ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This is a defendant's application in revision directed against at order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Mirzapur dated 2-2-1976, directing that certain issues namely issues Nos. 1 and 2 be decided along with other issues framed in the suit after parties have had led evidence in the case. 2. It appears that a suit was filed by the plaintiff-opposite party against the defendants-applicants for recovery of Rs. 1.00,000/- against the defendants-applicants jointly or severally. Certain issues were framed be the trial court. They are issues Nos. 1 and 2 of the issues framed and are as follows ;- 1. Issue No. 1 :- Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the claim ? 2. Issue No. 2:- Whether the suit is barred by Sections 26, 27 and 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act ? The trial court fixed 22-1-1976 for disposal of issues Nos. 1 to 3 before other issues. Issue No. 3 was whether the suit was bad for multifariousness of parties and misjoinder of causes of action. The trial court heard learned counsel for the parties on issues Nos. 1 to 3 and came to the conclusion that having regard to the controversy involved in the case, it was a fit case where a decision on issues Nos. 1 and 2 should be postponed till oral evidence has been led by the parties and that these issues should be disposed of along with other issues framed in the suit. As regards issue No. 3 learned counsel for the defendants-applicants made a statement that they were not pressing the same. It was accordingly disposed of by the learned Civil Judge answering the said issue against the defendants-applicants. 3. The Revision is directed against the aforesaid order passed by the learned Civil Judge deciding to dispose of issues Nos. 1 and 2 along with the other issues. 4. In order to appreciate the submissions made at the bar, it will be necessary to set out briefly the controversy involved in the suit, the plaint allegations and the averments made in the written statement. Very briefly stated, the plaint averments made were that the plaintiff-applicant was a Company which owned a factory in the district of Mirzapur, wherein it carries on the business of manufacturing and selling aluminium and aluminium products. Very briefly stated, the plaint averments made were that the plaintiff-applicant was a Company which owned a factory in the district of Mirzapur, wherein it carries on the business of manufacturing and selling aluminium and aluminium products. The defendants other than defendant No. 1 are its workmen, the defendant No. 1 being a Union of workmen employed in the aforesaid company and is a Union registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act. It was alleged in the plaint that some disputes were going on between the employers and employees since before the year 1973. The dispute led to strikes, stay in strike or go slow or tool down, different facets of strikes by the workmen of the Company. This led to the reference of the dispute for arbitration to one Sri S. K. Verma, a former Chief Justice of this Court. It is alleged that the matters relating to the said strikes are the subject matter of arbitration before Sri Verma and the plaintiff reserves his right to claim compensation in respect of the losses incurred by the Company on account of strikes, go slow, or tool down, etc. for that period. It is then alleged in the plaint that on account of continuous strikes, go slow, tool down or stay in strikes, the employers were forced to declare a lockout whereupon the Government of Uttar Pradesh intervened and as order was passed under Section 3A of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act directing the employers to lift the lockout and prohibit the workmen from continuing their strikes, it is alleged that notwithstanding this Government Order, the workmen continued to indulge in strike, go slow, tool down etc., whereupon the employers and the defendant No, 1 on behalf of the workmen arrived at a settlement which was duly signed by the parties on 7-3-1973 and it was duly registered under Section 6B of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The plaint allegations further are that despite this agreement under which the workmen were required to maintain discipline and peace at the works site they continued to resort to direct action like go slow, tool down or other overt acts. It appears that the above state of affairs continued and it is alleged in para 14 of the plaint that the defendants indulged in direct action like go slow, too] down etc. It appears that the above state of affairs continued and it is alleged in para 14 of the plaint that the defendants indulged in direct action like go slow, too] down etc. followed by gherrao, manhandling and obstructing the loyal employees of the plaintiff and committing overt wrongful acts between the period March, 1974 to 12th April 1974. It is alleged in para 14 of the plaint that as a consequence thereof the working of the factory was affected adversely resulting in substantial damage and losses for which the defendants are liable in contract, tort and law. It is then alleged that there were again strikes etc. and subsequently fresh settlements were arrived at between the workmen on the one hand and the employers on the other. These settlements are said to have been duly registered under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The plaint allegations are that these settlements were totally disregarded by the workmen and they indulged in tactics which resulted in huge losses in production and was tages of all sorts of things, substantial monetary losses to the plaintiff company. It is alleged again in the plaint that some of the defendants intimidated other workmen and prevented them from working resulting in losses to the company. As a result of the aforesaid wrongful acts of the defendants, it is alleged in the plaint, the plaintiff opposite parties suffered losses to the tune of Rs. 33.62 lacs but inasmuch as in the view of the plaintiff-opposite party, the workmen were not likely to be able to pay that huge amount, the plaintiff-opposite party had limited their claim to rupees one lac only. 5. A written statement was filed on behalf of the defendants in which various pleas were raised alleging that the breach of settlement, if any, was on the part of the employers and that the defendants or the other employees of the company had not done anything in contravention of terms of the settlement. By way of additional pleas, it was asserted on behalf of the defendants that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It would be useful to reproduce the averments made by the defendants pertaining to the jurisdiction of the court. Paras 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the additional pleas in the written statement are as follows :- "3. It would be useful to reproduce the averments made by the defendants pertaining to the jurisdiction of the court. Paras 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the additional pleas in the written statement are as follows :- "3. That the suit of the plaintiff is clearly barred under the specific provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the plaintiffs have chosen a wrong forum. 4. That this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and to give finding over the alleged disputes. 5. That there being no stipulation between the parties in either of the agreement or settlement for compensation of any loss or damages, if suffered, the defendants are neither liable in contract, nor in law to make good the same. 6. That the plaintiffs have no right of a civil action for the alleged damages or loss against the defendants in view of the specific provisions as envisaged under Sections 26, 27 and 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The exclusive remedy open to them is available under the aforesaid section of the aforesaid Act. The defendants cannot be made liable either in tort or in law to compensate the plaintiffs." 6. From the aforesaid pleas raised in the written statement, it appears that the objection as regards the jurisdiction, of the court as pleaded by the defendants-applicants was that the dispute in question was an industrial dispute which could be properly tried by Industrial Courts, and_also that inasmuch as there is provision for penalty under Sections 26, 27 and 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act in regard to the breach of the I terms of employment or settlement, the I suit is barred by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 7. It is on the basis of the aforesaid averments that the above mentioned issues were struck. The trial court is of opinion that it would be proper to dispose of issues Nos. 1 and 2, having regard to the questions of facts involved in the case and the nature of controversy arising out of the pleading of the parties, along with other issues after the parties have led evidence. 8. The trial court is of opinion that it would be proper to dispose of issues Nos. 1 and 2, having regard to the questions of facts involved in the case and the nature of controversy arising out of the pleading of the parties, along with other issues after the parties have led evidence. 8. Learned counsel for the applicant has urged that the issue of jurisdiction, namely, whether the suit is cognisable by Civil Court or by an industrial court was a matter which could be disposed of as a preliminary issue without any evidence and that the court below has acted with illegality and material irregularity in directing this issue to be tried along with other issues. Learned counsel also tried to urge that the dispute in question is on the face of it an industrial dispute and the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the same. 9. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party on the other hand submitted that the question whether issues Nos. 1 and 2 should be decided as preliminary issues or whether they should i be decided along with other issues after evidence had been led is a matter which was within the discretion and jurisdiction of the trial court and it is not permissible for this court exercising jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. to interfere with that order. Learned counsel for the opposite party also submitted that having regard to the pleadings of the parties and the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Automobiles v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke reported in AIR 1975 SC 2238 : (1975 Lab IC 1651), it is clear that the matter of jurisdiction could not be disposed of satisfactorily by the civil court until evidence had been taken on these issues and on other issues involved in the case. Learned counsel for the opposite party also urged that on the plaint allegations it cannot be said that the dispute is one which can be described as an industrial dispute or that the suit is one for enforcement of the rights under the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel urged that it is not correct to say that whenever compensation is claimed on the ground that the workers had gone on illegal strikes, it is a claim which is covered by the provisions of U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel urged that it is not correct to say that whenever compensation is claimed on the ground that the workers had gone on illegal strikes, it is a claim which is covered by the provisions of U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel for the opposite party also submitted that in any case, the dispute is not an industrial dispute, and consequently, there is no question of the suit being not cognizable by the Civil Court. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length, I am clearly of the view that there is no substance in this revision and it is liable to be dismissed. I am in full agreement with the learned counsel for the opposite party that it was primarily for the trial court to decide as to whether these two issues should be decided as preliminary issues, or they be decided along with other issues after evidence has been led in the lease. On the pleadings of the parties and having regard to the tests laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Automobiles v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke (1975 Lab IC 1651) (SC) (supra) it could not be said that the trial court has committed any error of jurisdiction in deciding to dispose of issues Nos. 1 and 2 along with other issues. 11. Learned counsel for the applicant urged that the dispute in question is clearly an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2 (1) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and further that is in respect of a matter connected with the employment of the workmen and consequently the dispute could be taken to an industrial court under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel for the applicant also urged that the plaintiff-opposite party was making a claim on the basis of settlement duly registered under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, and consequently, they were claiming rights under the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel for the applicant also urged that the plaintiff-opposite party was making a claim on the basis of settlement duly registered under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, and consequently, they were claiming rights under the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel submitted that applying the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Premier Automobiles v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke (1975 Lab IC 1651 (SC) ) (supra), the case was clearly one which was cognizable by the Industrial Disputes Act and not by the civil court, as it was in respect of industrial dispute as well as for enforcement of a right under the Industrial Disputes Act. I may point out. that it is not for me to express at this stage any concluded opinion as to whether the dispute in question is an industrial dispute or not. It will be for the trial court which is seized of the suit to dispose of that issue. However, in the case of Premier Automobiles v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly laid down the tests governing the determination of the question as to whether a certain dispute is triable by an industrial court or by a civil court. Laying down the said tests their Lordships have observed as follows : "The principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to an industrial dispute may be stated thus:- (1) If the dispute is .not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act, the remedy lies only in the Civil Court; (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy; (3) If the industrial dispute relates to enforcement of the right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Art" 12. In order to determine the question whether the suit is triable by the civil court or industrial court, therefore, the following questions will have to be determined:- (i) Whether it is an industrial dispute; (ii) Whether it is for enforcement of a right under the Industrial Disputes Act or of a right or an obligation under the general or common law. In a case reported in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union reported in AIR 1976 SC 425 :. (1976 Lab IC 303) their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed (that it is not correct to say that every claim for compensation by employers from striking employees on account of damages caused to the employer's properties in the course of an illegal strike is a matter in respect of which a remedy lies under the Industrial Disputes Act. According to their Lordships, it would depend upon the real object and motive of the striking employees. Where the main or real object of the striking employees is not the enforcement of their right or claim in furtherance of their cause, but is to cause, damage or destruction to the property or business of the employers, the claim for compensation would clearly be a claim for which a remedy would lie in the Civil Court. The enquiry in the present case will, therefore, have to be into what was the predominant motive or object or intent of the defendant who, according to the plaintiff, caused damage and loss to the business and property of the plaintiff. Obviously, these questions can be properly decided only after parties have led evidence, the questions being questions of fact. The court below, therefore, cannot be said to have committed any error in deciding to dispose of these issues after parties have led evidence in the case. Obviously, these questions can be properly decided only after parties have led evidence, the questions being questions of fact. The court below, therefore, cannot be said to have committed any error in deciding to dispose of these issues after parties have led evidence in the case. Their Lordships have moreover, also observed in paragraph 30 of the case Rohtas Industries Limited v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union (1975 Lab IC 1651 (SC)) (supra) as follows :- "Without launching on a long discussion, we may state that compensation for loss of business is not a dispute or difference between the employers and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the condition of labour of any person " From the observations made in this case is well as from the principles laid down / in the case of Premier Automobiles v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke reported in AIR 1975 SC 2238 : (1975 Lab IC 1651) it is clear that there are a number of mixed questions of law and facts to be decided before issue of jurisdiction can be properly disposed of. In my view, therefore, the trial court cannot be said to have committed any error of jurisdiction in postponing the decision of these issues until the parties have led evidence in the case. I have perused the averments made m the plaint as well as in the written statement. It does not appear 1 to me to be a case where an issue of jurisdiction can be disposed of solely on t.he basis of averments made in the plaint and written statement. Under the circumstances the trial court was right in i taking the view that the two issues should be decided along with other issues after the parties had led evidence. 13. Learned counsel for the applicant lastly urged that if evidence has to be taken then I should direct the trial court to take evidence only on issues Nos. 1 and 2 postponing the other issues for the time being. I do not think I will be justified in making that direction. In my view the issues involved in the case are so interlinked that it would not be right to try the suit piecemeal. The claim in the suit is based on matters or incidents which took place in 1974. The suit was 1 filed in the year 1976. I do not think I will be justified in making that direction. In my view the issues involved in the case are so interlinked that it would not be right to try the suit piecemeal. The claim in the suit is based on matters or incidents which took place in 1974. The suit was 1 filed in the year 1976. More than four; years have already elapsed. Since the cause of action arose under the circumstances, it will not be proper to decide (these issues piecemeal. 14. In the result, the Revision fails and is dismissed with costs. The stay order is vacated.