JUDGMENT 1. - Both these writ petitions are directed against the order dated 19th September, 1978, passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, hereinafter referred' to as the Tribunal)' whereby the appeals of the petition were dismissed and a temporary' permit for a period of four months was granted to the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, (hereinafter referred to at the 'Corporation') on the Hanumangarh-Moga via, Abhore route. 2. Hanumangarh-Moga route is an inter-state route which lies partly in the State of Raj. and partly in. the State of Punjab. A reciprocal transport agreement has been arrived at between the two States in-regard to grant of permits on the said route by each. State but as the said agreement has not yet been formally notified by the two Governments, it has been agreed that bus services be started on temporary basis with effect from 1st May, 1975 and in pursuance of the said agreement two temporary permits are being granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Bikaner on the said route. During the period, from July 1975 to July 1976, both the temporary permits were granted to the Corporation. By its notification dated July 8, 1976, the Regional Transport Authority granted one temporary permit for a period of four months to petitioner Sardarilal and the other temporary permit was granted to the Corporation. Since then, one of the two temporary permits is being granted to the Corporation and the other temporary permit was being granted to petitioner Sardarilal. The temporary permit which had been granted in favour of Sardarilal was to expire on May 14, 1978, and the petitioners as well as the Corporation submitted applications for the grant of a temporary permit. The Regional Transport Authority, by its resolution dated 9th May, 1978, granted the temporary permit to the Corporation and rejected the application of Sardarilal. It appears that the application of M/s Zamidara Transport Cooperative Society Limited (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner Society), was not considered by The Regional Transport Authority while passing the resolution dated 9th May, 1978, granting the temporary permit in favour of the Corporation. Aggrieved by the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority, both the petitioners filed appeals before the Tribunal and the Tribunal, by its order dated 3rd June, 1978, allowed the appeal of the petitioner Society and granted one temporary permit for a period of four months to the petitioner Society. Aggrieved by the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority, both the petitioners filed appeals before the Tribunal and the Tribunal, by its order dated 3rd June, 1978, allowed the appeal of the petitioner Society and granted one temporary permit for a period of four months to the petitioner Society. The appeal of petitioner Sardarilal was, however, rejected by the Tribunal. The Tribunal in allowing the appeal of the petitioner Society, proceeded on the basis that the petitioner Society had offered to put a vehicle of 1978 model, whereas the other applicants, viz. Sardarilal and the Corporation had offered vehicles of 1977 model. Subsequently, after the-passing of the order of the Tribunal, dated 3rd June, 1978, the petitioner Society on 5th June, 1978, submitted an application before the Tribunal wherein it was stated that the vehicle bearing No.. RSK, 9698 which had been offered by the petitioner Society was of 1976 model and not 1978 model and that the petitioner Society was willing to engage another bus of 1978 model but the building of the body of the said bus was likely to take sometime and that till then it was prayed that the petitioner Society may be allowed to avail the temporary permit granted to it on the aforesaid 1976 model bus. The said application of the petitioner Society was rejected by the Tribunal by its order dated June 7, 1978 on the view that the merits of the parties had been assessed on the assumption that the petitioner Society had offered a vehicle No. RSK 9698 of 1978 model and the said mistake could not be rectified. Two writ petitions (Civil Writ Petitions No. 396 of 1978 and 385 of 1978) were filed by the Corporation and petitioner Sardarilal against the order of the Tribunal dated 3rd June, 1978, granting a temporary permit in favour of the petitioner Society. Both these writ petitions were disposed of by this Court by its judgment dated August 2, 1978, whereby the writ petitions were allowed and the order dated 3rd June, 1978, passed by the Tribunal was quashed. By the judgment of this Court, the Tribunal was directed to decide the matter afresh and releases the comparative merits of the claimants again after affording to the parties an opportunity of hearing. By the judgment of this Court, the Tribunal was directed to decide the matter afresh and releases the comparative merits of the claimants again after affording to the parties an opportunity of hearing. In its judgment aforesaid, this Court observed that the petitioner Society had been running its 1978 model bus on the route since June 13, 1978 and that public convenience would suffer if the Society had to stop plying its vehicle on the route, even before the final decision of the matter by the Tribunal, and this Court directed that the petitioner Society be allowed to continue to ply its 1978 model vehicle on the route until August 28, 1978. In pursuance of the order of this Court, the matter went back to the Tribunal and the Tribunal, after considering the merits of all three claimants namely; the two petitioners and the Corporation, passed the order dated 19th September, 1978 whereby it decided that the Corporation is best suited for the grant of the permit and directed that a temporary permit for a period of four months may be granted to the Corporation and that the period of four months shall be calculates from the date the Corporation obtains temporary permit in respect of any vehicle of 1978 model. Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, dated 19th September, 1978, the petitioners have filed these two writ petitions. 3. Shri R.R. Vyas, the learned counsel for the petitioner Society, who has advanced the, main arguments, has urged the following contentions:- (1) The Tribunal lad exceeded its jurisdiction in granting a temporary permit in favour of the Corporation from the date the Corporation obtains temporary permit in respect of vehicle of 1978 model and as a result the Corporation will obtain a temporary permit in excess of the period of four months prescribed by the Motor Vehicles Act. (2) The Tribunal has misdirected itself it proceeding on the basis that the decision of Supreme Court in Sri Ram Vilas Service (P) Ltd v. C. Chandraiskaran and others, AIR 1965 SC 107 , holding that granting of monopoly to a Bus Operator would be prejudicial to the public interest and is relevant consideration for denying a permit, can have no application to the Corporation. (3) The finding recorded by the Tribunal that the Corporation alone is in a better position to offer better facilities is based on no, evidence. (3) The finding recorded by the Tribunal that the Corporation alone is in a better position to offer better facilities is based on no, evidence. 4. Shri S N. Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner Sardari Lal, has adopted the aforesaid contentions urged by Shri R.R. Vyas. 5. In support of the first contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that originally a temporary permit for a period of four months had been granted in favour of the Corporation by the Regional Transport Authority, by its resolution dated 9th May, 1978 and in pursuance of the said resolution a temporary permit was issued in favour of the Corporation on 14th May 1978. The said resolution of the Regional Transport Authority dated 9th May, 1978 was set aside by the order of the Tribunal dated 3rd June, 1978 but the Corporation was able to ply its bus from 14th May, 1978 to 3rd June, 1978 on the basis of the temporary permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority. Now as a result of the order passed by the Tribunal dated 19th September, 1978, the Corporation has been granted a permit on 13th October, 1978, and the said permit shall be operative till 12th of February, 1979. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that as a result of the order passed by the Tribunal, the Corporation will be able to enjoy a temporary permit for a period in excess of the period of four months and that under the Motor Vehicles Act, a temporary permit can only be issued for a period of 4 months only. The submission of Shri R N. Munshi, the learned counsel for the Corporation, on the other hand, is that the earlier permit which had been granted by the Regional Transport Authority in favour of the Corporation was quashed by the order of the Tribunal on 3rd June, 1978 and the said p?emit, had not been revived by the judgment of this Court dated 2nd August 1978 and that this Court had directed the Tribunal to consider afresh the comparative claims of all the three claimants and therefore, the permit which had been granted by the Tribunal under its order dated 19th September, 1978 should be regarded as a fresh permit and not in continuance of the earlier permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority. In support of the aforesaid submission, the learned counsel for the Corporation has placed reliance on the direction contained in the judgment of this Court to the effect that the petitioner Society may be allowed to continue to ply its bus on the route until August 28, 1978 and has submitted that the aforesaid direction postulates that the permit which had been issued in favour of the Corporation in pursuance of the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated 9th May, 1978, was not revived. 6. I find myself in agreement with the aforesaid contention urged by the learned counsel for the Corporation, and in my view the order dated 19th September, 1978 passed by the Tribunal, directing the issue of a temporary permit to the Corporation for a period of four months from the date it obtains a temporary in respect of any vehicle of 1978 model cannot be said to be an order passed without jurisdiction. The temporary permit which had been granted in favour of the Corporation on 14th May, 1978 in pursuance of the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority dated 9th May, 1978, came to an end when the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority was quashed by the Tribunal in its order dated 3rd June 1978. Although this court by its judgment dated 2nd August, 1978, has quashed the aforesaid order of the Tribunal dated 3rd June, 1978, but the said judgment proceeds on the basis that the earlier permit granted in favour of the Corporation in pursuance of the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority will not be revived as a result of quashing of the order of the Tribunal dated 3rd June, 1978. This court while reminding the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration of the comparative merits of all the three claimants afresh, had directed the Tribunal to take into consideration subsequent events while assessing the comparative merits of the three claimants. This court also gave a direction to the effect that the petitioner Society, which had been running its 1978 model vehicle on the route since 13th June, 1978, may be permitted to continue to ply the said vehicle until August 28, 1978 or otherwise the public convenience will suffer. This court also gave a direction to the effect that the petitioner Society, which had been running its 1978 model vehicle on the route since 13th June, 1978, may be permitted to continue to ply the said vehicle until August 28, 1978 or otherwise the public convenience will suffer. If the permit granted in favour of the Corporation on 14th May, 1978 in pursuance of the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority dated 9th May, 1978 had been revived as a result of the judgment of this Court, quashing the order of the Tribunal dated 3rd June, 1978, there was no need for giving such a direction in favour of the petitioner Society in as much as public convenience would not have suffered on account of the stoppage of the vehicle which was being plied by the petitioner Society on the said route because the Corporation would have started plying its vehicle immediately thereafter. The direction of thin court that the Tribunal shall re-determine the whole matter & reassess the comparative merits of all the three claimants afresh taking into consideration subsequent events, implied that the Tribunal shall grant a temporary permit for a period of four months to the applicant who is found most meritorious on the date when the Tribunal is considering the matter. The Tribunal had, therefore, not committed any error in directing the issue of a temporary permit to the Corporation for a period of four months from the date it obtains a temporary permit in respect of any vehicle of 1978 Model. 7. As to the second contention, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that in Sri Ramvilas Service (P) Ltd., v. C. Chandrasekwan & others, AIR 1965 SC 107 , the Supreme Court has expressed the view that while considering the interest of the public generally under Section 47 (1) (a) in the matter of grant of a permit under the Motor Vehicles Act, it would not be irrelevant for the appropriate authority to proceed on the basis that the granting of monopoly to a bus operator mould be prejudicial to the public interest and that the Tribunal has erred in holding that the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court are not applicable to a case where the Corporation happens to be monopolist bus operator. The learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that a distinction must be drawn with regard to the grant of the permit to the Corporation under the provisions contained in Chapter IV and Chapter IV A of the Motor Vehicles Act, that in so far as an application filed under Chapter IVA of the Act is concerned, the Corporation is entitled to the grant of a permit without being required to compete with the private operators, but that in the matter of grant of a permit under the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act, the Corporation stands at par with other private operators & the Corporation can not claim any preferential right. The learned counsel for the Corporation does not dispute the proposition that in the matter of grant of permit under the provision of Chapter IV, the Motor Vehicles Act the Corporation stands at par with other operators and it cannot claim any preferential right. The submission of the learned counsel for the Corporation is that if the Corporation stands on the same footing as other applicants, a permit cannot be denied to the Corporation merely on the ground that the Corporation is holding a monopoly. The learned counsel has submitted that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Shri Ram Vilas Service (P) Ltd. v. G. Chandrasekaran and others, AIR 1965 SC 107 can have no application to issue a temporary permit. The submission of the learned counsel for the Corporation is further that in that case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the case of two private operators and the said decision could have no application to a State Transport undertaking established under the Road Transport Corporation Act 1950. 8. It is true that the Motor Vehicles Act proceeds on the basis that in respect of matter covered by Chapter IV-A of the Act, the Corporation will have a right to the grant of a permit to the exclusion of private operators and in respect of matters governed by Chapter IV of the Act, the Corporation, make any other operator, is entitle to make an application and it has to complete with other private operators and a permit can be granted to it if it has a better claim than other applicants. This does not, however, mean that if the Corporation has a better claim than other applicants it should be denied a permit on the ground that it is a monopolist The scheme of our Constitution is that creation of monopoly in favour of the State or Corporation owned or controlled by the State for the purpose of carrying on any trade, business or industry or service is in the interest of general public and a law providing for creation of such monopoly is not open to challenge on the ground that the restriction imposed by it on the right of the citizens to carry on any occupation, trade or business are not reasonable or are not in the interest of general public (Art. 19 (6)). In enacting Chapter IV.A of the Motor Vehicles. Act, the Parliament has proceeded on the basis that the creation of monopoly in the matter of motor transport services in favour of a State Transport undertaking would better serve the interest of the general public. In J. K. Kondala Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation & Others, AOR 1961 SC 82 , the Supreme Court, in the context of examining the constitutional validity of Chapter IV A of the Motor Vehicles Act, has observed:- "Ordinarily a State Transport undertaking, compared with persons or private undertakings, should be in a better position than others to carry on the said services for the benefit of the pubic administratively, financially and technically it can be expected to be in a far better position than others. It can provide more well equipped buses, give better amenities to the travelling public, keep regular timings, repair or replace the buses in emergencies. It may also employ efficient supervisory staff to keep things going at an appreciably high standard." 9. The aforesaid observations are equally applicable in the matter of grant of a permit under Chapter IV of the Act in as much as Section 47 (1) (a) of the Act lays that in considering an application for grant of a Stage Carriage permit, the Regional Transport Authority (so also the State Transport Appellate Tribunal) shall have regard to the interest of public generally. The existence of a bigger organisation with larger number of vehicles and better resources is a circumstance which should weigh in favour of the State Transport Undertaking and it cannot be invoked as a disqualification which may disentitle it from being granted a permit under Chapter IV of the Act. 10. In Shri Ram Vilas Service (P) Ltd , v. C. Chandrasekaran & others, AIR 1965 SC 107 , the Supreme Court. while dealing with a case involving the rival claims of two private operators in the matter of grant of a non temporary permit, has observed that the consideration that the granting of monopoly to a bus operator may be prejudicial to public interest, is not an irrelevant consideration. In that context, the Supreme Court as pointed out:- "There can be no doubt that in granting a permit, the appropriate authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act are required to consider the interests of the public generally under Section 47 (1)(a), and in assessing the merits of an individual applicant for a permit on any route, it would be open to the appropriate authority to enquire whether the service which the individual applicant would render to the public if he is given a permit would be efficient and satisfactory or not. In dealing with this aspect of the matter, it would not be irrelevant for the appropriate authority to hold that if an applicant is or would be in the position of a monopolist if a permit was granted to him, he would be liable to neglect the interests of the public and may not be very keen on taking all steps to keep his service in good and efficient order. Absence of any competition from another bus operator on the route is likely to develop a feeling of complacence in the monopolist and that is a factor which the appropriate authority can certainly take into account." 11. The aforesaid observations, on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and which were made in with regard to grant of non-temporary permits, cannot in my opinion, be applicable to the present case relating to the grant of a temporary permit. The aforesaid observations, on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and which were made in with regard to grant of non-temporary permits, cannot in my opinion, be applicable to the present case relating to the grant of a temporary permit. The considerations referred to the Supreme Court viz.; feeling of complacence arising out of absence of competition, cannot exist in the case of temporary permit which is granted for a period of four months only and after the expiry of the period of four months, the monopolist, if he applies again for a fresh temporary permit, will have to compete with other applicant;. Even in the matter of grant of non-temporary permit, the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court in Sri Ram Vilas Service (P) Ltd., v. Chandrasekaran & Others. AIR 1965 SC 107 will not apply to a case where the State Transport Undertaking is the applicant may be observed that the Corporation has been constituted under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 and Section 18 of the said Act casts a duty on the Corporation to exercise its powers to provide an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated system of road transport in the State. The considerations which may apply when a private operator happens to be the monopolist will not, therefore, apply to the Corporation. 12. Moreover, I find that, in so far as the State of Rajasthan is concerned, the Motor Vehicles Act has been amended by the Motor Vehicles (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1974 (Rajasthan Act No 10 of 1974) whereby the following proviso has been added to sub-section (2) of Section 58 of the Act:- "Provided also that other conditions being equal an application for stage carriage permit by a state Transport Undertaking, as defined in Section 68-A. whether an application for renewal or a new application, shall be giver preference over all other applications for renewal " 13. The aforesaid amendment indicates that in the matter of grant of non-temporary permits, the Corporation shall be entitled to be given preference over other applicants. This would mean that the fact that the Corporation stands in the position of a monopolist would not stand in the way of the Corporation being granted a non temporary permit in preference to other applicants. This would mean that the fact that the Corporation stands in the position of a monopolist would not stand in the way of the Corporation being granted a non temporary permit in preference to other applicants. There is, no reason why in the matter of grant of temporary permits, for a period of four a months only, the Corporation should be treated differently and it should be disentitled from obtaining a temporary permit merely because it happens to be a monopolist. The Tribunal, therefore, did not commit an) error of law in proceeding on the basis that the petitioners were not entitled to preference over the Corporation merely because the Corporation is in the position of a monopolist. 14. In support of the third contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners has pointed out that in the impugned order the Tribunal has observed that the Corporation alone is in a position to offer better facilities, considering the availability of stand by vehicles with them, their financial resources, the facility of a well equipped workshop in the State as well as the reciprocal arrangement in the State of Punjab. The submission of the learned counsel is that there is no material on the record to justify the said findings by the Tribunal. In my view, the aforesaid contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. A perusal of the resolution in of the Regional Transport Authority dated 9th May, 1978. shows that the Regional Transport Authority had found that:- "I feel that far from being a case of equal merits here is a case where the R.S R.T.C. has superior merit because it is already plying on this route as well as other routes which are covered by this inter State agreement & for one-year had both the permits & it was only later that Shri Sardari Lal was allowed to supplant the Corporation in respect of one permit. It is needless to point out that the Corporation has several workshops spread over the region, equipped with modern tools and has also an agreement with the State Transport Undertaking of Punjab for repair to its buses in the workshops of the Punjab State Transport Undertaking." 15. The Tribunal in its order dated 19th September, 1978 has merely reaffirmed the aforesaid finding recorded by the Regional Transport Authority. The Tribunal in its order dated 19th September, 1978 has merely reaffirmed the aforesaid finding recorded by the Regional Transport Authority. In my view, no case is made out by the petitioners for interfering with the aforesaid finding of the Transport Authorities in exercise of the jurisdiction of this court to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Abdul Rehman and others, The State Transport Appellate Tribunal & others (3), the Supreme Court has reiterated that the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, should be reluctant to interfere with or disturb the decision of specially constituted authorities or Tribunals under the Act especially when the legislature has entrusted the task of granting or renewing the stage carriage permits to the aforesaid authorities or Tribunal which are expected to be conversant with the procedure and practice and the relevant matters which should engage their attention under the provision contained in the Act. The Supreme Court has further observed that while dealing with the applications for writs of certiotori under Article 226 of the Constitution, it mint he borne in mind that the High Court does not exercise the jurisdiction of an Appellate Court and the findings or conclusions on questions of fact could hardly be reexamined or disturbed by it. In the present case, I do not fled any reasons to disturb the findings of fact recorded by the Regional Transport Authority and the Tribunal in exercise of the jurisdiction of this Co in under Article 226 of the Constitution. 16. There is, therefore, no merit in these writ petitions, and they are dismissed. Taking into consideration the circumstances of the case, I direct that the parties, shall hear their own costs in these writ petitions.Writ dismissed. *******