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1979 DIGILAW 415 (ALL)

Nandha v. Deputy Custodian General

1979-04-02

S.C.MATHUR, T.S.MISRA

body1979
ORDER S.C. Mathur, J. - This petition is directed against the order dated 14-12-1972 (Annexure No. 10 to the writ petition) passed by the Deputy Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi cancelling the sale certificate dated 19-1-1961 issued in favour of the petitioners by the Assistant Custodian-cum-Managing Officer, Evacuee Property, Lucknow. The dispute in the present writ petition relates to one-third share of one Imran Ahmad who became an evacuee on migration to Pakistan in respect of khata khetauni No. 36 of village Balehra Kamal Nagar, Tahsil Bilgram district Hardoi. 2. In spite of notice of the petition having been served upon the opposite parties no counter affidavit was filed by any of the opposite parties. At the time of hearing only Sri Umesh Chandra, learned Chief Standing Counsel appeared and supported the impugned order on legal grounds. As such the facts stated in the writ petition have to be accepted as correct. The said facts are thus : - Sultan Ahmad, Lukman Ahmad and Imran Ahmad were three real brothers and were joint tenure-holders of Khata No. 36, each having one-third share therein. Imran Ahmad became an evacuee by his migration to Pakistan and his one-third share became evacuee property. The plots comprised in the khata were in possession* of tenants and, therefore the compensation Officer exercising powers under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act recognised their Sirdari rights to the extent of ?rd share of Sultan Ahmad and Lukman Ahmad by expunging their names from the record. The name of Imran Ahmad was retained on his remaining l/3rd share. By this process the plots representing ?rd share of Sultan Ahmad and Lukman Ahmad became separated from the remaning l/3rd share. The village where the land in question was situate was brought under consolidation operations and Chak No. 45 was carved out in favour of Imran Ahmad representing his l/3rd share in the Khata. This Chak included plots numbered 311m, 312m, 319m, 320m and 326m. In C. H. Form No. 23 Imran Ahmad was not indicated as evacuee. On the death of Imran Ahmad an application was moved by Ahsan Lukman son of Lukman Ahmad that his uncle Imran Ahmad had died and the name of his father be brought on record. In this application the fact that Imran Ahmad had become an evacuee was concealed. On the death of Imran Ahmad an application was moved by Ahsan Lukman son of Lukman Ahmad that his uncle Imran Ahmad had died and the name of his father be brought on record. In this application the fact that Imran Ahmad had become an evacuee was concealed. Mutation was allowed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer by his order dated 28-12-1968. On 7-10-1969 Ahsan Lukman, as agent of his father Lukman Ahmad, sold the plots mentioned above to opposite parties 3 to 6. Opposite parties 3 to 6 applied for mutation which was objected to by Bakhtawar Singh, the Pradhan of the village on the ground that the property was evacuee property and the sale deed in favour of opposite parties 3 to 6 was invalid. By order dated 23rd October 1970 the Deputy Director of Consolidation cancelled the mutation order which had been passed in favour of Lukman Ahmad. By order dated 26-6-1971 the Consolidation Officer rejected the application of opposite parties 3 to 6 for mutation in their favour on the basis of the sale deed. This order was passed on the ground that the sale deed relied upon by opposite parties 3 to 6 was invalid and conferred upon them no right, title or interest in the plots in question. Opposite parties 3 to 6 did not challenge this order by filing any appeal, revision, suit or petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in this Court. Thus the order rejecting mutation application in their favour became final. The petitioners applied to the Assistant Custodian-cum-Managing Officer for sale of the plots to them as they were in possession thereof. Their application was allowed and the sale certificate was issued in their favour on 19-1-1971. 3-4. Against this sale certificate opposite parties 3 to 6 filed revision before the Deputy Custodian General, Evacuee Property, New Delhi, opposite party No. 1. By the impugned order dated 14-12-1972 the Deputy Custodian General allowed the revision of opposite parties 3 to 6 and cancelled the sale certificate issued in favour of the petitioners and remanded the case to the Assistant Custodian for disposing of the evacuees interest in the plots in question after determining the same and considering the eligibility of the parties for the transfer of the same in their favour. This order has been challenged by the petitioners on the ground hereinafter indicated. 5. This order has been challenged by the petitioners on the ground hereinafter indicated. 5. A perusal of the impugned order would indicate that the sale certificate in favour of the petitioners was cancelled on three grounds; firstly, it was not certain whether the Custodian General had accorded approval for transfer under Section 16 (2) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 because no order to that effect had been brought to the notice of opposite party No. 1; secondly, it was not certain whether the property in question was actually composite property as alleged by opposite parties 3 to 6; and thirdly, both parties claimed to be in possession of the plots in question and, therefore entitled to preferential right of transfer in their favour and this required opportunity of hearing to both the parties. In respect of the first ground, it may be pointed out that on behalf of the petitioners it had been alleged before opposite party No. 1 that some general instructions had been issued by the Custodian General which authorised the custodian to transfer properties which had vested in him as evacuee properties. These general instructions were not produced before the Deputy Custodian General and he was of the view that opportunity should be afforded to the petitioners to produce the alleged general instructions. On the second ground it was conceded on behalf of the petitioners that if the property in question was composite property the same could not be dealt with by the consolidation authorities and, therefore, the separation of the share of the evacuee done either by the Compensation Officer or by the Consolidation authorities was of no consequence. It was, however, contended on their behalf that even prior to his migration the share of Imran Ahmad evacuee was separate from his brothers and, therefore, even at the time of migration of Imran Ahmad the property in dispute was not a composite property. The Deputy Custodian General was of the view that the petitioners should be afforded an opportunity to substantiate their claim by placing on record relevant revenue extracts which had not been filed. 6. The Deputy Custodian General was of the view that the petitioners should be afforded an opportunity to substantiate their claim by placing on record relevant revenue extracts which had not been filed. 6. On behalf of the petitioners it was urged by Sri Mohammad Husain, their learned counsel, that by virtue of the proceedings taken by the Compensation Officer in exercise of the power conferred upon him under the provisions of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the share of the evacuee became separated and, therefore, the property ceased to be composite property and the Deputy Custodian General was in error in cancelling the sale certificate issued in favour of the petitioners on the plea that the matter whether Imran Ahmad was separate even prior to his migration required investigation. The learned counsel further argued that the separation of the share of Imran Ahmad was also confirmed in consolidation proceedings when a separate Chak was carved out in favour of Imran Ahmad evacuee and this also led to the breaking up of the composite nature of the property. The learned counsel then argued that even if the property be treated as composite property the sale deed executed in favour of the petitioners did not become invalid because no one had invoked the jurisdiction of the Competent Officer under the provisions of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951. The argument of the learned counsel was that the Competent Officer appointed under Section 4 of the Act, hereinbefore mentioned, acquired jurisdiction only when it was invoked either by the Custodian or on an application from a claimant. Unless jurisdiction was invoked in this manner the Competent Officer could not exercise any power in respect of composite property and, therefore, there was no question of the case being remanded to the Assistant Custodian in order to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act 1951. It was also argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the property in dispute being evacuee property, Custodian alone could transfer the same and Lukman Ahmad had absolutely no right to transfer the same in favour of opposite parties 3 to 6 and therefore, the sale deed in their favour was entirely invalid. It was also argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the property in dispute being evacuee property, Custodian alone could transfer the same and Lukman Ahmad had absolutely no right to transfer the same in favour of opposite parties 3 to 6 and therefore, the sale deed in their favour was entirely invalid. The learned counsel further argued that the sale deed relied upon by opposite parties 3 to 6 being invalid they had no locus standi to prefer revision before the Deputy Custodian General, opposite party No. 1. We will first take up the question of locus standi of opposite parties 3 to 6 to maintain revision before opposite party No. 1. 7. The revisional power has been conferred upon the Custodian General under Section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950 which runs as follows : "27. Powers of Revision of Custodian General. - (1) the Custodian-General may at any time either on his own motion or on application made to him in this behalf call for the record of any proceeding in which any Custodian has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any such order and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit: Provided that the Custodian-General shall not pass an order under the subsection prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard." 8. A perusal of the above provision would indicate that the Custodian General can exercise his revisional powers on his own motion as well as on an application made to him in that behalf. The section does not prescribe that the person moving the application should be personally aggrieved by the order under revision or should have some interest in the property which is the subject-matter of dispute. Thus it is competent for anybody alleging illegality or impropriety in the order passed by the subordinate authority to ring the same to the notice on the Custodian General and thereafter the Custodian General would be competent to exercise his revisional power under sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Act. Thus it is competent for anybody alleging illegality or impropriety in the order passed by the subordinate authority to ring the same to the notice on the Custodian General and thereafter the Custodian General would be competent to exercise his revisional power under sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Act. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that even if we hold that the sale deed in favour of opposite parties 3 to 6 was invalid, we cannot hold that the Deputy Custodian General, opposite party No. 1, did not acquire jurisdiction to exercise his revisional powers. We accordingly reject the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that opposite parties 3 to 6 had no right to maintain the revision before opposite party No. 2. 9. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the property in question remained composite even after proceedings under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act had been taken. After the enforcement of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was amended by U. P. Act 20 of 1954. By this amending Act a new chapter was added to the Act being Chap. II-A. Section 26-B falling under this Chapter reads as follows : "The provisions of this Act in their application to evacuee property shall have effect subject to the modifications set out in Sch. V." 10. A perusal of the various provisions contained in Sch. V would indicate that the interest of the evacuee vests completely in the Custodian and if any person claims any interest therein his claim has to be adjudicated upon by the Custodian and the Custodian alone has jurisdiction to transfer the interest of the evacuee. This position is clearly brought out from the provisions contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 of Sch. V appended to the Act. The said paragraphs are reproduced below: - "5. This position is clearly brought out from the provisions contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 of Sch. V appended to the Act. The said paragraphs are reproduced below: - "5. Any person becoming an asami under sub-section (2) of Section 21 of any land being Evacuee Property, shall, notwithstanding anything in this Act, be liable to ejectment by the Custodian in the same manner and to the same extent as a person holding under a lease from the Custodian and all the provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 relating to ejectment shall apply to him accordingly. 6. (1) If in respect of an evacuee land a question arises as to whether any person in occupation thereof is or is not a sirdar under Sections 16 and 19 or is or is not an adhivasi under Sec. 21 such question shall be decided by the Custodian of evacuee property and not by any other court or authority and the decision of the Custodian shall be conclusive subject to the provisions of appeals, review and revision contained in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. (2) Where in any suit or proceeding relating to land instituted after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1956, in a Civil or Revenue Court or if instituted before the said commencement, a decree or order has not already been passed, the question arises or is raised whether any party to the suit or proceeding is or on any material date was a sirdar adhivasi or asami of land and such question was not previously determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or the Custodian, the Court shall stay the proceedings and direct the party claiming to be a sirdar, adhivasi or asmi to get the said right determined by the Custodian. (3) The decision of the Custodian shall be conclusive subject to the provision of appeal reviews and revisions contained in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 332-N shall thereafter apply as if, for the word Collector the word Custodian had been substituted therein. (3) The decision of the Custodian shall be conclusive subject to the provision of appeal reviews and revisions contained in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 332-N shall thereafter apply as if, for the word Collector the word Custodian had been substituted therein. (8) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 153, the Custodian of the Central Government may transfer, by sale or otherwise, the interest of a sirdar in the land vested in them under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, or the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 : Provided that no such transfer shall be made for so long as any person is entitled to acquire bhumidhari rights in such land under the provisions of paras. 2, 4, 4-A, 4-B." 11-12. Chapter III of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act deals with assessment of compensation to the intermediaries whose rights, title and interest are acquired under the Act. Under Section 19 of the Act certain classes of tenants acquire sirdari rights. As indicated hereinabove the plots comprised in the khata were in occupation of tenants who claimed acquisition of sirdari rights by virtue of their possession as tenants. During the course of assessment proceedings it became necessary and incumbent upon the Compensation Officer to determine as to whether any person had acquired sirdari rights over any specific plot comprised in the khata. This investigation in the present case led to the separation of the entire ?rd share which was held in the khata by the two brothers of Imran Ahmad evacuee, namely Sultan Ahmad and Lukman Ahmad. The share of the evacuee under the provisions contained in Section 26-B read with Schedule V of the Act vested in the Custodian as a separate entity. This separation became necessary m order to prepare compensation roll prepared under Chap. Ill of the Act. There is no provision under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act debarring the Compensation Officer from taking any proceedings in respect of a holding in which an evacuee also holds a share. Separation of evacuees share was thus a necessary consequence of the proceedings taken by the Compensation Officer under the Act. Ill of the Act. There is no provision under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act debarring the Compensation Officer from taking any proceedings in respect of a holding in which an evacuee also holds a share. Separation of evacuees share was thus a necessary consequence of the proceedings taken by the Compensation Officer under the Act. The Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951 confers jurisdiction upon the Competent Officer to separate the interest of an evacuee but this can be done only when his jurisdiction is invoked under the Act. The Act does not provide that all composite properties shall be dealt with only by the Competent Officer appointed under the Act. The State Government is empowered under Section 4 of the Act to appoint Competent Officers. Under Section 5 of the Act the Competent Officer has jurisdiction to decide any claim relating to any composite properly situate within the limits of the local area of his jurisdiction. Section 6 of the Act provides as follows : "6. Notice to submit claims. - (1) For the purpose of determining or separating the evacuee interest in a composite property, any competent officer having jurisdiction over such property may, either on information received in this behalf from the Custodian or on an application from a claimant, issue, in such form and manner as may be prescribed. - (a) a general notice requiring all persons who claim interest in such property, and (b) also a notice on every person who, in the opinion of the competent officer, may have a claim in such property, to submit claims, if any, in respect of that property. (2) An application under sub-sec. (1) shall be in such form and manner as may be prescribed. (3) No application under this section shall be entertained if filed after the expiry of one year from the commencement of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Amendment Act, 1960." 13. A perusal of the above provision would indicate that the Competent Officer acts when he receives information from the Custodian or an application is made before him by a claimant. Once he acquires jurisdiction in the manner hereinbefore indicated he proceeds under Section 10 which provides for separation of interest of evacuee from those of claimants in composite property. Section 10 so far as is material for the purposes of the Act provides as follows : - "10. Once he acquires jurisdiction in the manner hereinbefore indicated he proceeds under Section 10 which provides for separation of interest of evacuee from those of claimants in composite property. Section 10 so far as is material for the purposes of the Act provides as follows : - "10. Separation of the interests of evacuees from those of claimants in composite property: - Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or contract or any decree or order of a Civil Court or other authority, the competent officer may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, take all such measures as he may consider necessary for the purpose of separating the interests of the evacuees from those of the claimants in any composite property, and in particular may, - (a) .............. (i) ............. (ii) transfer the property to the claimant on payment by him of the amount of money assessed in respect of the share of the evacuee in the property; or (iii) sell the property and distribute the sale proceeds thereof between the Custodian and the claimant in proportion to the share of the evacuee and of the claimant in the property; or (iv).................... (B)......................" 14. In the present case it has not been asserted by any party that any claim was preferred before the competent officer or that any information was supplied to him by the Custodian. In this view of the matter there was no question of the competent officer exercising any jurisdiction in respect of the property in question even if the same be taken as composite property. It is only while exercising powers under the Act that the competent officer may in view of provisions contained in Section 10 ignore any law, contract or decree or order of a Civil Court or other authority. It is apparent, therefore, that if the jurisdiction of the competent officer has not been invoked, the decree or order of a Civil Court or other authority is not nullified. In the present case we have indicated hereinbefore that share of the evacuee came to be separated in proceedings taken by the Compensation Officer and the consolidation authorities. The said orders are not nullified by any provision contained either in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 or in Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951. In the present case we have indicated hereinbefore that share of the evacuee came to be separated in proceedings taken by the Compensation Officer and the consolidation authorities. The said orders are not nullified by any provision contained either in the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 or in Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that by virtue of the proceedings taken by the compensation officer under the provisions of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and by the consolidation authorities under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, the share of the evacuee became completely separated from that of his co-sharers Sultan Ahmad and Lukhman Ahmad and there was no question of any proceedings being taken under the provisions of Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951 and the Deputy Custodian General was, therefore, obviously in error in remanding the case to the Assistant Custodian in order to find out whether even prior to his migration to Pakistan the evacuee was separate from his two brothers Sultan Ahmad and Lukhman Ahmad. 15. The only question which now survives for determination is whether the sale certificate issued in favour of the petitioners is vitiated for lack of previous approval of the Custodian General for transferring the evacuees share in favour of the petitioners. Cl. (o) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 10 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 confers power upon the Custodian to transfer in any manner whatsoever any evacuee property, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or agreement relating thereto. This clause has a proviso which runs as follows: "Provided that the Custodian shall not sell any immovable property or any business or other undertaking of the evacuee, except with the previous approval of the Custodian-General." 16. The prohibition against sale of immovable property except with the approval of the Custodian-General is imperative. As such the Assistant Custodian who transferred the property in favour of the petitioners could not have done so if he had not obtained previous approval of the Custodian General. Our attention was not drawn to any provision under which this requirement could be waived. Before opposite party No. 1 it was corn tended on behalf of the petitioners that the Custodian-General had issued general instructions empowering the Custodian to transfer immovable property which had vested in him as evacuee property. Our attention was not drawn to any provision under which this requirement could be waived. Before opposite party No. 1 it was corn tended on behalf of the petitioners that the Custodian-General had issued general instructions empowering the Custodian to transfer immovable property which had vested in him as evacuee property. This general instruction was not produced before opposite party No. 1. A copy of the general instructions was not annexed even to this writ petition. Opposite Party No. 1 was of the view that the petitioners should have an opportunity to substantiate their claim regarding general instructions. We are of the view that the opportunity provided by the Deputy Custodian-General should be available to the petitioners. The petitioners have not availed of that opportunity by placing the instructions before this Court. They should, however, avail of the opportunity by producing the same before the Assistant Custodian to which authority the case had been remanded by opposite party No. 1. Once it is found that the requisite approval was there the sale deed in favour of the petitioners would be valid, since the sale deed in favour of opposite parties 3 to 6 had been executed by a person who did not have any title thereto we are of the opinion that in the proceedings which have been remanded to the Assistant Custodian, opposite parties 3 to 6 should not be allowed to intervene. We are therefore of the view that the Assistant Custodian in proceedings which have been remanded to him should confine himself only to finding out the existence of previous approval of the Custodian-General which is prescribed under the proviso to cl. (o) to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 10 of the Act. The writ petition will have to be dismissed with the observations contained hereinbefore. 17. In view of the above the writ petition is dismissed but it is provided that in the remand proceedings the Assistant Custodian will confine himself only to the question of previous approval of the Custodian-General contemplated under the proviso to cl. (o) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 10 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950. The costs of this petition shall be easy.