JUDGMENT S. C. Mathur, J. -Through this petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 23rd October, 1975 passed by Sri. S. K. Bhargava, Presiding Judge of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U. P. Lucknow, rejecting the petitioners appeal under Section 64 (1) (e) of the Motor Vehicles Act as barred by time. 2. The petitioner was holder of a regular stage carriage permit which was valid till 13-2-1975 for the route of Etah-Awagarh-Jalesar-Sadabad-Mathura. By application dated 18th September, 1974 the petitioner applied for renewal of the permit. At its meeting held on 14-5-1975 respondent No. 1, the Regional Transport Authority, Agra Region, Agra, granted renewal of the petitioners permit only for a portion of the route; the renewal was refused for the portion from Etah to Awagarh. Against this order of the Regional Transport Authority an appeal lay to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal under Section 64 (1) (e) of the Motor Vehicles Act. In view of the Provision contained in sub-section (1) of Section 64 this appeal was to be preferred within prescribed time and in the prescribed manner. The time for preferring the appeal and the manner of preferring the appeal has been prescribed through the U. P. Motor Vehicles Rules 1949 as amended by the U. P. Motor Vehicles (Fifth Amendment) Rules 1974. Under sub-rule (2) of Rule 71 of the amended rules the appeal is to be preferred within thirty days of the receipt of the order to the Presiding Judge of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The limitation for preferring the appeal against the order of the Regional Transport Authority was to expire on 15th September, 1975. According to the allegations made in the writ petition the memorandum of appeal could not be ready during office hours of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and, therefore, the memorandum of appeal was taken to the residence of the Presiding Judge of the Tribunal where it was left at about 10 P. M. on the next day, that is on 16-9-1975 the memorandum of appeal along with connected papers was returned to the petitioners counsel for proper presentation. The papers were represented the same day. The petitioner was issued notice to show cause why the appeal be not dismissed as time-barred. The papers were represented the same day. The petitioner was issued notice to show cause why the appeal be not dismissed as time-barred. It appears from the record that no written objection was preferred on behalf of the petitioner against the notice, but the petitioners counsel Sri A. J. Fanthome appeared before the Presiding Judge and he was heard. By order dated 23rd October 1975 the Presiding Judge dismissed the appeal on the ground that the same was delayed by one day. The order of (he Tribunal mentions that Sri Fanthome had appeared and was heard. What Sri Fanthome submitted before the Tribunal has not been stated in the order of the Tribunal. 3. In this petition it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner did every thing that lay in his power to present the petition within the period of limitation but it was on account of the attitude of the Presiding Judge which prevented him from presenting the petition to him personally at his residence. In paragraph 7 of the petition it has been stated that when the petitioner reached the residence of the Presiding Judge a young lady came out and the memorandum of appeal was given to her by the petitioners counsel for being taken to the Presiding Judge. It is further stated that the young lady took the memorandum of appeal inside the house and later she brought it back and informed the counsel for the petitioner that the appeal should be presented in the office the next day, that is on 16th September, 1975. On this the petitioners counsel informed the young lady that 15th September, 1975 was the last date of limitation and it could be filed at the residence of the Presiding Judge and that she should give the papers to the Presiding Judge. In paragraph 8 of the petition it has been asserted that the Presiding Judge of the Tribunal appeared to be present in the adjoining room. The allegation contained in paragraph 8 of the writ petition does not appear to be correct and cannot be accepted even though Sri S. K. Bhargava, the Presiding Judge of the Tribunal, has not filed any counter affidavit. In paragraph 8 it has been asserted that the Presiding Judge of the Tribunal appeared to be present in the adjoining room and his voice was heard. In paragraph 8 it has been asserted that the Presiding Judge of the Tribunal appeared to be present in the adjoining room and his voice was heard. If his voice had actually been heard there was no occasion to use the word 'appeared in paragraph 8 of the Writ Petition. However it is not necessary in this petition to enter into the controversy as to whether the Presiding Judge was acually present at his residence when the memorandum of appeal was taken to his residence and was left there. The fact that the memorandum of appeal was left at the residence of the Presiding Judge is not in dispute. The Presiding Judge appears to have taken the view that since the appeal was not presented to him personally the presentation was improper and, therefore, no benefit could be given to the petitioner of that presentation. 4. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 71 of the Rules referred to above provides as follows :- "(2). Any person aggrieved by an order referred to in sub-rule (1) may prefer an appeal in writing within thirty days of the receipt of the order to the Presiding Judge of the said Tribunal in the form, of a memorandum. The above sub-rule clearly requires preferring of appeal to the Presiding Judge of the Tribunal. In the writ petition it has not been disputed that the presentation of the memorandum of appeal was not made to Sri S, K. Bhargava who at, the relevant time was the Presiding Judge of the Tribunal, In fact in the petition itself it is asserted that the memorandum of appeal was handed over to a young lady. Presentation of memorandum of appeal to a young lady cannot be equated with presentation of appeal to the Presiding Judge. As such the presentation of appeal to the young lady on 15th September 1975 was improper and the appeal cannot be said to have been validly presented on the said date. The petitioner also submitted to this position, when he took back the memorandum of appeal and refiled it on 16th September, 1975." 5. From the order of the Tribunal itself it appears that before dismissing the appeal as time-barred opportunity was given to the petitioner to show cause as to why he (his) case be not dismissed as time barred. The petitioner also submitted to this position, when he took back the memorandum of appeal and refiled it on 16th September, 1975." 5. From the order of the Tribunal itself it appears that before dismissing the appeal as time-barred opportunity was given to the petitioner to show cause as to why he (his) case be not dismissed as time barred. The order further indicates that in response to the notice the petitioners counsel Sri A. J. Fanthome appeared before the Presiding Judge and he was heard. When Sri Fanthome was heard naturally he must have said something against the dismissal of the appeal as barred by time. The argument of Sri Fanthome has not been mentioned in the order of the learned Presiding Judge. The Presiding Judge has also not considered the argument that was advanced by Sri A. J. Fanthome. It may be mentioned that by virtue of the provision contained in sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act 1963, provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act were applicable to the appeal in question. If the facts stated in the writ petition were correct, there could be sufficient cause for filing the appeal one day beyond time and the delay in the circumstances could be condoned. Unfortunately as stated hereinabove the order of the Tribunal does not indicate what plea was raised on behalf of Sri Fanthome and how the same was considered or dealt with by the Presiding Judge. It may be stated that sub-sec. (2) of Section 29 would be applicable only in those cases where the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act referred to in the said sub-section has not been expressly excluded by the special or local law. Limitation for preferring the appeal has been prescribed under the U. P. Motor Vehicles Rules 1940 as amended by Motor Vehicles (Fifth Amendment) Rules 1974. These rules do not exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In this view of the matter Section 5 of the Limitation Act was clearly applicable and once there was sufficient cause for not presenting the memorandum of appeal withm time the appeal could be accepted and heard on merits. This aspect of the matter has been completely lost sight of by the Tribunal. In this view of the matter Section 5 of the Limitation Act was clearly applicable and once there was sufficient cause for not presenting the memorandum of appeal withm time the appeal could be accepted and heard on merits. This aspect of the matter has been completely lost sight of by the Tribunal. Of course no written application appears' to have been moved on behalf of the petitioner seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In case the Tribunal had applied its mind to the fact that the delay could be condoned, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act it could have asked the petitioner to move a formal application. 6. In view of the above we are of the opinion that the order passed by the Tribunal is manifestly erroneous and has caused substantial prejudice to the petitioner. We accordingly allow the writ petition and set aside the order dated 23rd October, 1975 (Annexure-3) passed by Sri S. K. Bhargava, Presiding Judge, State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U. P. Lucknow. The Tribunal shall re-admit the appeal to its original number and give opportunity to the petitioner to move application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and thereafter decide the same. If the Tribunal is of the view that the cause shown in the application for condonation of the delay in preferring the appeal was sufficient it will allow the application and thereafter hear the appeal on merits. In the circumstances of the case the cost of the petition shall be easy.