JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the order and decree dated April 14, 1972, passed by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, in appeal No. 51/77 of 1970-71. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur and have gone through the record. The remaining respondents have not appeared to contest the appeal in spite of due service. 3. Respondent No. 1, Smt. Maqsoodjahan Begum Paliwal had filed a suit claiming to be Bhumidhar of plot No. 940 situated in village Chanderi on the basis of a registered sale deed dated October 27, 1960, executed in her favour by the previous Bhumidhars, Sri Rameshwar Nath Tandon and his son Prithvi Nath Tandon, respondent No. 2, She sought the ejectment of Raja Singh, defendant-appellant as a trespasser from the land in dispute. Raja Singh contested the suit on the ground that he himself was in possession of the disputed property as Bhumidhar on the Basis of a sale deed executed in his favour on October 23, 1961 by Hira Lal Khanna and that Hira Lal Khanna was in possession of the disputed property from October 7, 1960 on the basis of a sale deed executed in his favour and that any subsequent alleged sale deed dated October 27, 1960 in favour of the plaintiff was illegal and infructuous. Both the courts below had decreed the suit. Raja Singh has now come up in second appeal. 4. Both the courts below had decreed the suit. Raja Singh has now come up in second appeal. 4. The grounds taken in the second appeal are that the lower appellate court has ignored the provisions of Appendix III framed under Rule 338 of UPZA and LR Rules 1952 while confirming the decree of the trial court, that the lower appellate court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record of the case, that the finding that the appellant is not a Bhumidhar but a trespasser is erroneous and in clear violation to the provisions of Section 130 of the UPZA and LR Act, that the lower appellate court has ignored the provisions of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, that the lower appellate court has failed to appreciate the law laid down in the ruling of the Board of Revenue in 1971 RD 160 , that there is substantial error in framing issue No. 1 and assuming jurisdiction by the trial court in contravention to the provisions of Section 331-A and finally, that the sale deed executed by Babu Lal, the General Agent of Rameshwar Nath Tandon, in favour of the appellant is valid and legal and must prevail over the sale deed subsequently executed by Sri Rameshwar Nath Tandon and his son Prithvi Nath Tandon. 5. It is proved from the extract of the Khatauni as well as the original Bhumidhari Sanad of February 4, 1956 that Rameshwar Nath Tandon and his son Prithvi Nath Tandon were Bhumidhars of the land in suit. The registered sale deed executed by them in favour of Smt. Maqsood Jahan Begum Paliwal on October 27, 1960 is on record. As against it, the appellant had filed the sale deed executed in his favour for the same land by Hira Lal Khana on October 23, 1961. But Hira Lal Khanna is not the original Bhumidhar himself. In the sale deed itself he claims to have purchased the land from a sale deed executed by one Babu Lal Goel on October 7, 1960 in his capacity as the Mukhtar of Rameshwar Nath Tandon. There is nothing on record to show that Babu Lal Goel possessed the authority to execute the sale deed on behalf of Rameshwar Nath Tandon and Prithvi Nath Tandon. Further it is not even alleged that Babu Lal Goel was the Mukhtar of Prithvi Nath Tandon as well. There is nothing on record to show that Babu Lal Goel possessed the authority to execute the sale deed on behalf of Rameshwar Nath Tandon and Prithvi Nath Tandon. Further it is not even alleged that Babu Lal Goel was the Mukhtar of Prithvi Nath Tandon as well. In the circumstances, the courts below have held that the sale deed executed by the rightful owners would prevail over a sale deed executed by a person claiming title merely on the basis of another sale deed by a Mukhtar or Agent. The ground that the provisions of Appendix III framed under R. 338 of the UPZA and LR Rules, 1952 have been ignored has no substance at all. The plaint shows that the defendant appellant asserted his right to possess and refused to deliver possession of the land in suit on or about October 22, 1969 and the suit itself was filed on February 3, 1970. Thus, the suit was not time-barred. The contention that the appellant has become Bhumidhar under Section 30 of the UPZA and LR Act, cannot be accepted. A person who claims right as a vendee from a vendor who himself does not possess the rights, cannot acquire those rights. As regards the contention that the appellate court has ignored the provisions of Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act, this section provides that the court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. I don not find that the lower appellate court was required to make any presumptions under this section and the question of his ignoring the provisions of this section, therefore does not arise. However, the ground that there is substantial error in framing issue No. 1 and assuming jurisdiction by the trial court in contravention of the provisions of Section 331-A of the UPZA and LR Act, 1951 has substance. Section 331-A reads as follows :- "S. 331-A. Procedure when plea of land being used for agricultural purposes is raised in any suit. However, the ground that there is substantial error in framing issue No. 1 and assuming jurisdiction by the trial court in contravention of the provisions of Section 331-A of the UPZA and LR Act, 1951 has substance. Section 331-A reads as follows :- "S. 331-A. Procedure when plea of land being used for agricultural purposes is raised in any suit. - (1) If in any suit, relating to land held by a Bhumidhar, instituted in any court, the question arises or is raised whether the land in question is or is not used for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry, which includes pisciculture and poultry farming, and a declaration has not been made in respect or such land under Sections 143 or 144, the court shall frame an issue on the question and send the record to the Assistant Collector In-charge of the Sub-Division for the decision of that issue only : Provided that where the suit has been instituted in the court of Assistant Collector In-charge of the Sub-Division, it shall proceed to decide the question in accordance with the proviso as of Sections 143 or 144, as the case may be : (2) The Assistant Collector In-charge of the Sub-Division after reframing the issue, if necessary, shall proceed to decide such issue in the manner laid down for the making of a declaration under Sections 143 or 144, as the case may be, and return the record together with his finding thereon to the court which referred the issue. (3) The court shall then proceed to decide the suit accepting the finding of the Assistant Collector In-charge of the Sub-Division on the issue referred to it. (4) The finding of the Assistant Collector In-charge of the Sub-Division on the issue referred to it shall, for the purposes of appeal, be deemed to be part of the finding of the court which referred the issue." Thus where a plea is raised that the land in question is not used for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry and a declaration has not been made in respect of such a land under Sections 143 or 144, the trial court is bound to frame an issue on the question and send the record to the Assistant Collector In-charge of the Sub-Division for decision of that issue. The use of the word 'shall' in this section leaves no scope of discretion for the trial court. In the present case a plea of this nature has been raised in the trial court and, therefore, the issue should have been referred to the Sub-Divisional Officer for decision. The trial court has erred in deciding the issue himself. Further it has been held in 1971 RD 160 that till such time that a Bhumidhar does not get the requisite declaration under Section 143 of the UPZA and LR Act, he continues to be covered by the provisions of the Act. The second appeal must succeed on this ground as this raises a question of improper exercise of jurisdiction. 6. The result is that I allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the court below. The case is remanded to the trial court for following the procedure laid down in Section 331-A of the UPZA and LR Act and thereafter deciding the case afresh.