Judgment :- 1. The appellant before this Court is the Court auction purchaser. Respondents 1 and 2 are the judgment-debtors and the 3rd respondent is the decree-holder. The 3rd respondent filed a suit, O.S. No. 100 of 1968, on the file of the Sub Court, Coimbatore, on a hundi executed by respondents 1 and 2 (husband and wife) and obtained a decree on 20th June, 1968 for a sum of Rs. 9,777. The 3rd respondent filed E.P. 248 of 1968, for attachment and sale of the house belonging to the second respondent situated in Coimbatore. The property was attached and even while the execution petition was pending, the 3rd respondent filed another execution petition, E.P. 42 of 1969 for attachment and sale of lands belonging to the Ist respondent in Salakurichi Village, Palladam taluk. The properties were brought to sale and there were no bidders, the execution petition was dismissed on 29th June, 1970, and the attachment was allowed to continue for a period of six months from that date. On 25th January, 1971, the ouse property in Coimbatore belonging to the second respondent was sold in Court-auction and the sale was duly confirmed and part satisfaction was recorded and E.P 42 of 1969 was closed on 27th February, 1971. Soon after the filing of E.P. 42 of 1969 and long before the property belonging to the second respondent was brought to sale, the 3rd respondent filed E.A.42 of 1969 on 6th January, 1969 for transmitting the decree to the Sub Court, Dindigul for execution on the ground that the 1st respondent owned certain properties in that Courts jurisdiction. Transmission was ordered on 8th January, 1969 without notice to respondents 1 and 2. After transmission the 3rd respondent filed E.P. 67 of 1969 for attachment and sale of the ginning factory with its machinery and the adjoining land belonging to the first respondent. The properties were duly attached without notice to respondents 1 and 2. The properties were not sold for want of bidders. The E.P was dismissed on 20th March, 1970 keeping the attachment pending. The 3rd respondent filed another E.P. No. 46 of 1970 on 18th April, 1970. Notice under Or. 21, R. 66, C.P.C. was ordered and no personal service was effected on respondents 1 and 2. On 21st July, 1971, the ginning factory, machinery and the adjoining lands were sold for Rs. 64,500 to the appellant. The 3rd respondent filed another E.P. No. 46 of 1970 on 18th April, 1970. Notice under Or. 21, R. 66, C.P.C. was ordered and no personal service was effected on respondents 1 and 2. On 21st July, 1971, the ginning factory, machinery and the adjoining lands were sold for Rs. 64,500 to the appellant. Part satisfaction was entered into and the E.P. was dismissed on 4th December, 1972. The first respondent filed E.A.345 of 1971 in the Sub Court, Dindigul, under Or. 21, R. 90, C.P.C. to set aside the sale on the ground of material irregularities in the publication and conduct of the sale. The first respondent furnished security which was rejected on being tested. The matter was not further pursued and the first respondent filed E.A.614 of 1972 under S. 47, C.P.C. for a declaration that the Court sale of the ginning factory, machinery and the adjoining lands on 21st July, 1971 was void. 2. Before the executing Court it was contended that simultaneous execution taken out against the first respondent in both the Courts, one at Coimbatore and one at Dindigul, without notice is bed in law, and the sale of the machinery, ginning factory and adjoining land without notice to the first respondent is invalid and inoperative, and as the judgment-debtors valuation has not been disclosed in the sale proclamation, the sale is liable to be set aside. 3. The executing Court held that simultaneous execution as contemplated in the Civil Procedure Code, is the execution levied both against the property and person of a judgment debtor and not proceedings in execution taken out against different properties of the same judgment-debtor and proceedings taken by the third respondent decree-holder in both the Courts are valid in law and they would not vitiate the Court auction sale of the ginning factory and machinery and adjoining lands belonging to the first respondent. The executing Court further held that there was no fraud or irregularity in the conduct of the sale. The executing Court further held that there was no fraud or irregularity in the conduct of the sale. Against the order of the executing Court there was an appeal to the District Court and the learned District Judge held—(1) while ordering the transmission of the decree from the Sub Court, Coimbatore to the Sub Court Dindigul, the first respondent must have been put on notice and beard to avoid hardship, and this by itself is not sufficient to make the sale held in execution of the decree in E.P. 46 of 1970 as void: (2) there has been no proper compliance with the first part of Or. 5, R. 19, C.P.C. and there is only an endorsement on the back of the notice that the judgment-debtor (respondents 1 herein) was not available and in the absence of an affidavit, the executing Court ought to have examined the serving officer on oath to testify to the facts stated in the endorsement made by him in the notice and as this procedure has not been followed, the sale held was without proper notice to the first respondent and it has to be set aside. (3) The sale proclamation does not contain the judgment-debtors valuation and the sale is liable to be set aside on this ground as well. On these findings, the learned District Judge let aside the sale held on 21st July, 1971 in E.P. 46 of 1970. Aggrieved against the order of the learned District Judge the court auction purchaser has filed this appeal before this Court. 4. The first respondent filed E.A 345 of 1971 in E.P. 46 of 1971 in O.S. No. 100 of 1968 on the file of the Sub Court, Dindigul, to set aside the sale. Though it purports to be a petition under Or. 21, R. 90, C.P.C., the first respondent apart from alleging material irreguarity and fraud in publishing and conducting the sale has further alleged that notice of sale proceedings was not served on him. The petition was dismissed as sufficient security was not furnished by the first respondent. Though it purports to be a petition under Or. 21, R. 90, C.P.C., the first respondent apart from alleging material irreguarity and fraud in publishing and conducting the sale has further alleged that notice of sale proceedings was not served on him. The petition was dismissed as sufficient security was not furnished by the first respondent. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that having raised the plea regarding lack of service of notice of sale proceedings in E.A. 345 of 1971 and having allowed the same to be dismissed by failing to furnish adequate security, the first respondent is barred by the principle of constructive res judicata to raise the same plea in E.A. 614 of 1972 which is the subject matter of the present appeal. Relying on the three decisions of the Supreme Court in Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Krishna Mukherjee, 1953 S.C.R. 377 Dergao v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1457 and Panduranga Dhoni Chougula v. Maruti Hari Jadhav, 1966 1 S.C.R. 102 learned counsel for the appellant contended that the plea of res judicata is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of Courts and the rule of constructive res judicata, though technical, is founded on considerations of public policy and it is in the interests of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction and individuals are not vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation and the appellant should be permitted to raise the plea of constructive res judicata though it has not been raised in the Courts below. The appellant has also filed C.M.P. 4653 of 1979 to permit him to raise the plea of constructive res judicata as an additional ground in appeal. As the plea regarding constructive res judicata relates to jurisdiction and goes to the root of the matter, the learned counsel for the appellant was permitted to raise the plea before this Court. 5. The allegations made in E.A. 345 of 1971 in E.P. 46 of 1970 are such as to bring the petition both under S. 47, as well as Or. 5. The allegations made in E.A. 345 of 1971 in E.P. 46 of 1970 are such as to bring the petition both under S. 47, as well as Or. 21, R. 90, C.P.C. The allegation regarding sale without proper service of notice on first respondent attacks the very sale and an illegality of that kind will not amount to a mere irregularity in the publication or conduct of the sale so as to fall within the ambit of Or. 21, R. 90. It would bring the case within the purview of S. 47, C.P.C. In the case reported in Natarajan v. Chandmull Amarchand by power of attorney K. Milopchand 1971 1 M..L.J. 474=84 L.W. 361 a Division Bench of this Court has pointed out that want of notice under Or. 21, R 64 or 66 is a stage anterior to the publication of proclamation of sale or conducting the sale and such a petition would fall within the purview of S. 47, C.P.C. and not under Or. 21, R. 90, CP.C, In the Official Receiver, Tiruneiveli v. P.R.M. and Co, Tuticorin A.I.R. 1963 Mad, 201=76 L.W. 196, this Court has held that if there are allegations which would bring the case both under S. 47 as well as Or. 21, R. 90, it will be open to the Court to demand security in so far as that part of the petition falling under Or. 21, R. 90 and it cannot demand security for that part of the petition falling under S. 47, C.P.C. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the application in so far as it related to Or. 21, R. 90, can be dismissed for the first respondents default in furnishing security and the Court should have proceeded with the application so far as it related to S. 47 and as the executing Court dismissed the application relating to Or. 21, R. 90 and S. 47 as well for default in furnishing adequate security and as the first respondent has allowed the matter to become final and conclusive without preferring an appeal, he will be debarred by the principle of constructive res judicata from raising that plea regarding lack of notice under Or. 21, R. 64 or 66. 6. The allegations made in E.A.345 of 1971 in E.P. 46 of 1970 would bring the case both under S. 47 as well as Or. 21, R. 90, C.PC. 21, R. 64 or 66. 6. The allegations made in E.A.345 of 1971 in E.P. 46 of 1970 would bring the case both under S. 47 as well as Or. 21, R. 90, C.PC. It is open to the executing Court to demand security only in respect of that part of the petition falling under Or. 21, R. 90 and not to that part of the petition falling under S. 47. So the order of dismissal of the executing Court for default in furnishing adequate security can relate to allegations pertaining to that part of the petition falling under Or. 21, R. 90, C.P.C. In other words, the order of dismissal for default in furnishing security can relate to the portion of the petition falling under Or. 21, R. 90 and not to the portion of the petition falling under S. 47. At the executing Court is not competent to demand security for a petition under S. 47, C.P.C., its order of dismissal can only pertain to the portion of the petition falling under Or. 21, R. 90, C.P.C. As there is no dismissal of that part of the petition falling within the ambit of S. 47, C.P.C., the question of appeal or the first respondents failure to file an appeal constituting constructive res judicata can hardly arise. The plea of the appellant regarding constructive res judicata is accordingly negatived. 7. The Full Bench of this Court in Rajagopal v. Ramanujachari I.L.R 1924 Mad. 288=19 L.W. 179 (F.B.), took the view that the sale held in execution without the issue of notice under Or. 21, R. 22(2), C.P.C., is a nullity and not merely voidable and it can be set aside under S. 47, C.P.C. In Neelu Neithiar v. Subramania Moothan A.I.R. 1920 Mad. 481.=11 L.W. 59 a Division Bench of this Court held that the ground of complaint relating to violation of Or. 21, R. 66 can only be considered under S. 47, C.P.C. A Division Bench of this Court in Nararaja v. Chandmull Amarchand 1971 1 M.L.J. 474.=54 L.W. 361 held that Or. 21, R. 90 C.P.C. would apply only where the sale was sought to be set aside and on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it and want of notice under Or. 21, R. 90 C.P.C. would apply only where the sale was sought to be set aside and on the ground of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it and want of notice under Or. 21, R. 64 or 66 being a stage anterior to the publication of the proclamation of sale or conducting the sale, it would not fall under Or 21, R. 90 and the application for setting aside the sale on that ground should be made under S. 47, C P.C. Reviewing these decisions a Full Bench of this Court in an unreported judgment A P.V. Rajendran v. S.A. Sundararajan Since reported in 93 L.W. 47 (F.B.)=1980 1 M.L.W. 198 dt. 14th June, 1979 in C.M.A. Nos. 386 of 1975, 2 and 3 of 1976 held— “Though S. 47 is very wide in its terms and in one sense all questions relating to the execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree that arise between the decree holder and the judgment debtor are within the purview of that section, nevertheless that section ought to be so interpreted as not to render redundant the other provisions contained in the Code, particularly Rules 80, 90 and 91 of Or. 21, and as between the judgment debtor and the decree-holder only such applications to set aside an auction purchase made by the decree-holder as do not come within the purview of Rules 89, 90 and 81 of Or. 21 are within the scope of S. 47 of the Code Thus, if the sale is sought to be set aside on the ground of material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale within the meaning of Or. 21, R. 90, then S. 47 cannot come into play at all, and the sale could be set aside only by invoking Or. 21. R. 90. But if the sale is claimed to be void for certain illegality or voidable on ground of material irregularity not referred to in Or. 21, R. 90 then S. 17 has to be invoked and in such cases Or. 21, R. 90 C.P.C. cannot come into play at all.” 8. 21. R. 90. But if the sale is claimed to be void for certain illegality or voidable on ground of material irregularity not referred to in Or. 21, R. 90 then S. 17 has to be invoked and in such cases Or. 21, R. 90 C.P.C. cannot come into play at all.” 8. From the judgment of the Full Bench cited supra it can be seen that if a sale is sought to be set aside on the ground of material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale, or on the ground that there is defect or irregularity in the sale proclamation, then the petition would fall within the purview of Or. 21 R. 90. But if the sale is claimed to be void for want of notice under Or. 21, R. 22 or 64 or 66 then S. 47 has to be invoked. In the present case, the first respondent has alleged that no notice of sale proceedings had been served on him. As the sale is claimed to be void for want of proper service of notice under Or. 21, R. 64 or 66, the present petition E.A. 614 of 1972 falls under S. 47, C.P.C. The fact that security was ordered to be furnished only strengthens the conclusion that the earlier petition E.A. No. 345 of 1971, was treated as one falling under Or, 21, R. 90, C.P.C. The question of proper service of sale notice which is now the main ground for having the sale set aside under S. 47, could not have been a matter in issue ( Sic ) in the petition in E.A. No. 345 of 1971. Whether the sale is a nullity for want of service of notice under Or. 21, R. 64 or 66, is foreign to the scope of enquiry under Or. 21, R. 90, C.P.C. That question can be considered only on an application filed under S. 47, C.P.C. As the matter regarding want of service of notice under Or. 21, R. 64 and 66 invalidating the sale was not a matter directly and substantially in issue between the parties in S.A. 345 of 1971, the question of res judicata or constructive res judicata operating at a bar for raising that issue in E.A. 614 of 1971 can hardly arise. 9. 21, R. 64 and 66 invalidating the sale was not a matter directly and substantially in issue between the parties in S.A. 345 of 1971, the question of res judicata or constructive res judicata operating at a bar for raising that issue in E.A. 614 of 1971 can hardly arise. 9. The next question to be considered is whether the Court auction sale is a nullity for want or proper service of sale notice to the first respondent. A Full Bench of this Court in Parasurama Odayar v. Appadurai Chetti A.I.R. 1970 Mad 231 after reviewing the entire law on the subject, held— 1. the provision of Or. 5 C.P.C. relating to the manner of service will apply even to the notice issued under Or, 21, R. 65 C.P.C. 2. where the return of the process server under Or 5. R. 17, has not already been verified by the affidavit of the serving officer, the court shall examine the servag officer on oath or cause him to be so examined by another court touching his proceedings Where there is no affidavit of the serving officer and where the serving officer is not subsequently examined by the court there is non-compliance with the first part of Or.S, R-19, C.P.C. and the service is ineffective. 3. There must be a declaration by the executing court that the summons have been duly served as required by second part of Or. 5, R. 19. The endorsement of the court should indicate that the Presiding Officer has applied his mind and considered that the summons has been duly served. The exact form of declaration may be in any convenient form such as ‘defendant has been duly served’ or it is declared that the service is sufficient’ or simply ‘defendant duly served’ or ‘service sufficient’. 10. In the present case, in the execution of decree in E.P. 46 of 1970 the first respondent has not been personally served with notice under Or. 21, R. 66, C.r.C. The endorsements in E.P. 46 of 1970 show that on 2nd May, 1970, sale notice was ordered to the first respondent returnable on 15th July, 1990 and that notice was returned as ‘affixed’ and fresh notices were ordered for 17th August, 1970, 25th September, 1970 and 13th November, 1970. 21, R. 66, C.r.C. The endorsements in E.P. 46 of 1970 show that on 2nd May, 1970, sale notice was ordered to the first respondent returnable on 15th July, 1990 and that notice was returned as ‘affixed’ and fresh notices were ordered for 17th August, 1970, 25th September, 1970 and 13th November, 1970. On each of these occasions notices were returned as ‘affixed’ on the ground that the first respondent is away and not available for service of notice. In the last notice issued for the hearing on 30th November, 1970, the endorsement of the process server on the notice is as under— Tamil Learned counsel for the appellant laying emphasis on the words (Tamil) contended that the above endorsement of the process server on the reverse side of the notice should be construed as an affidavit within the meaning of Or. 5, R. 19 C.P.C. and the requirement of service of notice as laid down by the decision of the Full Bench referred to supra has been complied with in the present case. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the above endorsement is only a report of the serving officer required under Or. 5, R. 17, and not an affidavit as contemplated under Or. 5, R. 19, Or. 5, R. 17, C.P.C. provides that when the defendant is absent from the residence and cannot be found by the serving officer to effect service of notice, then the serving officer shall affix a copy of the notice on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the house in which the defendant ordinarily resides and return the original to the Court with a report endorsed thereon stating that he has so affixed the copy, the circumstances under which he did so, and the name and address of the person by whom the house was identified and in whose presence the copy was affixed. When summons is returned under Or. 5, R. 19, and if the return under that rule has not been verified by the affiavit of the serving officer, the Court may, if it bas not been so verified, examine the serving officer on oath or cause him to be so examined by another Court touching hit proceedings, and may make such further enquiry into the matter as It thinks fit (vide Or. 5, R. 19). 5, R. 19). In the present case, the passage extracted above in Tamil only indicates that it is only a report of the serving officer at contemplated under Or. 5, R. 17. There it no verification by the serving officer and the words written and initialled by the Nazir will not have the effect of the serving officer verifying the return by affidavit. Even granting that the process server was affirmed by the Central Nazir while making the endorsement on the notice extracted above, it would only mean that the process server solemnly affirmed the fact stated in the return before the N.244, the requirement under law is that besides the report of the serving officer as required under Or. 5, R. 17, there must have been an affidavit of the serving officer under Or. 6, R. 19. Since no affidavit was taken by the Nazir, it was incumbent on Court under the first part of Or. 5, R. 19 to examine the serving officer on oath. Since that was not done, there is no valid service of notice under Or. 21, R. 66. Adverting to this aspect, the Full Bench in Parasurama Odayar v. Appadurai Chetti A.I.R. 1970 Mad. 271 has observed:— “where the return under R. 17 has not been verified by the affidavit of the serving officer, the Court shall examine him on oath and it is mandatory. If there is an affidavit, it means that the serving officer has stated something on oath and, if this statement turns out to be false he could be prosecuted. That itself would put him on guard and make him adhere to the truth as far as possible and would minimise the chances of a false return of service. It is with the same object that the Court is required to examine him on oath where be has not verified the return by an affidavit before the prescribed officer (Nazir). We know of numerous instances where defendants and judgment-debtors come to the Court and state that the process server has not come to their place at all and that the alleged affixture is a myth, and there are several cases where such a contention of the defendant or judgment-debtor has been accepted by the Courts. Such a danger would be minimised if the Court adheres to the provisions of Or. 5, R. 19”. 12. Such a danger would be minimised if the Court adheres to the provisions of Or. 5, R. 19”. 12. The passage extracted above only emphasises the need for strict compliance of Or. 5, R. 19. Since the law makes it obligatory on the part of the judgment-debtor to file an application for setting aside the sale within 30 days of the date of sale where he has notice, actual or constructive, it is necessary that there should be strict compliance with the provisions of Or. 5, R. 19. As the decree-holder or auction purchaser can invite the Court to hold that there was constructive notice under Or. 21, R. 66 to the judgment-debtor the provisions of Or. 5, R. 19, have to be strictly construed. In the present case, as there is no affidavit of the serving officer and the serving officer is not subsequently examined by Court, there is non-compliance of the first part of Or. 5, R-19, C.P.C. and the service of notice under Or. 22, R. 66 is ineffective and the sale held in pursuance of such an ineffective notice is a nullity. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ittyavira Mathal v. Varkey Varkey A.I.R. 1964 SC. 907 and Dhirendranath Gorai v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1300 learned counsel for the appellant contended that non-compliance of Or. 5. R. 19, C.P.C. will not make the sale a nullity, so long as the Court auction sale was held by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter. The requirement under Or. 5, R. 19, it is mandatory requirement and the sale held in contravention of that mandatory requirement is not a mere irregulerity, but would have the effect of making the sale a nullity. As Or. 5, R. 19 is a mandatory provision conceived in public interest and as the sale was held in contravention of the mandatory provision, it will render the sale a nullity. As pointed out by a Full Bench decision of this Court in Rajagopala Iyer v. Ramanujachariar , 47 Mad. 283 a sale held in execution of a decree without notice to the judgment-debtor is a nullity and not merely voidable but is void as against the person to whom notice should have been, but was not, issued. Hence the objection of the learned counsel for the appellant that absence of proper notice under Or. 283 a sale held in execution of a decree without notice to the judgment-debtor is a nullity and not merely voidable but is void as against the person to whom notice should have been, but was not, issued. Hence the objection of the learned counsel for the appellant that absence of proper notice under Or. 21, R. 66 to the first respondent is merely voidable and not void cannot be accepted. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the objection regarding absence of proper service of notice under Or. 21, R. 66 invalidating the sale was taken up for the first time only before the District Court, and the objection was not even pleaded in the application filed by first respondent to set aside the sale. In paragraph 11 in E A. 614 of 1972 the first respondent has clearly stated that he has not been apprised of the various proceedings taken in executing court. Absence of proper service of notice under Or. 21, R. 66 can be spelt out from the above allegation. Even otherwise, absence of proper notice under Or. 21, R. 66 invalidating a sale is a question of law which required no further investigation of facts and was understood and debated as such by the parties before the District Court. So the contention of the learned counsel on this point is negatived. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the application for setting aside the sale having not been filed within 30 days from the date of sale is barred by limitation under Art. 127 of the Limitation Act. As there has been no strict compliance of the provision of Or. 5, R. 19, C.P.C, by the Executing Court, the application to set aside the sale will be governed by the residuary Art 137, as laid down by this Court in the Full Bench decision reported in Parasuram Odoyar v. Appadurai Chetti A.I.R. 1970 Mad. 271. As the present application for setting aside the sale has been filed within 3 years from the date of sale, it is not barred by Art. 137. 271. As the present application for setting aside the sale has been filed within 3 years from the date of sale, it is not barred by Art. 137. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that no application for setting aside the sale can be entertained after the sale had been duly confirmed by the the Executing Court and after confirmation by the Executing Court, the only plea available to the party is to contend that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property sold. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on Somasundara v. Kondayya 49 M.L.J. 401, Pechaperumal Ambalam v. Chidambaram Chettiar A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 760, Raja Kacherlokata Venkata Jagannatha Rao Garu v. Maharaja Ravu Venkata Kumara Mahipathi Surya Rao Bahadur A.I.R. 1936 P. C. 204 and Ramasami Iyer v. Komalavalliamal A.I.R. 1941 Mad 377. In the case reported in Somasundaram v. Kondoyya A.I.R. 1941 Mad 377. the plaintiff was a transferee from the auction-purchaser and his suit was to redeem a mortgage held by the defendant and subject to which the property was sold at the auction. The defendant pleaded that the property being an inam land was inalienable, and therefore the sale conveyed no title to the auction-purchaser. The Court held that the proper place to raise the objection to attachment in sale is the Executing Court and the judgment-debtor who had not raised the objection at Executing Court could not afterwards question the validity of the sale in the suit instituted by the transferee from the auction-purchaser. The broad principle laid down by Courts in all the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is to the effect that the proper place to raise objections to attachment in sale is the Executing Court and if the judgment-debtor has failed to raise objections at the stage, it is not open to him to question the validityt of the sale in a suit instituted by the auction-purchaser or his successor-in-interest. From these decisions it follows that the judgment-debtor will be permitted to impeach the sale only in the executing Court and if he had not raised any objection to the attachment and sale of the property in that executing Court. From these decisions it follows that the judgment-debtor will be permitted to impeach the sale only in the executing Court and if he had not raised any objection to the attachment and sale of the property in that executing Court. He will be bound by the order of confirmation of sale and precluded from questioning the validity of the Court sale in any suit instituted by the auction-purchaser or his successor-in-interest. In the present case, the first respondent is impeaching the validity of the sale befor the executing Court in an application filed under S. 47, C.P.C. The only place where he can question the validity of the sale is the executing Court and that is what precisely the first respondent has done by filing an application under S. 47, C.P C. before the executing Court. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant will have therefore no application to the facts of the present case. In fact, a single Judge of this Court in the decision reported in Pandurngaa v. Dasu Reddu 1972 2 M.L J. 277 had gone to the extent of holding that an application under Or. 21, R. 90 will lie even incases where the sale had been confirmed and the sale certificate issued. In the circumstances, the objection by the learned counsel that after the confirmatioin of the sale it is not open to the first respondent to question the validity of the sale lacks substance and is accordingly negatived. 15. The sale cannot be invalidated on the ground of simultaneous execution in view of the Supreme Court in Premlata Agarwal v. Lakshman Prasad Gupta A.I.R 1970 S.C. 1525. Relying on the decision of this Court reported in Rajagopal Naidu v. Muthulakshmiammal , A.I.R. 1969 Mad 5 the learned District Judge has held the sale to be invalid on the ground that the sale proclamation has failed to disclose the valuation of the judgment-debtor. If the judgment-debtor fails to appear and state his estimate of the value of the property at the execution proceedings, the value of the properties as stated by the judgment-debtor cannot be specified in the sale proclamat on as required under Or. 21, R 66(2). If the judgment-debtor fails to appear and state his estimate of the value of the property at the execution proceedings, the value of the properties as stated by the judgment-debtor cannot be specified in the sale proclamat on as required under Or. 21, R 66(2). The order of the learned District Juuge setting aside the sale on the ground that the Court has not specified in the sale proclamation the value of the property as per the estimate of the judgument-debtor cannot therefore, be sustained in view of the decision of this Court reported in Krishnawsami Gounder v. Palani Gounder 1975 1 M.L.J. 114. In the result, the order of the learned District Judge is confirmed though on different grounds and the appeal stands disrupted with costs.