judgment Amareswari, J.- This is an unfortunate case of a gruesome crime alleged to have been committed by an irate son, who axed his mother to death for not obliging him with the money demanded by him. 2. The sole accused in Sessions Case No. 40 of 1971 on the file of the Court of Session, Prakasham Division, Ongole, is the appellant. He was convicted under section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to imprisonment for life. 3. The case of the prosecution is: Kalluri Venkamma, the deceased in this case, is a resident of Kandukur in Prakasham District. Kalluri Mallikharjuna Rao the accused is her son. Kanchivardhanamma (P.W.1) is the daughter of the deceased. The deceased her daughter P.W. 1 and the accused were living in the Southern portion of the house belonging to P. W. 8 taken on rent. P.W. 8 and his family were residing in the Northern portion of the house. P.W. 9, the elder son of the deceased was living separately with his wife. The accused was frequently asking the deceased his mother for money and the latter was pleading her inability. On 11th January, 1977 as usual, the appellant asked his mother to give some money at about 11 a.m. The deceased told him. that she had no money. On the same day at about 3-30 p.m. P.W. 1 the daughter of the deceased and P. W. 3, the landlady i.e., the wife of P.W. 8 were sitting in the front verandah, which is common to both the portions. The appellant came at that time and asked his sister P.W. 1 for some drinking water and P.W. 1 brought the same. The appellant having taken it handed over the empty tumbler to P.W. 1 who went inside the house to place the empty glass. P.W. 3, the landlady was going towards her house portion of the verandah and she heard cry as “Amma” “Ayya”. She turned back and looked at the front yard and saw the deceased lying on the ground in the front verandah and the accused was holding an axe in his hand (M.O.8). The accused again hit the deceased on the head with an axe. On seeing the incident, P.W. 3 became unconscious. She turned back and looked at the front yard and saw the deceased lying on the ground in the front verandah and the accused was holding an axe in his hand (M.O.8). The accused again hit the deceased on the head with an axe. On seeing the incident, P.W. 3 became unconscious. P.W. 2., the daughter of P.W. 3, who was inside the house on hearing the cry of the deceased came out to the front verandah and saw the deceased lying there and also the accused standing by her side with an axe in his hand. As P.W. 3 was falling down unconscious she helped her mother and took her inside their house. P.W. 4 who was at a nearby cinema Hall, went to the scene of offence on hearing the cries of P.W. 1. P.Ws. 6 and 7, who are the employees in the rice mill belonging to the deceased also rushed to the scene of offence on being informed by P.W. 1 that the appellant was beating her mother. On reaching the scene of offence, P.W.4 bandaged the wounds of the deceased as she was still having some life, but shortly thereafter the deceased succumbed to the injuries. P.W. 8, the owner of the house and who is working as a Head Clerk in the Taluk Office in the same place, who was by then informed that his wife becoming unconscious went home. After regaining conciousness P.W. 3 informed that she saw the appellant hitting the deceased with an axe and on seeing the incident, she became unconscious. P.W. 1, the daughter of the deceased went to the Police Station, Kandukur at about 4 p.m. and gave a report Exhibit P-1 to the Sub-Inspector of Police.P.W. 12. He registered the F.I.R.Exhibit P-14 and proceeded to the scene of occurrence. P.W. 12, the Sub-Inspector of Police and P.W. 14, the Inspector of Police, Kandukur, immediately proceeded to the scene of offence, saw the dead body of the deceased and also the axe (M.O.8) which was by her side. The appellant was found to be absconding. After holding the inquest, the dead body of the deceased was sent for post-mortem examination. P.W. 10, the lady Medical Officer, Kandukur conducted the post-mortem examination on 12th January, 1977 at 9-00 a.m. and found four incised wounds. The appellant was found to be absconding. After holding the inquest, the dead body of the deceased was sent for post-mortem examination. P.W. 10, the lady Medical Officer, Kandukur conducted the post-mortem examination on 12th January, 1977 at 9-00 a.m. and found four incised wounds. She opined that the deceased died due to the injuries which might have been caused with a weapon like M.O.8 Exhibit P-13 is the post-mortem certificate, After completing the investigation P.Ws. 12 and 14 laid the charge-sheet. The accused was ultimately found on 4th February, 1977, at Ongole. When examined under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code, the appellant pleaded that he cannot say anything about the offence and he wanted an adjournment. As the appellant refused to co-operate with the Court, the Sessions Judge himself cross-examined the witnesses and appointed one senior advocate at Kandukur by name Mr. Ranga Rao as amicus curiae to argue the case. 4. On an appreciation of the evidence on record, learned Sessions Judge found the accused guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. The learned Sessions Judge relied upon the evidence of P.W. 3, who is a direct witness and also on the evidence of P.Ws.2,4 and 8 who corroborated P.W. 1 on material particulars. 5. In this appeal, the learned Counsel for the appellant Mr. A. Venkata Ramana made two submissions. The first submission was that there is no acceptable evidence on record to connect the accused with the crime and it is unsafe to rely upon the solitary evidence of P.W.3. The second submission is that the entire trial is vitiated inasmuch as the Sessions Judge has not assigned a lawyer to the appellant and thereby violated the mandatory provisions of section 304, Criminal Procedure Code (as amended by the amending Act II of 1974). 6. We will first take up the first plea which relates to the merits of the case. The main stay of the prosecution is in the evidence of P.W. 3, the landlady. The deceased was undoubtedly living in the Southern portion of the house belonging to P.W. 3 along with her daughter P.W. 1 and the accused and P.W. 3 were living in the Northern portion of the house along with her husband (P.W. 8) and daughter (P.W. 2). The deceased was undoubtedly living in the Southern portion of the house belonging to P.W. 3 along with her daughter P.W. 1 and the accused and P.W. 3 were living in the Northern portion of the house along with her husband (P.W. 8) and daughter (P.W. 2). P.W. 3 deposed that on 11th January, 1977, the appellant quarrelled with the deceased at about 11 a.m. when she refused to give him money and that at 3.30 p.m. when she was sitting in the front verandah which is common to both the portions along with P.W. 1, the appellant came and asked P.W. 1 for some water and after drinking the same P.W. 1 went inside the house to keep the glass and when P.W. 3 got up to go into the portion of her house she heard an alarming cry “Amma” “Ayya” and when turned back she saw the deceased lying on the ground and the accused holding an axe in his hand and that the appellant hit the deceased again and on seeking the incident she fell down unconscious. P.W. 2 the daughter of P.W. 3, who was at that time inside the house came out of the house immediately on hearing the cries and saw the deceased lying on the front yard and the accused standing by her side with axe in his hand and she helped her mother and took her inside the house. Thereafter P.W. 8 stated that on coming to know that his wife fell down unconscious came there and after gaining consciousness P.W. 3 told him that the appellant had beaten the deceased with an axe on her head and on seeing the deceased she became unconscious. The evidence of P.W. 3 cannot be disregarded for any reason whatsoever. She is the landlady and admittedly residing in the Northern portion of the same house while the deceased was residing in the Southern portion. There is no reason of any kind for P.W. 3 to give false evidence. Her presence at the scene of occurrence cannot be doubted for the simple reason that she is residing in the same house and according to her she was sitting in the verandah which is common to both portions. To a question put by the Court whether the appellant asked her any money at any time, she replied that the appellant never demanded her for any money. To a question put by the Court whether the appellant asked her any money at any time, she replied that the appellant never demanded her for any money. She also stated that she saw the accused hitting the deceased and became unconscious on seeing that ghostly scene. The evidence of P.W. 3 does not suffer from any infirmities from the evidence of P.W. 3. We feel that the witness was giving a natural and correct version of the incident that she saw on that fateful day. Thus though the entire evidence of the prosecution depends upon the evidence of the single witness. P.W. 3 we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that it is absolutely safe to rely upon her evidence and the only conclusion possible from her evidence is that it is the appellant and the appellant alone that killed the deceased. P.W. 1, who no doubt in the first instance went and reported to the Police (Exhibit P-1) later gave a different version in the Court. She was treated as hostile by the prosecution. We can very well understand the conduct of P.W. 1 in deposing contrary to what she was stated in Exhibit P-1. P.W. 1 is no other than the sister of the appellant. When she saw the incident her first inclination was to go and report to the police about her brother killing her mother. As days passed she went back upon that version in order to save the appellant, her own brother having lost her mother, who under any circumstances cannot be revived, she might have thought of at least helping her brother by going back upon the first information report. We are not surprised at this conduct of P.W. 1 as in many cases we find that where a member of the family is killled by another member of the same family though a first report was given about the culprit, later as time passes, the informant goes back upon the earlier version with a view to save the culprit realising that under any circumstances the person dead is gone for ever. Then we have the evidence of P.W. 8, the husband of P.W. 3, who was a clerk in the Taluq Office, we deposed that he came to the house on being informed that his wife became unconscious. Then we have the evidence of P.W. 8, the husband of P.W. 3, who was a clerk in the Taluq Office, we deposed that he came to the house on being informed that his wife became unconscious. After she gained consciousness, she informed him that she became unconscious as she saw the appellant beating his mother with an axe and that she was unable to see the ghostly scene. From the evidence of these three witnesses we have no doubt that it was the appellant who was responsible for the death of the deceased. 7. The second contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the trial is vitiated as no lawyer was appointed by the Court to defend the appellant during the trial even though he was unrepresented by an advocate. The submission of Mr. A. Venkatat ramana is that under section 304 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is obligatory for the Court to assign a pleader for the accused, who is not represented by a pleader. He submits that this provision was newly introduced in order to provide legal aid to an accused in cases which are triable by a Court of Sessions as the Legislature thought that the cases which are triable by a Court of Sessions are serious in nature and in every case where the accused is not represented by a pleader, it is mandatory on the part of the Court to engage one for him. In order to appreciate this argument it is necessary to refer to section 304, Criminal Procedure Code, as introduced in the year 1973, which is as follows: “304. Legal aid to accused at State expense in certain cases-(1) Where, in a trial before the Court of Session, the accused is not represented by a pleader, and where it appears to the Court that the accused has not sufficient means to engage a pleader, the Court shall assign a pleader for his defence at the expense of the State.” 8. From a reading of the section it is clear that it is not in every case which is triable by a Court of Sessions and the accused is not represented by a pleader the Court is under an obligation to engage a pleader for his defence at the expense of the state. In order to attract section 304, Criminal Procedure Code, two conditions must be satisfied. In order to attract section 304, Criminal Procedure Code, two conditions must be satisfied. (1) the accused is not represented by a pleader and (2) the Court must be satisfied that the accused had no sufficient means to engage a pleader. If both these conditions are satisfied, it is mandatory on the part of the Court to assign a pleader for his defence at the expense of the State. We cannot accept the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that in every case where the accused is not represented by a pleader the Court is bound to engage a pleader at the expense of the State. It is significant to note that the word used is “and” and not “or” and having regard to the context in which it is used, cannot read the expression “and” as “or”. If “and” has to be read as “or” and the Court has to appoint a pleader at the expense of the State in every case where the accused is not represented by a pleader, the latter part of the section 304 namely, that where the accused had no sufficient means to engage a pleader becomes unnecessary and surplusage. If the objects and reasons are of any guidance, we find that it was for the defence of indigent accused this provision was made so that mere poverty may not stand in the way of adequate defence in a proceeding which may result in deprivation of liberty or property or loss of reputation and the denial to the indigent of the benefit of Counsel's examination of the record, marshalling of arguments on his behalf, is nothing less than denial of justice. “The indigent, has where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual”. The object of the section seems to be clear that it was introduced only to help persons who cannot afford to engage lawyers and to aid the indigent accused in conduct of their defence. The Court must be satisfied that the accused does not have the means to engage a pleader. Therefore, we cannot accept the extreme proposition canvassed by the learned Counsel for the appellant that in every trial before a Court of Session where the accused is unrepresented, the Court is under an obligation to engage a pleader at the expense of the State. Therefore, we cannot accept the extreme proposition canvassed by the learned Counsel for the appellant that in every trial before a Court of Session where the accused is unrepresented, the Court is under an obligation to engage a pleader at the expense of the State. It is only where the accused does not have sufficient means to engage a pleader it becomes obligatory of the part of the Court to engage a pleader at the expense of the State. The learned Counsel for the appellant has also relied upon Article 21 of the Constitution of India and submitted that no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law and that the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and the right to state his case and comment on the prosecution on evidence are part of the procedure established by law. It is true that Article 21 of the Constitution contemplates that no person can be deprived of liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. What is that law, and what is the procedure established by law? The law is the Code of Criminal Procedure and the procedure is what is contemplated by section 304. The said section does not prescribe that it shall be the duty of the Court to appoint a Counsel to defend the accused in every case, but directs that a Counsel should be appointed at the expense of the State where the accused has no sufficient means to engage one. No doubt the provision in section 304 is beneficial legislation inspired by Article 21 of the Constitution of India and all beneficial legislation is to be liberally interpreted in favour of the subject, but we cannot do so in view of the express clear and unequivocal language used in section 304 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the present case the evidence of P.W. 9 the elder brother of the accused clearly shows that the undivided family of the accused and P.W. 9 possesses a rice mill and 10 acres of dry land besides 400 gadis of vacant site. From this evidence it does not appear, that the accused has no means to engage a lawyer. But nevertheless the Commital Magistrate has sent a report that the appellant was not in a position to engage a lawyer, as nobody was evincing interest at that time. From this evidence it does not appear, that the accused has no means to engage a lawyer. But nevertheless the Commital Magistrate has sent a report that the appellant was not in a position to engage a lawyer, as nobody was evincing interest at that time. We are therefore inclined to proceed on the assumption that the accused was an indigent person. Then the question is whether there was any breach of section 304, Criminal Procedure Code, in the present case. 9. The case was posted for trial to 15th July, 1977, before the Sessions Court. The case docket shows that the appellant represented to the Sessions Court that the case may be adjourned by one month. It was adjourned to 16th August, 1977. Again at the request of the appellant, the case was adjourned to 15th September, 1977. On that day the appellant gave a petition to transfer the case either to the High Court or to the Supreme Court and on his request the case was again adjourned to 22nd September, 1977. On that day the accused represented that this case should be adjourned till his other matters are disposed of before the High Court and the Supreme Court. The case was adjourned to 23rd September, 1977. As the appellant did not engage a lawyer on 23rd September, 1977, the Sessions Judge asked the appellant whether he would like to engage a pleader or whether he wants a lawyer to be engaged at the expense of the State. The appellant submitted that he wants to argue his own case and that he does not want any pleader. The case was posted to 24th September, 1977. The question for consideration is whether in these circumstances there was any breach of the provisions of section 304, Criminal Procedure Code. From the facts referred to above it is clear that the learned Sessions Judge specifically asked the accused whether he would like to have a lawyer engaged at the expense of the State and the accused replied that he wants to argue his case in person and that he does not wantany pleader. From the facts referred to above it is clear that the learned Sessions Judge specifically asked the accused whether he would like to have a lawyer engaged at the expense of the State and the accused replied that he wants to argue his case in person and that he does not wantany pleader. The learned Counsel for the appellant submits that even if the accused is not willing for the appointment of a lawyer at the expense of the State, still it is the bounden duty of the Court and obligatory on the part of the Court to appoint a lawyer at the expense of the State where the accused is unrepresented He submits that a liberal interpretation has to be given to section 304, Criminal Procedure Code, which by itself is mandatory especially in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Even giving the widest interpretation to section 304, Criminal Procedure Code, read with Article 21 of the Constitution of India and even it is said that in every case where the accused is unrepresented by a lawyer, it is the duty of the Court to engage a lawyer at the expense of the State, still we cannot accede to the proposition that a lawyer has to be imposed on an unwilling accused. Where the accused submits that he wants to argue his own case and expresses his unwillingness to have any pleader it cannot be said either there is violation of section 304, Criminal Procedure Code or Article 21 of the Constitution of India if the Court does not assign a lawyer to him. The right given to the accused cannot be extended to impose a Counsel on the unwilling accused. If the accused himself wants to argue in person and if he does not want a pleader to defend him, no Court can appoint a Counsel to represent him. The accused has as much a right to say that either he wants to argue his own case or he does not want any lawyer to defend him. If the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant is to be accepted it would amount to depriving the accused of the right to defend himself. The accused has as much a right to say that either he wants to argue his own case or he does not want any lawyer to defend him. If the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant is to be accepted it would amount to depriving the accused of the right to defend himself. We have no doubt in our minds that neither section 304, Criminal Procedure Code, nor Article 21 of the Constitution of India, can be construed in a manner which would defeat the very purpose for which the right is conferred on him. As observed by a Division Bench of this Court in Sessions Judge, Nellore v. J. Ramana Reddy1 the Court may appoint a Counsel to act as amicus curiae to assist the Court, but he cannot represent accused when he does not want and the only way in which the Court may protect the accused is to put necessary questions to the prosecution witnesses on matters requiring clarifications. In the present case the Sessions Judge has engaged one of the Senior Advocate as amicus curiae to assist the Court at the time of arguments and the judge himself put necessary questions to the prosecution witnesses as the appellant had refused to cross-examine the witnesses. The Sessions Judge has also stated in his judgment that on every day when the case was posted for prosecution evidence he was repeatedly asking the accused as to whether he agreed for the appointment of a defence lawyer at the expense of the State and the accused was consistently refusing to have any assistance. In these circumstances, we find that there is no breach of section 304 of the Criminal Procedure Code or violation of any right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 10. For all the reasons given above, we find no merits in this appeal it is accordingly dismissed. The conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court are confirmed. G.S.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.