T. v. Sarma VS A. Naga Koteswara Rao — 1979 DIGILAW 419 (MAD)

Judgment Crl. R.C. No. 162 of 1979 is directed against the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ongole, in Crl.M.P.No. 43 of 1979 in Sessions Case No. 8 of 1976. 2. Crl.R.C.No. 190 of 1979 is directed against the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad- cum-Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad in Crl.M.P.No. 37 of 1979 in Sessions Case No. 5 of 1979. 3. In both the cases, the same question of law has arisen and hence they can be disposed of by one common judgment. 4. Sessions Case No. 5 of 1979 arose out of a private complaint filed by Sri M. Surajmul, the brother of the deceased Kanta Bai. A-1 is the husband of the deceased Kanta Bai. A-2. is the mother and A-3 is the servant of A-1. A-4 is the younger sister's husband of A-2, A-5 and A-6 are brothers and they are Kavalkar and Police Patel respectively. The offences alleged against the accused are those punishable under section 120-B read with sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. Surajmul filed the complaint in the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Hyderabad West, and the case was committed by the learned Magistrate to Sessions Court. The learned Sessions Judge, Hyderabad District took the case on file as Sessions Case No. 5 of 1979 and made it over to the Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad District- cum-Metropolitan Sessions Judge for disposal according to law. 5. When the trial of the case was taken up, the complainant's Counsel Sri T.V. Sharma, filed the petition Crl.M.P. No. 37 of 1979 contending that that the prosecution should be conducted by the Counsel of the complainant, but not by the Public Prosecutor since the proceedings were initiated by the complainant himself, but not by the State. 6. In Crl.R.C.No. 162 of 1979 the petitioner Sri. T.V. Sharma filed a private complaint against the respondents who are A-1 to A-16 and A-18 to A-25 in the Court of the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Chirala and the same was registered as P.R.C.No. 1 of 1979 and the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court and its was registered as Sessions Case No.8 of 1976 by the learned Sessions Judge and made over to the Additional Sessions Judge. When the trial was taken up, Sri Sharma filed a petition Crl.M.P. No. 43 of 1975 before the learned Sessions Judge contending that since the proceedings have arisen out of a private complaint filed by him and as such he should alone conduct the prosecution and the Public Prosecutor has no locus standi to conduct the case. 7. The Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad District- cum-Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad and the Additional Sessions Judge. Ongole dismissed the petitions holding that when once the case is committed to the Session Court, section 225 , Criminal Procedure Code, comes into play and that as section 225 provides that in every trial before a Court of Session, the prosecution shall be conducted by Public Prosecutor, private complainant or a Counsel of his choice cannot conduct the prosecution. Aggrieved with the respective orders, these revision cases are filed. 8. Sri T. V. Sharma who is appearing as Counsel for the petitioner in Crl.R.C. No. 190 of 1979 and who is the petitioner in Crl. R.C.No. 162 of 1979 contends that where a Sessions case arises out of a private complaint, the complainant himself should conduct the prosecution, but not the Public Prosecutor According to him, the State is not interested in the prosecution since it has arisen out of a private complaint and hence the Public Prosecutor should not conduct the prosecution. In support of his contention he relied upon sections 2(a) , 24 , 301 , 302 , 385(1)(iv) , 401(4) and 378 (4), Criminal Procedure Code. He also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh.1 9. Public Prosecutor and the advocate appearing for the respondents in both the cases on the other hand, contend that section 385(1)(iv) , 401(4) and 378(4), Criminal Procedure Code, relate to the particular cases mentioned therein and they cannot be invoked in support of the contentions raised by Sri Sharma. Public Prosecutor and the advocate appearing for the respondents in both the cases on the other hand, contend that section 385(1)(iv) , 401(4) and 378(4), Criminal Procedure Code, relate to the particular cases mentioned therein and they cannot be invoked in support of the contentions raised by Sri Sharma. They also contend that neither sections 2(u) and 24, Criminal Procedure Code, nor the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh1 lend any support to the contention of Sri Sharma, but it is section 225 , Criminal Procedure Code, that governs the matter and hence the Courts below are justified in holding that the private complainant or the Counsel of his choice has no locus standi to conduct the prosecution and the Public Prosecutor alone should conduct the prosecution as declared by section 225, Criminal Procedure Code. 10. Section 2(u), Criminal Procedure Code, defines the ‘Public Prosecutor’. It reads as follows: “‘Public Prosecutor’ means any person appointed under section 24 and includes any person acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor”. 11. Section 24 of the new Code as amended in 1978 deals with the appointment of Public Prosecutors. It reads as follows: “24 (1). For every High Court, the Central Government or the State Government shall after consultation with the High Court, appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional Public Prosecutors for conducting in such Court, any prosecution, appeal or other proceedings on behalf of the Central Government or State Government, as the case may be. 2. The Central Government may appoint one or more Public Prosecutors, for the purpose of conducting any case or class of cases in any district or local area. 3. For every district, the State Government shall appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional Public Prosecutors for the district.” 12. 2. The Central Government may appoint one or more Public Prosecutors, for the purpose of conducting any case or class of cases in any district or local area. 3. For every district, the State Government shall appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional Public Prosecutors for the district.” 12. According to section 24(1), the Central Government or the State Government shall have a Public Prosecutor in the High Court for conducting any prosecution, appeal or other proceeding on behalf of the Central or State Government as the case may be Relying upon this provision, Sri Sharma contends that since the Public Prosecutor appointed by the State or Central Government is in charge of any prosecution, appeal or other proceeding on behalf of the State or Central Government, as the case may be, the Public Prosecutor should not conduct any Sessions case arising out of a private complaint. Explaining this. Sri Sharma contends that a Public Prosecutor is in charge of a Sessions case arising cut of a charge-sheet filed by the State, but not a sessions case arising out of a complaint filed by a private party and hence the complainant or his Counsel alone should conduct the prosecution in the trial of sessions case arising out of private complaint. 13. But section 24(1) is concerned with the Public Prosecutors in the High Court. The language employed in section 24 (3) is entirely different. In sub- section (3) of section 24 which deals with the appointment of Public Prosecutor in the Sessions Court, it is not stated that the Public Prosecutor is appointed for conducting any prosecution, appeal or other proceedings on behalf of the State Government. When it is not stated specifically so, it should be concluded that he shall be in charge of prosecution of any sessions case, whether it arise out of the charge-sheet filed by the State or out of a private complaint. It is on account of this reason that it is expressly stated in section 225, that the Public Prosecutor alone should conduct the prosecution in every trial of Sessions case. Section 225 reads as follows: 225. In every trial before a Court of Session the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor”. 14. The expression “in every trial” and the “Public Prosecuto”r in this section assume special significance in the context in which they are used. 15. Section 225 reads as follows: 225. In every trial before a Court of Session the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor”. 14. The expression “in every trial” and the “Public Prosecuto”r in this section assume special significance in the context in which they are used. 15. A careful reading of this section makes it abundantly clear that every trial whether it is in respect of a sessions case arising out of a charge-sheet filed by the State or out of a complaint filed by a private party, should be conducted by Public Prosecutor. At this juncture it is necessary to consider the provisions of section 209 (d) which has some bearing on this aspect. Section 209 reads as follows: “209, When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall (a) commit the case to the Court of Session; (b) * * * * (c) send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are to be produced in evidence; (d) notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session.” This section deals again with a case either instituted on a police report or on a private complaint as the words “instituted on a police report or otherwise” make this position clear. If the case either instituted on a police report or on a private complaint relates to the offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the Magistrate has to commit it to the Court of Session and when once it is committed to the Court of Session, the Magistrate has to notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session as envisaged by clause (d) of this section. Since it is the Public Prosecutor that should conduct the prosecution in every trial of session case, the legislature felt it necessary to notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session. Since it is the Public Prosecutor that should conduct the prosecution in every trial of session case, the legislature felt it necessary to notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session. If the trial of a sessions case arising out of a private complaint is to be conducted by the complaint or his Counsel as contended by Sri Sharma then there is no necessity to notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Sessions Court. Besides sections 225 and 209(d) , the provisions of sections 305 and 302, Criminal Procedure Code, throw much light on this aspect. Section 301(1) provides that the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor incharge of a case may appear and plead without any written authority before any Court in which the case is under enquiry trial or appeal. 16. Sub- section (2) of section 301 provides that if in any such case any private person instructs a pleader to prosecute any person in any Court, the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor incharge of the case shall conduct the prosecution and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under the directions of the Pubic Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, and may with the permission of the Court, submit written arguments after the evidence is closed in the case. 17. Sub- section (2) thus permits the complainant to engage a pleader to conduct the prosecution in a sessions case, but enjoins that the counsel so engaged should act under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor, as the case may be. But he is not permitted to act independently without the directions of the Public Prosecutor in conducting the prosecution. If the Public Prosecutor does not permit such a counsel even to assist him in conducting the prosecution, he cannot do so. In other words, Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor can avail the services of an advocate engaged by the complainant for conducting the prosecution. But the management of the case must remain with the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor as the case may be in such a case. The Public Prosecutor should not abdicate his functions, but should continue to be in charge of the case and to issue directions on all important matters in the trial. 18. But the management of the case must remain with the Public Prosecutor or the Assistant Public Prosecutor as the case may be in such a case. The Public Prosecutor should not abdicate his functions, but should continue to be in charge of the case and to issue directions on all important matters in the trial. 18. In Ramakrishnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh1, a Division Bench of this Court considered section 493 of the old code which corresponds to section 301 of the new Code. In that case the Public Prosecutor did not examine the most important witnesses for the prosecution nor did he address arguments upon the case. The Counsel who was instructed by the complainant did both. The demand made on behalf of the accused for the examination of certain persons whose names were mentioned in the charge-sheet as having been present at the time of the offence and who had even been served with the summonses as witnesses for the prosecution, was turned down by the Court at the instance of that pleader. Thus the counsel engaged by the complainant not only did the case for the Public Prosecutor, but he determined alone and without any restraint, the course which the prosecution pursued every time a choice was presented between two alternative courses. The Public Prosecutor did not seem to have taken any part on all such occasions. In fact he did not conduct the prosecution. 19. The learned Judges observed that the Public Prosecutors are the representatives of the State and their office is one of trust and responsibility. That being so, they should do nothing to lower the dignity of the office by effacing themselves or by being content to play second fiddle in the trial of sessions cases. 20. The learned Judges considered the ruling of the Allahabad High Court in Bisheshar v. Rex1 in which it was laid down that the rights of a complainant are only subordinate to the rights of the Grown. 20. The learned Judges considered the ruling of the Allahabad High Court in Bisheshar v. Rex1 in which it was laid down that the rights of a complainant are only subordinate to the rights of the Grown. They also considered as to what exactly does the word “conduct” used in section 493 (old) import and answered that it conveys the idea of leading and guiding that is to say the person who conducts the prosecution determines all important questions of policy involved in the course of the trial and the attitude to be adopted by the prosecution towards material objections raised or demands made by the accused with respect to the evidence. So long as the Public Prosecutor leads and guides in the above sense the pleader for the private party, no objection to such a procedure could be entertained. But, if in a particular case, it happens that the very conduct of the prosecution is completely left in the hands of such a pleader, then the provisions of the Code must be held to have been violated and these provisions do not however, authorise the abdication of the functions by the Public Prosecutor and he should continue to be in charge of the case and to issue directions on all important matters. 21. Section 302 deals with the trial before Magistrate and permission to be granted by the Magistrate to conduct prosecution. It provides that any Magistrate enquiring into or trying a case may permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than a police officer below the rank of Inspector, but no person other than the Advocate-General or the Government advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor shall be entitled to do so without such permission, provided that no police officer shall be entitled to conduct the prosecution if he has taken any part in the investigation into the offence with respect to which the accused is being prosecuted and any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader. 22. This section gives the power to the Magistrate to grant permission or refuse to grant permission to any person other than a police officer below the rank of Inspector for conducting the prosecution of a case before him and without such permission no person is entitled to do so. 22. This section gives the power to the Magistrate to grant permission or refuse to grant permission to any person other than a police officer below the rank of Inspector for conducting the prosecution of a case before him and without such permission no person is entitled to do so. Sub- section (2) provides that any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader. 23. Thus the language employed in sections 301 and 302 clearly shows that while section 301 deals with the limitations imposed on an advocate engaged by a complainant in a sessions case for conducting the prosecution, section 302 deals with the permission necessarily to be obtained from a Magistrate by any person other than a police officer below the rank of an Inspector for conducting the prosecution. 24. Section 301 mandates that the Counsel engaged by the complainant should act under the directions of the Public Prosecutor in conducting the prosecution and he cannot conduct the prosecution independently without control or guidance of the Public Prosecutor and the Sessions Judge has no power to grant permission to such a Counsel to conduct the prosecution when the Public Prosecutor does not accord permission to conduct the prosecution. But under section 302, Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate is given the power to grant permission to any person other than the police officer below the rank of an Inspector to conduct the prosecution if the Magistrate feels it desirable to accord such permission in the interests of justice, and the person so permitted by the Magistrate may conduct the prosecution personally or by a pleader. 25. In this context, it is necessary to consider whether the advocate engaged by a complainant can be treated as a Public Prosecutor. Under the definition of section 2 (a) a Public Prosecutor includes any person acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor. It is, therefore, clear that if the advocate engaged by a complainant is acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor in conducting the prosecution, he can be treated as a Public Prosecutor. But an advocate who is engaged by a complainant to conduct the prosecution cannot claim to be the Public Prosecutor if he is not permitted by the Public Prosecutor to conduct the prosecution under his directions. But an advocate who is engaged by a complainant to conduct the prosecution cannot claim to be the Public Prosecutor if he is not permitted by the Public Prosecutor to conduct the prosecution under his directions. Thus section 301 makes it abundantly clear that the Court cannot grant permission to him to conduct the prosecution if the Public Prosecutor does not accord permission to him. 26. From a careful reading of the provisions of sections 2 (a) , 24 (2) , 209 , 225 and 301, it is clear that every trial before a Sessions Judge should be conducted only by a Public Prosecutor and the Counsel engaged by the complainant cannot be permitted by a Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge, as the case may be, to conduct the prosecution unless permission is granted by the Public Prosecutor to the complainant's Counsel to act under his control or directions and the Counsel so permitted should act under the directions and supervision of the Public Prosecutor in conducting the prosecution. 27. These provisions are clearly conceived in the public interest as well as in the interest of the accused, because the position of the Public Prosecutor is different from an advocate appearing for a private party. A Public Prosecutor is regarded as Minister of Justice and he will present a fair and dispassionate attitude while conducting the prosecution where as an advocate appearing for a private party will be zealous in conducting the prosecution as he is primarily concerned with the interests of his client and is therefore determined to get better of the other by whatever means available. A Public Prosecutor is not a persecutor and is expected to be scrupulously fair both to the State as well as to the accused and present his case with attachment without evincing any anxiety to secure a conviction and such a principle is based upon the high policy. Such a fairplay and dispassionate attitude cannot be expected from an advocate engaged by the complainant in conducting the prosecution. It is right to remember that the Public Prosecutor though an executive officer is, in a large sense, also an officer of the Court and that he is bound to assist the Court with his fairly considered view and the Court is entitled to have the benefit of the fair exercise of his function. It is right to remember that the Public Prosecutor though an executive officer is, in a large sense, also an officer of the Court and that he is bound to assist the Court with his fairly considered view and the Court is entitled to have the benefit of the fair exercise of his function. The Court cannot have such an assistance, from an advocate engaged by a complainant. The Legislature therefore, felt in its wisdom that it is not desirable to permit the complainant or his Counsel to conduct the prosecution independently and it, therefore, mandates that every trial before a Sessions Judge should be conducted by a Public Prosecutor and even if the Public Prosecutor permits a Counsel engaged by the complainant, should act under the direct control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor and the Public Prosecutor should not abdicate himself from conducting the prosecution or assisting the Court leaving the prosecution in its entirety to the Counsel engaged by the complainant. Sri Sharma relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh1, in support of his contention that the complainant or his Counsel alone should conduct the prosecution in the sessions case arising out of a private complaint and the prosecution cannot be left to the Public Prosecutor and the question of the complainant or his Counsel taking permission from the Public Prosecutor for conducting the prosecution does not arise at all. In that case Harnek Singh lodged a complaint at the Police Station, Phul on 15th October, 1964 at about 10.40 p.m. that while coming out of picture house alone with Surjit Singh (1st respondent therein) his foot accidentally struck against third party Avtar Singh who was also coming out of the picture house along with Raj Pal (2nd respondent). According to the complaint, Avatar Singh and the 2nd respondent picked up a quarrel with Harnek Singh. But they were pacified and separated by the Manager of the Cinema who intervened. It is lodged further that when Harnek Singh and the 1st respondent were near the Civil Hospital, Phul the 2nd respondent fired a shot at Harnek Singh. The police appears to have investigated and took the view that the 2nd respondent had not participated in the occurrence and that he had been falsely implicated on account of enmity. It is lodged further that when Harnek Singh and the 1st respondent were near the Civil Hospital, Phul the 2nd respondent fired a shot at Harnek Singh. The police appears to have investigated and took the view that the 2nd respondent had not participated in the occurrence and that he had been falsely implicated on account of enmity. But, before the police actually filed a complaint before the Magistrate against Avtar Singh alone, the 1st respondent instituted a complaint before the Magistrate under sections 307 , 504 and 323 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, against both Avtar Singh and the 2nd respondent. The Magistrate after holding a preliminary enquiry issued summonses to both the accused. On 8th January, 1965, the prosecuting Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bhatinda filed an application in his capacity as Public Prosecutor before the trial Magistrate under section 494 of the Code for permission to withdraw from the prosecution of the case and for discharging the 2nd respondent. According to that officer, the 2nd respondent was innocent and had been falsely involved in the case by the complainant and that this fact had come to his knowledge during the investigation. The said application was opposed by the 1st respondent on two grounds, (1) that Sri Harbans Singh, Prosecuting Deputy Superintendent of Police did not exercise the powers of a Public Prosecutor and, therefore, that he had no locus standi to file the application; and (2) that the application was not bona fide. In consequence the 2nd respondent prayed that permission should not be granted for withdrawal. The trial Magistrate by his order dated 8th February, 1965, overruled the objections raised by the 1st respondent and held that the Prosecuting Deputy Superintendent of Police was the Public Prosecutor for the entire district of Bhatinda within whose jurisdiction the Magistrate's Court at Phul was situated and that the application was bona fide. In consequence, the Magistrate gave permission for the withdrawal of the case as against the 2nd respondent who was one of the two accused. This order was challenged by the 1st respondent in revision before the Sessions Judge, Barnala. Apart from contending that the officer who presented the application under section 494 of the Code for withdrawal was not a Public Prosecutor, the 1st respondent urged a slightly new ground of attack. This order was challenged by the 1st respondent in revision before the Sessions Judge, Barnala. Apart from contending that the officer who presented the application under section 494 of the Code for withdrawal was not a Public Prosecutor, the 1st respondent urged a slightly new ground of attack. That ground of attack was that even assuming that the said officer was Public Prosecutor, nevertheless he could not file an application under section 494 of the Code inasmuch as the Public Prosecutor was not in charge of the prosecution, which was being conducted by the complainant, a private party. The learned Sessionss Judge held that the officer who filed the application under section 494 of the Code had been appointed as a Public Prosecutor for the Magistrate's Court at Phul by the Government and that the said Public Prosecutor could intervene in a criminal case instituted on a private complaint and such Public Prosecutor could be considered to be one who had taken charge of the case when he made an application to withdraw from the prosecution. In this view both the objections raised by the 1st respondent were overruled. The learned Sessions Judge on the merits had also taken the view that in giving permission to withdraw from the prosecution the Magistrate had exercised his jurisdiction judicially and not in any arbitrary manner and that he gave permission only after considering the reasons given by the Public Prosecutor in the application filed by him. Ultimately the order of the trial Magistrate was confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge. The first respondent again went up in revision to Punjab High Court challenging the two orders passed by the trial Magistrate and the Sessions Judge. 28. A Division Bench of the Punjab High Court accepted the position that the prosecuting Deputy Superintendent of Police has been vested with the powers of a Public Prosecutor and therefore he was a Public Prosecutor, but ultimately held that a Public Prosecutor cannot withdraw under section 494 of the Code from the prosecution of a case pending before the Magistrate instituted upon a private com“plaint despite the complainant's objection to the withdrawal of the case. The learned Judges in consequence directed the complaint filed by the 1st respondent against both the accused to be proceeded with. The learned Judges in consequence directed the complaint filed by the 1st respondent against both the accused to be proceeded with. The main objection before the High Court was that as the case before the Magistrate had been started on a private complaint and the Public Prosecutor being nowhere in the picture, he had no locus standi to file an application under section 494 of the Code. The High Court, as stated above held that when a case is pending before a Magistrate and has been initiated on a police report, it is the State that normally arranges for the conduct of the Prosecution. But in the case of a private complaint before a Magistrate which is conducted by the complainant or by his duly authorised Counsel the Public Prosecutor does not come into the picture in the conduct of such cases and therefore he has no locus standi to file an application under section 494 of the Code in respect of such case. The High Court also took the view that when neither the Public Prosecutor nor any agency of the State was in charge of the conduct of the prosecution, it is difficult to hold that the Public Prosecutor can withdraw from such prosecution. The learned Judges have also held that if it is accepted that any Public Prosecutor can file an application under section 494 in a case which is being proceeded with by the complainant on a private complaint, it will lead to all kinds of abuses and mischief. Aggrieved with the decision of the High Court, the State preferred appeal before the Supreme Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows: “In our opinion, the Public Prosecutor, who can file an application under section 494 of the Code, must be the Public Prosecutor who is already in charge of the particular case in which that application is filed. We are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the expression “the Public Prosecutor” in section 494 is to be understood as referring to any person who is a Public Prosecutor, whether he is a Public Prosecutor appointed generally under section 492(1) or for the purpose of a particular case as contemplated under section 492 (2) of the Code. Section 492 only deals with the appointment of Public Prosecutors by the Government or by the District Magistrate, in circumstances mentioned therein and section 493 specifically refers to the Public Prosecutor who is in charge of the case which is under enquiry, trial or appeal, when appearing and pleading before such Court. Section 493 only dispenses with the Public Prosecutor having to file any written authority. That section also makes it clear that if any private person is instructing a pleader to prosecute any person in any such case which must have reference to the case of which the Public Prosecutor is in charge nevertheless, the Public Prosecutor shall conduct the prosecution and the pleader is to act under his directions. Section 494 also, in our opinion, must refer only to the Public Prosecutor who is in charge of the particular case in which he makes a request to withdraw from the prosecution. Some of these aspects have been already adverted to by us earlier. If any public prosecutor, who had nothing to do with a particular case, is held entitled to file an application under section 494, in our opinion, the result will be very anomalous. For instance, if there are two public prosecutors appointed for a particular Court, and one of the Public Prosecutors is conducting the prosecution in a particular case, and desires to go on with the proceedings, it will be open to the other Public Prosecutor to ask for withdrawal from the prosecution. Similarly, a Public Prosecutor appointed for case A, before a particular Court, can, by virtue of his being a Public Prosecutor, file an application in case B, with which he has nothing to do, and ask for permission of the Court to withdraw from the prosecution. The reasonable interpretation to be placed upon section 494, in our opinion, is that it is only the Public Prosecutor, who is in charge of a particular case and is actually conducting the prosecution, that can file an application under the section, seeking permission to withdraw from the prosecution. If a Public Prosecutor is not in charge of a particular case and is not conducting the prosecution, he will not be entitled to ask for withdrawal from the prosecution, under section 494 of the Code.” 29. If a Public Prosecutor is not in charge of a particular case and is not conducting the prosecution, he will not be entitled to ask for withdrawal from the prosecution, under section 494 of the Code.” 29. This decision, I have no hesitation to say, cannot render any assistance to Sri Sharma, as what was laid down by their Lordships in this decision is only applicable to cases coming under section 494, Criminal Procedure Code, and this ruling cannot be extended to the trials before a Sessions Court. It is true that their Lordships unequivocally stated that a Public Prosecutor who is not in charge of particular case is not entitled to ask for withdrawal from prosecution under section 494 of the Code. In other words, if the criminal proceedings are initiated on the basis of a complaint filed by a private party before a Magistrate, it is the complainant or his Counsel that is in charge of the proceedings but not the Public Prosecutor. Therefore, their Lordships felt it necessary to prevent the Public Prosecutor from making efforts to withdraw from the prosecution in which he was not interested. 30. Sri Sharma strenuously argued that as their Lordships held in this case that because the proceedings were initiated by a private party, the Public Prosecutor has no interest in the proceedings and as such he cannot file a petition under section 494 for withdrawing from the prosecution. He, therefore, contends, on the same analogy, that as the Sessions cases in the case on hand have not arisen out of the charge-sheets filed by the State but have arisen only out of complaints filed by private parties, they alone should be permitted to conduct the prosecution and the Public Prosecutor cannot, therefore, be permitted to conduct the prosecution. 31. The argument appears to be attractive. But in the face of the provisions of sections 2(a) , 24(3) , 209(d) , 225 and 301(2) which govern the trial of the sessions cases and also the diffrence of language employed in section 301(2) and section 302 , I find myself unable to apply the ruling of the Supreme Court to the trials governed by section 225, Criminal Procedure Code. When a Counsel engaged by the complainant is not permitted under section 301(2) to act independently, but has to act under the control and directions of the Public Prosecutor, it would be beyond the scope of section 225 as well as section 301(2) if the complainant's Counsel is permitted to conduct the prosecution of a sessions case arising out of a private complaint. 32. Sri Sharma contends that under sections 385(1)(iv) and 377, Criminal Procedure Code, the complainant shall be made a party and be supplied with the copies of grounds of appeal and shall be given notice. He further contends that in any revision under section 401(2) the High Court is bound to give notices to the accused or other person if an order to the prejudice of the accused or other person, is made. According to him, the provisions clearly show that a notice has to be given to the complainant though the appeal is filed by the Public Prosecutor, and the private complainant has got a right to say in the matter. 33. Section 385(1)(iv) declares that if the appellate Court does not dismiss the appeal summarily, it shall cause notice of the time and place at which such appeal will be heard to be given-if the appeal is under section 377 or 378 to the accused and shall also furnish such Officer, complainant and accused with a copy of the grounds of appeal. 34. Section 401(2) also requires that in the case of any proceedings the record of which has been called for by the High Court, the High Court may in its discretion exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of appeal by sections 386 , 389 , 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by section 307; and (2) that no order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence. 35. Section 385(1)(iv) , of course, requires notice to be given to the complainant in case of appeal under section 377 for enhancement of sentence or in case of an appeal under section 378 against the order of acquittal. Section 401(2) also requires that notice should be given to the complainant. 35. Section 385(1)(iv) , of course, requires notice to be given to the complainant in case of appeal under section 377 for enhancement of sentence or in case of an appeal under section 378 against the order of acquittal. Section 401(2) also requires that notice should be given to the complainant. In all these cases, the Legislature felt it necessary that the complainant also should be heard along with the Public Prosecutor. Even under these provisions, the presence of the Public Prosecutor is not effaced and the Public Prosecutor is given first place and the complainant is given the next place. But on that account it cannot be concluded that a complainant or his Counsel alone should be permitted to conduct the prosecution of a trial in a sessions case before the Sessions Judge. As long as the express provisions of sections 209(d) , 225 , 301(2) explicitly govern the trials in a sessions Court, the complainant's Counsel has no independent status in a trial of sessions case and he takes his place according to the dictates and directions of Public prosecutor and the complainant has no right to demand that the Public Prosecutor should abdicate his presence and functions in a trial of sessions case on the ground that the proceedings which give rise to sessions trial have been initiated by private complainant. The provisions of sections 225 and 301(2) do not authorise the Public Prosecutor to abdicate his functions and efface his presence in the trial of sessions case giving place to the complainant or his Counsel. For these reasons, I find myself unable to accept the contentions of Sri Sharma. 36. In the memo, of additional grounds Sri Sharma repeated the same questions and also added some other grounds which are irrelevant so far as the subject-matter of these criminal revision cases are concerned. Hence they need not be repeated once again as the reasons given above will hold good even for them. 37. Having regard to the aforesaid reasons and findings given by me, I find no merits in the revision cases. They are, therefore, dismissed. T.K.K. ----- Revision cases dismissed.