JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the Judgment and decree dated February 18, 1972 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division in Appeal No. 147 arising out of suit No. 42/-247/125 under Section 229-B of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The appellant, Chandrika Prasad had filed a suit under Section 229-B U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act seeking declaration of his Sirdari rights in plot No. 159-M area, 98 acres, on the basis of a lease granted by the Gaon Sabha of Himmat Nagar in his favour on May 16, 1965. The Gaon Sabha did not contest the suit but the state of U.P. through the Collector Sitapur, contested the suit on the ground that the appellant was the son of Gajadhar Prasad, Pradhan Gaon Sabha, Himmat Nagar and the lease in question was executed in an irregular manner as a result of collusion. The trial court decreed the suit but the Additional Commissioner has set aside the order of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. 4. The first ground taken in the second appeal is that a notice under Section 80, C.P.C. was substantially complied with and the Additional Commissioner erred in law in holding to the contrary. The Judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner shows that he has set aside the order of the trial court without going into the merits of the case solely on the technical ground that a proper notice under Section 80, C.P.C. was not issued. This view of the learned Additional Commissioner is entirely erroneous in law. The trial court's record includes the copies of the notice issued under Section 80, C.P.C. to the State of U.P. through the Collector, Sitapur sent by the counsel for the appellant on July 22, 1970 and the notice under the Section 106 of the Panchayat Raj Act sent to the Gaon Sabha Himmat Nagar on the same date. The notice under Section 80, C.P.C. gives the complete details of the land, the cause of action and the relief sought. The cause of action shown is that the suit was felt because the Gaon Sabha was intending to grant a lease of this land in favour of some other person, and the relief sought was the declaration of Sirdari rights. The cause of action shown is that the suit was felt because the Gaon Sabha was intending to grant a lease of this land in favour of some other person, and the relief sought was the declaration of Sirdari rights. The learned Additional Commissioner has sought to make a distinction without any logic that the cause of action is different in the notice and in the suit as filed. A notice under Section 80, C.P.C. does not become invalid merely because the cause of action given in the notice and the plaint have some slight difference when the details of the property given and the relief sought are identical. 5. In State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1309, a learned Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: "Learned counsel appearing for the appellant points out that it is not clear at all from the notice whether the plaintiff's claim is based on a contract for the payment of godown rent or on the footing of damages for use and occupation of the plaintiff's godown or through whom the first defendant is alleged to have entered into the alleged agreement for the payment of godown rent or interest thereon the submits that in the premises the notice does not fulfil the requirement of Section 80. In considering the question so posed before us, we must bear in mind the following observations made by this court in Dhian Singh Sobha Singh v. Union of India, 1958 S.C.R. 781 at pp. 795 and 796: (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 274 at p. 281): "We are constrained to observe that the approach of the High Court to this question was not well founded. The Privy Council no doubt laid down in 54 Int. p. 383: (A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 176) that the terms of this Section should be strictly complied with. That does not however, mean that the terms of the notice should be scrutinised in a pedantic manner or in manner completely divorced from common sense. As was stated by pollock C.B. in Jones v. Nicholls, (1844) 153 E.R. 149 at p. 150. We must import a little common sense into notices of this kind. Beamont, C.J. also observed in Chandu Lal Vadilal v. Govt. of Bombay, I.L.R. (1943) Bom. 128 : (A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 138). As was stated by pollock C.B. in Jones v. Nicholls, (1844) 153 E.R. 149 at p. 150. We must import a little common sense into notices of this kind. Beamont, C.J. also observed in Chandu Lal Vadilal v. Govt. of Bombay, I.L.R. (1943) Bom. 128 : (A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 138). One must construe Section 80, with some regard to common sense and the object with which and it appears to have been passed...... It should be remembered that Ex. p-6 is a legal notice of a suit sent through a lawyer. It is well known that a claim for 'rent' in legal parlance, can only be founded on a contract. Throughout this notice the claim is described as 'godown rent' and not damages for use and occupation of the godown. Therefore, he claim, prima facie, appears to be founded on a contract. Paragraph 3 is quite explicit that the supply of black gram by the plaintiff to the first defendant was arranged by and through the Asstt. Marketing Officer, the second defendant. The arrangement for payment of godown rent was only incidental to the contract of supply of the goods and it is not unreasonable to infer that this arrangement was also made by and through the second defendant acting for the first defendant. The relief claimed in paragraph 2 of the notice is that the Madras Government should pay up the amount claimed and if it does not pay up the amount claimed or failure is found to be due to the Officer of the Madras Government, then the officer concerned should be held responsible, which indicates that the transaction was through some officer and the officer concerned in this case can be no other than the Assistant Marketing Officer through whom the goods were supplied, as stated in paragraph 3 of the notice. In the next place, paragraph 3 indicates that the godown rent is claimed for having stored 11000 tons of black gram. Paragraphs 1 and 4 indicate that the godown rent became payable as that goods remained undespatched for more than two months on account of no arrangement for transport facilities having been made by the first defendant, the Madras Government. The bill mentioned in paragraph 5 would show the rate at which the godown rent was calculated and the period for which it was claimed. The bill mentioned in paragraph 5 would show the rate at which the godown rent was calculated and the period for which it was claimed. Therefore, on a fair reading of the notice it may be said that the fact of the contract for the payment of the godown rent, the quantity of goods stored, the rate at which and the period for which the claim was made and the failure of the first defendant to pay the same are sufficiently stated so as to enable the first defendant, which is the appellant before us, to know what the plaintiff's claim was about and whether the claim should be conceded or resisted. On a careful consideration of the terms of the notice we are not of opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is well founded." 6. In Rajiab v. Shamsher Khan, 1969 R.D. 368 a learned Member Shri Y.N. Varma has even gone on to say that sending of a notice under Section 80, C.P.C. to the State Government is not necessary in a suit under the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act while not agreeing with this view, I would still hold that the notice under Section 80, C.P.C. should not be examined in a pedantic and artificial manner, and it should be only ensured that its substantial requirements are fulfilled. 7. The result is that I hereby allow the second appeal, set aside the Judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner and direct that the shall now proceed to hear and decide the first appeal afresh on merits.