JUDGMENT : P.K. Mohanti, J. - The Second Appeal is by the Plaintiffs against a reversing decree. The suit was for a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from taking possession of a house sold in execution of a decree for damages. The question of law raised in the appeal is whether a decree for damages passed against a Hindu father is an Avyavaharika debt and the sons have no liability under the rule of pious obligation to pay the same. 2. The facts lending to the litigation may be shortly stated as follows: Dharmu Sabato had three sons named Krushna, Bauri and Dasarathi. The Plaintiffs-Appellants ate the sons of Krushna. Title Suit No 3 of 1950 was filed by Krushna in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Berhampur against his father and brothers for partition of the joint family properties. A final decree for partition was passed on compromise allotting to each share one or more houses, besides other properties. A particular house was allotted to the share of Dharmu. He gifted away the same to Bauri (Respondent No. 1) by a registered deed of gift dated 15-6-1958. Dasarathi was found in possession of that house and he did not give up possession. Bauri obtained an order for recovery of possession of the house and also filed Money Suit No. 21 of 1961 for recovery of mesne profits from Dasarathi. During the pendency of the suit and the eviction proceeding against Dasarathi, the said house was forcibly occupied by Krushna on 7-2-1960. He was evicted from the house on 15-7-1962 by process of Court. Then Bauri instituted Money Suit No. 84 of 1963 for recovery of damages of Rs. 522/- from Krushna and obtained a decree. In execution of the decree the suit house which is one of the houses allotted to Krushna's branch was purchased by Bauri in Court sale. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs-Appellants filed the suit on the allegation that the decree was not binding on them and that only their father's 1/l0th undivided interest in the property passed by the Court sale. 3. The defence in the suit was that the decree for damages is not Avyavaharika debt and therefore it is binding on the Plaintiffs under the rule of pious obligation. 4. The trial Court relying on a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the ease of Sheodhar Mahton and Others Vs. 3. The defence in the suit was that the decree for damages is not Avyavaharika debt and therefore it is binding on the Plaintiffs under the rule of pious obligation. 4. The trial Court relying on a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the ease of Sheodhar Mahton and Others Vs. Sitaram Mahton and Others accepted the contention of the Plaintiffs and granted a decree for permanent injunction as sought for. The appellate Court distinguished the Patna decision on facts and came to hold as follows: Liabilities such as this arising between parties in disputes of a civil nature, especially between brothers fighting a partition litigation can in no case be regarded as opposed to good morals or unjust or dishonest so as to become Avyavaharika debt.... Upon such findings the appellate Court reversed the decree of the trial Court. 5. The fundamental rule is that a Hindu son is not liable for a debt contracted by his father which is Avyavaharika The question which requires consideration is whether a decree for damages passed against a Hindu father is Avyavaharika debt. 6. In the case at Palanivel Ramasubramania Pillay and Another, by mother Muthammal Vs. Sivakami Ammal a Division Bench took the view that it was not essential for the son to prove criminal liability against the father in respect of the debt in question in order to claim exemption from payment of such debt. It was pointed out that the son can claim immunity only when the father's conduct is utterly repugnant to good morals or is grossly unjust or is flagrantly dishonest. 7. The above decision was referred to in a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the ease of Govindprasad Vasudevprasad Tiwari Vs. Raghunathprasad Indraprasad Manolikar. In that case, it was held that where a person in possession of property, to which he was not entitled, disposes of that property and deprives the rightful owner of that property, his conduct is dishonest and the son is not liable for the debt arising out of his conduct. Raghunathprasad Indraprasad Manolikar. In that case, it was held that where a person in possession of property, to which he was not entitled, disposes of that property and deprives the rightful owner of that property, his conduct is dishonest and the son is not liable for the debt arising out of his conduct. Beaumont, C.J. in the course of' the judgment, observed: ...I would rather myself express the rule as being that the son can claim immunity, when he proves that the debt of the father was of a character which was illegal, dishonest or immoral though I appreciate that difficult cases may arise in the application of such a rule.... Wassoodew, J., in his concurring judgment, referring to the question about the liability of the son, observed that the answer to that question must depend upon the nature and character of the act itself which results in the liability enforceable at law and the Court has to consider whether at the point of time when the accrual of the right takes place the act is "Avyavaharika". Lokur, J., while considering the conduct of the father in disposing of the property, to which he was not entitled, observed that his conduct was certainly opposed to good morals and the son could not be held liable for the debt arising out of such conduct of his father. 8. The principle laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of AIR 1943 142 (Privy Council), is as follows: The translation of the term avyavaharika debt used in Hindu Law, by Colebrock as debts for a cause repugnant to good morals makes the nearest approach to the true conception of the term and may well be taken to represent its correct meaning. 9. The decision of the Privy Council was referred to in the case of S.M. Jakati and Another Vs. S.M. Borkar and Others. Their Lordships also observed that the translation of the term "avyavaharika" given by Colebrock may well be taken to represent its correct meaning and that the term did not admit of a more precise definition. 10. In the case of Sheodhar Mahton and Others Vs. Sitaram Mahton and Others a Full Bench of the Patna High Court on a careful consideration of the authorities bearing on the subject held as follows: ... 10. In the case of Sheodhar Mahton and Others Vs. Sitaram Mahton and Others a Full Bench of the Patna High Court on a careful consideration of the authorities bearing on the subject held as follows: ... while considering the liability of the son under the rule of pious obligation in Hindu Law to pay the debt of his father, the facts the circumstances and the conduct of the father antecedent to the incurring of the debt if question could be looked into to ascertain the nature and the character of the debt so as to be binding on the son as being not 'Avyavaharika'. In that case, one Tribeni Mahto, without any semblance of claim, forcibly dispossessed the Mahanth of a Math from the Mal h properties and enjoyed the usufructs the same, along with others who sided with him in forcibly dispossessing the Mahanth. In the suit brought by the Mahanth for recovery of possession, it was held that the Defendants including Tribeni Mahto, were wrongfully in possession of the Math properties and were liable for mesne profits. On ascertainment of the mesne profits, a decree was passed against those Defendants and that decree was ultimately sought to be executed after the death of Tribeni Mahto, against his son and grandsons. It was held that the conduct of Tribeni Mahto in forcibly dispossessing the Mahanth and retaining possession of the Math properties was grossly unjust and flagrantly dishonest. Accordingly, It was held that the son and grandsons had no liability under the theory of pious obligation to pay the same. 11. The Patna decision was relied upon by a learned Single Judge of this Court In the case of Sri Bimala Thakurani and Anr. v. Kashinath Panda and Ors 1976 (1) C.W.R. 419. 12. In Pareman Dass v. Bhattu Mahton ILR (1897) Cal. 672, a decree for damages was sought to be executed against the sons in respect of the joint family properties the Court held that the sons were not in a pious duty to pay the debt and therefore the interest of the sons would not be sold in execution. 13. 12. In Pareman Dass v. Bhattu Mahton ILR (1897) Cal. 672, a decree for damages was sought to be executed against the sons in respect of the joint family properties the Court held that the sons were not in a pious duty to pay the debt and therefore the interest of the sons would not be sold in execution. 13. The principle deducible from the above decisions is that if the debt of the father is of a character which was illegal, dishonest or immoral, it is an avyavaharika debt .and the sons have no liability under the theory of pious obligation to pay the same. The facts, circumstances and the conduct of the father are to be looked into to ascertain the nature and character of the debt. 14. In the present case, there is no controversy that the house was allotted to the share of Dharmu Sabto by a lawful compromise entered into between the parties. Dharmu gifted away the same in favour of Baud by a registered deed of gift dated 16-6-1958. Krushna was found in possession of the house on 7-2-1960 and was evicted therefrom on 15-7-1962 Money Suit No. 84/63 filed by Bauri was resisted by Krushna on false allegations. Firstly, his defence was that according to the terms of compromise Dharmu could not alienate the house without permission of the Court and secondly, that he was inducted as a tenant by Dharmu in respect of that house. This defence failed both in the Court of first instance and also in the Court of appeal. The concurrent view taken by both the trial Court and the appellate Court was that Bauri was the lawful owner of the house and Krushna was a trespasser in respect of the same and was liable for damages. 15. It is thus manifest that though Krushna had no semblance of title to the house, he forcibly possessed the same at a time when an eviction proceeding and a suit for mesne profits filed against Dasarathi were pending. He did not give up possession for about two and half years until he was evicted by process of Court. 1 here could be no justification for his conduct in forcibly possessing the house and retaining possession for such a long period and depriving the lawful owner of the benefits thereof. He did not give up possession for about two and half years until he was evicted by process of Court. 1 here could be no justification for his conduct in forcibly possessing the house and retaining possession for such a long period and depriving the lawful owner of the benefits thereof. Retention of the property for such a long period was for dishonest purpose. The defence taken in Money Suit No. 84 of 1963 was also dishonest. Thus, the conduct at Krushna was grossly unjust, dishonest and repugnant to good morals. That being so, the decree obtained against him is in the nature at an Avyavaharika debt for which the sons are not personally liable under the theory at pious obligation. 16. The trial Court, on a consideration of the facts, circumstances and the conduct of Krushna, took the correct view in holding that the act of trespass was unjust and dishonest. The appellate Court reversed the decree of the trial Court without keeping in mind the well established principles of law and without considering the facts, circumstances and the conduct of the father incurring the debt. 17. In view of my above findings, I allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the appellate Court and restore that of the trial Court. In the circumstances, I direct both the parties to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed. Final Result : Allowed