JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is plaintiff's second appeal in a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant demolishing the plaintiffs building alleged to be situate in plot No. 484 (12 biswas 12 bis-wansies) of village Dudaheri, pargana Khatauli, district Muzaffarnagar, or from making a passage through that plot of land or from interfering in any way with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the building and the land. The suit was dismissed by the trial court. The plaintiffs appeal from that decree was also dismissed by the lower appellate court. 2. The substantial question of law, for determination of which, notice of the appeal was directed to be issued after hearing under O. 41 R. 11 Code of Civil Procedure, as formulated by this Court is; Whether the suit was maintainable. 3. The question arises this way: The consolidation of holding commenced in the village in the year 1962. Plot No. 1080 having an area of 18 biswas consisted of two parts, 1081/1 having an area of 5 biswas 12 biswansies on the northern side, and 1080/2 on the southern side covering the rest of the area, that is, 12 biswas 8 biswansies. The plaintiff applied to the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, for constructing buildings on plot No. 1080/1 and the permission was granted by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, by an order dated 10th Oct., 1963. The respondent Kadam Singh preferred a revision from that order. He was absent when the revision was taken up for hearing by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Deputy Director while dismissing the same, held that the application for permission was misconceived, observing that the objection of Kadam Singh that he had a right of passage in plot No. 1080 and, therefore, the plaintiff, who was the opposite party before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, could not be allowed to construct buildings on the plot, was incorrect inasmuch as the right of passage, if any, could not fetter the right to construct, the building on the land and Kadam Singh could, if lie had any right of user, establish the same in a proper court. With these observations, the revision was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by an order dated 16th Sept. 1965, a certified copy of which is Ext. 11 on the record. With these observations, the revision was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by an order dated 16th Sept. 1965, a certified copy of which is Ext. 11 on the record. Kadam Singh appears to have applied for setting aside of the said order of the Deputy Director. The application was dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by an order dated 17th Dec, 1965, a certified copy of which is Ext. 12 on the record. In this order the Deputy Director of Consolidation considered the merits of the case and again observed that there was nothing illegal in the grant of the permission by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, as his doing so, did not affect the scheme of consolidation. The observation to the effect that Kadam Singh could establish his right of user, if any, in a proper court, was, it was clarified, made without any prejudice to the case of either party. Although the point of time when the constructions in suit were commenced and completed by the plaintiff has not been specifically stated anywhere in the plaint, except for saying that the plaintiff "constructed his abadi" in the area of plot No. 1080/1 immediately after the grant of permission on 10th October, 1963, it appears doubtful from the facts and circumstances to be mentioned hereinafter that the constructions in suit were commenced in December, 1965, after the final order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ext. 12, dismissing Kadam Singh's revision. 4. Now, it appears from the record that while the revision against the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation dated 10th Oct. 1963, granting permission for the raising of constructions, was pending before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the respondent Kadam Singh had started a parallel proceeding for re-alignment of the chak road adjacent to plot no. 484 which was the new number given to the land held by the plaintiff comprising partly of old plot No. 1080/1. This proceeding was started by way of an objection under Section 21 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, praying that a chak road may be provided for the applicant Kadam Singhs grove, situate in plot no. 1075 through plot no. 1080/1. The Consolidation officer rejected the prayer by an order dated 4th April, 1965, Vide Ext. 11, on the ground that plot no. 1080/1 was outside consolidation. 1075 through plot no. 1080/1. The Consolidation officer rejected the prayer by an order dated 4th April, 1965, Vide Ext. 11, on the ground that plot no. 1080/1 was outside consolidation. Kadam Singh took up the matter in appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. The appeal was dismissed by order dated 17th June, 1965, vide. Ext. 9. 5. It appears that an application was thereafter made on behalf of Hari Singh, the plaintiffs son, that interpolations have been made in the consolidation records and a road has wrongly been shown through plot No. 1080. On that application, the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, directed an enquiry to be made under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vide order dated 3rd August, 1965, Ext. 10. This order was later on discharged by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, by order dated 4th April, 1966, vide Ext. 13. 6. In the meanwhile, Kadam Singh had filed a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation against the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, dated 17th June, 1965, Ext. 9. That revision was allowed by the Deputy Director, Consolidation, bv order dated 26th August, 1965 vide Ext. A-12. It has been observed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation that in a compromise arrived at in Civil Suit No. 59 of 1959 between the parties, they had agreed for provision of a passage on the eastern side of plot No. 1080 to enable Kadam Singh to have access to his grove in plot No. 1075 and also to enable the present plaintiff to carry on irrigation through the same; that, however, in the statement of proposals drawn up in respect of that plot read with the statement of principles, no passage was available to Kadam Singh for access to his grove on plot No. 1075. The Deputy Director of Consolidation then proceeded to give effect to the right of Kadam Singh to have the passage, to which he was held entitled by the civil court, observing that 10 biswansies of land would be required for the passage; that an equal area of land had been reserved on the western side of the plot and that reference to the map showed that the said area could conveniently be shifted from the western side of plot No. 1080 to its eastern side and demarcated as a chack road to meet the demand of Kadam Singh. It was, accordingly, ordered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation that 10 biswansies of land reserved for abadi on the eastern side of plot No. 1080 should be transferred to the eastern side of that plot for provision of a chak road so as to connect plot No. 1075 with the existing chak road. This order does not show that any objection was raised by or on behalf of the plaintiff who was the opposite party before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, that he had already made constructions over that area of plot No. 1080/1 in pursuance of the permission granted to him by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, vide order dated 10th October. 1963, and that, therefore, the proposed transfer of land from the western side of plot No. 1080 to its eastern side for the purpose of providing a chak road would not be possible on account of existence of his constructions in that area. This strongly suggests that there was no building on that area of 10 biswansies which was demarcated as chak road on the eastern side of plot No. 1080, by the Deputy Director's order dated 16th August, 1965. 7. However, while on the one side an application was made by Hari Singh before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, to show' that there had been some interpolation in the records culminating in the order of the Settlement Officer dated 3rd August, 1965, Ext. 10, ordering an enquiry under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was later on discharged by the order dated 4th April, 1966, Ext. 13, the plaintiff also appears to have blocked the chak road, which was ordered to be provided by the Deputy Directors order dated 26th Aug., 1965, Ext. A-12, on the eastern side of plot No. 1080, connecting the plot No. 1075 with the existing chak road, whereupon an application dated 30th December, 1965, was moved by Kadam Singh against the plaintiffs party complaining of the obstruction and praying for its removal under Section 133, Cr. P. C., a certified copy of which is Ext. A-l on the record. Besides the reference to the said order of the Deputy Director. P. C., a certified copy of which is Ext. A-l on the record. Besides the reference to the said order of the Deputy Director. Consolidation, dated 26th August, 1965, it is alleged in the application that the plaintiffs party had that day, that is, on 30th December, 1965, started constructing a sadwar with great speed and had thereby obstructed the passage through the said chak road towards its south at points D-C shown on the site-plan. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate ordered the removal of the obstruction by an order dated 11 October, 1971, vide Ext. A-2. A conditional preliminary order had been passed by him on 10th March, 1966, vide Ext. A-3. The delay in passing the final order was occasioned by interlocutory orders and proceedings on objections raised by the plaintiff. A revision was filed from the final order dated 11th Oct., 1971, vide Ext. A-2. It was dismissed by the Court of II Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar, by an order dated 22nd Feb., 1972, a certified copy of which is Ext. 9. The revision filed against this order, was dismissed by this court on 13th August, 1976, vide Ext. A-13. 8. In the meanwhile, the plaintiff had also filed a suit, being suit No. 693 of 1965, for an injunction against Kadam Singh which culminated in Second Appeal No. 1807 of 1969 and was permitted to be withdrawn by the judgment dated 4th May, 1973, of this Court, a certified copy of which is Ext. A-16 on the record. 9. The plaintiffs case as laid in the plaint filed on 3rd Sept., 1976, was that he is the bhumidhar of plot No. 484 having an area of 12 biswas 12 biswansies consisting of 7 biswas of land out of plot No. 1079 and 5 biswas 12 biswansies of land carved out from plot No. 1080; that the defendant had no concern or right or title or possession in that land but threatened on 25th August, 1976, that he would demolish the plaintiffs constructions on that plot and make a passage through it and did not desist from his threat in spite of plaintiffs remonstrance. 10. The case taken in the defence was that the matter had been finally set at rest by this Courts order dated 13th August, 1976, in the criminal revision from the proceedings under Sec. 133, Cr. 10. The case taken in the defence was that the matter had been finally set at rest by this Courts order dated 13th August, 1976, in the criminal revision from the proceedings under Sec. 133, Cr. P. C. and that the suit is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 135, Cr. P. C. It was also pleaded in defence that the land in suit was part of the chak road and not part of the plaintiffs abadi land and that the constructions in dispute were not old but were started in Dec., 1965. There were other pleas but it is not necessary to refer to them. The trial court framed the following 5 issues-: 1. Whether the plaintiff is the Bhumidhar in possession of plot No. 484 and his gher lies therein ? 2. Whether the defendants Rasta lies in plot No. 484 as alleged in para 20 of W. Section ? 3. Is the suit barred by Sec. 133 of the Cr. P. C. ? 4. Is the plaint vague ? 5. Relief ? 11. Issue No. 1 was decided in the affirmative. Issue no. 2 was also decided in the affirmative. On issue No. 3, it was held that the suit is barred by the proceedings under Section 133 of the Cr. P. C.; on issue No. 4, that the plaint is vague; and on issue No. 5, that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief claimed. On these findings, the trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal by the plaintiff, the the lower appellate court found that pursuant to the orders in the proceedings under Section 133. Cr. P. C. the constructions in dispute had been removed, vide - police report dated 1-12-1976. However, the plaintiff again obstructed the defendants passage through the chak road provided through the eastern portion of the plot No. 1080 which led to further proceedings culminating in the order of t.ha Additional District and Sessions Judge, dated 10th Jan., 1978, Ext. A-31 (wrongly referred to as the Ext. 21) whereby the fresh obstructions placed by the plaintiff on the chak road in question were ordered to be removed. A-31 (wrongly referred to as the Ext. 21) whereby the fresh obstructions placed by the plaintiff on the chak road in question were ordered to be removed. The learned Civil Judge held that in the circumstances, the injunction prayed for could not have been granted and it dismissed the appeal observing that the suit appears to have been filed - "just to delay the proceedings under Sec. 133, Cr. P. C. which have become final", and that "the plaintiff has deliberately concealed the material facts regarding proceedings under Sec. 133, Cr. P. C. in the plaint and his conduct throughout has been such as to disentitle him to claim any relief of injunction. Under these circumstances, the suit of the plaintiff, Was rightly dismissed by the learned Munsif." 12. Mr. R. N. Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant urged that the lower appellate court had grossly erred in law' in approaching the case with a prejudiced mind against the plaintiff on the ground that he was a Moharrir of some Advocate at Allahabad and his son is the Moharrir of some Advocate at Muzaffarnagar, and that history of the past litigation between the parties showed that the defendant-respondent has actually been harrassed by the plaintiff, and by relying on the orders passed and the findings recorded in the proceedings under Sec. 133, Cr. P. C., and holding that the suit Was not maintainable because of those proceedings. The learned counsel urged that the proceedings under Sec. 133, Cr. P. C. are of a summary nature and it has always been open to the aggrieved party to have his title to land adjudged by suit in a Civil Court. In support, the learned counsel relied on the case of Mukhtar Hussain v. Ganga Prasad. 1951 All LJ 171. 13. The substantial question of law raised for determination in this appeal is, as observed above; whether the suit was maintainable Assuming that the determination, by a Magistrate, of the preliminary question whether the obstructions complained of. are situate in a public place, in a proceeding under Section 133, Cr. P. C. of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is not final, or relevant, in a properly constituted suit by a person aggrieved by the order under Section 133, Cr. are situate in a public place, in a proceeding under Section 133, Cr. P. C. of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is not final, or relevant, in a properly constituted suit by a person aggrieved by the order under Section 133, Cr. P. C. claiming title to the land as his private property; the basic question involved in the present case is whether the plaintiff can lawfully claim in this suit that the land which was demarcated as chak road on the eastern side of plot No. 484 by the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. dated 26th Aug., 1965, Ext. A-12, is his private property and not a public-way, in spite of and notwithstanding that order. The learned counsel for the plaintiff tried to get over that order by referring to the parallel proceedings taken by him and his son Hari Singh, particularly the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 17th Dec., 1965 (Ext. 121, whereby he had affirmed the permission for raising constructions. The learned counsel further urged that this order was later in point of time than the order dated 26th Aug., 1965 (Ext. A-12), and thus supplanted the latter. He urged that the right of passage claimed by the defendant had been considered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and rejected by that order. He further urged that at any rate the Deputy Director's order dated 26th August, 1965 (Ext. A-12), was without jurisdiction inasmuch as it admittedly related to land covered by Abadi, which was not land within the meaning of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. For this proposition, the learned counsel relied on the case of Triloki Nath v. Ram Gopal, 1973 All WR (HC) 185; Beni Madho Dubey v. D. D. C., 1978 All LJ 777; and two unreported judgments of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 907 of 1977, Ram Behai Dubey v. The D. D. C., decided on 20-1-1978; and in Civil Misc. Writ No. 952 of 1977; Bensraj Tewari v. The D. D. C. decided "on 30-3-1978. Writ No. 907 of 1977, Ram Behai Dubey v. The D. D. C., decided on 20-1-1978; and in Civil Misc. Writ No. 952 of 1977; Bensraj Tewari v. The D. D. C. decided "on 30-3-1978. He also urged that the constructions had been commenced and completed by the plaintiff within one month of the passing of the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, dated 10th Oct., 1963, and they still stood at their place under the protection of the orders passed by the lower courts, and by this Court while admitting the appeal on 23rd Sep., 1978, staying the orders requiring their removal under Section 133, Cr. P. C. 14. In Triloki Nath v. Ram Gopal (1973 All WR (HC) 185) (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that the provisions of the proviso under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. showed that use of the holding for the purposes unconnected with agriculture, whether permitted under the Act or commenced prior to the application of the Act, the land which is put to such non-agricultural use, is not covered by the definition of land under the Act and that the provisions of the Act would not apply to it. According to this decision it is the use of the land for a non-agricultural purpose which renders the Act inapplicable. If the land is used for non-agricultural purposes when a notification under Sec. 4 of that Act is issued in respect of the village where the land is situate, the provisions of the Act will not apply to it, while, on the other hand, if the land is held for agricultural purposes but the tenure-holder wants to use it for non-agricultural purposes after the issue of the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act in respect of the village in which the land is situate, the tenure-holder must obtain the permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation before he could put the land to such non-agricultural use. The provisions of the Act would cease to apply to such land which is put to non-agricultural use- after the notification under Sec. 4, with the permission of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, only When the land is put to such use, for if the provisions of the Act did not apply When the notification under Section 4 was issued, there could be no question of obtaining any permission from the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, for using the land for non-agricultural purposes. It is the plaintiffs own case that the land in suit was held by him as Bhumidhar. It is not his case that he had obtained any declaration under Sec. 143 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in respect of the land at any time before the issue of the notification under Section 4 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, which means that the plaintiff was holding the land for agricultural purposes when the consolidation of holding operations began, and the fact that he applied for permission to the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, to raise the constructions thereon, that is, to use it for non-agricultural purposes, shows that he was using it for agricultural purposes before the permission was granted to him. It is evident that the land in suit did not till then cease to be land subject to consolidation operations. It ceased to be land for the purposes of consolidation of holdings only on the commencement of its use for non-agricultural purposes. It has been found in the course of the recital of the indisputable facts of the case in this judgment that the plaintiff did not commence any construction on the land in suit at any time before the Deputy Directors order dated 26th Aug., 1965 (Ext. A-12), but he did so only after the permission for making the construction had been finally confirmed by the Deputy Directors order dated 17th Dec., 1965 (Ext. 12). It follows that on the ratio decidendi of Triloki Naths case (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the order dated 26th August, 1965 (Ext. A-12) cannot be held to be without jurisdiction inasmuch as the land in suit was, till that date and for a few months thereafter, still land within the meaning of Consolidation of Holdings Act. A-12) cannot be held to be without jurisdiction inasmuch as the land in suit was, till that date and for a few months thereafter, still land within the meaning of Consolidation of Holdings Act. The decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Beni Madho Dubey v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 All LJ 777, does not advance the plaintiffs case any further, nor do the two unreported cases relied upon by the learned counsel. By his order dated 26th August, 1965, all that the Deputy Director of Consolation did was to shift the 10 biswansies of land reserved for the abadi from the western side of plot No. 1080 to its eastern side in order to give effect to the compromise arrived at between the parties in Civil Suit No. 59 of 1959 by providing a passage, that is an approach road to the defendants grove plot No. 1075 from the existing chak road. By doing so, he did not reduce the area of the land allotted to the plaintiff from out of the plot No. 1080/1, nor did he, in any other manner, impinge upon the rights of the plaintiff in that land. The order was passed after hearing the plaintiff and considered the case put forth by him before the Deputy Director of Consolidation and was eminently reasonable and just. 15. This brings me to the main point raised by the learned counsel with regard to the force and effect of the proceedings and orders passed under Section 138, Cr. P. C. The basic requirement for the exercise of a Magistrate's powers under Sec. 133, Cr. P. C. in the circumstances of the present case, was the obstruction of a public way. The ; land in suit had already been demarcated to be a public way by the Deputy Directors order dated 26th August, 1965 (Ext. A-12). The consolidation authorities had exclusive jurisdiction to do so and the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation had become final. There could, thus, be no question for any such reference to a court of competent jurisdiction as is contemplated by Sec. 133, Cr. A-12). The consolidation authorities had exclusive jurisdiction to do so and the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation had become final. There could, thus, be no question for any such reference to a court of competent jurisdiction as is contemplated by Sec. 133, Cr. P. C. because in the face of the Deputy Directors order, there could be no reliable evidence to support a denial by the plaintiff and his party of the fact that what they had obstructed by the constructions raised by them was a public way. The record of this suit showed that the plaintiff pursued every imaginable remedy under the law for getting over the preliminary order passed against him on 10th March, 1966 (Ext. A-3) which was made absolute by the Sub-Divisional Magistrates order dated 11th Oct., 1971 (Ext. A-2), under Section 133, Cr. P. C. for removal of the constructions made by him on the land in suit. These orders under Sec. 133, Cr. P. C. became final with this Courts judgment dated 13th August, 1976 (Ext. A-13). The present suit was filed to get over that. The question is whether such a suit 9 maintainable The answer is a plain no, and I think the lower appellate court was fully justified in holding so. 16. The decision in Mukhtar Hussains case (1951 All LJ 171) (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, does not advance his case at all. . The jurisdiction of the Deputy Director of Consolidation to demarcate the land in suit as a chak road was exclusive. The Civil Court was not competent to adjudicate upon the question of title to the land in suit, which was raised by the plaintiff in the suit giving rise to the present second appeal. 17. In view of the above findings, no other question survives for consideration. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.