ORDER K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is a defendants-applicants revision filed against the judgment of the 3rd Additional District Judge Aligarh dated 3-12-1977 dismissing a revision filed by the defendant-applicant under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. 2. The defendant was a tenant of a building of which the plaintiff was the owner. As 1he defendant remained in arrears of rent since Sept. 1, 1969, the plaintiff Sent a notice of demand of arrears of rent and termination of tenancy to the defendant which was received by the defendant on June 10, 1970. The defendant did not pay the rent. Hence the plaintiff filed the suit. 3. The defendant contested the suit and claimed that she was not in arrears of rent and as such she was not liable to ejectment. She claimed that before the notice of demand was served on her she had sent a money order on May 12, 1970 for Rs. 112/- in favour of M/s. Bhajan Lal Babu Lal. The plaintiff did not receive the said amount despite the fact that it had been tendered to him. It was thereafter again sent on May 25, 1970 by money order to the plaintiff. As he had refused to accept the same, the defendant could not be treated to be in arrears of rent. 4. Holding that the money order dated 12th May, 1970 for Rs. 112/- had been sent to a wrong person and not to the plaintiff, the Judge, Small Cause Court held that the defendant could take no advantage of that remittance. With respect to the money order dated 25th May 1970, the view taken by the Judge, Small Cause Court was that as it had not been tendered to the plaintiff, the Judge Small Cause Court found that the endorsement "refused" made on the money order was incorrect and as such no liability could be fastened on the plaintiff. 5. The defendant took up the matter in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. In revision, the learned Additional District Judge agreed with the finding given by the Judge, Small Cause Court. He found that the defendant was in arrears of rent. As he did not pay the same within the prescribed period, he was liable to eviction. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the defendant filed the present revision. 6. In revision, the learned Additional District Judge agreed with the finding given by the Judge, Small Cause Court. He found that the defendant was in arrears of rent. As he did not pay the same within the prescribed period, he was liable to eviction. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the defendant filed the present revision. 6. The only point that had been raised in the revision was that the courts below misconstrued the meaning of the expression "in arrears of rent" used in Section 3(1) (a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and acted illegally in the exercise of jurisdiction by decreeing the suit. 7. Before actually dealing with the point, it appears necessary to mention that the defendant had, admittedly, not remitted the rent to the plaintiff within a period of one month after the receipt of the notice of demand on 10-6-1970. He entirely relied upon the earlier remittance dated 25th May, 1970. In respect of this very amount, a money order had been sent on 12th May, 1970 in the name of a Firm M/s. Bhajan Lal Babu Lal Kishan Lal. The plaintiff, who is the owner of the house, was admittedly not its payee. Consequently, the defendant could take no advantage of the first, remittance. In fact, the defendants counsel did not place any reliance upon the first money order, which had been sent on 12th May, 1970. Reliance had been entirely placed on the second money order, sent on 20th May, 1970. In respect of this remittance, the case was that the defendant had deposited the same under Section 7-C of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, before the Munsif alleging that as the defendant had refused to accept the money order, he was depositing the same under Sub-sec. (1) of Section 7-C of the aforesaid Act. The Munsif rejected the application on the ground that the defendant did not prove that the rent had been refused by the landlord. Against the said order, the defendant filed a revision in this Court. The revision was dismissed on 6-12-1973 on the ground that as in the application, filed under Section 7-C, there -was no averment that the plaintiff had refused to accept this rent, the application was not maintainable. Against the said order, the defendant filed a revision in this Court. The revision was dismissed on 6-12-1973 on the ground that as in the application, filed under Section 7-C, there -was no averment that the plaintiff had refused to accept this rent, the application was not maintainable. The High Court also held that on the materials brought on record in the proceedings under Section 7-C the defendant had failed to establish that, the rent remitted on 25-5-1970 had been refused by the plaintiff. 8. The controversy of refusal of rent had, however, been further raised in the present proceedings. The learned Munsif accepted the evidence of the plaintiff and found that the rent had not been refused by the plaintiff. In revision, the Additional District Judge agreed with the finding of the Judge. Small Cause Court and held that even if there was a presumption in favour of the endorsement, made on the money order, the evidence brought by the plaintiff on the record, established that he w-as not. in town and that money order had not been refused by him. The Additional District Judge found that, as the second remittance had not been refused by the plaintiff, the defendant was in arrears of rent, having not paid the same within a period of one month of the receipt of notice. 9. Counsel appearing for the defendant, however, contended that even if it was taken against him that the money order had not been refused by the plaintiff, the suit of the plaintiff could not be decreed. Inasmuch as a suit on the ground of default can be decreed, only if the defendant is in arrears of rent, but as the defendant had remitted the money order before the notice of demand had been served on him on 10th June, 1970, he could not be held to be a defaulter. His submission further was that law does not permit a landlord to manufacture a ground for ejecting a tenant. He urged that if the interpretation placed by the plaintiff on the expression "in .arrears of rent" was accepted, the safeguard, provided by the U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947, to a tenant, would become meaningless. 10. His submission further was that law does not permit a landlord to manufacture a ground for ejecting a tenant. He urged that if the interpretation placed by the plaintiff on the expression "in .arrears of rent" was accepted, the safeguard, provided by the U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947, to a tenant, would become meaningless. 10. Before I deal with the point, argued by the learned counsel, I wish to note that the present revision had been filed under Section 115 of the Civil P. C. At this place it may be stated that before an enforcement of the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) (Act No. 37 of 1972), a suit, for eviction as against a tenant', was required to be filed in the regular side. But by UP. Act No. 37 of 1972, the legislature amended the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, as well as the Civil P.C. A provision was made in this Act for filing of a suit in a Court of Small Causes. Section 8, which was a transitory provision, laid down that all the suits, pending in the court of a Munsif or Civil Judge, stood transferred to the Court of a Judge, Small Causes. As a result thereof, the suit, filed by the plaintiff, was transferred to the Judge Small Cause Court. It was decreed on 15-12-1973. After the said suit was decreed, the defendant filed a revision, under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, which had also been amended by the U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972. The revision was dismissed and thereafter the present revision was filed under Section 115 of the Civil P. C. 11. Under Section 115 of the Civil P. C. This Court can interfere only if there is jurisdictional error in the judgment of a subordinate court. This Court has no jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil P. C. to interfere with the order of a subordinate court either on the ground of an error or the question of fact or law. Its power is confined to interference only if Lt is found that a court below has committed an error of Jurisdiction by refusing to exercise it of by exercising it. 12. Counsel for the defendant, however, relied upon Cl. (c) of Section 115 of the Civil P. C. Cl. Its power is confined to interference only if Lt is found that a court below has committed an error of Jurisdiction by refusing to exercise it of by exercising it. 12. Counsel for the defendant, however, relied upon Cl. (c) of Section 115 of the Civil P. C. Cl. (c) of Section 115 provides that the High Court can interfere, when subordinate court appears to have acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally of with material irregularity. The words "illegally" and "with material irregularity" in Cl. (c) do not cover either errors of fact or of law. They do not refer to the decision arrived at but simply to the manner in which it is reached. 13. As said by the Supreme Court in D.L.F. Housing Company v. Swaroop Singh (AIR 1971 S. C. 2324), errors contemplated by this Clause relate either to a breach of some provision of law or to material defects of procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors either of fact or of law. 14. In Shaik Jaffar Shaikh Mahmood v. Mohd. Pasha Hakkani Saheb ( AIR 1975 SC 794 ), the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret Section 26(c) of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954. Cl. (c) of the Section 26 of the aforesaid Act was in the same terms as Section 115 (c) of the Civil P. C. Interpreting Section 26(c), the Supreme Court held that the High Court was required to see whether there was any error of jurisdiction committed by the Controllor or by the appellate authority in passing the order or whether there is any such manifest error of procedure committed by the courts as may affect the ultimate decision resulting in gross injustice. The Supreme Court further observed that it is only in that context that under Section 26(c) the words "acted illegally" or "with material irregularity" have been used. 15. Interpreting Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, which was also in the same language as Section 115 C.P.C., the Supreme Court held in Sher Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation ( AIR 1978 SC 1341 ): (1978 All LJ 685), that erroneous decisions on a question of law or fact having no relation to question of jurisdiction of subordinate officer cannot be corrected. 16. 16. What is a matter of procedure is again not a controversy on which there should be any dispute. 'Procedure is the mode by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished from the law which gives or defines the right, and which, by means of the proceeding the court is to administer the machinery, as distinguished from its product. What is a matter of procedure has been very aptly defined by Lush, L. J. in Poyser v. Minors (1881) 7 Q. B. D. 329, as "the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced as distinguished from the law which gives or defines the right." The term is commonly opposed to the sum of legal principles constituting the substance of the two, and denotes the body of rules, whereby the rights are effectuated through the successful application 0f the proper remedies. 17. In this case, the error pointed out is not about the procedure. There is no complaint that the courts below committed any error in regulating the procedure of the court. It is also not disputed that the courts below possessed the plenary jurisdiction and competence to go into the question of correctness of the points raised. 18. After considering the aforesaid authorities under Section 115(l)(c), I am unable to find any error which could justify my interference with the impugned orders in the present case. The error, pointed out by the learned counsel for the defendant, even if was assumed to have been committed, it would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the present proceedings. Taking the argument at its best, the submission requires to hold that the finding on the question of law was erroneous. Deciding a point on a wrong view, cannot be said to be a case of lack or excess of jurisdiction. I would prefer to call such a mistake as one which fell within the jurisdiction of the courts below. The courts below did not step outside the jurisdiction, requiring interference. 19. Even on merits, I find no substance in the submission. The defendant was not demanded the rent, when he sent the same in May 1970. The arrears had been sent by the defendant of his own. This was returned with the endorsement "refused". The money sent was also returned to the defendant. 19. Even on merits, I find no substance in the submission. The defendant was not demanded the rent, when he sent the same in May 1970. The arrears had been sent by the defendant of his own. This was returned with the endorsement "refused". The money sent was also returned to the defendant. It has been found on the oasis of the evidence that the money order had not been refused by the plaintiff and the endorsement made thereon was incorrect. The submission, however, was that under Section 3 (1) (a) the defendant could be said to be 'in arrears if he had not sent the rent to the plaintiff at his regular and proper address. And since the rent had been sent to the plaintiff at his normal address, the defendant had been absolved of the duty to remit the rent. The fact of sending the rent was sufficient in itself to hold that the defendant was not in arrears. There is no merit in the submission. Under Section 3(1)(a), a tenant is required to remit a money order within a month on the receipt of the notice. If rent is demanded by a landlord and that in pursuance of that demand, the rent is remitted, the refusal to accept the same would absolve the defendant from the consequence of default. Inasmuch as he could not be said to be in default, having done whatever was required of him under the law. 20. Counsel for the defendant, also, relied on a Full Bench decision reported in Indrasain v. Din Ali (1968 All WR (HC) 167) (FB) and urged that in that case as rent had been sent earlier in that case, the Full Bench held that where the rent due had been lawfully tendered to the landlord and is improperly refused by him, the tenant could not be said to be in arrears of rent. With the help of the aforesaid decision, the counsel argued that even in the instant case, the defendant could not be held to be in arrears. The decision 0f that case is, however, not applicable to the present case. In that case, the notice of demand was served on the tenant. He did not remit the rent and relied on the remittance of the rent, sent earlier in pursuance of another notice of demand. The decision 0f that case is, however, not applicable to the present case. In that case, the notice of demand was served on the tenant. He did not remit the rent and relied on the remittance of the rent, sent earlier in pursuance of another notice of demand. It had been argued that as the defendant had remitted earlier in pursuance of a notice of demand and that the same had been illegally and unjustifiedly refused by the landlord, the landlord could not he permitted to create a ground by making of a demand on the same ground afresh. Accepting this argument, the Bench had held that, "we, therefore, hold that where rent due had been lawfully tendered to the landlord and is improperly refused by him, the tenant cannot be said to be in arrears of rent." 21. The ratio of the aforesaid decision is not applicable to the present case, as in the Full Benchs case rent had been remitted after demand made by the landlord. Pursuant to the demand, the money was sent but the same was refused. In these circumstance', the Full Bench held that the defendant could not be said to be in "arrears of rent." In the instant case, however, such is not the position. I here is no evidence that in pursuance of the demand made by the landlord that the rent had been remitted by the defendant in the month of May 1970. As already stated above, he sent the same on his own. As the plaintiff was not in station and had not refused to accept the same, the aforesaid decision cannot apply to the present case. The defendant would have not been in arrears of rent, if the earlier remittance had been made in pursuance of the demand of the landlord. 22. Counsel for the defendant referred to a number of decisions of this Court, wherein it has been held that in a case where a person is required to make a demand to another, the duty of the former is to go to the latter and tender the demand, and if there be clear evidence that he did so, it must be held that there was a full compliance with the requirement of making the payment. On the basis of this principle, counsel submit.ed that as he had done his duty by remitting the money order, which could not be delivered to the plaintiff as he did not meet, there had been no failure on his part. It would be noticed that, in all these cases, (he landlords demanded rent from tenants. In this background, the view taken was that if a tenant, in pursuance of demand, remits money, he has done his duty. In the instant case, the plaintiff did not make any demand of the rent. Accordingly, if the defendant remitted the rent on his own, he could not be permitted to urge that absence of the plaintiff from his house at the time when the money order was taken to him was unjustified. 23. Even if the defendant had proved 1 hat the agreed mode of payment of rent was sending it through money orders, the contractual duty might have been discharged by the exact performance thereof. But as this was not the case, I refrain from expressing an opinion on it. 24. Accordingly, I hold that the defendants contention has no force and must be repelled. 25. In the result, the revision fails and is/ dismissed With costs. The applicant is granted 3 months time to vacate the premises.