ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is against the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh dated 21-6-1973 in Revision No. 2306 under Section 48 of U. P. C. H. Act, The present writ petition arises out of proceedings for the allotment of chaks. The revision petition filed by contesting opposite party Prabhu Nath was allowed. Against the judgment of the revisional court the petitioner has come to this Court. 2. The main grievance raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the revision petition filed by the contesting opposite party No. 2 was beyond time and the Deputy Director of Consolidation has failed to deal with the aforesaid question. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the disturbance of the petitioners chak by the revisional court was without affording proper opportunity to the petitioner and the order allotting water logging area to the petitioner is wholly unjust. 3. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party submitted before me that the petitioner had not taken any specific ground in the writ petition that the revision petition was beyond time, hence the aforesaid point should not be entertained by this Court. He fur;her submitted that according to the view of a Full Bench case of this Court the Deputy Director of Consolidation should not dismiss the revision petition at the stage of final hearing when he had issued notice in the revision petition and had called the record of the subordinate authorities, hence no useful purpose would be served by calling upon the Deputy Director of Consolidation to examine the question raised on behalf of the petitioner. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has also filed a supplementary affidavit before me indicating that the question of limitation was not urged before the Deputy Director of Consolidation and that in the circumstances of the present case the delay in filing the revision petition should be deemed to have been condoned by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 4. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. It is true that no specific ground has been taken in. the writ petition to the effect that the revision petition filed by the contesting opposite party was beyond time and that the Deputy Director of Consolidation erred in. allowing the revision without dealing with the question, of limitation. I have examined the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. It is true that no specific ground has been taken in. the writ petition to the effect that the revision petition filed by the contesting opposite party was beyond time and that the Deputy Director of Consolidation erred in. allowing the revision without dealing with the question, of limitation. In paragraph 7 (a) of the writ petition the fact that, the revision filed by the contesting opposite party was beyond time and that the Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the revision petition without deciding the question of limitation has been mentioned, and in paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit the stand taken by the contesting opposite party is that the delay should be deemed to have been condoned in the circumstances of the present case. Since both the parties are conscious of the point involved in the present writ petition, I have entertained the point raised on behalf of the petitioner which goes to the root of the jurisdiction. exercised by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 5. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has relied upon the Full Bench ruling reported in, AIR 1975 All 126 : (1974 All LJ 834) Ramakant Singh v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, U. P. In paragraph 10 of the aforesaid ruling it has been observed as below: - " Once the record has been summoned the Director of Consolidation should examine the record and decide on merits whether the case is a fit one for interference. " Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the aforesaid Ruling run thus: - Para. 16: - In our opinion the observations made above can be applied to proceedings under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act only when the Deputy Director of Consolidation rejects an application in revision at the initial stage on the ground that either it was barred by time or suffered from such other defect which rendered it liable to be rejected and yet chooses to exercise his suo motu power. The observations will not apply where he does not reject the application in revision, at the initial stage but issues notice on it and calls for the record of the subordinate authority but on the date of final hearing it transpires that the application in revision suffers from any such defect as pointed out above. The observations will not apply where he does not reject the application in revision, at the initial stage but issues notice on it and calls for the record of the subordinate authority but on the date of final hearing it transpires that the application in revision suffers from any such defect as pointed out above. At that stage if after issuing notice to such other person who may be likely to be affected by his order he decides the case on merits it cannot be said that any person has been taken by surprise by the exercise of power under Section 48 even though suo motu. In such a case even if he does not pointedly bring it to the notice of the parties that he proposes to exercise his suo motu power nor does he in his order speak about It, the order will not be vitiated for it is settled law that if power to act is there, the action will not be invalid simply because the relevant provision of law conferring power is not quoted. Even in the case of D. N. Roy ( AIR 1971 SC 1045 ) it was observed at p. 1048): - "We agree that if the exercise of a power can be traced to an existing power even though that power was not purported to have been exercised, under certain circumstances, the exercise of power can be upheld on the strength of an undisclosed but undoubted power." Para. 17. In view of the above observations, our answer to the question referred to this Full Bench is: - After the record has been, called for by the Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act he should examine the record to decide whether it was a fit case for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction suo motu. Such opinion shall have to be formed even where the application in revision moved by a party is defective having been made beyond the prescribed period of limitation or all the necessary parties have not been impleaded. If the Deputy Director of Consolidation finds that the case requires further hearing he shall give notice to all the necessary parties irrespective of whether they were or were not impleaded in the application and after giving them reasonable opportunity of hearing pass such orders as he thinks fit. If the Deputy Director of Consolidation finds that the case requires further hearing he shall give notice to all the necessary parties irrespective of whether they were or were not impleaded in the application and after giving them reasonable opportunity of hearing pass such orders as he thinks fit. Where the application in revision is not defective and is maintainable the exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall be at the instance of the parties and not suo motu." 6. It is true that in the aforesaid Full Bench ruling it has been indicated that the revisional court should examine the case of the parties on merits and the Deputy Director of Consolidation has suo motu powers to hear the revision petition and it is not necessary for him to bring it to the notice of the parties that he intends to exercise suo motu powers nor it is necessary for him to say in, his order that he was hearing the revision petition suo motu, but it is noteworthy that the contesting opposite party in the revision petition had a right to say that the revision petition could not be heard on merits as it was beyond time and the revisional court had full power to overrule that objection and could proceed to hear the revision. petition on merits. But it is not just, legal and equitable to presume that the Deputy Director of Consolidation had exercised his powers suo motu when he had allowed revision petition on merits. It is quite possible that if the point had been brought to the notice of the revisional court it might not have thought it proper to proceed suo motu in the case when the applicant in revision had not approached the revisional court within time. 7. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party also invited my attention to the ruling reported in 1968 Rev. Dec. 39 (All) Nanku v. Asstt. Director of Consolidation Lucknow, Camp at Gonda wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court did not accept the contention that in the absence of any express order condoning the delay in preferring the appeal either by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation or by the Assistant Director of Consolidation the appeal must be held as incompetent. Director of Consolidation Lucknow, Camp at Gonda wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court did not accept the contention that in the absence of any express order condoning the delay in preferring the appeal either by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation or by the Assistant Director of Consolidation the appeal must be held as incompetent. In short the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party emphasised that when the revision petition was allowed, it should be presumed that the delay in preferring the revision petition was condoned. It is also possible that if the attention of the Deputy Director of Consolidation had been drawn to the fact that the revision. petition was beyond time, he might not have condoned the delay and he might not have chosen to proceed with the hearing of the revision petition, on merits. In such a state of affairs I am not inclined to agree with the suggestion of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that it should be presumed that the delay in preferring the revision petition was condoned by the Dy. Director of Consolidation when he had allowed the revision petition on merits. 8. It is well known that when a remedy of a party is barred by lapse of time the other party gets a valuable right and that right can be negatived only when. sufficient cause has been shown in preferring the delayed revision petition. Since the Dy. Director of Consolidation has not addressed himself to the question of limitation involved in the revision petition be-t fore him, I think it proper to quash the impugned judgment and ask him to decide the question of limitation first. 9. Recently two learned single Judges of this Court in Writ No. 1194 of 1977 Sital v. Dy. Director of Consolidation and Writ No. 4955 of 1972 (All) Mukti Rai v. Dy. Director of Consolidation Azamgarh, have considered the import of the Full Bench ruling mentioned supra and they have ruled that when the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not considered the question of limitation he should be asked to examine that question again. I am in agreement with the views expressed by the learned Judges of this Court in unreported decisions mentioned supra. 10-11. I am in agreement with the views expressed by the learned Judges of this Court in unreported decisions mentioned supra. 10-11. Even according to the Full Bench case of this Court the Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act should examine the record to decide whether it is a fit case for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction suo motu. Such opinion shall have to be formed even where the application in revision moved by a party is defective having been, made beyond the prescribed period of limitation, hence in the present case it. is not clear whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation had really made up his mind to exercise the revisional jurisdiction suo motu. I think it proper that his judgment should be quashed and he should be asked to reexamine the question as to whether the revision petition filed by the con-testing opposite party should be treated as within, time in view of the application and affidavit filed by the contesting opposite party or the Deputy Director of Consolidation prefers to decide the revision petition under his suo motu powers. Ordinarily I would have preferred to refer this case to a larger bench for resolving the conflicting views of this Court but I have come across the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a different context but relevant for purposes of deciding this case, hence I have chosen to decide this case myself. The relevant observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the ruling reported in AIR 1961 SC 832 Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava are as below (at p. 838): - "However, as we have indicated, the question about the competence of the appeal has to be judged in each case on its own facts and appropriate orders must be the impugned order is prejudicial to the interest of the present petitioner Since the case is going back to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for considering the revision petition filed by the contesting opposite party in the light of the observations made by me above, the petitioner is permitted to urge his grievance that his Chak should not be interfered with by the Depute Director of Consolidation so as to cause prejudice to his claim. 12. 12. For the reasons given above, the writ petition succeeds and the impugn ed judgment of the Deputy Director Consolidation dated 21-6-1973 is hereby quashed and the Deputy Director Consolidation is directed to decide the claim of the petitioner in accordance with Law. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.