JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - This is defendant's application in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure who is aggrieved by a decree, inter alia, for his ejectment from the premises in suit after striking out his defence. Having unsuccessfully assailed the said decree before the District Judge in a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, the applicant has approached this Court. 2. A suit was brought by the plaintiff-opposite party for the ejectment of the applicant from the premises in question on the ground that the applicant was in arrears of payment of rent for a period of several months from February, 1973 to December, 1973. The rent was claimed to be Rs. 41.25 per month. The suit was registered on January 3, 1974 when summons were directed to issue to the applicant fixing March 28, 1974, for hearing. On that date, namely, March 28, 1974, a written statement was filed by the applicant but the court could not take up the case for hearing due to some administrative work. It adjourned the case for hearing to July 4, 1974. On that date as well the court felt that the date had inadvertently been fixed and directed the case to come up for hearing on September 26, 1974. Since no time was left on account of other work on that date, the hearing was adjourned to October 10, 1974, by the court. 3. On October 10, 1974, an application (8-C) was moved by the plaintiff opposite party for striking out the defence of the applicant. In this application, it was mentioned that since under Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by U.P. Civil Law Amendment Act, the applicant was required to deposit the admitted rent on the date of the first hearing and thereafter regularly month after month and, inasmuch as, the applicant had not done so, his defence be struck off. The court passed an order on October 10, 1974 fixing October 17, 1974 as the date for the bearing of the suit and also directed that the objection to the aforesaid application of the plaintiff, Opposite party if any may be filed mean-while which would also be considered by it on that date. The court passed an order on October 10, 1974 fixing October 17, 1974 as the date for the bearing of the suit and also directed that the objection to the aforesaid application of the plaintiff, Opposite party if any may be filed mean-while which would also be considered by it on that date. The applicant filed an objection on October 17, 1974 supported by an affidavit in which he claimed that nothing was due against him when the suit was filed because the amount of rent due form him had been deposited by him under section 7-6 of U.P. Act III of 1947. It was also stated therein that he had deposited the entire rent upto August, 1974 during the pendency of the suit and that the rent for the months of September and October, 1974 had also been deposited by him subsequently. 4. The trial judge by his order dated October 17, 1974 decided to strike out the defence of the applicant. He took the view that, inasmuch as the first date of hearing of the suit was March 28, 1974, it was necessary for the applicant to have deposited the amount due from him by that date. The applicant had not done so nor had he made any representation seeking time to do so that it was on September 20, 1974 that the applicant deposited the amount upto August, 1974. In the opinion of the trial Judge, the applicant had not complied with the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by U.P. Act 37 of 1972) and his defence was, therefore, liable to be struck off. 5. After passing the aforesaid order, the court proceeded to hear the suit on merit. The plaintiff-opposite party examined himself as a witness. An application was made on behalf of the applicant for summoning certain documents. The trial Judge going of opinion that since the defence had already been struck off and further that in view of other circumstances it was not necessary to summon these counter fails, beard the arguments and fixed October, 19, 1974 as the date for delivery of Judgment. On that date, he delivered the judgment and decreed the suit against the applicant. 6. On that date, he delivered the judgment and decreed the suit against the applicant. 6. From the sequence aforesaid it is clear that even though March 28, 1974 was fixed in the summons issued to the applicant as the date for hearing of the suit, the hearing did not take place on that and the court postponed it from one date to another and eventually the suit was first heard on October 17, 1974. From the order of the trial Judge disposing of the application made by the plaintiff for striking out the defence of the applicant it is clear that on September 20, 1974 the applicant deposited the amount due in terms of Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the period ending August, 1974. On the record of the case there is a tender which was certified by the Munsarim on October 12, 1974 for a sum of Rs, 62.50 purporting to be the amount of rent at the rate of Rs. 31.25 per month which the applicant claimed to have tendered for the months of September and October, 1974. This appears to be the amount which, according to the affidavit filed by the applicant in support of his objection to the plaintiffs' application for striking out his defence, was deposited by him for the months of September and October, 1974. 7. Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it stood at the relevant time was in the following terms : "(5) Striking off defence on non-deposit of admitted rent etc. 7. Order 15 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it stood at the relevant time was in the following terms : "(5) Striking off defence on non-deposit of admitted rent etc. In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from any immovable property after the determination of his lease, and for the recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease, or of compensation for the use and occupation thereof, whether instituted before after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972, the defendant shall at "or before' the first hearing of the suit, (or in the case of a suit instituted before the commencement of the said Act, the first hearing after such commencement) deposit the entire amount of rent, or compensation for use and occupation, admitted by him to be due, and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent or compensation for use and occupation, due at the rate admitted by him, and in the event of any default in this regard, the court, may, unless after considering any representation made by him in that behalf allows him further time on security bring furnished for the amount, refuse or entertain any defence or as the case may be, strike off his defence." In its material part, it provided, that the defendant shall at or before the first hearing of the suit deposit the entire amount of rent or compensation for use and occupation, admitted by him to be due and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent or compensation at the rate admitted by him. In the event only of a default in the making of the aforesaid deposit, the court was entitled to strike off the defence of a defendant in a suit of the nature referred to in the aforesaid rule. 8. According to Shri S.P. Srivastava, learned counsel for the defendant applicant, the language used in the aforesaid rule clearly indicated that it was open to the defendant-applicant to have deposited the amount of arrears of rent etc. 8. According to Shri S.P. Srivastava, learned counsel for the defendant applicant, the language used in the aforesaid rule clearly indicated that it was open to the defendant-applicant to have deposited the amount of arrears of rent etc. at the admitted rate by the first hearing of the suit and, inasmuch as, in the instant case the first hearing of the suit took palace on October 17, 1974, the defence of the applicant could not have been struck off as had been done, since the defendant had made the requisite deposit by two tender by two tenders dated September 20, 1974 and October 12, 1974. The learned counsel has argued that that the courts below had no jurisdiction to strike out the defence of the applicant on their view that the failure of the applicant to make the deposit by March 28, 1976 and regular deposits thereafter empowered them to do so and that March 28, 1974 was the first date of hearing of the suit. 9. It has been noticed earlier that rule 5 of Order 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure used the words" at or before the first hearing of the suit" and not "at the first date of hearing of the suit". The Legislature later amended the provision by U.P. Act 28 of 1976, inter alia, by adding an explanation to rule 5 by which it provided that the expression "first hearing" means the date for filing written statement or for hearing as mentioned in the summons. 10. The present case relates to a period before the aforesaid explanation was added to rule 5 of Order 15 C.P.C. The addition is not retrospective in nature. In the case of Ladly Prasad v. Shri Ram Shah Billa and others, 1975 A.L.J. 602. a Division Bench of this Court dealt with the scope of this rule and, inter alia, observed that "Order 15 relates to disposal of suit at the first hearing. This state is arrived after the defendant had filed his written statement, the parties have been examined under Order 10, if considered necessary, to clarify the points in controversy, documents on which parties rely have been produced and admission and denial obtained ; and necessary issues framed as provided under Order 14. After the framing of the issues the case is ready for hearing. After the framing of the issues the case is ready for hearing. This is the stage when Rule 5 Order 15 comes into play. This is anterior to the stage when the parties examine their witnesses". 11. Dealing with almost similar words appearing in sub-section (4) of section 20 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 (prior to its amendment by U.P. Act 28 of 1976), another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bankey Behari v. Gopal Das, 1978(1) R.C.J. 348, observed that".........it may be profitably noticed that section 20 (4) does not use the words "date of first hearing". On the other band, it provides for the tenant being relieved of the liability for eviction if he deposits the requisite amount mentioned in that sub-section "at the first bearing of the suit". This leads, in our opinion, to the inevitable conclusion that if on a date fixed for hearing of a suit no hearing has in fact taken place and the case is adjourned for one reason of the other the failure of the defendant to deposit the amount on that date does not disentitle him to the benefit of section 20(4) of the Act as its stands amended". 12. In Mathura Prasad and another v. Vikram Jeet Singh, 1978 A.L.J. 348, the view that where a date fixed for the hearing of the suit mentioned in the summons is altered by the court to another date, the adjourned date will be deemed to be the date of first hearing for purposes of rule 5 of Order 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A deposit made by the defendant on such adjourned date would be deemed to be a deposit on the first date of bearing and the defendant would not, in such circumstances, incur the liability of striking out of his defence. 13. Striking out of the defence of a defendant in a suit is a measure of penalty and should be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances. The object of rule 5 of Order 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by U.P. Act 37 of 1972, clearly was to ensure that by the time a suit filed by a lessor came to be heard on merits, his interest, at least to the extent of the liability admitted by the lessee, be secured. The object of rule 5 of Order 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by U.P. Act 37 of 1972, clearly was to ensure that by the time a suit filed by a lessor came to be heard on merits, his interest, at least to the extent of the liability admitted by the lessee, be secured. In that context, it would be reasonable to consider the words "at or before the first hearing as "meaning" by the time of first hearing" of the suit. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-opposite party that once a defendant chooses to make a deposit prior to the date of the first hearing of the suit he must, in order to escape the liability of the striking out of his defence, continue to deposit the admitted amount regularly and that his failure to do so even during the period anterior to the first hearing of the suit would render him liable for the striking out of his defence, cannot be accepted. The right of a defendant to deposit the amount admittedly due from him upto last moment when the case is taken up for hearing for the first time and to be able to defend the suit on merits flows from the plain and natural meaning of the words "at or before the first hearing" of the suit. If, as held by me, it is open to a lessee to make the deposit contemplated by rule 5 of Order 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the time the first hearing of the suit takes place, it would be curtailing that right if, on the acceptance of the submission made by the learned counsel 1 for the plaintiff-opposite party, it were to be held that once the defendant has made some payment on a date anterior to the date of the first hearing of the suit, it would not be open to him to defer the payment of the remaining amount by the time of the first hearing of the suit. 14. 14. The courts below, in the instant case, have proceeded on the assumption that it was incumbent upon the applicant to have deposited the entire admitted amount due from him by March 28, 1974, the date which was initially fixed in the summons for the hearing of the suit, and to have there after deposited every month the amount admittedly due from him by way of monthly rent. The suit was, consequently, tried after striking out of the applicant's defence. In the view that I have taken, it is apparent that it was open to the applicant to deposit the amount admittedly due from him by the first hearing of the suit, namely by October 17, 1974, the date to which the court had eventually adjourned the hearing of the suit on merits and had actually taken up the suit for disposal. Since there is some dispute about the adequacy of the amount deposited by the defendant-applicant, particularly, about the deposit made through tender dated October 12, 1974, it would be necessary to require the trial Judge to go into this question and to find out as a fact as to whether the entire amount admittedly due from the applicant stood paid by the applicant by October 17, 1974, the date when the suit was first heard by him. If it is so, the suit will have to be tried afresh after considering the defence of the applicant. 15. In the result, the application in revision succeeds and is allowed. The decisions of the courts below are set aside and the case is sent back to the trial Judge for disposal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of observations made by me above. The suit, having been filed in the year 1974, deserves to be expeditiously disposed of - For that purpose the record of the case may be remitted forthwith to the trial Judge who is directed to try and dispose of the matter within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the record. Costs on parties.