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1979 DIGILAW 420 (ALL)

Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. , Kanpur v. Labour Court (II). Kanpur

1979-04-03

N.D.OJHA, R.R.RASTOGI

body1979
JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - Two applications were made on 29th March, 1971, one by Prithvi Raj and the other by Sheo Shankar, two workmen in the petitioner company under Section 11-C of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, inter alia, in regard to the interpretation of Standing Orders 3. 4 (c) and 4 (d). Since the entire controversy rests on the interpretation of these Standing Orders, it would be useful to quote them here: - "Classification of Operatives. 3 (a) Operatives shall be classed as 1. Permanent; 2. Probationer; 3. Substitute; 4. Temporary; 5. Apprentice; and 6. Casual. (b) A "permanent" operative is one who has completed a probationary period of two months in the same occupation in the Mill and is employed on permanent post. Provided however that non-displaced person shall be entitled to be made permanent on posts reserved for displaced persons unless otherwise declared by the Management by a notice posted to this effect on the Notice Board. (c) A "probationer" is an operative who is provisionally employed to fill a permanent vacancy and has not completed two months in that occupation. If a "permanent" operative is employed as a "Probationer" in a new occupation, he may, at any time during the probationary period of two months by an order in writing by the Manager. (d) A "Substitute" is one whose name is entered in the Register of Substitutes and who is employed on the post of a permanent operative or probationer, who is temporarily absent on leave or otherwise. (e) A "Temporary" operative is one who is engaged for work of an essentially temporary character or one who is engaged for a temporary period or one who is engaged temporarily as an additional' operative in connection with the work of permanent character provided, he has not been in continuous employment for 3 months. (f) An "Apprentice" is a learner whether paid or unpaid during the period of his training. (g) A "Casual" workman is a workman whose employment is of casual nature. Enrolment, Muster Roll, Tickets, Cards or Tokens. 4 (a) and (b) ................ (c) In the Muster Roll against the name of every operative without exception shall be clearly indicated the classification to which he belongs. (g) A "Casual" workman is a workman whose employment is of casual nature. Enrolment, Muster Roll, Tickets, Cards or Tokens. 4 (a) and (b) ................ (c) In the Muster Roll against the name of every operative without exception shall be clearly indicated the classification to which he belongs. (d) Every operative, without exception shall be provided with a ticket, card, or token bearing his number and any other particulars which the Company at its discretion may require. ................................." 2. The Labour Court, respondent No. 1 which dealt with these applications, has given its decision in regard to the nature of the post of a permanent operative. It has held that if any permanent post has undoubtedly fallen vacant even according to the records of the employer and the employer has appointed a particular workman in the said permanent vacancy and has allowed him to work on that post and the said workman has worked for more than two months on the said vacant post, he shall be deemed to have completed two months probation on the vacant post and accordingly he will come under the definition of a permanent operative contained in Standing Order 3 (b). He would become a permanent operative and he should be classified as a permanent employee under the Standing Order 3 (a). Consequently, this classification should be shown against his name in the Muster Roll and he shall be provided with the ticket or routine card of a permanent operative accordingly. Aggrieved by this interpretation of the Labour Court, the employers have instituted this writ petition. 3. It was urged by counsel for the petitioner that the interpretation put by the Labour Court if a person had been allowed to work for more than two months on a permanent post, in respect of which a clear vacancy occurred, should be deemed to have worked for more than two months on probation even though his appointment was not made on probation, is manifestly erroneous. According to counsel for the petitioner the nature of the appointment depends upon the manner of the appointment as expressed by the employer. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner we are of opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any such error which may justify interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution. According to counsel for the petitioner the nature of the appointment depends upon the manner of the appointment as expressed by the employer. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner we are of opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any such error which may justify interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is true that it is not incumbent upon an employer to invariably make a permanent appointment on a permanent post in respect of which a clear vacancy has occurred in view of the exigencies of the situation. For instance, a person competent to be appointed in a permanent. manner on such post may not be available or there may be several claimants and an adjudication by the employer in regard to their claims may be necessary involving lapse of time but simultaneously it may also be necessary for some one to be appointed for the time being and the like. In such a situation it will certainly be open to the employer not to appoint any person on a permanent basis on such post but in that event it will be equally incumbent on the employer to expressly state in the letter of appointment, if any, and in the relevant column of muster roll the actual nature of the appointment so that the classification of the workman concerned may be ascertained. If, however, this is not done the matter will have to be decided in the background of the facts of each case, for instance if on a permanent post an appointment is made in a leave vacancy the appointment will apparently be as a substitute. Likewise if the post itself is temporary and an appointment is made on such a post it will on the face of it be deemed to be a temporary appointment, if appointment is made for doing work of a casual nature the workman would be casual. Likewise if the post itself is temporary and an appointment is made on such a post it will on the face of it be deemed to be a temporary appointment, if appointment is made for doing work of a casual nature the workman would be casual. If, however, the post is a permanent one and a clear vacancy has occurred and an appointment is made on that post without any reservation and without expressing anything in regard to the actual nature of the appointment it will be deemed that notwithstanding the silence of the employer on the subject, the appointment had been made on probation and on completion of the period of probation the incumbent would become permanent and the consequences contemplated by Standing Orders 4 (c) and 4 (d) will ensue. This indeed is the manner in which the relevant Standing Orders have been interpreted by the Labour Court. 5. We accordingly find no merit in this writ petition and it is hereby dismissed, but since no one had appeared to oppose it, there will be no order as to costs.