ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This is a judgment-debtors application in revision directed against concurrent orders passed by the courts below rejecting an objection of the applicants under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Facts relevant for the decision of the issues raised in the revision are as follows: The decree-holder-opposite parties filed a suit against the judgment-debtor-applicants for possession over a certain piece of land and for demolition of certain constructions raised by judgment-debtor-applicants over the land in suit. There was also a prayer in the suit for permanent injunction restraining the judgment-debtor-applicants from making any further construction over the land in suit. The decree-holder-opposite parties case was that they had taken the land in suit measuring 240 square yards on a lease from the State of U. P. and that the judgment-debtor-applicants had wrongfully occupied an area measuring 36x23 on 1-11-1965. The decree-holder-opposite parties thereupon filed the aforesaid suit for the reliefs mentioned above. This suit was contested by the applicants on the ground that the suit was barred by time and that they had been in possession for a long time. The trial court held that the decree-holder-opposite parties were the lessees and that the judgment-debtor-applicants had wrongfully occupied the land in suit. The trial court passed a decree for possession against the judgment-debtor-applicants. 3. Aggrieved, the judgment-debtor-applicants filed an appeal. The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. Thereupon, the applicants filed a second appeal being Second Appeal No. 2976 of 1971 which was dismissed on 9-1-1976 (All). It appears that after the dismissal of the second appeal, the decree-holder opposite parties put their decree into execution. The applicants filed an objection under Section 47 C.P.C. asserting that the decree was in executable as the decree-holder-opposite parties had ceased to be the lessee of the Government, the lease in their favour having expired and that the executing court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the execution in view of Section 15 of the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 22 of 1972). The trial court rejected the objection of the applicant. 4. Aggrieved, the applicants filed an appeal. The learned District Judge, Nainital has dismissed the appeal of the applicants by the impugned order dated 28-2-77. Against the aforesaid orders, the applicants have, filed this Revision. 5. The trial court rejected the objection of the applicant. 4. Aggrieved, the applicants filed an appeal. The learned District Judge, Nainital has dismissed the appeal of the applicants by the impugned order dated 28-2-77. Against the aforesaid orders, the applicants have, filed this Revision. 5. Learned counsel for the applicants has repeated the grounds of objection which were taken before the lower appellate court against the execution of the decree. These grounds are as follows: - (1) The lease of the decree-holder-opposite parties having expired, they have no right to evict the applicants from the premises in question; (2) The execution proceedings are barred by Section 15 of the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that there is no substance in either of the two grounds urged by the learned counsel for the applicants, and that the Revision is liable to be dismissed. 7. Taking the first point first, it may be noted that the decree passed in favour of the decree-holder-opposite parties was affirmed by this Court in the above-mentioned second appeal on 9-1-1976 i.e. while the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972, was in existence and operation. I have perused the judgment given in the second appeal and I do not find that any plea based upon the provisions of the said Act were raised on behalf of the applicants. Learned counsel for the applicants urged that the lease of the decree-holder opposite parties has expired after the decision of the second appeal, and consequently, the decree-holder-opposite parties became unauthorised occupants subsequent to the passing of the decree in second appeal. In my view, it is not permissible for the Executing Court to go behind the decree and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties afresh. It is not the function of the Executing Court to embark upon a fresh trial of the rights and liabilities of the parties and to enter into the question whether the decree-holder still has a subsisting right to claim possession under a decree of which execution is sought. It is not the function of the Executing Court to embark upon a fresh trial of the rights and liabilities of the parties and to enter into the question whether the decree-holder still has a subsisting right to claim possession under a decree of which execution is sought. In my view, the lower appellate court has rightly held that it is net permissible to go behind the decree, and to consider the plea raised by the judgment-debtor-applicants in execution proceedings that the decree-holder-opposite parties have ceased to be the lessees of the land in question subsequent, to the passing of the decree. In my view, even if it be assumed that the lease of the decree-holder-applicants expired after the decree was passed by the High Court on 9-1-76, the Executing Court cannot refuse to execute the decree. I am clearly of the view that the circumstances alleged by the judgment-debtor-applicants does not have the effect of rendering the decree passed against them as nullity. Consequently, the Executing Court was right in taking the view that it was bound to execute the decree as it stood and that it could not adjudicate upon the rights and liabilities of the parties which are alleged to have accrued after the passing of the decree under execution. 8. As regards the second ground urged on behalf of the applicants, in my view, the bar of Section 15 of the aforesaid Act would apply only to entertainment of any suit or proceeding in respect of eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises. I am clearly of the view that it is not for the executing court to determine the issues whether the person was in occupation of unauthorised occupation within the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the aforesaid Act. Learned counsel for the applicants argued that the State of Uttar Pradesh has already instituted proceedings for the eviction of the decree-holders as well as judgment-debtor from the land in suit under the aforesaid Act. From the mere fact that proceedings have been instituted for the eviction of the decree-holder-opposite parties and judgment-debtor-applicants, it does not follow that the decree-holder-opposite parties must be presumed to be unauthorised occupants. From the mere fact that proceedings have been instituted for the eviction of the decree-holder-opposite parties and judgment-debtor-applicants, it does not follow that the decree-holder-opposite parties must be presumed to be unauthorised occupants. The decree-holder-occupants have asserted in their counter-affidavit filed in reply to the stay application in this Court that they have already applied for renewal of the lease in their favour and that they have deposited the lease money as well as all the amounts payable for the renewal of the lease and the receipts therefor have been filed in the Executing Court. The decree-holder-opposite parties have vehemently denied that they are unauthorised occupants. In my view, Section 15 of the aforesaid Act would not in these circumstances bar the execution proceedings. The provisions of Section 15 of the Act would apply only if it had been found or admitted that the decree-holder-opposite parties were unauthorised occupants. The lower appellate court is right in its view under these, circumstances that the bar of Section 15 of the Act would not apply. Moreover, in my view, the bar of Section 15 would apply only to the entertainment of any suit or proceeding in respect of eviction of any person. In the context, I am of the view that the bar of Section 15 would not apply to execution proceedings. In my view, the word 'proceeding occurring in Section 15 does not include within its ambit the words 'execution proceedings. Judgments and decrees rendered by courts of law have to be executed as they are unless there is anything express or implied in the legislation unambiguously conveying an intention to render nugatory those judgments and decrees. 9. Learned counsel for the applicants placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in B. V. Patankar v. C. G. Sastry reported in AIR 1961 SC 272 in support of his submission that where an Executing Court directs delivery of possession in disregard of prohibition contained in an enactment against the eviction of tenants, it is open to the Executing Court to pass an order recalling its earlier order and to direct redelivery of possession to the tenant. Learned counsel submitted that there is a clear prohibition against the Courts entertaining suits or proceedings for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises, and consequently, the Executing Court is prohibited from proceeding with the execution. Learned counsel submitted that there is a clear prohibition against the Courts entertaining suits or proceedings for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises, and consequently, the Executing Court is prohibited from proceeding with the execution. The above decision has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case, their Lordships were considering the provisions of Mysore House Rent Control Order 1945, Section 8 (1) of which reads as follows: - "Section 8 (1). A tenant in possession of a house shall not be evicted therefrom whether in execution of a decree ' or otherwise before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provision of this clause........ " The above order was replaced by Mysore Rent and Accommodation Control Order of 1948, Section 9 (1) of which is as follows: - "9 (1). A tenant in possession of a house shall not be evicted therefrom whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this clause...... " It is therefore clear that in the provision with which their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing, there was an express prohibition even against execution of a decree for eviction. There is no such prohibition in U. P. Act No. 22 of 1972 mentioned above. It appears that wherever a legislature intends to stall execution proceedings in pursuance of judgment and decrees passed by courts of law, it makes a specific provision to that effect. For example, in U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1947, under Section 14, there was an express provision laying down that no decree for eviction of tenant. from any accommodation passed before the commencement of that Act, shall be executed except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of that Act. In my view, the Executing Court is bound to execute decrees and orders passed by courts of law of competent jurisdiction as they stand, except where the decrees and orders sought to be executed fall in the category of being nullities. I am fortified in this view by a decision of the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India reported in (1978) 2 SCC 50 at pp. G6 and 67: ( AIR 1978 SC 803 at p. 817). I am fortified in this view by a decision of the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India reported in (1978) 2 SCC 50 at pp. G6 and 67: ( AIR 1978 SC 803 at p. 817). Their Lordships have held that if by reason of any alteration of the factual or legal situation, a judgment rendered by a court of law is rendered erroneous the remedy is by way of appeal or review but so long as the judgment stands, it cannot be disregarded or ignored. The Executing Court in the present case was, therefore, bound by the judgment and decree passed in the case; it could not refuse to execute the same on the ground that as a result of the supposed extinction of the lease-hold rights to the decree-holder-opposite parties, they are no longer entitled to evict the applicants. I am, therefore, clearly of the view that the provisions of Section 15 of the aforesaid Act do not bar the execution of the decree in question. The court below have rightly held that the decree is executable against the judgment-debtor-applicants and that there is no substance in the objections raised by the applicants. 10. In the result, the Revision fails and is dismissed with costs. The stay order is hereby vacated.