemplated under section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act and till any such transfer of ownership is entered in the certificate of registration, one has to take it that the person in whose favour such a certificate of registration is issued by the Motor Transport Authorities is the owner and such a person is entitled to remain in possession of the vehicle. Noncompliance of certain provisions of theMotor Vehicles Act sometimes makes the owner responsible. Noncompliance of certain provisions of theMotor Vehicles Act sometimes makes the owner responsible. In those circumstances, it would be ordinarily prudent and in consonance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act to allow such a motor vehicle to remain in possession of such a person in whose name the certificate of registration stands. As it stands, the petitioner is entitled to the custody of the car.” 24. Relying on these decisions, it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the appellant alone is entitled to the custody of the buses in question, inasmuch as the registration certificate in respect of those buses stands in his name and further the route permits for the same are also standing in his name and all the statutory records also stand in the name of Chinnu Naidu, the appellant herein. 25. P.W. 6, the appellant herein was running a bus service called the Rajmohan Bus Transport and having a workshop on the Trichy Road. He owned three buses MAD 6877, MDA 5778 and TNR 306. He purchased the last of the aforesaid buses from the Virudhunagar Meenambigal Transport. Exhibit P-3, is the registration certificate in respect of that vehicle and Exhibit P-4 is the insurance certificate. That bus was running on the Dindigul-Pilathu route and the route permit also stands in his name. The bus MDA 5778 was running on the Dindigul-Palaviduthi route. There was also a hire purchase agreement with the Sundaram Finance in regard to the bus TNR 306 between the appellant and the Sundaram Finance. These facts which are found in the evidence of P.W. 6 are not disputed. According to P.W. 6 he sustained a loss in running the transport service and in 1975-76 his creditors attached all the three buses. Thereupon P.W. 6 entered into an agreement with Ramasami Reddiar for a sum of Rupees Two lakhs and received an advance of Rs. 50,000 and handed over possession of the ”buses to Ramasami Reddiar. It was further agreed under that agreement that Ramasami Reddiar should pay the quarterly tax for the aforesaid two buses, repair the buses and run them in the routes and should, out of the balance consideration of R. 1,50,000, settle the debts due to one Palanimuthu Pillai, the Sundaram Finance Private Ltd. and to one Rengasami Reddiar. It was further agreed under that agreement that Ramasami Reddiar should pay the quarterly tax for the aforesaid two buses, repair the buses and run them in the routes and should, out of the balance consideration of R. 1,50,000, settle the debts due to one Palanimuthu Pillai, the Sundaram Finance Private Ltd. and to one Rengasami Reddiar. P.W. 6 further agreed that he would execute documents of the transfer in the name of Ramasami Reddiar or his nominee. In accordance with that agreement Ramasami Reddiar was running the two buses. But Ramasami Reddiar was admitted into hospital and the first accused Rengasami Reddiar, claiming to be the hire of Ramasami Reddiar, was running the buses. When Ramasami Reddiar recovered his health and came out of the hospital he asked the first accused Rengasami Reddiar to handover the buses to him. But the first accused dismantled the bus TNR 306 in the Balasubramaniam Roadways Workshop. Ramasami Reddiar then died on 9th October, 1975 and thereafter the first accused was running the buses and after taking the collections was rendering accounts to the appellant. But six months later, the first accused Rengasami Reddiar was not rendering accounts or handing over documents and hence, he, the appellant on 19th June, 1976 took over possession of the bus TNR 306. The appellant's further case is that even on 10th June, 1976 he had taken possession of the bus MDA 5778 on the ground that the loan had been discharged and thereafter that bus has been in his possession. This fact is not disputed seriously by the first accused. The first accused however denies that the appellant took possession of the bus TNR 306 on 19th June, 1976 and contends that he is still in possession of the vehicle. It is also stated that Ramasami Reddiar had executed a registered Will on 20th January, 1975 bequeathing his properties to the first accused, but on 21st June, 1975, Ramasami Reddiar executed a registered document revoking the Will. 26. On 20th June, 1976 the appellant sent a petition to the District Superintendent of Police and the Sub-Collector, Dindigul for police protection. It is also stated that Ramasami Reddiar had executed a registered Will on 20th January, 1975 bequeathing his properties to the first accused, but on 21st June, 1975, Ramasami Reddiar executed a registered document revoking the Will. 26. On 20th June, 1976 the appellant sent a petition to the District Superintendent of Police and the Sub-Collector, Dindigul for police protection. On 22nd June, 1976 P.W. 1, who is the driver of the aforesaid bus went to the police station at about 11-15 p.m., with injuries and gave the complaint Exhibit P-23 alleging that that day when he was driving that bus from Pilathu to Dindigul at about 9-25 p.m. between Vadamadurai and Thennampatti, the first accused came in a lorry with 50 or 60 persons armed with sticks, velsticks and knives, etc., obstructed the bus, made him get down, dragged him down from the drivers seat and 4 or 5 of those persons beat him on his left knee and left ankle and the 2nd accused stabbed with a knife on his right shoulder and right flank and those persons then drove away the passengers and broke the windscreen and then took him and the conductor in that bus to Dindigul and after making him get down near the Balasubramaniam bus shed, took away the bus. P.W. 24 registered a case under sections 147, 148, 323, 324 and 426, Indian Penal Code, and despatched the first information report to the Vadamadurai police station since the occurrence took place within the jurisdiction of that police station. P.W. 25 took that first information report to the Vadamadurai police station and handed it over there at 6-30 a.m. on 23rd June, 1976 and P.W. 26 registered a case tinder the same sections and took up the investigation and went to the scene of the occurrence and recovered from the scene broken pieces of glass and prepared a rough sketch. He then examined P.W. 3 and sent him to the hospital and then proceeded to the Dindigul hospital and examined P.W. 1 and the medical officer who examined P.Ws. 1 and 3. He then proceeded to the Balasubramaniam Roadways shed and seized the bus TNR 306. He then examined P.W. 3 and sent him to the hospital and then proceeded to the Dindigul hospital and examined P.W. 1 and the medical officer who examined P.Ws. 1 and 3. He then proceeded to the Balasubramaniam Roadways shed and seized the bus TNR 306. After investigation, the charge-sheet was laid against the accused person and it was taken on file as P.R.C. No. 2 of 1977 and the accused were then ordered to take their trial before the Court of Session and the learned Sessions Judge tried the accused for offences under sections 147, 148, 323, 324,392 read with 397, 427 and 427 read with 109, Indian Penal Code and eventually acquitted the accused as already stated by me, and while acquitting the accused he also, as already stated above, directed the return of the bus TNR 306 to the first accused Rengasami Reddiar. 27. The first accused contends that the agreement Exhibit P-5 was an out-and-out sale of the vehicles; but the appellant's case is that it was only an agreement regarding a loan with a scheme for recovery of the amount of the loan by the daily collections got out of the buses and actually no application for transfer of the registry of the vehicles to the first accused was ever made and the bus TNR 306 continues to stand in the name of the appellant. It might also be noted that on 26th June, 1976, the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Vedasandur passed an interim order directing the delivery of possession of the bus to the appellant pending the criminal case. Thereupon C.M.A. No. 863 of 1976 was filed by the first accused for ordering custody of the bus to him but that was dismissed. The appellant had executed a bond undertaking to produce the vehicle before the Court whenever required and he was required by the learned Sessions Judge to produce the bus on 27th September, 1978 the date to which the case had been posted for pronouncing judgment and the bus was accordingly produced and immediately after the judgment was pronounced the order that the bus should be returned to the first accused was carried out. 28. Mr. 28. Mr. G. Ramaswami appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that the order of the learned Sessions Judge directing the return of the bus to the first accused is unsustainable since no notice was given to the appellant before that order directing the return of the bus to the first accused was passed, and on that ground he wanted remanding of the matter, citing the decision of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Rajendra Kumar Singh and others. In that case during the course of the trial certain currency notes were ordered to be returned to the appellant-State Bank on an application filed by the appellant under section 517 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. Subsequently, the trial ended in acquittal, but an appeal was filed by the State before the High Court which eventually set aside the order of acquittal and convicted the third respondent of the offence charged. Then on an application made by the first respondent asking for delivery of the currency notes to him on the ground that they belonged to him and the second respondent, the High Court directed the notes to be handed over to the first and second respondents. Against that order an appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court contending inter alia, that the High Court had reversed the order of the trial Court without giving notice to the appellant and without giving an opportunity of being heard and as such the order directing the return of the currency notes to the first and second respondents was violative of the principles of natural justice and was illegal. That appeal was resisted by the respondents who contended that there was no provision in section 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for giving notice to the affected parties. The Supreme Court rejected that contention and held that the High Court was bound to give notice to the appellant before reversing the order of the trial Court, directing the disposal of the property under section 517, Criminal Procedure Code, although the statute does not expressly require a notice to be issued, or a hearing to be given to the parties adversely affected, for there was in the eye of law a necessary implication that the parties adversely affected should be heard before the Court makes an order for return of the seized property. The aforesaid decision was followed by this Court in Ibrahim Bathima v. Thirukkanna Thevar There is also another decision of this High Court of Akella Rama Krishnayya v. Devulapalli Seethamma. But then it must be noted that when the learned Sessions Judge passed the order directing the return of the bus to the first accused, he passed the order under section 517 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and against that order the present appeal has been filed under section 520, Criminal Procedure Code, and notice has been given to the first accused and both the parties have been given an opportunity of being heard on the matter of return of the bus. Therefore it is not necessary to remand the matter back to the trial Court. 29. Now, as I have already stated, while the appellant would contend that the agreement Exhibit P-5 entered into between him and Ramasami Reddiar was only an agreement of loan with a scheme recover the amount of loan by appropriating the daily collections got out of the buses, the contention of the first accused is that it was an out-and-out sale of the vehicles as the document itself shows. I have already referred to the recitals in that document; and no doubt a sale has been mentioned in that document. But then, the question as to whether this document is an out-and-out sale or is only a loan agreement has to be decided only in a regularly instituted suit before the civil Court. The criminal Court cannot, as has been held in a number of decisions, be allowed to try the civil case. I respectfully agree with the observations in Lata Har Bhagwandas and another v. Diwan Chand where it was held that where the question of possession is disputable and the rights of the parties to possession have to be decided on the basis of the agreements between the parties, it would be a matter for decision by a civil Court; and in a criminal case, what the criminal Court has to see is the prima facie right to possession at the time of the incident and not to adjudicate upon the civil rights of the parties. 30. 30. In Rajkishore Mahapatra and others v. Narasingh Mishra it is observed that it is not expected under the provisions of section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to try a dispute which is of a civil nature. In that decision the observations of this Court in Muthia Muthirian v. Vairaperumal Muthirian which are to the following effect have been referred to: “But a criminal Court, as well pointed out in the exhaustive analysis in Chitaley and Annaji Rao's Criminal Procedure Code, Volume III, 4th (1950) Edition, at page 2862, is not expected, under the provisions of section 5 T7 to ‘try’ civil cases. It is not the function of a criminal Court to decide nice questions involving principles of civil law, if there is a dispute between rival parties claiming a return of the property. It should not help a party whose object is to endeavour to obtain its judgment upon a question which ought to be determined in a civil Court. Where, therefore, there is a ‘doubt as to ownership’ of property, or where a ‘question of bona fide title’ by purchase or otherwise arises, the duty of the criminal Court is to leave the parties to their remedy in a civil Suit.” Therefore, it is not within the province of the criminal Court to go into the question as to whether the agreement Exhibit P-5 is an out and-out sale or is only an agreement of loan. It is admitted however that in pursuance of that agreement the bus in question as well as another bus MDA 5778 along with the route permits were handed over to Ramasami Reddiar for the latter to run the buses along the routes and thereafter the bus in question was being run by Ramasami Reddiar and after him by the first accused indisputably till 18th June, 1976. One important factor in connection with this is that the bus MDA 5778 was sometime before 18th June, 1976 taken possession of by the appellant and he is running it. 31. According to the appellant he took possession of the vehicle TNR 306 on 19th June, 1976 and started operating it; but on 22nd June, 1976 by means of violence the bus was seized by the accused when it was returning from Dindigul and was taken away to the Balasubramaniam Roadways Workshop and from there the police seized it. 31. According to the appellant he took possession of the vehicle TNR 306 on 19th June, 1976 and started operating it; but on 22nd June, 1976 by means of violence the bus was seized by the accused when it was returning from Dindigul and was taken away to the Balasubramaniam Roadways Workshop and from there the police seized it. It was such alleged forcible seizure of the bus that was the subject-matter of the criminal case and the criminal Court found that the offences alleged against the accused have not been proved and acquitted the accused of the various charges which were framed against them in connection with that alleged incident. Of course, there is no evidence to prove that even on 19th June, 1976, P.W. 6 took possession of the bus in question. The only reason why the learned Sessions Judge ordered the return of the bus to the first accused was that the bus was seized from the shed in the possession of the first accused and there was nothing to show that on 19th June, 1976, the appellant took possession of the bus. Undoubtedly, the registration certificate and the route permits still stand in the name of the appellant and no attempt was made to effect a transfer of the registration certificates and the licence in the name of the first accused. This has also to be borne in mind in considering the question of the return of the bus in view of the decisions which I have referred to above relating to the return of motor vehicles by the criminal Court. 32. The learned Counsel Mr. G. Ramaswami has also vehemently contended that the learned Sessions Judge has overlooked certain evidences which are on record, especially the statement of the first accused, when he was examined under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code and the confessions of accused 2 and 3 and Exhibit P-14, the duty roster and the trip-sheet Exhibit P-15. 32. The learned Counsel Mr. G. Ramaswami has also vehemently contended that the learned Sessions Judge has overlooked certain evidences which are on record, especially the statement of the first accused, when he was examined under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code and the confessions of accused 2 and 3 and Exhibit P-14, the duty roster and the trip-sheet Exhibit P-15. The first accused, during his examination under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code when confronted with the evidence of P.W. 6 to the effect that he purchased the bus from the Virudhunagar Meenambigai Transport and that Exhibit P-3 was the registration certificate in respect of that vehicle while Exhibit P-4 was the insurance certificate in respect of it and that the bus was running in route No. 17 and there was a hire purchase agreement 17 and there was a hire purchase agreement in favour of the Sundaram Finance, admitted that evidence to be true. Then again the statement of the second accused when examined under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code is to the effect that when the bus was being driven from Kallal and was near Thennampatti where it stopped to enable the driver and the conductor to take tiffin, suddenly, he, the second accused heard the bus being moved and when he came out and saw, P.W. 1 was taking the bus and Jayaraman and Sethu were with him and the bus was then taken away. P.W. 1's evidence is that on 22nd June, 1976 at about 8 p.m. when he was resting Sethu and Jayaraman came and told him that the bus had a break-down and asked him to bring the bus and he went and saw the bus standing near Thennampatti and Jayaraman asked him to get into the bus and drive it and the bus driver who was the second accused asked him how he could drive the bus when he, the driver of it was there but Jayaraman asked him to drive the bus whereupon the second accused and others created a thakarar and then there was rioting during which he sustained injuries. The evidence of P.W. 2 is to the effect that when the bus was coming from Pilathu to Dindigul with P.W. 1 as the driver of it and it was proceeding slowly near Thennampatti, a lorry laden with a number of people came and they obstructed the bus and damaged it and he was also beaten. To the same purport is the evidence of P.W. 4. Therefore the bus, while it was running between Pilathu and Dindigul on that night was taken away by violence. As to who were responsible for so taking it away, there was no reliable evidence. Consequently, the accused were acquitted. Exhibit P-14 the duty roster shows that P.W. 1 was the driver of the bus in question when it was plying between Dindigul and Pilathu. The trip-sheet Exhibit P-15 bears the printed heading Rajmohan Transport, Dindigul. P. W. 6 is admittedly the owner of that bus transport. Taking all the above facts and circumstances into consideration, and having regard to the decisions referred to by me above in regard to the return of the motor vehicles by the criminal Court under section 517, Criminal Procedure Code, I am of the view that the bus should be ordered to be returned to the appellant who is the owner of the same and in whose name the registration certificate, the insurance certificate and the permit stand and if the first accused claims title to the bus and claims to be entitled to be in possession of it, on the strength of the agreement entered into between Ramasami Reddiar and the appellant, it is for him to establish his claim before the civil Court. Hence this appeal is allowed and the order of the learned Sessions Judge directing the return of the bus to the first accused is set aside and the bus TNR 306 is ordered to be returned to the appellant. Accordingly this criminal appeal is allowed.