JUDGMENT P.N. Goel, J. - This is a plaintiffs appeal against the judgment and decree dated 29-5-1969 passed by the Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, Varanasi in Civil Appeal No. 55 of 1968 confirming the decree of dismissal of the appellants suit dated 30-5-1967 passed by the City Munsif, Varanasi in Original Suit No. 657 of 1965. 2. The appellant is an employee of Life Insurance Corporation of India, respondent No. 1, hereinafter called the Corporation. He joined the services, of the corporation in Feb., 1958. The appellant claimed the following reliefs in the suit: (1) Declaration that he was appointed to the post of an Assistant in the Corporation's Varanasi Office with effect from 25-2-1958. (2) Declaration that he was confirmed as an Assistant after the expiry of the period of probation on or before 1-12-1958, and (3) Declaration that he was entitled to draw salary as an Assistant from the date of appointment i.e. 25-2-1958. 3. Briefly stated the case of the appellant was that he was an Assistant in the Corporation from 25-2-1958, that he was on probation, that in Dec., 1958 he was offered the post of Record Keeper which he accepted because notice of termination of his services was given to him, that his acceptance of the post of Record Keeper was under pressure and undue influence, that he continued to work as an Assistant up to 31-3-1958 and was paid the salary of an Assistant up to that date and that thereafter his appointment as a Record Keeper amounted to his retrenchment from the post of an Assistant with effect from 1-1-1959, that under the rules he was to be deemed confirmed on the post of Assistant with effect from 1-12-1958. 4. The case of the Corporation was that he was a temporary hand on daily wages up to 31-7-1958, that from 1-8-58 he was a temporary Assistant at Rs. 130/- per month, that his services were no longer required and as such his services were terminated, that by way of sympathy he was offered the post of Record Keeper which he willingly accepted and, therefore, he was a Record Keeper with effect from 1-1-1959, that he was never on probation as an Assistant and that there was no question of his being deemed confirmed on the post of an Assistant. 5. 5. The Munsif who tried the suit found that the appellant was not a permanent employee as an Assistant, that it was wrong to say that he agreed to accept the post of Record Keeper under any undue influence and that he could not be considered as a retrenched Assistant under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 6. The appellant filed appeal before the District Judge, Varanasi which was decided against him by the Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge. 7. The respondent had raised certain legal objections against the suit of the appellant. It is unnecessary to indicate the same as they were not urged in this Court and the appellants suit was not thrown off on any of the legal points taken by the respondent. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that with effect from 25-2-1958, the date of inception of service, the appellant was a temporary Assistant, that he was to be deemed on probation and that as such after the expiry of the period of probation he was to be deemed confirmed because his period of probation was never extended and he continued to remain in the service of the Corporation beyond the period of probation. 9. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant made reference to the rules contained in - (1) Life Insurance Corporation of India Staff Regulations, 1956, and (2) Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules, 1946. 10. Averment may first be made to the relevant rules contained in Life Insurance Corporation Staff Regulations, 1956. Rule 7 classifies the permanent staff of the Corporation under five heads : Head No. III reads - Supervisory and Clerical Staff. The appellant belongs to this category of the Staff. 11. It will be noticed that in this rule or in any other rule there is no provision for appointing a person on daily wages. 12. Rule 8 (1) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Regulations, a Managing Director or a Zonal Manager may employ staff in Classes III and V on a temporary basis. 13. Rule 9 indicates the authorities which can make appointments. If the appointment is to be made in the Central Office the competent authority is the Managing Director nominated by the Chairman. If the appointment is to be made in a Zonal or Divisional Office, the Zonal Manager is the appointing authority. 13. Rule 9 indicates the authorities which can make appointments. If the appointment is to be made in the Central Office the competent authority is the Managing Director nominated by the Chairman. If the appointment is to be made in a Zonal or Divisional Office, the Zonal Manager is the appointing authority. In case the appointment is made in a Branch Office the Divisional Manager within whose jurisdiction the Branch functions, subject to the approval of the Zonal Manager, is the appointing authority. 14. The appellant was employed in the Corporations Divisional Office at Varanasi. Therefore, his appointment was to be made by the Zonal Manager. 15. Rule 12 lays down that all first appointments shall be made on the minimum pay of the grade to which the appointment is made. 16. Rule 16 lays down that Employee's belonging to Class III shall on their first appointment in the Corporations service, be required to be on probation for six months. 17. Thereafter R. 19 provides that where an employee has rendered continuous temporary service prior to his appointment in a permanent vacancy, the provisions of Regulation 16 regarding the period required to be spent on probation may be waived, at the discretion of the appointing authority, to the extent of the period of such temporary service. 18. The above rules clearly show two things : (1) A person can be appointed in a permanent vacancy, and (2) A person can be appointed on a temporary basis. 19. If a person is appointed on a temporary basis he cannot obviously be considered on probation, whereas a person appointed in a permanent vacancy, will be on probation for six month's under Regulation 16 (1). This Regulation obviously does not envisage a person appointed on temporary basis. Its reason is obvious from Regulation No. 19 which lays down that the period of temporary services can be reckoned in lieu of probation, at the discretion of the appointing authority in the case of an employee, who has rendered continuous temporary service prior to his appointment in a permanent vacancy. Regulation No. 19 clearly shows that a person appointed on a temporary basis can be appointed later on or even with effect from the beginning of his service in a permanent vacancy. Regulation No. 19 clearly shows that a person appointed on a temporary basis can be appointed later on or even with effect from the beginning of his service in a permanent vacancy. As soon as he is appointed in a permanent vacancy, the appointing authority can treat the period of his temporary service as on probation. 20. The above rules, therefore, clearly show that a person appointed on temporary basis cannot automatically take advantage of Regulation 16 (1) and cannot say that he should be deemed on probation from the date of his appointment. 21. Papers on record show that no vacancy was notified by the Corporation to be filled in, that one Sri J.N. Shukla, Assistant working on daily wages at Rs. 3.50 per day resigned with effect from 22-2-1958, that the appellant just gave an application for appointment in the office of the Corporation on 22-2-1958, that the appellant moved another application on 25-2-1958, that as Sri J.N. Shukla had resigned, the appellant was appointed temporarily on daily wages of Rs. 3.50 and that he was not to be paid for the holidays. The appellants appointment as such continued and he was paid at the rate of Rs. 3.50 per day up to 31-7-1958. 22. It has been indicated above that the Regulations did not envisage any temporary appointment on daily wages. Regulation No. 12 clearly states that all first appointments shall be made on the minimum pay of the grade to which the appointment is made. In view of Regln. 7, a person on the clerical staff was to be appointed as Class III. The minimum pay of this Class in 1958 was Rs. 130/-. Therefore, in accordance with the Regulations the appellant should have been appointed on a temporary basis at the minimum pay of Rs. 130/-. On 4-8-1958 the Zonal Manager wrote to the Divisional Manager that in view of the instructions contained in the Central Office letter dated 22-7-1958 regarding "engagement of temporary employees", temporary appointments should, as far as possible, be discouraged, and any temporary appointments, if made, should be on consolidated monthly salary. Consequently the Divisional Manager, Varanasi issued an order on 25-8-1958, saying that with effect from 1-8-1958 all temporary Employee's who were being paid weekly wages would be paid their remuneration on monthly basis. In this order the name of the appellant is at serial No. 11. Consequently the Divisional Manager, Varanasi issued an order on 25-8-1958, saying that with effect from 1-8-1958 all temporary Employee's who were being paid weekly wages would be paid their remuneration on monthly basis. In this order the name of the appellant is at serial No. 11. The order further shows that he was to be paid Rs. 130/- per month. It follows from this that with effect from 1-8-1958 the appellant was getting Rs. 130/- per month, minimum pay admissible to an Assistant. Record further shows that on 30-9-1958 the Divisional Manager terminated the services of the appellant with effect from 1-11-1958 because permanent vacancies were to be filled in by recruitment on the basis of the last competitive examination and interviews. It appears that a competitive examination was held on 31-8-1958. In this examination the appellant had failed. But his services were not actually terminated with effect from 1-11-1958. On the other hand he was reappointed as a temporary Assistant at Rs. 130/- per month for one month only from 1st to 30th November, 1958. Again on 29-11-1958 he was reappointed as a temporary Assistant at Rs. 130/- per month for one month only from 1st to 31st Dec., 1958. In the meantime on 8-12-1958 the Divisional Manager offered an appointment to the appellant in the record keepers grade of Rs. 55-Rs. 180/-. On 19-12-1958 the appellant accepted this offer. In the circumstances he became a record keeper from 1-1- 1959. 23. In view of the above facts and especially in view of the fact that the Regulations did not envisage any appointment on daily wages, the appellant can be considered as an Assistant of Class III with effect from 25-2-1958 up to 31-12-58. No doubt there were vacancies in this Class/Grade of service, but there is absolutely nothing to show that the appellant was ever appointed in a permanent vacancy. The record clearly, shows that the service of the appellant was throughout temporary under Regulation No. 8. Therefore, Regulation Nos. 16 (1) and 19 do not help the appellant, He cannot be considered on probation. 24. In this connection reference may be made to Regulation No. 18 which lays down that an employee may have his period of probation extended at the discretion of the appointing authority, in the case of Employee's belonging to Class III to one year. 16 (1) and 19 do not help the appellant, He cannot be considered on probation. 24. In this connection reference may be made to Regulation No. 18 which lays down that an employee may have his period of probation extended at the discretion of the appointing authority, in the case of Employee's belonging to Class III to one year. It means that the period of probation, if the services of the employee on probation are going to be terminated within the six month's period of probation or just at the end of the said period of probation, can be extended to one year. As the appellant worked as a temporary Assistant of Class III for less than one year and he was not on probation, Regulation No. 18 is not applicable to his case. 25. The result of what has been stated above is that the appellant cannot say that he will be deemed to have been confirmed on or before 1-12-58. 26. Averment may now be made to Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules, 1946. These rules relate to a workman governed by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Rule 2 (a) gives classification of workmen. It will be noticed that "probationers" are a type of workmen. Rule 2 (c) defines a "probationer" as a workman who is provisionally employed to fill a permanent vacancy in a post and has not completed three month's service therein. A "permanent" workman, according to Rule 2 (b) is one who has been engaged on a permanent basis and includes any person who has satisfactorily completed a probationary period of three months. These rules, therefore, show that the period of probation is only three months. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellants case was covered by these rules. It will be noticed that there is nothing on record to show that the appellant was appointed as a probationer or that he was appointed to fill in a permanent vacancy. On the other hand the record shows that the appellant was appointed temporarily in place of Sri J. N. Shukla, who was a temporary daily wage earner. On the other side the learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that if these rules were applicable then the appellant was simply a casual workman. According to Rule 2 (f) a "casual" workman is a workman whose appointment is of casual nature. On the other side the learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that if these rules were applicable then the appellant was simply a casual workman. According to Rule 2 (f) a "casual" workman is a workman whose appointment is of casual nature. It will be noticed that in the present case the appellant was firstly on daily wages up to 31-7-1958 and that his services were going to be terminated on 1-11-1958 and that then he was given appointments two times for one month. On these facts the appellant can be considered as a causal workman, but in view of the specific regulations framed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India, these Central rules are hardly applicable. 27. The position that follows from the above is that the appellant was wholly temporary employee, that he was never appointed in permanent vacancy, that he was, therefore, never on probation and that as such he could not be confirmed on the expiry of the alleged period of six months. 28. The appellants counsel referred to three cases: (1) State of U.P. v. Ansar Husain, 1964 All LJ 141 : ( AIR 1964 All 346 ). Ansar Husain was an Assistant in the office of the U.P. Public Service Commission. In the year 1948 Sales Tax Department came into existence as a temporary department. Ansar Hussain was appointed as an officiating Assistant Sales Tax Officer. A little later he was appointed as an officiating Sales Tax Officer. Thereafter the department was made permanent. In this way the posts of Assistant Sales Tax Officers became permanent. On the department becoming permanent, the Govt. issued an order on 5-6-1957 that Ansar Husain and 6 other Assistant Sales Tax Officers should be placed under trial for a period of two years and that their cases for confirmation would be considered. Ansar Husain continued to work as an Assistant Sales Tax Officer and later on as officiating Sales Tax Officer. The Government reverted him to his substantive post in the office of the U.P. Public Service Commission. It was held that his reversion was in violation of Rule 55 (3) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. In view of this the writ petition of Ansar Husain was allowed. The State preferred a special appeal. The Government reverted him to his substantive post in the office of the U.P. Public Service Commission. It was held that his reversion was in violation of Rule 55 (3) of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. In view of this the writ petition of Ansar Husain was allowed. The State preferred a special appeal. In special appeal the definition of the term "probationer" given in Subsidary Rule was considered and it was held that as the department had become permanent, Ansar Husain would be deemed to be appointed against the substantive vacancy in the cadre of the post of Assistant Sales Tax Officer. Therefore, he could not be reverted to his substantive post in the U.P. Public Service Commission Office. Facts of this case are obviously quite distinct from the facts of the present appellant. Therefore, this case is of no help to the appellant. (2) R. Christopher v. Executive Engineer, Irrigation Workshop, Izatnagar, Bareilly, AIR 1966 All 97 . The appellant was an automobile fitter in the respondents workshop. He was dismissed with effect from 11-6-1958. His grievance was that compliance of the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution was not made. Article 311 applies to members of a Civil Service of the Union or a State. It was held that appellant was, despite the fact that he was employed on daily wages, holding a civil post, within the meaning of Article 311. The ratio of this case is wholly inapplicable to the case of the present appellant. He was just a temporary Assistant and his services were coming to an end by the expiry of the period of appointment. (3) State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 : (1968 Lab IC 1409). The principle laid down in this case is that a probationer if allowed to continue in his permanent post after the period of probation, he would be deemed to have been confirmed in the post. This principle is not applicable to the case of the appellant. 29. The result is that no precedent cited by the appellants counsel helps the appellant. 30. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that in view of para 10 of Establishment Manual of Life Insurance Corporation of India the appellant could not be appointed as a Record Keeper. Para 10 relates to Record Clerks, Section Heads and Superintendents. 29. The result is that no precedent cited by the appellants counsel helps the appellant. 30. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that in view of para 10 of Establishment Manual of Life Insurance Corporation of India the appellant could not be appointed as a Record Keeper. Para 10 relates to Record Clerks, Section Heads and Superintendents. It lays down that ordinarily no direct recruitment will be made to these cadres and the vacancies arising therein will be filled by promotions. It will be noticed that this lays down a general rule. But in special circumstances there can be direct recruitment of a Record Clerk. As the appellant was working as a temporary assistant and his services were being terminated by the Corporation, the post of Record Keeper was offered to him to avoid hardship to the appellant. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the appellant could not be appointed Record Keeper or Record Clerk. 30A. The appellant's counsel then referred to S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which lays down conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. This Section lays down that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until the workman has been given one month's notice in writing or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice. Section 25B of this Act defines one year of continuous service in this way that a workman who during a period of twelve calender months, has actually worked for not less than two hundred and forty days shall be deemed to have completed one year of continuous service. The question is whether the appellant was retrenched from the post of an Assistant Class III and whether he had been in continuous service as an Assistant for one year. 31. Facts of the present case clearly show that the appellant worked as an Assistant from 25-2-1958 to 31-12-1958. Thus he clearly remained an Assistant for less than one calendar year. It was pointed out that as the appellant had worked for two hundred and forty days he would be deemed to have been in continuous service for one year. 32. Facts of the present case clearly show that the appellant worked as an Assistant from 25-2-1958 to 31-12-1958. Thus he clearly remained an Assistant for less than one calendar year. It was pointed out that as the appellant had worked for two hundred and forty days he would be deemed to have been in continuous service for one year. 32. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to two cases : (1) Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. The Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1914 . In this case, the cases of three persons Manik Chandra Das, Nagen Bora and Monoharan were under consideration. The Supreme Court found the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Manik Chandra Das correct. Nagen Bora and Monoharan had worked for more than two hundred and forty days in less than 11 calendar months. It was observed, "Before a workman can be considered to have completed one year of continuous service in an industry it must be shown first that he was employed for a period of not less than 12 calendar month's and, next that during those 12 calendar month's had worked for not less than 240 days. Where, as in the present case, the workmen have not at all been employed for a period of 12 calendar months, it becomes unnecessary to examine whether the actual days of work numbered 240 days or more." The above observation clearly goes against the appellant and does not give any advantage to the appellant. The respondents counsel urged that if the appellant had worked as an Assistant at least for 12 calendar month's then he could have taken advantage of the fact that by continuing for 240 days he would get benefit of the provision of S. 25B. (2) Digwadih Colliery v. Their Workmen, (1965) 2 Lab LJ 118, corresponding to AIR 1966 SC 75 . One Jaldhar Singh worked as Badli workman in the calendar years 1959 and 1960 in different capacities. There were six breaks of one day to a week in 1959 and eight breaks of one day to a week in 1960. He, however, worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year though with these interruptions. In January, 1961, the colliery terminated Jaldhar Singhs services without notice to him or payment of wages in lieu of notice. The dispute went before the Tribunal. He, however, worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year though with these interruptions. In January, 1961, the colliery terminated Jaldhar Singhs services without notice to him or payment of wages in lieu of notice. The dispute went before the Tribunal. It was urged on behalf of Jaldhar Singh that he was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of S. 25F. The Tribunal found in his favour. The Supreme Court found that the view taken by the Tribunal was correct. The ratio was that service for 240 days in a period of twelve calendar month's is equal, not only to service for a year, but is to be deemed continuous service even if interrupted. This observation is of no help to the appellant because before the expiry of the period of twelve calendar month's he was given an offer in the grade of Record Keeper which he accepted and he became a Record Keeper within a period of twelve calendar month's from the commencement of his service in the Corporation. Therefore, this case is of no help to the appellant. 33. The learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that the appellant accepted the post of Record Keeper because the Corporation was going to terminate his services as an Assistant. This is no doubt true, but it does not mean that even after 1-1-1959 the appellant would be treated as an Assistant and not as a Record Keeper. Therefore, the provisions of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be taken advantage of by the appellant. 34. Before the trial court there was an issue that the suit was barred by the principles of estoppel and acquiescence. The trial court recorded a finding on this issue against the appellant. This point was not raised before the lower appellate court. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that there could be no estoppel against the statutory provisions and in support of his contention he referred to the case of Wadi Stone Marketing Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commr., (1965) 2 Lab LJ 32 (Mys). In this case it was observed, "It is a well settled proposition of law that there can be no estoppel against a statute". There is no dispute to this principle, but on the facts of the present case this principle is not applicable to the appellant. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commr., (1965) 2 Lab LJ 32 (Mys). In this case it was observed, "It is a well settled proposition of law that there can be no estoppel against a statute". There is no dispute to this principle, but on the facts of the present case this principle is not applicable to the appellant. There is a positive finding of fact recorded by the two Court's below that the appellants consent for the post of Record Keeper was not a result of undue influence or pressure. 35. Lastly, appellants counsel contended that three other Employee's K.N. Gupta, S.S. Ambwani and Vijai Narain Singh had failed in the recruitment test, but they were later on confirmed as Assistants and as such the Corporation made a discrimination. The counsel referred to Article 16 of the Constitution which lays down that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens relating to the employment or appointment to any office under the State. The learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that this case was not taken up by the appellant in the plaint and as such the appellant could not raise this point for the first time in this Court in Second Appeal. This point was not raised before the Court's below. There is considerable force in the contention of the respondents counsel. It is a question of fact whether the Corporation resorted to discrimination. Had this point been taken in the plaint, the Corporation would have got an opportunity to meet it. As this point was not taken in the plaint, nor it was urged before the lower appellate court, the appellant cannot legitimately urge this point in this Court. It was pointed out on behalf of the appellant that in the recruitment test the appellant had appeared as a direct candidate through Employment Exchange and not as a departmental candidate. This fact does not give any benefit to the appellant. The fact is that he failed in the test. 36. No other point was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant to entitle the appellant to any of the reliefs claimed. It will be noticed that in this case, the appellant has not claimed any arrears of pay, i. e. the difference between the pay of an Assistant and the pay as daily wage earner. 36. No other point was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant to entitle the appellant to any of the reliefs claimed. It will be noticed that in this case, the appellant has not claimed any arrears of pay, i. e. the difference between the pay of an Assistant and the pay as daily wage earner. The appellant did not obtain any leave of the Court to sue for recovery of this difference. This difference relates to the period 25-2-1958 to 31-7-1958. Claim for the difference in respect of this period has obviously become time barred. Therefore, it is wholly unnecessary to grant declaration that the appellant was virtually appointed with effect from 25-2-1958 as an Assistant in the Corporation. 37. The result of what has been discussed above is that there is no merit in this appeal. Appeal is dismissed with costs.