Order This petition by accused-2 is directed against the Order, dated 2nd December, 1978 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bangalore District, Bangalore, in C.C. No. 4641 of 1978 on his file, directing registration of a case under section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, against A-2 and issue of summons to him returnable by 29th December, 1978. 2. Accused-2 is the Managing Director of Smith Kline & French (India) Ltd., Bangalore. Complainant is the President of Smith Kline & French (India) Employees’ Union. 3. A complaint was lodged by the President of Smith Kline & French (India) Employees’ Union (hereinafter called ‘the Union’) against A-2 and 34 others under section 34 read with sections 39 , 29 and 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and read with section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Court below. 4. The averments made in the complaint are as follows: A-1-Smith Kline & French (India) Limited (shortly called ‘the company’) has in its employment about 800 employees and they have themselves formed into a Union, which was registered under the Indian Trade Union Act, on 28th July, 1977. The purpose for formation of the said Union was to secure security of service and to get improvements in the service conditions of the employees, among other things. After the formation and registration of the said Union, the management of the Company terminated the services of three Security Operators in an arbitrary manner without conducting any enquiry and without giving them opportunity of being heard or without giving even a charge-sheet. This arbitrary action on the part of the management created commotion and sense of insecurity among the employees and they reasonably apprehended that there might be a large scale termination of the employees in the aforesaid manner. In the above circumstances, the Union resorted to legitimate non-violent, peaceful and permissible action of going on strike in protest against the arbitrary and high handedness act of the management. On 2nd August, 1977 a registered letter was addressed to the management to undo the victimisation and to desist from unfair labour practices, but there was no reply to the said letter. On 2nd August, 1977 a registered letter was addressed to the management to undo the victimisation and to desist from unfair labour practices, but there was no reply to the said letter. Again, on 6th August, 1977 another letter was addressed to the management by the Union specifically pointing out that the Union was formed for securing the security of service etc., and requested for re-instatement of the terminated employees. Because of the then existing industrial dispute, the Labour Commissioner initiated conciliation proceedings under the provisions of the Act and during the said proceedings the management agreed that they would consult the Union before imposition of any major punishment on any workman in future. This was incorporated in the proceedings dated 11th August, 1977 and the same was signed by A-3-B.P. Prasad, Director, Finances & Administration, S.K. & F.-on behalf of the management. After much deliberation in this regard and considering all aspects after thorough discussion and at the instance and initiation of the Conciliation Officer, a memorandum of Settlement under section 12 (3) of the Act was entered into between the management and the Union on 19th August, 1977. 5. Under clause (7) of the said settlement, it was agreed that the management, in order to have security of service will not dismiss or discharge without observing the principles of natural justice and further the management shall consult the Union before imposition of any major punishment on the workmen in future, it is stated, that there afterwards the strike was called of and the employees resumed for work. On 16th September, 1977, the Union placed a charter of demands with the management for the revision of pay-scales and for other adequate service conditions. On 18th October, 1977 bilateral negotiations were started and an interim settlement was entered into between the management and the Union for additional payment of Rs. 60 per month on 31st December, 1977, which is to be adjusted in the final settlement. It is further alleged that instead of carrying out the said undertaking the management deliberately delayed the said payment and offered to give only Rs. 10 per month more as interim relief. Though the Labour Commissioner called several meetings and advised the management to increase their offer, it was of no avail. At last, after a lot of pursuasion the management undertook to pay Rs. 10 per month more as interim relief. Though the Labour Commissioner called several meetings and advised the management to increase their offer, it was of no avail. At last, after a lot of pursuasion the management undertook to pay Rs. 15 per month more, in addition to the interim relief. In this manner, because of the non-co-operative attitude of the management the conciliation proceedings ended in failure on 13th June, 1978 at S-30 p.m. It is the allegation of the complainant that the accused-management-deliberately brought about this situation with a view to victimise the leaders of the Union and thereby eliminate the very existence of the Union itself from the factory. 6. When the situation stood thus, the management declared lock-out on 13th June, 1978 at 8-30 p.m. keeping out all the employees from working. Further, the management dismissed the services of 21 workers on 21st June, 1978 in an arbitrary manner. On 22nd June, 1978 the management suspended 17 workers pending enquiry and again on 4th July, 1978, the management terminated the services of 3 more employees. This, according to the Union, was done without conducting any enquiry and also without even asking for explanation or even sending charge-sheet against any one of them. The intention of the management was not only to victimise the employees but also to eliminate the trade union activities in the Company. In this manner about 24 employees were dismissed. According to the Union, imposing major punishment without holding an enquiry and without consulting the Union is violative of clause (7) of the aforesaid Settlement. It is submitted that the settlement was binding on both the parties in view of section 18 (3) of the Act. Though oral representations were made in this behalf to the management they were of no avail. Hence the Union addressed three registered letters to A-2 (the Managing Director), A-3 (Director, Finance and Administration) and A-10 (Manager, Administrative Services), in which it was stated that the actions of the management in dismissing the Union leaders were pre-planned, deliberate and intentional, which would amount to commission of the breach of Settlement, dated 18th August, 1977 and requested to stop unfair labour practice forthwith. It is also stated therein that if the dismissal orders were not withdrawn, the Union would be approaching the Labour Commissioner to authorise the complainant to launch prosecution in an appropriate Court of law. It is also stated therein that if the dismissal orders were not withdrawn, the Union would be approaching the Labour Commissioner to authorise the complainant to launch prosecution in an appropriate Court of law. Though the accused received the said letters they did not reply or withdraw the order of dismissal. Hence, the Union was forced to approach the Labour Commissioner to obtain sanction for prosecuting the management. The Labour Commissioner, who is competent under the Act to issue such permission, issued a certificate to prosecute the management, by his order dated 22nd October, 1978. 7. The Union-complainant-arrayed all the Directors and Managers of the Company as accused and alleged that all of them have committed an offence within the meaning of section 32 of the Act and accordingly filed a complaint dated 29th November, 1978 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bangalore District, Bangalore. The learned Magistrate after having taken cognizance of the offence, recorded the sworn statement of the complainant on 30th November, 1978 and thereafter passed the impugned order registering a case under section 29 of the Act only against A-2 (the Managing Director of the Company) and issued -summons to him returnable by 29th December. 1978. The petitioner, who is A-2, aggrieved by the said order has challenged the same before this Court on the ground that the said order would amount to abuse of the process of the Court and therefore prayed that in the interest of Justice the said order and the entire proceedings be quashed. 8. Sri P.S. Devadas, learned Counsel for the petitioner-A-2-among other grounds contended that the matter in issue before the learned Magistrate is directly in issue before the Additional Industrial Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’), Bangalore under a reference by the Government of Karnataka, by its Order No. SWL 804, LLD 78, dated 23/27th October, 1978 and the first point of dispute referred to for adjudication is whether the management justified in terminating the services of the 23 workers mentioned therein, in which case the proceedings before the learned Magistrate would amount to parallel proceedings and therefore the prosecution would be premature and illegal. Elaborating his contention what he submitted was, that the Tribunal is ceased of the question whether the termination of the services of the 23 workers in question was justified or not and while adjudicating the aforesaid point invariably the Tribunal would have to take into consideration the agreement entered into between the Union and the Management dated 18th August, 1977, and while doing so. the issue whether the said termination was also in violation of the terms of the conditions agreed between the parties would be considered. Therefore, his submission is that the Tribunal would be considering the question whether there is any violation of clause (7) of the settlement by the management. If that is so, according to him, the charge before the learned Magistrate is also to the effect that the company by its Managing Director (A-2) has violated the said terms of the settlement attracting the penal provisions of section 29 of the Act. If the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that there was no such violation, he contended, then it would have a bearing on the criminal prosecution so launched by the Union. So, the continuance of the criminal proceedings as aforesaid would tantamount to the abuse of the process of the Court and that for the aforesaid reasons, he submitted, that in the interest of justice the said criminal proceedings should be quashed. 9. The second contention of Sri Devadas is that even conceding, without admitting, that A-2 violated clause (7) of the settlement, he is protected from prosecution by virtue of section 37 of the Act. Delineating on this point he submitted that the situation in the company was such that there was imminent threat and in pursuance thereof extensive damages to the property and personnel of the company and to prevent further untoward mishappenings A-2 was compelled to take extreme action of dismissal of the aforesaid workers and that, therefore, the said act was done in good faith. If that is so, he submitted, that the prosecution against A-2 is not maintainable as he is protected under the immunity contemplated under section 37 of the Act, which lays down that no prosecution shall lie against any person for that which is done in good faith or intended to be done in pursuance of the Act or any Rules made thereunder. In view of that he contended that there cannot be any criminal prosecution against A-2 for the aforesaid alleged offences. For the above reasons, he submitted that this is pre-eminently a fit case where this Court should quash the criminal proceedings or in the alternative to stay the aforesaid criminal proceedings pending disposal of the adjudication proceedings before the Tribunal. 10. Sri S. Krishniah, learned Counsel appearing for the Union, submitted that there is clear violation of clause (7) of the settlement and as such A-2 has committed the offence for which action should be taken against him under section 29 of the Act. His further submission is that it is not in all cases the Government accords permission to prosecute the Managing Directors of the Company. If that is so, he submitted, that the Government after perusing the petition of the Union for grant of permission to prosecute the company, has taken into consideration the surrounding circumstances, namely, the sanctity attached to such a settlement arrived at between the parties and accorded sanction thereafter. He contended that since the Labour Commissioner issued notice to the company asking to putforth objections, if any, and heard A-2 before sanction is accorded, it is not open to the petitioner now to contend that the criminal proceedings against him, at this stage, is not maintainable. In this behalf he brought to the notice of the Court the relevant provisions of the Act, i.e.,section 10 of the Act which deals with reference to disputes to Boards, Courts and of Tribunals. He further contended that the aforesaid settlement is binding on all parties to the Industrial Dispute under section 18 (3) of the Act. According to him, the points of dispute referred to for adjudication to the Tribunal is whether the management is justified in terminating the services of 23 workers and not whether the management was justified in not consulting the Union before terminating their services as stipulated under clause (7) of the settlement. Therefore, he contended, that the points involved in both these proceedings are quite different, distinct and separate to each other. Therefore, he contended, that the points involved in both these proceedings are quite different, distinct and separate to each other. He submitted that assuming for the sake of argument that the point before the Magistrate is the one similar to the adjudication proceedings before the Tribunal and it would amount to two parallel proceedings, even then the institution and pendency of one such proceeding would not “be a bar to the other. Lastly he contended that this is not a fit case wherein this Court should invoke its inherent powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code and quash the proceedings. 11. For proper appreciation of the rival contentions, it should be necessary to run through the admitted facts in the case. A-2 is the Managing Director of the Company. On 18th August, 1977 a settlement, at the instance of the Conciliation Officer, was entered into between the management and the Union. Clause (7) of the settlement stipulates that ‘the management shall consult the Union before imposition of any major punishment on the workmen in future’. It is an admitted fact that when 23 workers were dismissed from service the management did not consult the Union before terminating their services, nor held any enquiry in that behalf according to law or asked the explanation of the workers before embarking upon such a step much less served a charge-sheet on them. An industrial dispute ensued before the Conciliation Officer, i.e., the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bangalore Division-II, Bangalore. After protracted negotiations the conciliation proceedings failed. On a report by the Conciliation Officer about the failure of the conciliation proceedings, the Government of Karnataka by its order dated 29th September, 1978 referred the dispute relating to the dismissal of 23 workers of the Company along with other points arising therefrom for adjudication to the Tribunal, Bangalore, which was published in the Karnataka Gazette, dated 12th October, 1978, and on the day when the criminal complaint was lodged by the complainant, the dispute was still pending. 12. Now the point for consideration is whether the criminal complaint filed by the respondent is also the subject-matter of dispute referred to by the Government to the Tribunal for adjudication, in which case, if the said Tribunal comes to the conclusion that there is no such violation would the same have a bearing on the criminal prosecution so lodged by the respondent. In the reference to the Tribunal point No. 1 (a) is to the following effect: “Is the management justified in terminating the services of the following 23 workers?” Therefore, the matter that is referred to for adjudication to the Tribunal is whether there was any justification for the management to have terminated the services of 23 workers. Justification of the termination of services is one thing and not consulting the Union before a major penalty is imposed on the workers is a different one. The management could justify its action in terminating the services of the workers on various grounds, but that does not take away the obligation of the management under clause (7) of the settlement arrived at between the management and the Union under the terms of settlement. Clause (7) of the said Settlement reads thus: “The management hereby accepts the Union and in due course after subscribing to the Code of discipline by both the parties recognise the Union. It is also agreed by the management that in order to create a sense of security of service among the workmen there will be no dismissal or discharge without observing the principles of natural justice and further the management agree to consult the Union before imposition of major punishments as stated above on the workmen in future. However the management reserves the right to take appropriate action after consulting the Union as deemed fit.” The object of stipulating clause (7) was to see that sense of security of service among the workmen and that the workmen shall not be either dismissed or discharged without observing the principles of natural justice. It is in this background we have to view the implications of clause (7). It is further stated in the said clause that the management undertook and agreed to consult the Union before imposition of any major punishment on the workmen in future. But, it is also made clear therein that the management reserves the right to take appropriate action after consulting the Union as deemed fit. The management is therefore enjoined to consult the Union before dismissing the 23 workers. Admittedly, the Union has not been consulted before the aforesaid major penalty was imposed on the said workers. But, it is also made clear therein that the management reserves the right to take appropriate action after consulting the Union as deemed fit. The management is therefore enjoined to consult the Union before dismissing the 23 workers. Admittedly, the Union has not been consulted before the aforesaid major penalty was imposed on the said workers. In this situation it would be said that the management has violated the said Clause (7) in the settlement and, therefore, it is trying to justify its action in the dispute before the Tribunal. Clause (7) of the settlement is in the nature of a penal clause and any infringement of such a clause embodied in the terms of settlement is made punishable. It is not the case of the management that it did consult the Union before imposing the major punishment of dismissal of the 23 workers. But, on the other hand, it looks as though the management wants to seek a remedy to justify it on the point that on the situation that was prevailing at that time, it had no other option but to impose the major penalty on the 23 workers. Whatever justification they had for dismissal, either the internal security or the life and protection of the personnel of the Company as also the machinery, still it remains that the major punishment could not have been imposed on the workers violating Clause (7) of the settlement. This is further strengthened by the stipulation in the said clause itself that the management reserves the right to take appropriate action after consulting the Union as deemed fit. Any breach of any term of any settlement or award is made punishable under section 29 of the Act. Originally the breach of any terms of settlement or award by any person thereto was made punishable with a fine upto Rs. 200 on his first conviction and a fine up to Rs. 500 on the subsequent conviction. By Act XXXVI of 1956 , this section was substituted by section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 whereby the limit on the quantum of fine was removed. Besides, the fine, the punishment of imprisonment for a term extending up to six months was also provided. 500 on the subsequent conviction. By Act XXXVI of 1956 , this section was substituted by section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 whereby the limit on the quantum of fine was removed. Besides, the fine, the punishment of imprisonment for a term extending up to six months was also provided. The offender, therefore, could be punished with fine or imprisonment, or with both, The purpose behind it was to see that in the event of breach of any terms of any settlement or award to impose a deterrent punishment for breach of any terms of settlement or award. This provision was also found lacking to have sufficient deterrent effect against some unscrupulous employers who were able to successfully thwart the implementation of settlements or awards by paying fines once, which may be far less than what the obligation would otherwise entail and thus the workmen were unable to get the benefits flowing from awards or settlements, though employers might have been convicted for the breach thereof. So, with a view to ensure effect implementation of settlement or awards, it was considered necessary to provide deterrent penalties for continued breach of settlements and awards. It was to achieve this object the Parliament again amended the section as aforesaid. So, it is on this background that the violation of clause (7) of the terms of settlement have to be viewed. As already stated, the sanctity that was attached to the terms of settlement has been made clear in the preamble to the memorandum of settlement entered into between the parties. It was in order to create a sense of security of service among the workmen the management undertook that the workmen would not be dismissed or discharged without observing the principles of natural justice and further the management agreed to consult the Union before imposition of major punishment in future. But that does not take away the power of the management since under the same clause the management reserved its rights to take appropriate action after consulting the Union as deemed fit. But that does not take away the power of the management since under the same clause the management reserved its rights to take appropriate action after consulting the Union as deemed fit. It is to be seen that under sub- section (3) of section 18 of the Act a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub- section (3-A) of section 10-A or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable shall be binding on all parties to the industrial dispute. It is an accepted principle in Criminal Jurisprudence that the presence of ‘mens red is a condition precedent for the successful prosecution of a person. But however, it is open to the Legislature to provide for offences where ‘mens red may not be an essential element. If Legislature expresses its intention in that behalf in unambiguous and clear language, the principle that ‘mens red must ordinarily be established in a criminal case would have no application. The instances where legislature expresses such an intention constitute statutory offences of a minor and quasi-criminal character-see State v. Caul field Holland Ltd.1) In the aforesaid case a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dealing with the words ‘if any person commits a breach of any term of any settlement or award……took the view that the scheme of the Act, the policy and the object in passing the Act indicate that the obligation to comply with the award is unqualified, absolute and categorical, and its breach would invite the penalty under section 29 of the Act without proof of ‘mens red as such and further if ‘mens red were to be treated as an essential constituent of the offence under section 29 of the Act, this provision will become nugatory as it will not be possible to prove ‘mens red in such cases. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that the word ‘knowingly’ appearing in sections 25 and 28 of the Act is conspicuously missing in section 29 of the Act thereby indicating that it is not essential for the prosecution to prove ‘mens red for an offence under section 29 of the Act. This conclusion is fortified by the fact that the word ‘knowingly’ appearing in sections 25 and 28 of the Act is conspicuously missing in section 29 of the Act thereby indicating that it is not essential for the prosecution to prove ‘mens red for an offence under section 29 of the Act. From the aforesaid discussion what follows is that the intention of the Legislature is to make breach of any terms of agreement or award punishable. It is in this, light we have to view the infringement of clause (7) of the terms of agreement reached between the management and the Union. In addition to this, one more thing to be considered for proper appreciation of the contention of Sri Devadas in this regard is that the Government after receipt of a petition by the Union for according sanction, referred the same to the Labour Commissioner and the Labour Commissioner who issued the necessary sanction on 22nd September, 1978 did give an opportunity to the management to put forward any objections to the said petition for according sanction. In fact, the management was heard, and, sufficient and full opportunity was given to the management by the Labour Commissioner and after considering all aspects of the matter as also the objections raised by the management, he passed necessary orders sanctioning prosecution of the management for the infringement of the terms of the said settlement. 13. It is, therefore, clear that even sanctioning for prosecution, which was a separate and independent enquiry contemplated under the Act. after following the procedure the Government accorded sanction to the Union to prosecute the Directors of the Company. What follows from the aforesaid discussion is that the proceedings before the Magistrate for infringement of any terms of agreement or award as contemplated under section 29 of the Act is independent proceeding and that has nothing to do with the adjudication proceedings pending before the Tribunal under section 10 of the Act, as the question of justification of the infringement of the terms of settlement or rule would not arise for consideration before the Tribunal. This is made clear from the fact that the question of ‘mens red is not one of the necessary ingredients for proof of the offence before the criminal Court and if that is so, it would not be a relevant factor to be proved before the Tribunal. This is made clear from the fact that the question of ‘mens red is not one of the necessary ingredients for proof of the offence before the criminal Court and if that is so, it would not be a relevant factor to be proved before the Tribunal. The mere fact that there is a violation of the terms of agreement or award would be sufficient to attract the criminal proceedings contemplated under section 29 of the Act. Therefore, the contention of Sri Devadas that the points involved in both the proceedings, as aforesaid, are one and the same and that they were interdependent cannot be accepted. Even at the cost of repetition it could safely be concluded that the question of justification of infringement of the terms of agreement or award would not arise before the Tribunal at all in a reference under section 10 of the Act. So the first contention of Sri Devadas is rejected. 14. Sri Devadas elaborately argued on the powers of the High Court to interfere under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the allegations set out in a complaint or in a charge-sheet do not constitute an offence at all. There cannot be any doubt or misapprehension with regard to this proposition of law as the same is by now well-settled by many pronouncements on this legal aspect of the matter. Suffice to rely upon, one decision of the Supreme Court in this aspect of the matter is in Sharda Prasad v. State of Bihar1 wherein it is stated thus: “It is now settled law that where the allegations set out in the complainant or the charge-sheet do not constitute an offence, it is competent to the High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. The question do therefore arises for consideration is whether the allegations set out in the complaint constitute any offence against the appellant. Where the allegations contained in the complaint did not constitute an offence, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was in error in taking cognizance. The High Court in the circumstances ought not to have rejected the application of the appellant for quashing the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate”. If that is so. Where the allegations contained in the complaint did not constitute an offence, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was in error in taking cognizance. The High Court in the circumstances ought not to have rejected the application of the appellant for quashing the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate”. If that is so. the next point for consideration is whether the allegations set out in the complaint constitute any offence against the petitioner. This proposition need not keep us long. As already stated there is a clear violation or, in other words, infringement of the terms of settlement entered into between the Union and the management. The said settlement was binding on both the parties under section 18(3) of the Act and violation of any terms of the said agreement or settlement do constitute an offence under section 29 of the Act. Suffice to say at this juncture, the complainant has made out a case for issuing summons to the petitioner on the ground that the management has violated the terms of settlement, in which case, it is futile to contend that this Court can interfere at this stage with the criminal proceedings. So, this contention of Sri Devadas also fails. 15. The next contention of Sri Devadas, which falls for consideration at this stage, is that even conceding without admitting that the petitioner has violated clause ( 7) of the settlement, he is protected from prosecution by virtue of section 37 of the Act. To buttress his contention what he submitted was, that the situation in the Company was so explosive and there was imminent threat of peace and likelihood of breach of peace and damage to the property and injury to the personnel of the Company which ultimately forced the management to take drastic step of terminating the services of the 23 workmen, who, according to them, were responsible for such disturbance. If the management could justify its such action, then the management or the Directors of the Company could avail themselves of the protection or immunity available to them under section 37 of the Act and as such the criminal proceedings are premature and not maintainable. This section enacts that no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of the Act or any Rules made thereunder. This section enacts that no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of the Act or any Rules made thereunder. In other words, it is a kind of immunity section incorporated in all enactments conferring powers on executive officers to do acts which might infringe rights of parties or might inflict legal injury on them, but such a section has never been understood to oust the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to declare that an inferior Tribunal has acted in excess of its jurisdiction. Further, in this section it is also made clear that the expression of ‘any person’ used in the section would not mean only ‘any officer’ under the Act or the Rules. But the said expression includes even an employer or workman who has the advantage of the protection under section 37 of the Act for acts done or intended to be done in good faith in pursuance to the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. The expression used in the said section is ‘any person’ and it is manifestly clear and wide enough to include the Directors or the Managers of the Company. But the fact remains whether the petitioner is entitled to claim protection of his action under section 37 of the Act, and, if so, when? At this stage it is not possible to hold that the petitioner is entitled to the protection as claimed by him under section 37 of the Act as there are no materials placed on record to hold that the act of the petitioner is done in good faith or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or the Rules made thereunder. Whether violation of the terms of settlement entered into between the Union and the management, which is an offence under section 29 of the Act, would come within the mischief of the expression ‘in pursuance of this Act or Rules made thereunder’ is still to be decided. Whether violation of the terms of settlement entered into between the Union and the management, which is an offence under section 29 of the Act, would come within the mischief of the expression ‘in pursuance of this Act or Rules made thereunder’ is still to be decided. Further, the same is a question of fact and the trial Court has to come to the conclusion whether such violation is one of the obligations or duties cast on the petitioner and if so, whether he was justified any such violation by applying the principles enunciated in section 37 of the Act, namely, whether such a thing has been done in good faith or intended to be done in good faith. These matters are purely questions of fact and have to be gone into during the course of the proceedings after both the prosecution and also the accused have placed sufficient materials before the trial Court. So at this stage it is difficult to agree with the contention of Sri Devadas that the petitioner is entitled to protection under section 37 of the Act. As already stated, the petitioner is at liberty to raise this contention before the trial Court and it is for the trial Court to hold on the facts and circumstances before it to give a finding thereon. 16. The next contention of Sri Devadas is that the criminal proceedings, which is in the nature of parallel proceedings to the reference pending before the Tribunal is liable to be stayed as the continuance of the criminal proceedings would tantamount to the abuse of the process of the Court. In other words, what he submitted was that as the point for decision involved both before the Tribunal as also in criminal proceedings are one and the same and the decision before the Tribunal would have a bearing on the criminal proceedings. According to him, it is but safe in the interest of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court to stay all further proceedings in the criminal case. According to him, it is but safe in the interest of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court to stay all further proceedings in the criminal case. In support of that contention, he relied upon a decision in Dharmeswar Kalita v. The State1 wherein the learned Judges of the Assam High Court held while dealing with the inherent powers of the High Court as also under section 344, Criminal Procedure Code (old Code) thus: “A stay of proceedings for an indefinite period is not contemplated by section 344, Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court, however, has got inherent power which has been recognised in section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, to make orders for preventing the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus where the same matter is the subject of a civil suit and a criminal proceeding and there is a risk of a conflict between the decisions of the two Courts, the High Court can, in exercise of its inherent power under section 561-A, order stay of the proceedings till the final decision in the civil suit. It is not necessary to direct that the trial Magistrate should order stay of the proceedings from time to time under section 344, Criminal Procedure Code”. In M.S. Sheriff and another v. State of Madras and others2 it is held while considering sections 439 and 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code (old Code) as follows: “As between the civil and the criminal proceedings the criminal matters should be given precedence. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal Courts is not a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of the Court binding on the other or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration is the likelihood of embarrassment. Another factor which weighs with the Court is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The only relevant consideration is the likelihood of embarrassment. Another factor which weighs with the Court is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This, however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to prosecution ordered under section 476. Held, that the simultaneous prosecution of the present criminal proceedings and the civil suits will embarrass the accused and that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished.” 17. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court for stay of proceedings to the facts of this case, it cannot be said that this is pre-eminently a fit case for stay the criminal proceedings pending decision or adjudication of the proceedings before the Tribunal. As already adverted to supra, the matter under consideration before the Tribunal is not the one and the same as the one before the criminal Court. At the cost of repetition, the matter before the Tribunal is with regard to the justification of the termination of the 23 workmen by the management whereas the matter before the criminal Court is with regard to the violation of the terms of settlement entered into between the management and the Union. These are two different things and one has no bearing with the other and if that is so, there is no possibility of conflicting decisions by the Tribunal and the criminal Court and therefore, in my opinion, that is not a relevant factor to be taken into consideration to stay the criminal proceedings. These are two different things and one has no bearing with the other and if that is so, there is no possibility of conflicting decisions by the Tribunal and the criminal Court and therefore, in my opinion, that is not a relevant factor to be taken into consideration to stay the criminal proceedings. It is further to be seen that the proceedings before the Tribunal may drag for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. Public interest demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and,impartial trial. It is also undesirable to let things slide till memories, have grown too dim to trust. Though there is no hard and fast rule, special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. In the case on hand the decision that is going to take by the Tribunal will have no bearing on the question pending before the Magistrate. If that is so, even taking into the special circumstances of expediency, the petitioner has not made out a case for staying the proceedings before the Magistrate, as it has nothing to do with the matter pending decision before the Tribunal. Both these proceedings, though’ instituted by the Union, cannot be said to be parallel proceedings as the remedies prayed for are neither similar nor akin to one another. The matter before the Tribunal is a dispute between the management and the Union for adjudication with regard to the dismissal of 23 workmen of the Company and other allied questions whereas the complaint before the Magistrate is with regard to the violation of the terms of settlement and as such the matters pending and the remedies sought for are quite different and for such remedies different forums are selected by the Union and ultimately the decision in one forum has no bearing on the decision of the other forum and thus there is no possibility of conflicting of decisions. On this count also there is no scope for ordering stay of criminal proceedings pending adjudication of the dispute before the Tribunal. On this count also there is no scope for ordering stay of criminal proceedings pending adjudication of the dispute before the Tribunal. For the aforesaid reasons, there is no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 18. In the result, for the reasons stated above, this petition fails and is dismissed. S.V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.