Judgment :- 1. An interesting question of law relating to limitation arises in this second appeal at the instance of the legal representatives of deceased second defendant in the suit. Respondents 1 and 2 and their father Arumugham constituted members of a joint family and the plaint A schedule properties belonged to that family. In 1949 Arumugham died leaving behind him his sons, respondents 1 and 2 and his widow, the third respondent. According to the case of respondents 1 and 2, after the death of Arumugham, their mother, the third respondent, did not look after the family and did not attend to the family affairs, but launched a programme of alienating the family properties. Defendants 2 to 9, according to the plaintiffs, were such alienees and those alienations were not binding on the sons, respondents 1 and 2 herein, who were minors. Respondents 1 and 2 characterised these alienations as void ones and prayed for partition and separate possession after setting aside the alienations in favour of the defendants. Though there were several alienations which were so challenged by respondents 1 and 2 in the suit, what survives in this second appeal is only the alienation in favour of the second defendant dated 10th July, 1957 by the third respondent herein, who is the mother of the respondents 1 and 2. It would therefore suffice to notice the defence of the second defendant to the suit. According to him, the first respondent was over 26 years of age and the second respondent was of 22 years of age on the date of the institution of the suit and the suit not having been filed within three years of their attaining majority, is barred by limitation. In addition, a plea was also raised by the second defendant that the third respondent executed a registered mortgage deed on 24th March, 1950 in favour of one Nallan Padayachi to discharge the debts incurred by her husband. In order to discharge these debts, the sale of items 1 and 2 of the plaint A schedule properties was effected by the 3rd respondent herein for a sum of Rs. 750. In order to discharge these debts, the sale of items 1 and 2 of the plaint A schedule properties was effected by the 3rd respondent herein for a sum of Rs. 750. The second defendant further claimed that it was the 3rd respondent who was looking after the family and as the income from the family properties was not sufficient to maintain the family, the debts were incurred and the alienations were therefore for the benefit of the family. A plea of collusion between respondents 1 and 2 and the third respondent in order to defeat the right of the second defendant was also raised. 2. The learned District Munsif Kallakuruchi, who tried the suit, held that the impugned transaction is only voidable ani therefore, respondents 1 and 2 should have taken steps to set aside the alienation within three years of attaining majority and the suit having been filed beyond that time, was barred by limitation. A further finding was also given that the second defendant was entitled to claim a refund of the consideration under the impugned alienation. However, in view of the finding on the question of limitation, the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by that, the plaintiffs, preferred an appeal in A.S. 273 of 1970, Sub-Court, Cuddalore. The learned Subordinate Judge, held that the appropriate Article which would apply to the alienation sought to be impugned in this case would be Art 65 and not Art. 60 and in this view having regard to the vital finding that the first respondent was born prior to May, 1942, and the second defendant was born before September, 1945, the suit instituted on 15th February, 1967, being within 12 years from the date of the alienation by the third respondent herein would be, in time. On this finding, the learned Subordinate Judge proceeded to hold that the alienation in respect of items 1 and 2 will not be binding in so far as 2/3rd share of respondents 1 and 2 herein is concerned, but that respondents 1 and 3 will be entitled to a preliminary decree for partition of their 2/3rd share subject to their depositing into Court their proportionate share in a sum of Rs. 650 paid towards the discharge of a prior mortgage, dt. 24th March, 1950 which was wiped out by the impugned alienation. 650 paid towards the discharge of a prior mortgage, dt. 24th March, 1950 which was wiped out by the impugned alienation. Further, respondents 1 and 2 were also held entitled to mesne profits from the date of deposit of their proportionate share in the sum of Rs. 650 and two months time was granted for depositing the amount. In other respects, the suit was dismissed. 3. In this second appeal, at the instance of the legal representatives of the deceased second defendant, the only question that arises for consideration is whether the suit instituted by respondents 1 and 2 herein on 15th February, 1967 is in time. A decision on that question would depend upon the appropriate Article applicable to the facta and circumstances of the case. The factual findings of the lower appellate court that the first respondent was born prior to May, 1942 and that the second respondent should have been born before September, 1945 was not in any manner disputed. It is on the basis of these factual findings with reference to the dates of birth of respondents 1 and 2 that the question of limitation has to be considered. It is also not disputed that if respondants 1 and 2 should have resorted to Court before the expiry of three years after attaining majority on the footing that Art. 60 of the Limitation Act would apply then the suit would be barred. Equally, it is beyond dispute that if Art 65 of the Limitation Act should apply then the suit having been instituted within 12 years from the date of alienation, it would be well within time. Before proceeding to consider the appropriate Article applicable it is necessary to ascertain the precise interest of respondents 1 and 2 in the property, which was alienated by the third respondent herein purporting to act as the guardian on behalf of respondents 1 and 2, That respondents 1 and 2 and their father Atumugha Padayachi constituted members of an undivided Hindu joint family, that items 1 and 2 of the suit properties belonged to that family and that Arumugha died in the year 1949 are admitted. At the time of Arumughas death, respondents 1 and 2 herein, his sons, were admittedly minors. At the time of Arumughas death, respondents 1 and 2 herein, his sons, were admittedly minors. As the law then stood, the third respondent herein, the widow of Arumugha, suceeded to the interest of her husband under the provisions of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, as extended to agricultural lands. Though the third respondent thus stepped into the shoes of her husband with reference to his interest, yet, she could not in any manner be considered as a member of the coparcenary. Though respondents 1 and 2 were entitled to an undivided 2/3rd share and third respondent was entitled to the remaining one-third share, it must also be remembered that the interest of respondents 1 and 2 remained unchanged as before; viz, as an undivided interest in the joint family properties. The third respondent, mother of respondents 1 and 2, could not have occupied the position of a manager, she being a woman and not being a coparcener. In this situation, the legal effect of the alienation made by the third respondent with reference to the undivided two-third interest of respondents 1 and 2 in the joint family properties purporting to act as their guardian has to be considered. The alienation by the 3rd respondent for herself and as guardian of the minor respondents 1 and 2 is under Ex. B 5, dated 10th July, 1957 and it is not disputed that respondents 1 and 2 were then minors and that the provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act (Act 32 of 1956) which had come into force on 25th August, 1956 would be applicable. S. 5 of that Act gives overriding application of the provisions of the Act and in effect lays down that in respect of matters dealt with by it, it seeks to repeal all existing law on the matters dealt with. The result of of this overriding effect of the Act is that on and from 25th August, 1956, the law of guardianship applicable to Hindus by virtue of any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage having force of law ceases to have effect with respect to all the matters dealt with in the Act. The result of of this overriding effect of the Act is that on and from 25th August, 1956, the law of guardianship applicable to Hindus by virtue of any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage having force of law ceases to have effect with respect to all the matters dealt with in the Act. Under S. 6 of that Act, the natural guardian of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minors person as well as in respect of the minors property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property) is in the case of a boy or unmarried girl, the father and after him, the mother. In the instant case, we are not concerned with the natural guardian of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl or in the case of a married girl in respect of which provision has been made in S. 6 (b) and (c). A perusal of S. 6 indicates that in respect of the undivided interest of respondents 1 and 2 in the family property in the absence of the father, the mother cannot be the natural guardian. S. 6 which confers power on a natural guardian to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the protection and benefit of the minors estate and which enables such a natural guardian to dispose of property with the permission of the Court, does not apply to the mother, the third respondent in the instant case, because with reference to the interest of respondents 1 and 2 she cannot be the natural guardian. Ss. 11 and 12 of the Act are important provisions which have a vital bearing upon the contentions that have been advanced in the instant case, S. 11 states that after the commencement of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, no person shall be entitled to dispose of, or deal with the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or her being the de facto guardian of the minor. S. 12 states that where a minor has an undivided interest in joint family property and the property is under the management of an adult member of the family, no guardian shall be appointed for the minor in respect of such undivided interest. S. 12 states that where a minor has an undivided interest in joint family property and the property is under the management of an adult member of the family, no guardian shall be appointed for the minor in respect of such undivided interest. The proviso to hat section states that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of a High Court to appoint a guardian in respect of such interest. S. 11 has brought about a complete change with reference to the powers relating to alienations by guardians designated as de facto guardians and it had totally annihilated the authority of a person to deal with or dispose of any property of a Hindu minor on the ground of his being a de facto guardian of such a minor. The faint argument addressed by the learned counsel for the appellant that the alienation was made by the 3rd respondent. on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 purporting to act as their de facto guardian bas to be rejected in limine in view of the clear and categorical interdict on such de facto guardians with reference to their powers of disposal or dealings with the property of a Hindu minor. Another argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that ‘the property’ referred to in S. 11 is confined only to cases of the separate property of a minor and therefore, the alienation by a de facto guardian of the undivided interest of a minor in the joint family properties is not contemplated under S. 11, This contention, in my opinion, has no substance. While Ss. 6, 9 and 12 take care to exclude the undivided interest of a minor in the family properties from the scope of the property guardianship of a natural guardian, viz, the father or the mother, S. 11 does not contain any such restriction with reference to the property of a Hindu minor In the absence of any distinction between the separate property of a Hindu minor and the undivided interest of a Hindu minor in the joint family property, the prohibition in S. 11 must be held to apply equally to both the categories of properties. Otherwise, the object behind S. 11 of preventing the de facto guardian from dealing with the property of a Hindu minor would be totally frustrated inasmuch as a de facto guardian, while being prevented from dealing with the separate property of a Hindu minor under S. 11, would be at liberty to deal freely with the undivided interest of a Hindu minor in the family property. Having regard to the object with which S. 11 has been enacted it is difficult to place any such restriction on the word ‘property’ used in that section. In addition, such a construction is fortified by the decision in Ranganatha Gounder v. Kuppuswami Naidu 1976 2 M.L.J 128=89 L.W. 35 (S.N.). Dealing with the scope of S. 11, the learned Judge observed at page 131 thus— “S. 11 of the Act which I have already extracted abrogates the power of the de facto guardian to deal with any property of a minor, whether it is an undivided interest in a joint family property or not. Unlike Ss. 6 and 9, which, referring to the ‘minors property expressly state ‘excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property’ and ‘other than the, undivided interest referred to in S. 12 respectively, S. 11 does not exclude any such undivided interest of a minor in the joint family property from its scope and therefore the incompetency of a de facto guardian to deal with a minors property extends to all the properties of a minor without any exception”, 4. In view of the above interpretation of the scope of the word property’ occurring in S. 11, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the third respondent as a de facto guardian of respondents I and 2 was capable of dealing with the undivided interest of respondents 1 and 2 in the joint family property is wholly unsustainable. That the 3rd respondent could not have legally acted as the guardian of respondents 1 and 2 who were then minors, is also evident from S. 12 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act referred to already. As per that provision, if a minor is a member of a coparcenary, normally the father, as the kartha and manage, is entitled to the management of the property of the coparcenary as a whole, inclusive of the minors interest. As per that provision, if a minor is a member of a coparcenary, normally the father, as the kartha and manage, is entitled to the management of the property of the coparcenary as a whole, inclusive of the minors interest. After the death of the father manager, the management of the coparcenary property including the interest of the minor will pass to the eldest son as kartha. The mother is nowhere in the picture even in such a situation, because the property is not the separate property of the minor son, but it is his undivided interest and it is difficult to assume that an adult member of the family, contemplated under S. 12, would include the mother, in the absence of the father. That no inroad into such management of the coparcenary property by the manager thereof should be made is the purpose of S. 12 of the Act. Of course, the mother may be a member of the family, but she may not be a member of the coparcenary in the strict sense. Indeed, it has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, M. P. Nagpur v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills , 1965 2 S.C.J. 289that under Hindu law, coparcenership is a necessary qualification for the managership of a joint Hindu family and as the widow is not admittedly a coparcener, she has no legal qualifications to become the manager of a joint Hindu family. In doing so, the Supreme Court approved the following observations of Viswanatha Sastri, J. in V.M. N. Radka Animal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras 1950 1 M.L.J 399 at 402=63 L.W. 311: “The managership of a joint Hindu family is a creature of law and in certain circumstances, could be created by an agreement among the coparceners of the joint family. Coparcenership is a necessary qualification for managership of a joint Hindu family. It will be revolutionary of all accepted principles of Hindu Law to suppose that the seniormot female member of joint Hindi family, even though she has adult sons who are entitled as coparceners 10 the absolute ownership of the property, could be the manager of the family. She would be the guardian of her minor sons till the eldest of them attains majori ty but she would not be the manager of the joint family, for, she is not a coparcener.” 5. She would be the guardian of her minor sons till the eldest of them attains majori ty but she would not be the manager of the joint family, for, she is not a coparcener.” 5. In the context in which S. 12 has been enacted with a view to preserve the management of coparcenary properties by the kartha there of, undeterred by any interference by the Court by the appointment of a guardian in respect of the undivided interest of a minor in such property, it is difficult to conceive of the mother of respondents 1 and 2 as the kartha of the coparcenary consisting of two minor members and in my view the management of an adult member of the family referred to in S. 12 contemplates only a case of male member of the fimily being in management, Recognition of mother as an adult member of the family for the purpose of S. 12 would not clothe her with the powers to bind the interest of the minors by alienating the undivided interest of such minors. If the mother is regarded as an adult member of the family in management of the properties which includes the undivided interest of a minor in the family property, S. 12 merely enacts that no guardian shall be appointed for the minor in respect of such undivided interest, by the mother in the absence of the father, being oily the natural, guardian and the guardian of the separate property of the minor, is not empowered to deal with the undivided interest in the joint family property under S. 6 and therefore, any such alienation by the mother, would only be hit by S. 11 because the mother, in those circumstances, would still continue to be only a de facto guardian with reference to the undivided interest of a minor in the joint family property and therefore, the alienation would be interdicted by S. 11 as stated earlier. 6. In Maynes Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 11th edn. 6. In Maynes Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 11th edn. page 285, the learned author has stated as follows— “when all the coparceners of a Mitakshra joint family are minors, the Court can appoint a guardian of the property of the minors, though in such a case as soon as the eldest member of the family attains majority, the guardianship is ipso facto determined as regards all the members.” In Sri Raja Yerumalla Suryanarayanamurthi Dora Garu v. Sri Chttrappu Buchi Venkayya Partulu 1949 2 M.L.J. 774 the aforesaid statement of law had been approved and it has been held that the Court has power under the Guardians and and Wards Act to appoint a guardian for the whole of the joint family property in case there are no adult male members and where all the members of a joint family are minors, when one of the members becomes a major, he is ipso facto entitled to the resumption of the entire property and he could act as the natural guardian of the minors and not as the certificated guardian. The proviso to S. 12 furnishes a solution to such a situation wherein it might be open to the parties to approach the Court for the appointment of a guardian in respect of the undivided interest of such minors and if such guardian is appointed by Court it would always be open to such guardian, even if she be the mother, to apply for and obtain necessary directions for the sale of any property of the minor, if it becomes necessary to do so. The learned counsel for the appellants relies upon the judgment reported in E. Venkatakrishna Reddi v. Minor Amarababu 1971 2 M.L.J. 466=85 L.W. 99. On the special facts of that ease as stated by the learned Judges at page 477, it was held that the 4th defendant, acting as the mother and natural guardian of the eldest son, who is the kartha of the joint family, or as the natural guardian of all the minor coparceners as one group and of the property of that group as a whole did have authority to enter into the contract of sale in question, provided it was for the benefit or for the necessity of the minor coparceners. The decision therein must, therefore, be confined to the special facts of that case even as stated therein In view of the above considerations the alienation effected by the 3rd respondent, mother of respondents 1 and 2, in favour of the 2nd defendant in the suit must be treated as an alienation which bad been effected by a person who has no legal competency to act on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 either as a natural guardian or as a guardian appointed by Court. It is equivalent to an alienation made by an intermeddler. So the impugned alienation cannot in any manner be considered to be one effected by a guardian as such and therefore, Art. 44 of the Limitation Act of 1908, corresponding to Art. 60 of the Limitation Act of 1963, cannot have any application to the instant case. The appropriate Article that would be applicable is Art. 65, in as much as the respondents 1 and 2 have title to the property and the alienation has been effected on their behalf by a person who had absolutely no legal authority whatever to act and therefore, the alienation would be void ab initio and the suit having been brought within 12 years from the date of such an alienation the suit would be well within time. The result, therefore, is that the conclusion of the lower appellate Court that the suit is in time has to be upheld, though for totally different reasons altogether. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Course are, therefore, confirmed and the second appeal is dismissed; no costs. I must place on record the valuable assistance rendered by Sri A. Varadarajan, who appeared as amicus curiae for the respondents at the request of the Court.