Judgment This appeal has been preferred by the State represented by the learned Public Prosecutor against the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate of Erode acquitting the respondent-accused of an offence punishable under section 7 (1) read with section 16 (1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 2. The facts appearing in the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution are as follows: On 20th November, 1975 at about 6.30 a.m. P.W.1, the Food Inspector of Sathiamangalam Municipality, noticed the respondent coming in front of the Sathiamangalam Taluk Office on the Mysore-Sathiamangalam road bringing with him milk for sale whereupon P.W.1 after informing the respondent-accused that he was going to take sample of that milk, served on him Exhibit P-1, the notice in Form VI and purchased 660 ml. of milk and then paid 70 paise towards the price of the milk and obtained the receipt Exhibit P-2 from the respondent-accused and then divided the milk into three parts, poured them into three bottles adding to each bottle 16 drops of formaline and then affixing to each bottle a label containing the Number 52, sealed the bottles and handed over one of those bottles to the respondent-accused an sent subsequently another of the bottles to the Public Analyst along with Exhibit P-3 and a report was subsequently received from the Public Analyst to the effect that the milk was adulterated in that it contained 49% of added water. Apart from P.W.1, the prosecution examined P.W. 2 as an independent witness to corroborate the testimony of P.W.1. But P.W.2 merely stated that he knew P.W.1 and about six months prior to his deposition, one morning the Food Inspector took sample in a bottle. Nothing else was elicited from this witness by the person who conducted the prosecution before the trial Court. This witness, who is running a tea-shop, stated in cross-examination that at the time when the Food Inspector seized the sample of the milk, the respondent-accused was going from South to North and that the milk was in a brass bosi. It is extremely shocking to find that the person who conducted the prosecution did not care to elicit anything else from this witness. This witness has attested Exhibit P-2. Even that fact was not elicited from that witness. It is extremely shocking to find that the person who conducted the prosecution did not care to elicit anything else from this witness. This witness has attested Exhibit P-2. Even that fact was not elicited from that witness. The learned Magistrate found that P.W.2's evidence did not support the prosecution and did not connect the accused with the offence. It might be noted that when the accused was examined after the evidence of P.W.1 was over, he merely refuted the evidence of P.W.1 and even subsequently the accused, when examined by the Court, did not put forward any specific case of his, but merely refuted the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution. All that he stated was that he was threatened and his thumb impression was obtained. It might be noted that the accused never stated before the trial Court that the milk which he was taking was not for the purpose of sale, but was for his personal consumption. Only from a suggestion put to P.W.1 in cross-examination to the effect that the accused was not bringing that milk for purpose of sale, but was taking it for his own consumption, the learned Magistrate inferred that the contention of the accused was that he was not bringing the milk for purpose of sale, but was taking it for his own consumption. 3. The learned Magistrate after observing that the witness did not support the prosecution case, but merely stated that the sample was taken and it was poured into three bottles and that the witness did not say that he saw the accused and that the sample was taken from the milk which was brought by the accused, has observed that “there is no fact in the evidence of P.W.2 to connect the accused with the occurrence and that therefore we are left with the evidence of P.W.1 alone about the occurrence”. The learned Magistrate has then observed that prior to the occurrence, P.W.1 did not see the accused selling milk and P.W.1 further admitted that the accused is not a licensed vendor to sell milk and has further admitted that he issued Form VI notice to “P.W.1 (?)” and got his thumb impression on it and obtained a cash receipt also from the accused to which the accused has affixed his thumb impression. The learned Magistrate then proceeded to state that in cross-examination P.W.1 has clearly admitted that he did not read out the contents of Exhibits P-1 and P-2, and P.W.2, the only independent witness has not stated that P.W.1 purchased the milk from the accused and he signed Exhibits P-1 and P-2 as a witness and P.W.1 further stated in cross-examination that the accused brought milk in a tin can while P.W.2, who is the eyewitness to the occurrence has stated that the milk was brought in a brass bosi and these contradicting facts throw considerable doubt whether the accused was found in possession of the milk and sold the same to P.W.1. Iam unable to understand the reasoning of the learned Magistrate. Apparently, he did not want to believe the evidence of P.W.1 merely because the independent witness P.W.2 had not supported the prosecution case and had not spoken to the facts which would connect the accused with the offence and also because P.W.1 admitted that he did not read out the contents of Exhibits P-1 and P-2 to the accused. I am not able to understand how the fact that P.W.2 did not speak to any facts connecting the accused with the offence would militate against the acceptance of P.W.1's testimony or would detract from the value of P.W.1's testimony. Law does not require a plurality of witnesses and a conviction can undoubtedly be based on the testimony of a single witness, provided that the evidence of that witness is trustworthy. Furthermore,. section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act itself clearly states that no particular number of witnesses shall in any case, be required for the proof of any fact. In Public Prosecutor v. Subban Chettiar it was ob served as follows: “section 134 of the Evidence Act makes it clear that any fact could be proved even by a single witness. There is a recent trend in case of this type (offence under sections 7 (1) and 16 (1) read with section 2 (1) (a)and (b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act) and similar cases that the attesting witnesses always turn hostile and by reason of the attesting witnesses turning hostile, there is a tendency on the part of the Courts below to disbelieve the evidence of the Food Inspector. This trend is really deplorable and the Courts belowwould do well to keep section 134 in view and then appreciate the evidence of the Food Inspector by that standard laid, down in section 134 of the Evidence Act.” I am in respectful agreement with those observations. In the case now before me, it is not as if P.W.2 was hostile to the prosecution. In fact nothing which he has stated in his evidence is contrary to what P.W.1 has stated. There is only one discrepancy in the evidence and that is with regard to the nature of the vessel in which the milk was kept. Except for that, there is nothing in the evidence of P.W.2 which is inconsistent with the testimony of P.W.1. The fact that from P.W.2 the facts necessary to connect the respondent with the offence has not been elicited would only show the utter carelessness with which the prosecution has been conducted “before the trial Court. The deplorable trend in same persons in charge of prosecutions, before the trial Court conducting prosecutions in a slipshod manner is becoming accentuated and has to be curbed for it does certainly affect the administration of justice. The mere fact that the person who conducted the prosecution before the trial Court did not care to elicit from P.W.2 the necessary facts and did not even elicit from him the fact that he has attested Exhibit P-2 would not in any way detract from the value of the testimony of P.W.1. P.W.1's evidence has to be assessed on its own intrinsic value especially when there is nothing in P.W.2's evidence which would affect its intrinsic value. The learned Magistrate instead of doing so rejected the evidence of P.W.1 because P. W. 2 did not support his evidence and also because P.W.1 stated “I did not read Exhibits P-1 and P-2 to the accused”. Exhibit P-1 is after all a notice in Form VI given 1o the accused intimating that P.W.1 was going to take a sample while Exhibit P-2 is a receipt for the payment of the price for the milk. Of course, P.W.1 should have been more aware of his responsibilities as a public official and should have read out even these two documents to the accused before he obtained the thumb impression of the accused on them. Of course, P.W.1 should have been more aware of his responsibilities as a public official and should have read out even these two documents to the accused before he obtained the thumb impression of the accused on them. But merely because he did not do so-he frankly confesses that he did, not do so-would not show that P.W.1's evidence is untrustworthy or open to suspicion. The learned Magistrate has not weighed P.W.1's evidence or assessed its intrinsic value, but has given fallacious reasons for not relying on the evidence of P.W.1. He has wound up by stating “the above contradicting facts throw considerable doubt whether the accused was found in possession of milk and sold the same to P.W.1”. Then, the Magistrate proceeds to observe that “from the discussion in foe above paragraphs it will be seen that the prosecution has not let in sufficient evidence to establish that the accused, sold 660 milli litres of milk to P.W.1”. Then the learned Magistrate says that even assuming that the accused was found in possession of milk at the scene of the occurrence, he was of the opinion that mere possession of adulterated milk would not by itself constitute an offence and further there is no scope for an inference from the mere factum of possession that such possession was for the purpose of sale. After having said so, the learned Magistrate proceeds to lay down a very strange and shocking proposition of law and observes that for such a presumption it must be established that the possessor was in the habit of possessing such articles for sale. Then he proceeds to observe that in the instant case there is no evidence to show that the accused is a regular merchant in milk and that P.W.1 himself admits that the accused is not a licensee to sell milk. But then the learned Magistrate obviously has not kept in mind the language of section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act that no person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute any adulterated foods. But then the learned Magistrate obviously has not kept in mind the language of section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act that no person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute any adulterated foods. I am prepared to construe the above said observations of the learned Magistrate, as meaning that because the accused was not a regular merchant in milk and was not a licensee to sell milk it was likely that the milk which he was having in his possession was for the personal consumption and not for sale. But, if the learned Magistrate really meant by the above said words that only the person who is a merchant in milk and who is a licensee to sell milk could be prosecuted for selling adulterated milk then I have to correct the Magistrate's view on that aspect. The learned Magistrate has entirely overlooked the fact that the accused was in possession of 5 or 6 measures of milk in a can and as I have already stated he has not stated in his statement before She trial Court that he was taking the milk for his own consumption. If he was taking the milk for his own consumption and if the Food Inspector had stopped him and forcibly obtained from him a sample of the milk after paying the price of it, the accused would have certainly complained to the higher authorities and even if he had failed to do so, he would have, at the earliest opportunity before the trial Court, stated that the milk which he was taking not for sale, but that he was taking it for his own consumption. He did not state so at any time before the lower Court. In these circumstances, I am afraid that the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate acquitting the accused of an offence under section 7(i) punishable under section 16 (1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is quite perverse and thoroughly unjustifiable and that order has to be therefore set aside and I set aside that order and convict the respondent of an offence under section 7 (i) punishable under section 16 (1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 4. The offence was detected in the year 1975 and four years have passed by. 4. The offence was detected in the year 1975 and four years have passed by. During these four years, the respondent would have rehabilitated Himself and therefore I do not want after such a long lapse of time inflict a severe punishment on the accused by sending him to jail or by even inflicting a heavy fine on him which he will not be able to pay and the consequence of which would be, to serve the default sentence imposed if the fine is not paid. Fully conscious of the wide prevalence of this evil of adulteration in this country and fully conscious of the social responsibility that rests on Judges to see that such offences which affect the health and life of the entire community, are put down with a stern hand, I would have in the normal course of things inflicted a severe punishment on the accused, but in view of the long interval of time, that has elapsed I feel that a nominal punishment should be imposed on him. I therefore sentence him to pay a fine of Rs. 50 in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two weeks. One month's time is granted for payment of fine.