ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This is a defendants application in revision directed against orders passed by the court below refusing to set aside an ex parte decree passed against the defendants-applicants. The suit giving rise to this revision was filed by the plaintiffs opposite parties against the defendants applicants for ejectment from certain accommodation. 2. The relevant facts giving rise to this Revision are these; the plaintiffs opposite parties filed a suit against the defendants-applicants which was at the relevant time pending before the learned Judge Small Causes Court, Alllahabad. The defendants-applicants put in appearance in the suit and purporting to avail themselves of the benefit under Section 20 (4) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Rent, Letting and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No. XIII of 1972) deposited in court a sum of Rupees 312/- towards arrears of rent as well as damages claimed in the suit and due up to the date of the deposit at the admitted rate of rent. 20th Nov., 1974 was fixed for the final hearing of the suit. The case was not taken up on that date and in the presence of the learned counsel for the parties, it was adjourned to 15-2-75. Thereafter, it appears that the plaintiffs opposite parties moved an application on 23-11-74 for expediting the hearing of the suit. It appears that the said application was allowed that very day and the court advanced the date of hearing of the suit from 15-2-75 to 27-1-75. The office was directed to inform the learned counsel for the parties. The learned VI Additional District & Sessions Judge. Allahabad has observed in his order: - "The office was directed to inform counsel for the parties. The plaintiffs counsel was informed of the said change in the date fixed for final hearing, and the plaintiffs counsels signature were obtained on the order-sheet." The learned Judge has further observed that "the order sheet does not bear the signatures of the defendants counsel." 3. It appears that the suit was taken up for hearing on 27-1-75, the altered date, and was heard ex parte in the absence of the defendants or their counsel. Thereafter the suit was decreed ex parte on 8-2-75, on which date the judgment was delivered. It appears that the suit was taken up for hearing on 27-1-75, the altered date, and was heard ex parte in the absence of the defendants or their counsel. Thereafter the suit was decreed ex parte on 8-2-75, on which date the judgment was delivered. On 21-2-75, the applicants moved an application for setting aside of the ex parte decree accompanied by an affidavit in which it was stated that the case was fixed for 15-2-75, on which date, the applicant Nanhey, who was looking after the case on behalf of the applicants reached the Court and contacted his counsel. The applicants counsel consulted the cause list of the Court of that date and found that the case was not amongst the cases listed for disposal on the it date, which set them on inquiry and inspection of the record, which disclosed that the suit had been decided ex parte on 8-2-75 and also that the date which was originally fixed for final hearing, namely, 15-2-75, had been changed to 27-1-75 without any information to the defendants-applicants or their counsel despite a direction given by the Court to the office that the counsel for the 'parties should be informed. The inspection further revealed that the case was heard ex parte on 27-1-75 and it was decreed ex parte on 8-2-75. It was further asserted in the affidavit that the applicants were under the impression that the date fixed in the case was 15-2-75, and they had no information or knowledge of the change in the date made by the Court at the instance of the plaintiffs opposite parties. It was asserted in the affidavit that the applicants were innocent and that the suit had been decreed for no fault or negligence of the applicants, and that they would suffer irreparable loss if under the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the applicants, the ex parte decree was not set aside. No counter-affidavit was filed in reply to this affidavit, but an objection appears to have been filed on behalf of 1he plaintiffs opposite parties in which it was asserted that the date had been changed from15-2-75 to 27-1-75 upon the expedite application of the plaintiffs opposite parties of which a copy had been given to the defendants counsel in the early hours of the day on 23-11-74, and the said application was disposed of after lunch interval. Under these circumstances, it was asserted in the objection that there was no necessity of giving any information to the counsel for the defendants. It was also asserted that the application was also liable to be dismissed for non-compliance with Section 17 of l he Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 4. The trial court rejected the application as not maintainable on the ground that the defendants applicants had presented the security bond on 18-3-75 and it was filed on 19-3-75 after thirty days had expired from the date on which the defendants applicants derived knowledge of the ex parte decree. The trial court rejected the application of the applicants on the short ground that it was not maintainable as the applicants had not complied with the requirements of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The trial court did not think it necessary to consider the application of the applicants on merits i.e. whether there was sufficient cause for the absence of the applicants on the date on which the suit was heard ex parte and later decreed in the absence of the applicants. The applicants filed a Revision before the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge also dismissed the Revision on the same ground, namely, that the defendants-applicants application not having complied with the provisions of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. it was not maintainable. In the view of the courts below, the security bond was furnished by the applicants one day after the period of limitation had expired. In the view of the courts below, the security bond should have been filed latest by or on 18-3-75. The lower revisional court has also not gone into the question of the sufficiency or otherwise of the cause for non-appearance of n the applicants on the date fixed for the hearing of the suit. 5. Aggrieved, the applicants have filed this Revision against the aforesaid order passed by the courts below. 6. The lower revisional court has also not gone into the question of the sufficiency or otherwise of the cause for non-appearance of n the applicants on the date fixed for the hearing of the suit. 5. Aggrieved, the applicants have filed this Revision against the aforesaid order passed by the courts below. 6. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted the following points for the consideration of this Court: - (1) The security bond required to be furnished under Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act having been offered for being filed on 17-3-75, its non-acceptance by the office on that date as a result of which it could be filed only on 19th March 1975 should be taken as due compliance with the provisions of Section 17 of the aforesaid Act. The application of the applicants, was, therefore, rejected by the courts below unjustifiably resulting in their failure to exercise a jurisdiction which was vested in them by law; (2) The defendants-applicants counsel not having been informed of the change in the date fixed for final hearing, the passing of the ex parte decree was the result of the mistake of the Court itself which was liable to be corrected and in such a situation compliance with the provisions of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was necessary on the principle that the mistakes or the acts of the court should prejudice no one. The Court not only had the power to set aside the ex parte decree of the facts and circumstances, but it was its duty to do so, and the exercise power' did not depend upon the provisions of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 7. Learned counsel for the opposite parties on the other hand urged that the applicants having failed to comply with the provisions of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, their application under O. 9, R. 13 was not maintainable and was, therefore, rightly rejected by the courts below. Learned counsel for the opposite parties urged that where there is a specific provision for setting aside of ex parte decree such as contained in O. 9, R. 13, C. P. C. and Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, the Court has no jurisdiction to invoke its inherent power to set aside an ex parte decree. 8. Learned counsel for the opposite parties urged that where there is a specific provision for setting aside of ex parte decree such as contained in O. 9, R. 13, C. P. C. and Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, the Court has no jurisdiction to invoke its inherent power to set aside an ex parte decree. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that the courts below have failed to exercise a jurisdiction which was vested in them by law in not setting aside the ex parte decree. In my view, it was clearly a case where as a result of the mistake of the Court, the applicants could not be present on the date on which the Court took up the case and heard it ex parte and later also decreed it in the absence of the defendants-applicants. 1 have not the least doubt that in view of the fact that on the own finding of the lower revisional court, there was nothing to indicate that the defendants counsel had been informed of the change in the date fixed for final hearing. it was clear that the suit was disposed on a date of which no intimation was given to the defendants-applicants and consequently it would be deemed to have been disposed of on a date which was not fixed for the hearing of the case. Under these circumstances, in my view, the courts below have fallen into a manifest error in taking the view that the defendants-applicants application was not maintainable because the security bond was not filed within the period prescribed by law. 9. So far as the first .point of the learned counsel for the applicants is concerned, on the finding of the courts below that the security bond was furnished on 19-3-75, it is clear that it was filed beyond the period prescribed by law. The period prescribed for filing a security bond is 30 days from the date of the decree in view of the fact that it was a case where the defendants-applicants had been served with summons of the suit. The period prescribed for filing a security bond is 30 days from the date of the decree in view of the fact that it was a case where the defendants-applicants had been served with summons of the suit. The period of limitation for an application under O. 9 R. 13, C.P.C. in such a case would, therefore, be under Art. 123 Limitation Act (thirty days from the date of the decree and not thirty days from the date of the knowledge). That being so, the security bond was clearly filed beyond thirty days of the prescribed period. 10. Learned counsel for the applicants then urged that inasmuch as he had already deposited a sum of Rupees 312/- on 23-4-73, which covered the entire arrears of rent claimed in the suit as well as due up to 23-4-74, and thereafter, he continued to deposit rent in the court month by month, he would be deemed to have deposited in court the entire amount due under the decree within the meaning of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, and consequently, even if the bond was filed after the expiry of the period of limitation, that would not render his application under O. 9, R. 13, C.P.C. incompetent. Learned counsel for the opposite party made a statement before me in the course of arguments that the amount due from the defendants-applicants up to 23-4-73 by way of arrears of rent claimed in the suit and due up to 23-4-73 was Rs. 310.10. However, learned counsel for the opposite parties urged that even if it be assumed that the defendants-applicants had deposited the entire arrears of rent and damages due under the decree, the applicants had admittedly not deposited the sum of Rupees 73/- which was the costs awarded under the decree. The decree had been prepared on 10-3-75, which showed the amount of costs as Rs. 73.05. Admittedly, the applicants have not deposited this amount. From these facts, it is clear that the applicants had not deposited with their application under O. 9, R. 13 C. P. C. or even thereafter, the entire amount due from them under a decree as required by Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 11. 73.05. Admittedly, the applicants have not deposited this amount. From these facts, it is clear that the applicants had not deposited with their application under O. 9, R. 13 C. P. C. or even thereafter, the entire amount due from them under a decree as required by Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 11. Learned counsel for the applicants then urged that the bond was tendered on 17-3-75, and consequently, even if it was filed on 19-3-75, it should have been deemed to have been filed within time. Even if it be deemed to have been filed on 17-3-75, in my view, it would still be beyond time as the limitation will have to be computed from the date of the decree, namely, 8-2-75, and not from the date of the knowledge of the decree. Therefore, the applicants had[ neither deposited the amount due under the decree, nor filed the bond prescribed by law. Thus the findings of the, court below that the defendants-applicants have not complied with Sec. 17 of, the Act cannot be interfered with in Revision. 12. However, the applicants are clearly entitled to succeed on the second submission of theirs. The defendants-applicants had filed an affidavit showing that their counsel had not been informed of the change in the date by the office from 15-2-75 to 27-1-75. The learned District Judge has clearly observed in his order that there was a specific direction by the court while allowing the expedite application on 23-11-74 that the parties counsel should be informed. There was nothing on the record to show that the defendants counsel had been informed of the change in the date of the hearing. The applicants had filed an affidavit categorically staling that their counsel had not been informed of the change in the date. No counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs opposite parties in rebuttal of the statement made on oath on behalf of the applicants. The learned District Judge has also observed that whereas there was the signature of the plaintiffs counsel on the order sheet dated 23-11-74, there was no signature of the defendants counsel on the order sheet. In this state of material on the record, I am inclined to believe that the defendants-applicants counsel had not been informed of the change in 'he date. In this state of material on the record, I am inclined to believe that the defendants-applicants counsel had not been informed of the change in 'he date. When a Court changes a date fixed for the hearing of the suit, it is its duty to ensure that counsel for the parties are informed of the change. The duty is heavier where the date is advanced to an earlier date as in the present case. Clearly, the Court failed in its duty to inform the defendants counsel of the fact that it advanced the date for hearing from 15-2-1975 to 27-1-1975. 13. Learned counsel for the opposite-parties vehemently argued that in view of the fact that the defendants counsel had been served with a copy of the expedite application in the early part of the day and further in view of the fact that under the provisions of the General Rules (Civil), the applications are taken up after lunch hours, it was the duty of the defendants counsel to be present at the time of hearing of the expedite application and to note the change in the date of hearing. Learned counsel suggested that in view of the above facts, the defendants counsel must be imputed with the knowledge of the change in the date fixed for final hearing. I do not agree. From the mere fact that the defendants counsel had been served with a copy of the expedite application (which fact it, however, denied by the defendants-applicants counsel), it did not follow that the defendants-applicants counsel should be presumed to have learnt about the change in the date. At best, it could be said that the defendants counsel should have found out whether the hearing of The suit had been expedited or not. From the failure of the defendants counsel to appear at the hearing of the expedite application, one could say only this that the defendants counsel should have presumed that the application of the plain-tiffs-opposite-parties for expediting, had been allowed. But we cannot raise a further presumption that the defendants .counsel should also be imputed with the knowledge of the actual date fixed for the hearing of this Revision. But we cannot raise a further presumption that the defendants .counsel should also be imputed with the knowledge of the actual date fixed for the hearing of this Revision. In any case, in view of the direction of the Court to the office that the counsel for the parties would be informed, and in view of the assertion made by the defendants that their counsel was not so informed, and further having regard to the admitted fact that the defendants counsels signatures are not on the order-sheet of 23-11-1975, it is clear that the office had not informed the defendants counsel. This was a mistake of the Court. Under the circumstances, it was the duty of the courts below to have corrected that mistake and they could have set aside the ex parte decree under their inherent power. For the exercise of that power, compliance with Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was wholly unnecessary. 14. In view of the fact that the court had not informed the defendants counsel of the change in the date, it cannot be deemed that the Court disposed of the suit on a date which was fixed for the hearing of the suit, and consequently the provisions oi O. 9, R. 13, C. P. C. were strictly not applicable. That being so, the defendants-applicants were not required to comply with the provisions of Sec. 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Indeed on the facts of this case, no application was required to be moved by the defendants-applicants. 15. On the aforesaid facts being brought to the notice of the Court, the Court itself should have set aside the ex parte decree on the principle "actus curiae neminem gravabit" i. e. an act of Court shall prejudice no one. This is a time honoured maxim which is fully attracted to the facts of the present case. In the case of Mohammad Ali v. Governor-General in Council reported in AIR 1949 All 36. A learned Judge of this Court held that where an appeal was dismissed for default without notice of the date of hearing to respondents, the dismissal of the appeal would not be under O. 41, R. 17 and for setting aside such a dismissal, the provisions of Art. 168 of the Limitation Act of 1908 did not apply. A learned Judge of this Court held that where an appeal was dismissed for default without notice of the date of hearing to respondents, the dismissal of the appeal would not be under O. 41, R. 17 and for setting aside such a dismissal, the provisions of Art. 168 of the Limitation Act of 1908 did not apply. It was observed in that case: "It is always open to Court and ought to be open to the Court to rectify its error. This is what the court has done." 16. The same principle has been laid down in another case of this Court in Bhagwati Prasad v. Ram Roop Tewari, reported in AIR 1962 All 622 , in which it was held that unless the dismissal of the appeal was under O. 41, R- 17, neither Rule 19 of O. 41 of C. P. C. nor Art. 168 of the Limitation Act would apply, and that in such a case, the error could be corrected by the Court in its inherent jurisdiction for which Article 168 of the Limitation Act 1908 would not stand in the way. In this case also, the appeal had been dismissed without notice to the parties or their counsel. The plea of limitation was overruled and the Court held that in such circumstances, the Court has inherent power to set aside the order in question. The ratio of the two cases mentioned above, is fully applicable to the facts of this case. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is clear that the suit was heard and disposed of ex parte without notice to the defendants-applicants or their counsel. The absence of the defendants-applicants was due to mistake of the court. The defendants-applicants should not be allowed to suffer on account of an act of the Court for which the defendants were not to be blamed. I, therefore, hold that the courts below have failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them by law in rejecting the application of the defendants-applicants on the ground that the application did not comply with the requirements of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Their orders are, therefore, liable to be set aside. I am also clearly of the view that the defendants-applicants application for setting aside of the ex parte decree ought to be allowed on the facts and circumstances mentioned above. Their orders are, therefore, liable to be set aside. I am also clearly of the view that the defendants-applicants application for setting aside of the ex parte decree ought to be allowed on the facts and circumstances mentioned above. 17. As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite parties that inherent powers cannot be invoked where they are express provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside of ex parte decree, I am of the view that on the facts of this case, the provisions of O. IX were not applicable. In my view, the suit was decreed ex parte on account of a mistake of the Court and on a date which would be deemed not to be date fixed for the hearing on the suit. Consequently, the provisions of O. 9, R. 13 C. P. C. were not applicable in terms to the present case. Moreover, the principle that where there is an express statutory provision the Court will not exercise its inherent jurisdiction is subject to another very sound principle, namely, that it should always be open to a Court to correct its own mistakes, and that no one ought to suffer as a result of an act of the Court. For all these reasons, I hold that the courts below did have jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte decree. 18. In the result, the Revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders passed by the courts below are set aside. The application of the applicants dated 21-2-1975 is allowed and the ex parte decree passed by the trial court on 8-2-1975 is set aside. The suit is restored to its original number as considerable time has elapsed since thrilling of the suit, I direct that the suit should be disposed of expeditiously without any further delay. The parties will bear their own costs.