JUDGMENT T. U. Mehta, C. J.—All these eight appeals arise out of the compensation award given by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kangra Division to various claimants. All of them contain some common points of law. These claims have arisen out of the same motor accident and, therefore, same of the important facts relating to all these cases are also the same. In view of this, we propose to dispose of the common points arising in these appeals by a common Judgment. After disposing of these common points, we shall take up the individual appeals and shall dispose of individual cases on merits. 2. Facts of the case are that on 9th October, 1970, a passenger bus, which at the relevant time belonged to the Government transport, and which was having No. HIM 4174, was traveling from Tisa. It was bound for Chamba. When this bus arrived at a place known as Majra Ghar at 3 p. m. on that day, it met with this unfortunate accident in which 44 persons died and 11 were injured. The claims with which we are concerned in these nine appeals are the claims preferred by the dependents or heirs of some of the persons who have died in this accident. 3. The learned Judge of the Tribunal has awarded different amounts as compensation to the dependents and/or heirs of the deceased persons, and being aggrieved by this award the Himachal Pradesh Government Transport, Chamba has preferred these appeals. The Government transport has been subsequently taken over by Himachal Road Transport Corporation and, therefore, now this Corporation is substituted as the appellant in all these cases. 4. We have found that in these and other appeals arising out of the claims settled under section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act read with the Fatal Accidents Act, the learned Judges of the different Tribunals functioning in the State are not taking a consistent view and are not adopting a consistent method of assessing compensation in casts where the accident is found to be the result of some negligence. We have, therefore, heard the learned Advocates of the parties on the question of a proper method which could be evolved in determining the amount of damages which could be awarded in such cases. We have, therefore, heard the learned Advocates of the parties on the question of a proper method which could be evolved in determining the amount of damages which could be awarded in such cases. Therefore, before taking up the individual merits of each case we first propose to state some principles and methods for determining the amount of compensation in such cases. Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act prescribes that on receipt of an application for compensation made under section 110-A the Claims Tribunal shall hold an enquiry into the claim and may make an award determining the "amount of compensation which appears to it to be just". Thus, under this section of the Motor Vehicles Act the amount of compensation is expected to be "just". The justness of the award is obviously to be determined with reference to the peculiar facts of each case and therefore no such award can be confined to any rigid mechanical formula. However, when the court proceeds to make an award of compensation in cases which have resulted in a fatal accident the court is also expected to take into account two relevant sections of Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. These sections are section 1-A and section 2. Section 1-A reads as under: "Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default and the act is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the party who would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action or suit for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony or other crime. Every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased.". Every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased.". Section 2 reads as under: "Provided that, in any such action or suit, the executor, administrator or representative of the deceased may insert a claim for and recover any pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased occasioned by such wrongful act, neglect or default, which sum, when recovered, shall be deemed part of the assets of the estate of the deceased". 5. The reading of these two sections suggests that each one of them contemplates a different and distinct category of compensation Under section 1-A the damages are required to be paid to one or more of the relatives of the deceased for the loss of their dependency, while under section 2 the damages are required to be paid to the estate on account of the loss caused to the estate. This loss to the estate could be awarded to the legal heirs of the deceased even if they were not dependent on him, but loss on account of dependency calculated under section l-A can be paid only to the dependents of the deceased. There would be cases wherein both the categories of claims would be claimed by the same set of persons. Nonetheless, when the court is called upon to assess compensation resulting on account of some negligent act in a motor accident, the court has to keep in mind that under section 1-A it has to assess the loss caused to the legal heirs. 6. From this it follows that the loss caused to the dependents of the deceased should be assessed on the basis of the value of their dependency, while the loss caused to the estate should be assessed on the basis of the savings which the deceased could have made to augment his estate. The illustrate : suppose the deceased was making the net earning of Rs 500 per month and was spending the amount of Rs. 30 J for his dependents and the amount of Rs. 100 for himself, thus saving the amount of Rs. 100 per month, in such a case the loss of dependency would be calculated on the basic amount of Rs. 30 J for his dependents and the amount of Rs. 100 for himself, thus saving the amount of Rs. 100 per month, in such a case the loss of dependency would be calculated on the basic amount of Rs. 300 per month while loss of estate would be calculated on the basic amount of Rs. 100 per month. If his dependents are also his legal heirs, they would get compensation on the basic amount of Rs. 400 per month. 18-6-79 7. Section 1-A and section 2 of our Fatal Accidents Act are based on two English statutes, viz. (1) what is popularly known as Lord Campbells Acts (English Fatal Accidents Acts 9 and 10), and (2) English Law Reform (Misc. Provi.) Act, 1934. Therefore, for deciding the principles which should govern the mode and method of calculating compensation under section 1-A and section 2 of our Fatal Accidents Act, help of the English decisions on the subject can be freely taken and adopted to suit our peculiar problems. 8. Under section 1-A, principally financial loss to the dependents of the deceased is required to be assessed. The first question which arises to be determined in this connection is what would be a proper method of calculating compensation under both the sections, namely, section 1-A and section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act. 9. While considering the question of choosing a suitable method for assessing compensation under both the sections, one important fact which the court should bear in mind is that under section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act it is the just compensation which is required to be awarded. Therefore, no method of calculation of compensation would be justified if it does not result in awarding the amount which is not "just" looking to the peculiar facts of each cast. In other words, every method of calculation must be treated as subordinate to the necessity of giving a "just" compensation. Therefore, no method of calculation of compensation would be justified if it does not result in awarding the amount which is not "just" looking to the peculiar facts of each cast. In other words, every method of calculation must be treated as subordinate to the necessity of giving a "just" compensation. Therefore, though while adopting various methods of determining compensation for loss of dependency and loss to the estate the court may take into consideration the principles propounded by Judicial Pronouncements with regard to the implementation of the provisions contained in section !-A and section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, in so far as the ultimate figure of compensation is concerned the court is not bound by any rigid mathematical formula if it finds that the justness of the case requires either increase or decrease in that figure. 10 It is in this context that we may now proceed to consider the two important approaches as to the methods adopted by the Courts for quantifying compensation both under section 1-A and section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act. 11. The approach of the Tribunals in this State has been more or less on the method adopted by Viscound Simon in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd., (1951) AC 601. After pointing out that the claim for damages in such cases would fall under two separate heads, namely, (1) maintenance of wife and family, and (2) savings, Viscound Simon points out the proper approach to the determination of these damages in the following words :— "Under the first head—indeed, for the purposes of both heads—it is necessary first to estimate what was the deceased mans expectation of life if he had not been killed when he was ; (let this be "x" years) and next what sums during these x years he would probably have applied to the support of his wife. In fixing x, regard must be had not only to his age and bodily health, but to the possibility of a premature determination of his life by a later accident. In fixing x, regard must be had not only to his age and bodily health, but to the possibility of a premature determination of his life by a later accident. In estimating future provision for his wife, the amounts he usually applied in this way before his death are obviously relevant, and often the best evidence available ; though not conclusive, since if he had survived, his means might have expanded or shrunk, and his liberality might have grown or wilted." Then the learned Lord proceeds to observe as under: "Supposing, by this method, an estimated annual sum of y is arrived at as the sum which would have been applied for the benefit of the plaintiff for x more years, the sum to be awarded is not simply