JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a revision against the order dated March 5, 1971 of the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, dismissing Appeal No. 49 and confirming the final order dated October 11, 1968 of the Assistant Collector, First Class, district Kanpur, passed in the Execution Case No. 23 of 1968. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and have gone through the record. 3. The opposite party, Smt. Ramadevi, decree-holder, had filed an application for execution of the decree in a case under Sec. 202, UPZA and LR Act. The decree was obtained by her on January 31, 1964. An appeal against the judgment was, however, filed which was finally rejected by the District Judge on April 29, 1967. The application for execution was presented on April 27, 1968 and possession in pursuance of the decree was obtained on June 22, 1968. Therefore, the judgment-debtors Anantu and Kunji moved an application under Sections 47/144 and 151, Civil Procedure Code on July 1, 1968 in the trial court, alleging that the decree-holder had obtained possession after expiry of the period of limitation and, therefore, possession should be restored to them. The trial court by its order dated October 11, 1968 has rejected this application and confirmed the delivery of possession to the decree-holder. In appeal this order has been upheld by the Additional Commissioner. The Additional Commissioner's order is being challenged in the present revision. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionists has taken the plea that there is an error on the question of limitation involved in the instant case since the courts below have not correctly interpreted the law of limitation. According to the learned counsel the decree had become final on January 31, 1964 and not on April, 29, 1967 and a time-barred appeal especially when there was no grant of stay order by the appellate court, coupled with the fact that the appeal had been originally filed in an incompetent appellate court, does not save the limitation to the decree-holder. 5. The learned counsel for the opposite party has, on the other hand, contended that the decree had become final only on April 29, 1967 when the appeal had been rejected and as such the execution of decree was not time-barred. 6. A number of rulings have been cited. 5. The learned counsel for the opposite party has, on the other hand, contended that the decree had become final only on April 29, 1967 when the appeal had been rejected and as such the execution of decree was not time-barred. 6. A number of rulings have been cited. In Nagendra Nath v. Suresh AIR 1932 Privy Council 165 their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows : "The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide. It is at least an intelligible rule that so long as there is any question subjudice between any of the parties those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so ofter thorny path of execution which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage. Nor in such a case as this is the judgment-debtor prejudiced. He may indeed obtain the boon of delay, which is so dear to debtors, and if he is virtuously inclined there is nothing to prevent his paying what he owes into Court." 7. In Shoedan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar AIR 1966 SC 1332 a learned Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made the following observations: "It is true the High Court dismissed the appeal arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 either on the ground that it was barred by limitation or on the ground that steps had not been taken for printing the records. Even so, the fact remains that the result of the dismissal of the two appeals arising from suits Nos. 77 and 91 by the High Court on these grounds was that the decrees of the Additional Civil Judge, who decided the issue as to title on merits the result of the High Court's decision is to conform the decision on the issue of the title which had been given on the merits by the Additional Civil Judge and thus in effect the High Court confirmed the decree of the trial court on the merits, whatever may be the reason for the dismissal of the appeals arising from suits Nos. 77 and 91. 77 and 91. In these circumstances, the order of the High Court dismissing the appeal arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 was to uphold the decisions on the merits as to issue of title and, therefore, it must be held that by dismissing the appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 the High Cort heard and finally decided the matter for it confirmed the judgment of the trial court being on the merits the High Court's decision must also be deemed to be on the merits. To hold otherwise would make res judicata impossible in cases where the trial court decides the matter on merits, but the appeal court dismisses the appeal on some preliminary ground thus conforming the decision of the trial court on the merits. It is well settled that where a decree on the merits is appealed from the decision of the trial court loses its character of finality and what was once res judicatga again becomes res sub judice and it is the decree of the appeal court which will then be res judicata." 8. In Rajendra Nath Tewari v. Board of Revenue 1972 RD 100 a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court has held as follows :- "A Full Bench of this Court in Shohrat Singh v. Bridgman ILR 4 All. 376 held that the decree of the court of last instance is the only decree susceptible of execution. It was observed in this case that the appellate decree is the final decree and the only decree capable of being executed after it has been passed, whether the same reverses, modifies or confirms the decree of the court from which the appeal was made. The decision of the Full Bench was explained in Gobardhan Dass v. Gopal Ram ILR Vol. VII All. 366 thus, the effect is nothing more than that the last decree is to be regarded as the decree to be executed whether it reverses, modifies or confirms; but when it affirms and adopts the mandatory part of the first court's decree, that decree may be, and should be referred to, and the mandatory part of its so affirmed should be executed as though it were the decree of the appellate court. These authorities clearly establish that when appeals have been carried from the decree of the trial court then the only executable decree is the decree of the final court. The Board of Revenue has taken the view that since the second appeal in the present cases, was dismissed under Order XLI, Rule II, the order passed therein did not amount to a decree. This is obviously incorrect. In Durga Singh v. Wahid Raza 1964 ALJ 817 a Division Bench of this Court held that the doctrine of the merger applies even where a second appeal has been dismissed by the High Court summarily under Order XLI, Rule II, CPC and that in such a case the High Court's decree is the final decree and the decree of the first appellate court merges with it. In this view it was the decree of the Board of Revenue passed in second appeal on April 11, 1961 which was the executable decree. The application for execution was filed within one year from the date of the decree and was, therefore, within time. 9. In Mirza Kishwar Beg v. Board of Revenue 1975 RD 373 another learned Single Judge has similarly held that the order of the first appellate court having merged in the order of the Board of Revenue, the judgment and decree of the first appellate court has no independent existence and it could not be revived by the Board of Revenue. It has further been held that an appeal filed beyond the expiry of period of limitation will be taken to be an appeal preferred within the meaning of Section 333 of the UPZA and LR Act. 10. The above rulings leave no doubt at all that the order of the appellate court dismissing the appeal shall be deemed to be the final decree and the period of limitation for execution of a decree shall be counted from the date of the dismissing of the appeal and not from the date of the trial court's judgment. It is immaterial whether the appeal itself was time-barred or incompetent for any other reason. A decree-holder who prefers to await the result of the appeal against the decree before executing it cannot be penalised for his act of caution. It is immaterial whether the appeal itself was time-barred or incompetent for any other reason. A decree-holder who prefers to await the result of the appeal against the decree before executing it cannot be penalised for his act of caution. Supposing that the appeal was allowed, and the decree holder had already succeeded in getting the decree exercised earlier, is it conceivable that the decree-holder may claim that the trial court's decree was final and the appellate court's decree was a nullity. Such a plea would be legally absurd. The principle that the trial court's decree merges in the appellate court's decree is well established and it follows that the limitation for the purposes of execution of the decree shall be counted from the date of the appellate court's judgment. Thus, the courts below have taken the correct view of the law in confirming the execution of the decree. 11. The revision has no force and is hereby dismissed with costs.