JUDGMENT 1. - Appellant Reghuveer Singh has preferred this appeal against the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Churu, dated December 9, 1974 whereby he was convicted under section 304 part II Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years and a fine of Rs. 100/- in default of payment of which further rigorous imprisonment for three months. 2. The facts according to the prosecution were these. In the night intervening 19th and 20th August, 1974 the appellant killed his wife. P.W. 6 Sheokaranbai, mother of the appellant saw the incident and cried that Raghuveer had killed his wife. Dansingh PW 1 was sleeping in his house. He heard the cry and saw also PW 3 Nathuram. They reached the house of the appellant almost together. PW 4 Mool Singh and Sairam also arrived there. They were informed of the incident by Sheokaran Bai. They saw the wife of the appellant lying dead on a cot having bleeding injuries on neck & chin. The appellant was found in the kitchen. The witnesses asked the appellant as to why he had killed his wife. The appellant replied that his wife abused him so he killed her and had made a mistake Dan Singh PW 1. immediately started for police station Rajgarh where he lodged the report of the incident on the following morning at 7 a.m. The police station is about 12 miles from the place of incident. Girdhari Singh PW 7 SHO of the police station after registering the case reached to the scene of occurrence and started the investigation. He prepared 'panchnama' Ex. P 5 site plan Ex P 2 and 'Fard Halat Mauka 'Ex P. 3. He also collected the blood stained earth and the control sample. The other blood stained articles were also seized and sealed. On 20.8.1974 at 10 45 a.m. doctor Sahdev Singh PW 2 conducted the post-mortem examination of the body and found the following ante mortem injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death : "1. Incised wound 21/2"x ⅛"x 1/4" on the right mendible region of chin, laterally cutting the ramus of the right mandible bone. 2. Incised wound 41/2"x 1"x 2" right upper neck and chin, cutting the trachea at the level of thyroid coshiage and juglar vessels. The wound is extending upto right sternomasteus muscle laterally. Incised wound 21/2"x ⅛"x 1/4" on the right mendible region of chin, laterally cutting the ramus of the right mandible bone. 2. Incised wound 41/2"x 1"x 2" right upper neck and chin, cutting the trachea at the level of thyroid coshiage and juglar vessels. The wound is extending upto right sternomasteus muscle laterally. 3 Incised wound 3/4"x 1/4"x 1/4" left little finger ventral aspect first phalanx." The appellant was arrested and during the police custody he gave an information leading to the recovery of a blood stained 'Gandasa' which was sent for chemical examination. After completing the investigation the police filed a challan against the appellant and he was committed for trial. The appellant was charged under section 302 Indian Penal Code but was convicted in the manner stated above. At the trial the appellant retracted his extrajudicial confession. PW 6 Sheokaran Bai obviously turned hostile. The learned Sessions Jude convicted the appellant on the basis of the following circumstances:- "1. The mother of the accused Raghuvir cried in the midnight of occurrence that Raghuvir has killed his own wife and on this cry P W.1, PW 3 and PW 4 came. 2. The mother of the accused again told to PW 1 and PW 3 at the outer gate when they reached there, that Reghuvir has killed his own wife. 3. The witness (PW 1, PW 3, PW 4 and PW 5) found dead body of wife of accused lying on the cot having bleeding injuries on neck, jaw and chin (It is corroborated by medical evidence that the deceased had incised wounds on neck, jaw and chin). 4. The accused was present in the house and when asked he confessed before all the four witnesses that he has killed his wife because she abused him. 5. The FIR (Ex. P. 1) was lodged without delay in the morning hours at 7 a.m., which also gives corroboration to the prosecution case. 6 The recovery of the human blood stained 'Gandasa' on the information of the appellant & at his instance while in police custody." I have heard the learned course for the appellant and the learned APP and perused the record of the case carefully. 6 The recovery of the human blood stained 'Gandasa' on the information of the appellant & at his instance while in police custody." I have heard the learned course for the appellant and the learned APP and perused the record of the case carefully. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that it was not proved that, Sheokaran Bai PW 6 cried in the night that Raghuveersingh had killed his own wife & on her cry witnesse .PW 1., 3, 4 & 5 came there. I have considered the argument carefully. It could hardly be disputed that in the midnight though there was some dispute about the time these four witnesses had arrived at the house of the appellant. All the four witnesses have deposed so. That apart even PW 6 Sheokaran Bai who turned hostile admitted in her testimony that on her cry the four witnesses viz Dan Singh, Nathuram, Moolsingh and Sairam came there. Of course it is doubtful whether Sheokaran Bai cried that Raghuveer had killed his own wife. PW 1 Dansingh stated that he heard the cry that Raghuveer had killed,his wife However, in the cross examination he stated that in the sleep he bears the cry of the mother of Raghuveersingh, and he could not clearly hear her cry PW 3 Nathuram stated that, he hear cry that Raghuveer has killed his wife. The other two witnesses viz.. Moolsingh stated he heard the cry 'Maar Diya, Maar Diya' while PW 5 Sairam stated that he was awakened by Nathuram and Dan Singh. Thus there are contradictions on this point. Nothing turns on this circumstance because the cry of PW 6 Sheokaran Bai that his son had killed his wife would not be a circumstance against the appellant in the absence of her statement that she saw the appellant killing his wife. It could be her surmise as well. 3. It is also doubtful that when the witnesses PW 1 and PW 3 reached the house of the appellant his mother told them that Raghuveer had killed his wife. PW 1 Dan Singh did state that Sheokaran Bai told him that Raghuveer had killed his wife. PW 3 Nathuram also deposed similarly. However, this fact is not deposed to by PW 4 Moolsingh and PW 5 Sairam. Therefore, there is some doubt whether this information was conveyed by Sheokaran Bai to the witnesses. PW 1 Dan Singh did state that Sheokaran Bai told him that Raghuveer had killed his wife. PW 3 Nathuram also deposed similarly. However, this fact is not deposed to by PW 4 Moolsingh and PW 5 Sairam. Therefore, there is some doubt whether this information was conveyed by Sheokaran Bai to the witnesses. Again this would be of little import in the absence of the evidence that Sheokaran Bai saw the murder with her own eyes. She has not deposed that in her presence his son killed his wife. She is the mother of the appellant and obviously had turned hostile to protect her son though her police statement was to the contrary that she had seen the murder. The third circumstance could not be disputed that all the four witnesses found the dead body of the wife of the appellant lying on the cot having bleeding injuries on neck, jaw and chin. It is further corroborated by the medical evidence The next circumstance that the appellant was present in the house when the witnesses reached there cannot be disputed. However, it is strenuously contended that the extra judicial confession which the appellant had retracted was not proved by the evidence of these four witnesses. It was contended that there was some contradiction as to what time of the night the witnesses reached the house of the appellant and whether they reached there together. PW 1 Dan Singh stated that he heard the cry at about 12 or 12 30 midnight. PW. 3 Nathuram deposed that he heard the cry at about 1 30 a.m. PW 4 Moolsingh gave the time as 1 30 a m while PW 5. Sairam deposed that he was awakened it 2 p. m. In my opinion this was a very minor contradiction which does not effect,the intrinsic value of the evidence of these witnesses. PW 1 Dansingh deposed that he and Nathuram reached the house of the appellant almost together. To the same effect is the statement of PW 3 Nathu Singh. PW 4 Mool Singh stated that he heard the cry. Then he came out of the house. Sairam accompanied him and at some distance Dan Singh and Nathuram met them. PW 5 Sairam of course has given a different statement that Nathu and Dan Singh awakened him. To the same effect is the statement of PW 3 Nathu Singh. PW 4 Mool Singh stated that he heard the cry. Then he came out of the house. Sairam accompanied him and at some distance Dan Singh and Nathuram met them. PW 5 Sairam of course has given a different statement that Nathu and Dan Singh awakened him. This minor contradiction in the testimony of Sairam is hardly of any value and on this score their evidence cannot be thrown cut. It was then vehemently contended that these witnesses were not the relations of the appellant and, therefore, he had no occasion to confess his guilt to the them. This argument is devoid of any force because these witnesses reached at the place of occurrence just after the incident and under the impact of the crime the appellants confessed to them. Another minor contradiction was also brought to my notice that then these witnesses reached the house of the appellant where he was sitting or lying down. Dan Singh stated that Raghuveersingh was sitting in the kitchen Nathuram said that Raghuveer was lying in the kitchen. The statement of Mool Singh is to the effect that the appellant was lying in the north of the cot in the corner. PW 5 Sairam deposed that Raghuveer was lying in his house. These are obviously very minor contradictions which are incapable of costing any doubt on the evidence of these four witnesses. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the evidence as to extra judicial confession is a weak type of evidence which ought not to be easily believed. My attention was drawn to the observations of their lordships of the Supreme Court in the following cases:- Jagtar v. State of Haryana - AIR 1974 SC 1545 : "The evidence about an extra judicial confession is in the nature of things a weak piece of evidence. My attention was drawn to the observations of their lordships of the Supreme Court in the following cases:- Jagtar v. State of Haryana - AIR 1974 SC 1545 : "The evidence about an extra judicial confession is in the nature of things a weak piece of evidence. If the same is lacking in probability there would be no difficulty in rejecting it Further, the attempt of the investigating agency to introduce a fame story about the removal of the ornaments of the deceased and their recovery from the accused would also affect the credibility of the evidence regarding the extrajudicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused." The State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh & others AIR 1975 SC 258 "The evidence of extra judicial confession in the very nature of things is a weak piece of evidence." I have carefully perused the two authorities. The ratio of these authorities is not with regard to intrinsic value of the extrajudicial confess on but is with regard to the quality of the evidence which ought to be produced to prove the making of the extra judicial confession. 4. It was also vehemently argued that the witnesses are not unanimous on the point as to what was confessed to them by the appellant. Before I take up this point, I will like to read the observations made in Mulkraj v. The State of UP. ( AIR 1959 SC 902 : "An extra-judicial confess, if voluntary, can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence in convicting the accused. The confession will have to be proved just like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to the confession just like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it is made. It is true that the Court requires the witness to give the actual words used by the accused as nearly as possible, but it is not an invariable rule that the Court should not accept the evidence, if not the actual words but the substance was given. It is true that the Court requires the witness to give the actual words used by the accused as nearly as possible, but it is not an invariable rule that the Court should not accept the evidence, if not the actual words but the substance was given. It is for the Court having regard to the credibility of the witness, his capacity to understand the language in which the accused made the confession, to accept the evidence or not." Ratan Chand is v. State of Bihar AIR 1959 SC 18 : "Usually and as a matter of caution courts require some material corroboration to an extra judicial confessional statement, corroboration which connects the accused person with the crime in question." The observations in Dhobi v. State Rajasthan 1975 RLW 279 : are as follows:- "In Wakil Nayak v. State of Bihar (1) it was observed that before the Court acts on extra judicial confession the circumstances under which the confession is made, the manner in which it is made, the persons to whom it is made must be considered along with the two rules of caution First, whether the evidence of confession is reliable and secondly whether it finds corroboration. We are aware of a subsequent pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab (2) wherein it was observed that the evidence furnished by extra judicial confession made by the accused to witnesses cannot be termed to be a tainted evidence and if corroboration is required it is only by way of abundant caution. If the Court believes the witnesses before whom the confession is made and it is satisfied that the confession was voluntary, then in such a case conviction can be founded on such evidence alone. The observations made in Magharsingh's case (2), in our humble opinion, do not in any way, detract from the principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the earlier case. Thus, the two rules of caution in the matter of acting upon extra judicial confession laid down by their Lordships are : (1) that the evidence of confession must be reliable and free from infirmity and (2) it must find corroboration." At this stage I may also notice the authority cited by the learned APP. in Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab 1975 Cr. in Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab 1975 Cr. L. J. 1102 : "The evidence furnished by the extra judicial confession made by the accused to witnesses cannot be termed to be a tainted evidence and if corroboration is required it is only by way of abundant caution. If the Court believes the witnesses before whom the confession is made and it is satisfied that the confession was voluntary, then in such a case conviction can be founded on such evidence alone." Having considered all the authorities I am of the view that the evidence to prove the confession must be reliable and free from any infirmity and further it must find corroboration. Keeping the above principles in view, now I propose to discuss whether the prosecution, by cogent and convincing evidence has proved the making of the extra judicial confession by the appellant. The only point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that all the four witnesses are net unanimous on the point as to what was exactly spoken by the appellant. I have considered this argument which has little force. There is very little variation on this score in the testimony of the witnesses. PW 1 Dan Singh stated that Raghuvir said ' I have committed a mistake, I killed". They made a further query. The appellant said "abuses were given". PW 3 Nathu said that on enquire Raghuvir Singh told him that the wife abused him and, therefore, he cut her. PW 4 Mool Singh deposed that on enquiry Raghuvir Singh said "I was abused by my wife, I was enraged, I killed her". PW 5 Sairam stated that Raghuvir said 'my wife gave me abuse and I killed". Thus it would appear that there is hardly any contradiction in between the statements of the four witnesses Confession was made soon after the event and it appears that it was spontaneous. I, therefore. hold that the prosecution has proved by cogent evidence that the appellant confessed his guilt before these four witness. 5. It was then argued that the appellant had no motive to kill his wife. No doubt there does not appear to be any motive on the part of the appellant to kill his wife. except that he became angry. However, the question of motive in this case is irrelevant. 6. 5. It was then argued that the appellant had no motive to kill his wife. No doubt there does not appear to be any motive on the part of the appellant to kill his wife. except that he became angry. However, the question of motive in this case is irrelevant. 6. It could not be disputed that the FIR in this case was lodged without delay in the morning hours at 7 a.m. However it was vehementlyy contended that the prosecution did not prove that the seal on the Gandasa packet remained intact till it recahed the Chemical Examination. Therefore, it is not proved-that the 'Gandasa was stained with human blood at the time of its recovery. I have considered the argument carefully the prosecution did not examine the police witnesses who took the 'Gandasa' from the police station to the Chemical Examiner. The prosecution also did not examine Incharge, Malkhana of the police station where the 'Gandasa' might hive been kept. In such circumstances I am of the opinion that the prosecution cannot rely on the report of the Chemical Examiner to prove that the 'Gandasa' at the time of the recovery was stained with human blood. It was thus observed in the State v. Motia (1963 RLW 640 ,: "Whenever it is desired by the prosecution that certain articles which have been recovered from accused persons are to be identified, or are to be sent to the Chemical Examiner for analysis it is necessary that the officer recovering the articles should immediately take steps to seal them and evidence should be produced, that the seals were not tampered with till the identification is over, or till the articles are sent to the Chemical Examiner for analysis. In the absence of such precautions it would always b open to the accused to say that the police later put human blood on the articles in order to implicate the accused. It is, therefore, necessary for the prosecution to produce evidence that steps were' taken at once to seal the articles, and that from the time the, articles came in the possession. It is, therefore, necessary for the prosecution to produce evidence that steps were' taken at once to seal the articles, and that from the time the, articles came in the possession. of the police to the time they were sent for identification before a Magistrate or for examination to the Chemical Examiner the seals remained in tact Further, evidence should be produced that the articles recovered from the accused were the same as sent to the Chemical Examiner." It was strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was no circumstance to corroborate the extra judicial confession of tine appellant. The argument has no force. It is established by the prosecution evidence including the hostile witness PW6 Sheokaran Bai that at the time of the incident there were only two adults in the house viz, Sheokaran Bai and the appellant. From the conduct of Sheokaran Bai it is evident that she could not be the killer. If she would have been the killer, she would not have cried to attract the neighbours to her house. Thus it can be safely said that Sheokaran Bai did not kill the wife of the appearance the only other person who had an opportunity to kill the deceased was obviously the appellant. His conduct also indicated that he was the killer. He did not raise any hue and cry and on the other hand on enquiry confessed to his guilt. In my opinion the fact the appellant had the exclusive opportunity who murder his wife and his subsequent conduct are grave incriminating circumstances against him which corroborate the extra judicial confession fully. It may be observed that the extent of corroboration in support of the extra judicial confession will vary in the facts and circumstances of each case. In this case I am of the view that the above two circumstances fully corroborate the extra- judicial confession. The learned counsel for the appellant tried to argue that the presence of the appellant in his house is not unnatural because be was called there from his field Apart from the statement of the appellant that in the night he was in his field, there are no reasons to suppose that he was in his field. The learned counsel for the appellant tried to argue that the presence of the appellant in his house is not unnatural because be was called there from his field Apart from the statement of the appellant that in the night he was in his field, there are no reasons to suppose that he was in his field. His presence in the field is negatived by the testimony of Dan Singh and others who stated that when they reached the house of the appellant after hearing the cries of Sheokaran Bai, they found the appellant there Sheeokaran Bai raised the alarm obviously just after the murder. Thus the extra judicial confession is corroborated and the prosecution could bring home the guilt against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt. 7. The learned counsel next argued that if at all only an offence under section 304 part II was made out against the appellant. The occurrence took place suddenly and there is no proof that the appellant had any intention to kill his wife or to cause such injuries as were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. My attention was drawn to Shanker @ Kallu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Unreported judgment {S.C.), 1979 ,: "The occurrence took place,suddenly without any premeditation while the deceased along with the accused and others had just finished their meals. In the circumstances, therefore, we do not, think that the appellant had any intention of causing the particular injury that he caused to the deceased with dagger on a vital part of the body viz neck. There can however be no doubt that he must be deemed to have the knowledge that death may be caused by his act. In the circumstances, therefore, the case against the appellant squarely falls within the ambit of section 304 II IPC. The case is distinguishable on facts. Since the prosecution could not prove any other motive on the part of the appellant for killing his wife it appears that he became angry and caused the injuries which ultimately proved fatal. However, it can he safely inferred that the, appellant intentionally caused the injuries which were found on the body of his wife and further, the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature of cause death as per the statement of the doctor. However, it can he safely inferred that the, appellant intentionally caused the injuries which were found on the body of his wife and further, the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature of cause death as per the statement of the doctor. In this view of the matter I think the appellant was rightly: convicted for the offence under section 304(l). 8. As regards sentence it was argued that the appellant had been on bail for the last four years. He has two daughters of extremely tender age. There is none else in the family to look after them. In my opinion these may be mitigating circumstances but the law had to take its own course. In the circumstances I feel that the sentence of five years rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. 9. In the result the appeal is dismissed but the sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment awarded to the appellant under section 304(I) Indian Penal Code is modified to one for five years rigorous imprisonment. The sentence of fine is maintained. The appellant is on bail & he shall surrender to his bail bonds to serve out the remaining portion of his sentence.Appeal partly allowed. *******