ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This is a plaintiffs application in revision directed against judgment and order passed by the learned District Judge, Jhansi allowing a Revision filed by the defendants-opposite parties and setting aside an order passed by the trial Court and dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-applicant. 2. Facts relevant for the disposal of this Revision are as follows: The plaintiff-applicant filed a suit for possession over certain properties which he claimed to have purchased at an auction sale held by the Competent Officer under the Administration of Evacuee Properties Act. The plaintiff claimed that after he purchased the property, he entered into possession over the same. According to the plaint allegation, the property purchased by the plaintiff-applicant consisted of some houses and appurtenant land. The plaint allegations further were that the defendant No. 1 was the brother-in-law of one Durga Prasad, who was the Registrar Qanungo in Tehsil Jhansi at the relevant time and with the collusion and connivance of the said Durga Prasad, the defendant No. 1, Sri Babu Lal managed to obtain a Bhumidhari Sanad in respect of a part of the land in suit and on its basis forced his entry over the land comprised in the said Bhumidhari Sanad; he also got his name entered in the revenue papers. The allegations in the plaint were that the Bhumidhari Sanads were void inasmuch as the land in suit , was not agricultural land and was not covered within the definition of the land or agricultural area as defined under the Urban Area Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act. The claim of the plaintiff-applicant was that defendant No. 1 was a trespasser; and hence the suit. Somewhat similar allegations were made against the other defendants. The defendant-opposite parties filed a written statement and among other pleas raised a plea asserting that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to try the suit, and that the suit was triable by a Revenue Court. 3. The learned Civil Judge who was seized of the suit struck issues. Issue No. 1 was: - "Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit?" By an order dated 9-4-73, the trial court came to the conclusion that the suit was triable by the Civil Court, and not by the Revenue Court. The issue was accordingly disposed of in favour of the plaintiff. 4. Issue No. 1 was: - "Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit?" By an order dated 9-4-73, the trial court came to the conclusion that the suit was triable by the Civil Court, and not by the Revenue Court. The issue was accordingly disposed of in favour of the plaintiff. 4. Against the order of the learned Civil Judge dated 9-4-73, disposing of the issue of jurisdiction, the defendants-opposite parties filed a Revision before the learned District Judge under Section 115 of the Civil P. C. The learned District Judge has allowed the Revision, and not only set aside the order passed by the trial court on issue No. 1, but he has dismissed the suit itself on the finding that neither the Civil Court nor the Revenue Court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff-applicants suit or to give him any relief thereunder. 5. Aggrieved, the plaintiff-applicant has filed the present Revision. 6. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted the following points for my consideration. These are: - 1. The suit was triable by the Civil Court, and not by the Revenue Court; 2. The lower revisional court had no jurisdiction to dismiss the plaintiff-applicants suit even if it came to the conclusion that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit inasmuch as the Revision before the learned District Judge was only against an order disposing of a single issue by the trial court; 3. The view of the lower revisional court that the Revenue Court also could not grant any relief to the plaintiff-applicant is unsustainable in law; 4. The lower revisional court has committed a patent illegality in giving the findings on issues which had to be decided upon a full trial of the suit by the court having jurisdiction in a revision which was directed only against disposal of a single issue. 7. Learned counsel for the opposite-parties on the other hand urged that the order passed by the learned District Judge dismissing the suit was correct and was within his jurisdiction. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the opinion that the order passed by the lower revisional court is unsustainable, and that the learned District Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing the suit itself. 9. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the opinion that the order passed by the lower revisional court is unsustainable, and that the learned District Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing the suit itself. 9. Taking the first point raised by the learned counsel for the applicant, I have not the least doubt that the suit was cognizable by a Revenue Court and not by the Civil Court in view of the provisions of Section 82 of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1956 (which admittedly covers the area in question) read with I Section 331 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Section 82 of the U.P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition Act, 1956 provides that the provisions of Section 331 of the U. P.. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act shall apply in relation to suits, under this Act, i.e. under the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Section 331 (1) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in so far as it is relevant for the purposes of this case reads as follows: - "331. Cognizance of suits, etc. under this Act. - (1) Except as provided by or under this Act, no court other than a court mentioned in column 4 of schedule II, shall, notwithstanding anything "contained in the Civil P. C., 1908, take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceeding mentioned in column No. 3 thereof, or a suit, application or proceeding based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application : Provided that where a declaration has been made under Sec. 143 in respect of any holding or part thereof, the provisions of Sch. II in so far as they relate to suits, application or proceedings under Chapter VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereto. II in so far as they relate to suits, application or proceedings under Chapter VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereto. Explanation - If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the Revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the Civil Court may not be identical to that which the Revenue Court would have granted." The allegations made in the plaint clearly show that the cause of action is one in respect of which relief could be granted to the plaintiff-applicant by the Revenue Court. The cause of action relevant in this connection is the assertion by the plaintiff-applicant that the defendants-opposite parties have wrongly obtained Bhumidhari Sanad in their favour, and that they have unlawfully got their names entered in the revenue records. The cause of action alleged in the plaint further is that the defendant-opposite party No. 1 has illegally occupied the land in dispute. In respect of the aforesaid rhatters constituting cause of action in the suit, the relief for possession and declaration could be granted by the Revenue Court. Relief for possession has already been asked for in the suit. Under the Explanation to Section 331 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act quoted above, it is immaterial that the relief for declaration has not been asked for in the suit. The important thing to be noted is that the relief for declaration could be obtained by the plaintiff-applicant from the Revenue Court in respect of the cause of action alleged by him. The suit was, therefore, clearly cognizable by the Revenue Court and not by the Civil Court. Learned Counsel for the respondents Sri G. P. Bhargava also fairly conceded that the suit was triable by the Revenue Court. The first submission of the learned counsel for the applicant has, therefore, no substance. I agree with the conclusion of the learned District Judge that the suit is not cognizable by the Civil Court, though for reasons other than those given by the learned District Judge. 10. As regards the second point urged by the learned counsel for the applicant, I am inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel. The Revision before the learned District Judge was directed only against an order disposing of an issue, namely, whether the suit is cognizable by the Civil Court. 10. As regards the second point urged by the learned counsel for the applicant, I am inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel. The Revision before the learned District Judge was directed only against an order disposing of an issue, namely, whether the suit is cognizable by the Civil Court. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned District Judge was only called upon to decide whether the suit was cognizable by the Civil Court or by the Revenue Court. The court below exceeded it Jurisdiction in giving a finding not only on that issue, but in pronouncing judgment in the suit itself giving concluded findings on several disputed questions without a proper trial. Thus the learned District Judge recorded a finding that on account of Bhumidhari Sanads obtained by the defendants-opposite parties, the plaintiff-applicant was entitled to no relief in respect of land comprised in the Bhumidhari Sanad. He has also recorded a concluded finding that the land in dispute is agricultural land and not abadi or Uftada land as claimed by the applicant. The learned District Judge has also recorded a finding that the plaintiff-applicant is not entitled to any relief on account of Bhumidhari Sanad even from a Revenue Court. 11. In my view, the learned District Judge, clearly exceeded his jurisdiction in disposing of the entire suit in a Revision which was confined only to a short question whether the suit was cognizable by the Revenue Court or by the Civil Court. If the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the suit was cognizable by the Revenue Court and not by the Civil Court, he should have refrained from giving any finding on the aforesaid questions leaving it to be determined by the court of competent jurisdiction. In somewhat similar circumstances, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Khushro S. Gandhi v. N. A. Gazdar reported in AIR 1970 SC 1468 , have held that the High Court cannot in a revision against an order of the trial court disposing of an issue try other issues arising in the case even if the parties agreed to such a course. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 115, C. P. C. in disposing of other issues not arising for consideration before it in the revision. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 115, C. P. C. in disposing of other issues not arising for consideration before it in the revision. Following the above decision, I hold that the District Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in giving concluded findings on various disputed questions of facts and law while disposing of the Revision which was directed only against an order disposing of a single issue. The learned District Judge has, therefore, erred in dismissing the plaintiff-applicants suit itself. The proper thing for the learned District Judge would have been to direct the return of the plaint to the plaintiff for being presented to the proper court. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on a Full Bench decision reported in re: Mt. Ananti v. Channu reported in 1930 All LJ 256 : (AIR 1930 All 193) and on its basis urged that the learned District Judge was justified in dismissing the suit itself. In that case, two questions have been referred to the Full Bench for a decision: (1) Where, a plaintiff alleging himself to be a tenant sues a defendant treating him as a trespasser for possession, the suit is maintainable in the Civil Court; (2) Where a tenant on being dispossessed from a land sues a person for compensation and possession and also asked for injunction to restrain the defendants from doing any act prejudicial to the plaintiffs interest, what is the effect upon the jurisdiction of joining the relief of injunction with that of possession. It would thus be clear that the questions for consideration before the Full Bench did not directly involve the question with which I am concerned, namely, whether the learned District Judge had jurisdiction to dismiss the suit itself in a revision directed against the decision of the trial court only on a single issue. Following the dictum of the Supreme Court, I hold that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to give any findings on various issues, and on the basis of those findings, to dismiss the suit itself. The second point urged by the learned counsel for the applicant is well founded and has to be accepted. 13. Following the dictum of the Supreme Court, I hold that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to give any findings on various issues, and on the basis of those findings, to dismiss the suit itself. The second point urged by the learned counsel for the applicant is well founded and has to be accepted. 13. Coming to the third point, I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the applicant that the view of the learned District Judge that even the Revenue Court could not grant the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff-applicant is unsustainable. In the first place as already observed, whether the plaintiff-applicant is entitled to any relief or not is a matter which had better been left to be decided by the court competent to try the suit. The learned District Judge ought not to have expressed any opinion on whether the plaintiff-applicant is entitled to any relief in a proceeding which was limited to the determination of the question whether the suit was triable by the Revenue Court or the Civil Court. The finding of the learned District Judge, therefore, that the plaintiff-applicant was not entitled to any relief even from the Revenue Court is liable to be set aside on that ground alone.. Moreover, the only ground on which the learned District Judge has non-suited the plaintiff-applicant is that the defendant-opposite parties have obtained Bhumidhari Sanads and, in some cases, despite the objection of the plaintiff-applicant. The learned District Judge has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Sheo Charan v. Tota Ram reported m 1970 All LJ 242. All that has been laid down in that case is that the grant of a Bhumidhari Sanad is an important piece of evidence. The learned Judge has not held that the grant of Bhumidari Sanad has the effect of barring a regular suit for declaration of rights. In a case reported in Subhana v. Dy. Director of Consolidation reported in 1973 All LJ 375 (Para 7 of the judgment) : ( AIR 1973 All 427 ), a Division Bench of this Court has held as follows: "We agree with the learned Judge that no hereditary tenancy rights accrued to the appellant, and that no Bhumidhari rights could be claimed on the basis of mere possession of the Sanad. These two points need not detain us any longer." The mere fact, therefore, that the defendant-opposite parties held Bhumidhari Sanads could not legally lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff-applicant was not entitled to any relief or to maintain the suit. What is the effect of the Bhumidhari Sanad on the right of the parties would be decided in the suit itself by the Court having jurisdiction to Try the same. The learned District Judge was, therefore, wrong in dismissing the suit of plaintiff-applicant on the mere circumstances that the defendant-opposite parties held certain Bhumidhari Sanads in their favour. Likewise, the question whether the land in suit is agricultural land or Uftada land as claimed by the plaintiff is also a matter which has to be decided on the basis of the evidence which has still to be led, and, that, loo by the appropriate court and the learned District Judge was not justified in giving a concluded finding on that point in view of the limited scope of inquiry before him. The learned counsel for the applicant is, therefore, right in his submission on the third point. 14. As regards the last point urged on behalf of the applicant, I have already held that the learned District Judge was not justified in giving findings on various issues in view of fact that the revision was directed only against the order passed by the trial court disposing of the preliminary issue. Learned counsel for the opposite parties urged, that any observation made by the learned District Judge while disposing of the issue of jurisdiction having a bearing on the rights of the parties or the relief claimed by the plaintiff-applicant should be read, as being confined only to the question of jurisdiction, and consequently, I should not interfere with the order passed by the learned District Judge. Learned counsel for the opposite parties offered to make a statement to the effect that the findings given by the learned District Judge on other issues such as whether the plaintiff-applicant is entitled to any relief, whether the Bhumidhari Sanad granted in favour of the opposite party had the effect of operating as res judicata may be taken confined only to the question of jurisdiction and that for the decision of those other issues by the appropriate court, those findings might be ignored. In my view, the learned District Judge having dismissed the suit itself, a mere statement of the learned counsel for the opposite party of the nature mentioned above would not serve the ends of justice. The learned District Judge has dismissed the suit itself, according to me, without any justification and in excess of his jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, the findings recorded by the learned District Judge on matters other than those relating to jurisdiction must also be set aside, in order to give the court trying the suit a free hand. For, otherwise, the Revenue Court trying the suit is bound to be inhibited by the findings given by the learned District Judge. It may be noted that the learned District Judge has given the above mentioned findings without the parties having led evidence thereon. Under the circumstances, the learned District Judge clearly acted with illegality and material irregularity in dismissing the plaintiff-applicants suit and in holding that neither the Civil Court nor the Revenue Court could try the suit. 15. For the reasons stated above, the Revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the lower revisional court as well as that passed by the trial court dated 9-4-1973 are set aside and the case is sent back to the trial court with a direction that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff-applicant for being presented before the Revenue Court having jurisdiction. The parties will bear their own costs.