JUDGMENT 1. THE instant appeal and the cross objection arise out of a suit for declaration of right of easement and for permanent and mandatory injunctions. 2. THE plaintiffs arid the defendants are the owners of two adjacent buildings, intervened by a lane measuring 55' in length and 3' in breadth within the municipal limits of Bankura Town. The' lane belongs to the defendants and the plaintiffs have a rights of passage over, the same. The building of the defendants is one storied and is used as a shop room. It is holding No. 98 of Katwali Mahalla of Bankura Municipality and is on the west of the lane. The two storied building of the plaintiffs is holdings No. 100 and is to the east of the lane. The plaintiffs have another one storied building being holding No. 99 to the south of the defendants' building and the lane. The two buildings No. 100 and No. 98 are to the south of the municipal road known as Subhas Road and about on it. This road runs from east to west and the intervening lane between the two buildings starts from the north eastern corner of the plaintiffs' one storied building of holding No. 99 and comes up to the said municipal road. There are three doors in the two storied and one door in the one storied buildings of the plaintiffs which face the intervening lane and the plaintiffs are in occupation of their buildings through tenants. Plaintiffs' right of passage through the lane has been recorded both in C. S. and R. S. record of rights. There is and narrow drain which lies to the eastern extremity of and runs parallel to the land. In holding No. 100 there is a covered verandah on the first floor to its extreme north and there are two rooms one after another on the south of the verandah. The verandah has a big opening with iron railings on the northern side. On each of the eastern and western walls of the verandah there is a window, the window on the eastern wall being smaller in comparison to the window on the western wall. The verandah has a big opening with iron railings on the northern side. On each of the eastern and western walls of the verandah there is a window, the window on the eastern wall being smaller in comparison to the window on the western wall. The room just to the south of the verandah has a door and two windows in its northern wall, two windows in its western wall, two small windows in its eastern wall and one door and one window on its southern wall. The next adjoining room has two windows in its southern wall facing the open space from the court-yard and one window in its western wall besides there is a door at the eastern end of its southern wall. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants constructed a cement concrete projection, about 6, 1/2 cubits above the ground over some portion of the intervening lane for the purpose of Constructing a septic privy and,, chamber on the said projection and also raised walls on the first floor of their buildings for the purpose of constructing a second story, at a distance of only about 3 feet from the western wall of the plaintiffs' roadside building. The plaintiffs claim that through the doors of the ground floor of their houses, both the plaintiffs and their tenants come out on the lane and then to the municipal road and through the narrow drain in the lane the water from their houses is discharged. According to the plaintiffs as they have been enjoying such right peaceably, openly and uninterruptedly for more than 25 years, they have acquired absolute right of passage and drainage through the lane and that by the illegal construction of the aforesaid projection their right of passage and of discharging water is being impaired. The plaintiffs further contend that if the defendants are allowed to construct the second storey of their building their right of access and use of light and air to their rooms on the second storey, which they have been enjoying as an easement for more than 25 years-since the time of their predecessor in interest will be affected. They also allege that the proposed constructions of the defendants will not only infringe their easement right but will also impair and deteriorate the sanitary condition of their rooms. They also allege that the proposed constructions of the defendants will not only infringe their easement right but will also impair and deteriorate the sanitary condition of their rooms. To reinforce their contentions, they rely upon rule 40 of schedule VI of the Bengal Municipal Act, which came into force in Bankura Town from September 18, 1954, which prohibits any construction, addition or alteration within 6' feet 'of the adjacent domestic building. 3. IN resisting the suit, the defendants firstly contend that rule 40 of schedule VI of the Bengal Municipal Act has no manner of application as their building is not a domestic building and that they had began the construction with the requisite sanction of the municipality. While admitting the plaintiffs' right of easement of passage over the lane, they contend that the projection will not in any way obstruct or affect the plaintiff such right. They however deny the existence of easement right of air and light of the plaintiffs and contend that even if it is assumed that the plaintiffs have such rights through their western windows on the first floor, the proposed construction, of' the second storey will not be an actionable nuisance, as the total light and air that the plaintiffs enjoy will not be diminished to such an extent that it would make the rooms of the plaintiffs uninhabitable. They lastly contend that as no case of actionable nuisance has been made out by the plaintiffs, they are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for, merely on the allegation that they (the defendants) violated the municipal rules. 4. THE learned trial Court held that rule 40 of schedule VI of the Bengal Municipal Act was applicable to the facts of the case, that the plaintiffs had right of easement of light and air to their rooms in the second storey of their house, that the construction already made and proposed to be made by the defendant would substantially and materially obstruct the passage of air and light through tae western windows of the plaintiffs to such an extent as would. amount to an actionable nuisance, that the right of passage of the plaintiffs through the said lane 'had been infringed due to the construction of the projection and that because of the construction, of the projection the health and sanitation of the locality had been affected and it amounted to an actionable nuisance. amount to an actionable nuisance, that the right of passage of the plaintiffs through the said lane 'had been infringed due to the construction of the projection and that because of the construction, of the projection the health and sanitation of the locality had been affected and it amounted to an actionable nuisance. He accordingly decreed the suit and granted all the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs. In the appeal preferred by the defendants, the learned District Judge, Bankura concurred with all the findings of the learned Munsiff barring the one relating to the construction of the projection, being of the view that such construction could not be said to be an actionable nuisance so far as the plaintiffs' right of ingress and egress over the lane was concerned. On such findings he affirmed the decree, subject to the modification that the defendants might complete the construction of the urinal on the projection made over the lane. 5. AGAINST the judgment and decree of the learned lower appellate court, the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1 have filed the appeal and the cross-objection respectively. 6. MR. Saktinath Mukherjee' appearing on behalf of the appellants contended that the learned Judge failed to consider that the construction of the projection over the lane has materially affected the plaintiffs' right of passage and the contemplated construction of the urinal thereupon will also affect the health and sanitation of the locality. To appreciate the contention raised by Mr. Mukherjee in support of the appeal I have gone through the judgments of both the learned courts below. The learned Munsif and the learned Judge have taken great pains to discuss the entire evidence placed by the parties to arrive at their respective conclusions. In deciding the question whether the projection already constructed and the privy and urinal to be constructed thereupon will amount to an actionable nuisance, the learned Munsif discussed the oral evidence on record as also the reports of the pleader commissioner ( Ext. D (3) ) and of the engineering expert (Ext. 1) and being of the view that the report of the expert was more exhaustive and more dependable than that of the pleader commissioner he preferred to accept the former and to hold in favour of the plaintiffs. D (3) ) and of the engineering expert (Ext. 1) and being of the view that the report of the expert was more exhaustive and more dependable than that of the pleader commissioner he preferred to accept the former and to hold in favour of the plaintiffs. In overruling the said decision the learned lower appellate court in its turn, accepted the report of the pleader commissioner in preference to that of the expert on discussions of both the reports and other attending facts and circumstances. Whether the constructions made and to be made by the defendants would amount to an actionable nuisance or not is a question of fact and when the last Court of fact on proper reappraisal of the entire evidence on record answered the said question in favour of the defendants I will not be justified in this second appeal to reverse the said finding. The appeal has, therefore, got to be dismissed. Next comes the cross objection., Mr. Rabindra Nath Mitra, appearing in support of the cross-objection firstly contended that as the building of the defendants is a shop room schedule VI appended to the Bengal, municipal Act had no manner 'of application and as such the plaintiffs' suit was not maintainable. He next contended that even if schedule VI applied to the building of the defendants they were entitled to construct the second storey as they obtained the requisite sanction of the municipality and the said sanction could not be challenged without making the municipality a party in the suit. He next contended that as the plaintiffs constructed their house without leaving the requisite space of. 3' and as such they are not entitled to the equitable belief of injunction. He lastly contended - that the learned courts below erred in relying upon the report of the engineer instead of that of the pleader (commissioner though the latter was a more comprehensive and apt report on the issues involved in the suit. 7. IN elaborating his first contention Mr. Mitra submitted that "domestic building" has not been defined under the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 (hereinafter referred to) as the Act) and as such the literal and the dictionary meaning of the word "domestic" has to be accepted. In Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary the word 'domestic' means Belonging to the house: remaining much at home : private : tame". As such Mr. In Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary the word 'domestic' means Belonging to the house: remaining much at home : private : tame". As such Mr. Mitra submitted section C of schedule VI of the Act, which contains the rules governing dwelling houses and other domestic buildings and includes rule 40, is not applicable to buildings meant for shops. 8. TO appreciate this contention of Mr. Mitra it will be necessary to refer to the different provisions of the Act and the principle of interpretation of statutes. Section 3 (2) of the Act defines "building" to include a house, outhouse, stable, privy, urinal, shed, hut, wall (other than a boundary wall not exceeding 10' in height) and any other such structure, whether of masonry; bricks, wood, mud, metal or any other material whatsoever but does not include a hole or other similar kind or temporary shed erected on ceremonial or festive occasions "house" has been defined in section 3 (22) of the Act to include any hut, shop or wire house "dwelling house" has also been defined in section 3 (15) of the Act to mean a masonry of framed building constructed, used on adopted to be used wholly or principally; for human habitation. Schedule VI of the Act enumerates the rules as to the use of building sites and the execution of building work. Sections A. B. and G thereof enumerate the rules for building sites, building generally (other than huts), and dwelling houses and other domestic buildings (other than huts) respectively. In the instant case the relevant rule is rule 40 which comes in section C thereof. The literal and dictionary meaning of the word "domestic building" is wide enough to include dwelling houses. Still then section C refers and relates to "dwelling houses" and "other domestic buildings (other than huts)" which clearly shows the legislative intent to treat dwelling house as a separate category though they fully come within the genus of "domestic buildings". If the intention of the legislature was to give dictionary meaning to the word "domestic" section C could and would have been earmarked "for domestic building (other than huts)". In that context it must be held that the word 'domestic' can not be given the literal or dictionary meaning under the Bengal Municipal Act as contended by Mr. Mitra. If the intention of the legislature was to give dictionary meaning to the word "domestic" section C could and would have been earmarked "for domestic building (other than huts)". In that context it must be held that the word 'domestic' can not be given the literal or dictionary meaning under the Bengal Municipal Act as contended by Mr. Mitra. In this connection it has also to be borne in mind that no separate rules have been framed under the Action respect of shops and office premises. If the contention of mr. Mitra is to be accepted it would mean that buildings constructed for use or adopted wholly or principally for business and office purposes will be exempt from complying with any building rules or regulations thereby negating the entire object of the Act. It is a basic rule Chat the statute should be interpreted in such a manner as would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy for which it is enacted. I am therefore of the view that section C of schedule VI of the Act applies to buildings meant for business purposes also and the building of the defendants which is used as, a shop room comes within its ambit. 9. THE same conclusion is reached through a different route. "domestic building" has been defined in section 5 (24) of the Calcutta Municipal Act to include a dwelling house and any other masonry building which is neither a building of the warehouse class' nor a 'public building' as defined there under nor a place exclusively used for private worship. Both these Acts pertain to the same subject though they operate in two different areas within the State of West Bengal. One of the mode of interpretation of the Statute is : "where there are different statutes in pari material though made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together, as one system, and as explanatory of each other" (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edition, Page 66.) 10. MR. Mitra however contended that even if the provisions of Calcutta Municipal act are brought in aid and the definition of "domestic building" therein is accepted still then buildings used as shops will not come within the said definition. Mr. MR. Mitra however contended that even if the provisions of Calcutta Municipal act are brought in aid and the definition of "domestic building" therein is accepted still then buildings used as shops will not come within the said definition. Mr. Miras contention was that public building has been excluded from the said definition and since building "meant for shop is a public building such a building is not a domestic building. In this connection he drew my attention to section 5 (59) of the Calcutta municipal Act wherein public building has been defined to mean, inter alia, a building meant for public purposes. According to Mr. Mitra a shop is used for public purpose and as such It answers to the description of public buildings This contention of Mr. Mitra must be negative. A plain reading of Section 5 (59) will make it ineluctably clear that to attract the said provision the building must be used for public purposes. It is the purpose which will determine whether a building is meant for public or not The various description of buildings referred to therein leave no manner of doubt that it is only when public at large congregate for a purpose common and beneficial to them in a building then only such a building can be said to be meant for public purpose. Merely because a particular building is accessible to members of the public at one or other point of time it will not be a building meant for public purposes, as it has been constructed not in the general interest of the community but in the interest of the individual; namely, the owner of the shop. Relying on the definition of domestic building as defined in the Calcutta Municipal act it can therefore be safely held-that the holding of the defendant is a domestic building and as such all the rules appearing in section C of schedule VI apply to the same. The first contention of Mr. Mitra therefore fails. 11. AS regards the second contention of Mr. Mitra, I find that the plaintiffs did not ask for any declaration that the sanction of the municipality was illegal or void nor was the suit based on such premises. In that context I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Mitra that the suit is not maintainable without making the municipality a party. Mitra, I find that the plaintiffs did not ask for any declaration that the sanction of the municipality was illegal or void nor was the suit based on such premises. In that context I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Mitra that the suit is not maintainable without making the municipality a party. In my considered View, even if the, sanction is a valid one, the suit would still be maintainable if the plaintiffs can succeed in showing that the constructions already made or to be made amount to an actionable nuisance. I am fortified in this view of mine by the Division Bench Judgment of this court in the case of Nandalal Ladia -vs- Prabhudayal Tebriwal reported in A.I.R. 1952 Calcutta, Page 74. 12. COMING now to the third contention of mr. Mitra, it appears from the record that the Bengal Municipal Act 1932 came into force in the town of Bankura, where the premises in question are situate, in the year 1954 and long before that the building of the plaintiffs was constructed. In other words, at the time when the building of the plaintiffs was constructed they were under no obligation to construct their premises leaving a space of 3 ft. In such circumstances the construction of the house of the plaintiffs cannot be said to be in breach of any statutory rules or regulations. If the plaintiffs have acquired a right of easement in respect of ancient light and air in respect of the building they would be entitled to a relief of injection provided they could prove that such right was affected due to omission or commissions of the defendants. This contention of Mr. Mitra also fails. That brings us to the last contention of mr. Mitra. The reasons which weighed with me in repelling the contention of Mr. Mukherjee in the appeal, also prompt me to negative the contention of Mr. Mitra the same being based on questions of fact and concluded by the concurrent finding of the learned Courts below. In the result, both the appeal and the cross-objection fail and they are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs in either of them. Appeal and cross objection both dismissed, No costs in either.