ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Rae Bareili camp at Gorakhpur dated 23-9-1971, whereby the revision petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends before me that the disputed land was given to the contesting opposite parties in lieu of money, hence his possession is in the nature of permissive possession and the consolidation authorities have patently erred in recognising the claim of the contesting opposite parties as a tenure-holder. 3. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has tried to refute the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. According to him the contesting opposite parties were recorded in the basic year as tenure-holder and the petitioner had come before the consolidation authorities with the allegations that the possession of the contesting opposite parties was in lieu of money and when the petitioner failed to establish his claim he cannot make any legitimate grievance against the decision of the consolidation authorities. According to him, the appellate authority repelled the claim of the petitioner also on the ground that the money advanced by the petitioner stood repaid before the enforcement of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, hence the claim of the contesting opposite parties was rightly accepted by the appellate authority. 4. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. When the petitioner has given contradictory statement of his allegations in the objection and the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not accepted the case set up by the petitioner, it is difficult for me to say that the impugned judgment suffers from any manifest error. 5. Ordinarily if a person, who comes into possession with permission, his possession does not become adverse unless he delivers back possession to the tenure-holder who had permitted him to occupy a particular piece of land. In the present case, if the money borrowed was paid to the person concerned and during the period when the deed was operative, the possession might be permissive but if the money had been paid, thereafter the possession of the person continuing cannot be termed to be possession with the consent of the licensor. In the present case, if the money borrowed was paid to the person concerned and during the period when the deed was operative, the possession might be permissive but if the money had been paid, thereafter the possession of the person continuing cannot be termed to be possession with the consent of the licensor. It is a natural inference that when the money is paid the so-called permission is withdrawn and if fresh permission is granted it is for the party to allege the same and to prove the same. I do not think that the petitioner has taken such stand before the consolidation authorities that he had permitted the contesting opposite parties to remain in possession over the property after having paid the money to them. In this view of the matter, if the possession of the contesting opposite parties was considered in their own right and the claim of their tenancy right was recognised by the consolidation authorities, I am not inclined to hold that the judgment suffers from any manifest error. 6. For the reasons given above, the writ petition lacks merits and it is accordingly dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.