JUDGMENT T. R. Handa, J.—The appellant Mohinder Singh has been convicted under sections 451 and 394 read with section 397 of the India Penal Code by the Additional Sessions Judge, Dharamsala who after hearing the appellant on the question of sentence, sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 300 and in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one month under section 451, I. P. C. and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years under section 394,1. P. C. read with section 397, I. P. C, and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 and in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. The facts of the prosecution case, stated briefly are as follows: 2. The appellant Mohinder Singh used to sell cloth as a hawker and in course of that business he had been visiting village Dyarain the jurisdiction of Police Station Dharamsala. On 6-5-1976 at about 1 p. m. the appellant was in village Dyara where he first went to the house of P. W. 4 Shrimati Savitri where he took his meals. Thereafter he went to the house of P. W.3, Shrimati Kaulan who at that time was all alone in the house, her husband and both her sons having gone out on their work. Her house is somewhat away from the Abadi, the nearest house in the neighbourhood being about 200 yards away. The appellant after confirming from P. W. Kaulan that her husband and both her sons were away pounced upon her, removed a pair of silver Balis from her ears and in the process tore off the lobule of her one ear. He then manhandled her and also removed a gold Long and Tili from her nose. As a result of the blows inflicted upon her by the appellant with his fist and also with an axe, which was lying nearby, Shrimati Kaulan became unconscious. Her son P. W. 5 Jagat Ram on return home was the first to detect her lying unconscious with injuries on her person. He removed her to the Civil Hospital Dharamsala. As a result of the blows inflicted upon her by the appellant with his fist and also with an axe, which was lying nearby, Shrimati Kaulan became unconscious. Her son P. W. 5 Jagat Ram on return home was the first to detect her lying unconscious with injuries on her person. He removed her to the Civil Hospital Dharamsala. The Medical Officer Incharge of the Hospital who examined her sent a written information to the police about the admission of Shrimati Kaulan in the Hospital with injuries on her person and in response to that information, head constable Richpal Singh, P. W. 11 visited the Hospital and recorded-the statement of Shrimati Kaulan, found at Ex. P. D. Formal F. I. R. Ex. P, A. was later recorded on the basis of the said statement of Shrimati Kaulan. In her statement aforesaid Shrimati Kaulan had not only given a detailed account of the occurrence but also a vivid description of her assailant. During the investigation the appellant was arrested and while in police custody he made a disclosure statement to the effect that he had sold the pair of silver Balis as also the gold Tili and Long to one Charni Jat of village Ghumman in the jurisdiction of Police Station Dhariwal and that he could get the same recovered. Later in pursuance of that disclosure statement he led the police party to the house of Charni in village Ghumman were Shri Charni produced the pair of Balis as also the gold Long and Tili which ornaments were identified on the spot by Shrimati Kaulan who was also then accompanying the police party. As a result of the investigation, a prima facie case having been found to exist against the appellant, he was challaned to the Court and later committed to the Court of Sessions. The defence of the appellant in the Court below was that of denial simplicitor. 3. As already stated, the learned Sessions Judge on the basis of the material produced before him found the appellant guilty of the offence under sections 451, 394 and 597, I. P. C. and convicted him accordingly. 4. The defence of the appellant in the Court below was that of denial simplicitor. 3. As already stated, the learned Sessions Judge on the basis of the material produced before him found the appellant guilty of the offence under sections 451, 394 and 597, I. P. C. and convicted him accordingly. 4. The points that arise for determination in this case are whether the appellant committed house trespass into the house of P. W. Kaulan and then robbed her of her ornaments and in the process used some deadly weapon or caused grievious hurt to Shrimati Kaulan. 5. P. W. 3. Shrimati Kaulan, the alleged victim of the appellant, is the sheet anchor of the prosecution case. She gave a clear and consistent account of the entire occurrence. According to her she was all alone in her house when the appellant reached there at about noon time and after ascertaining from her that her husband and both the sons were out, he caught hold of her by the neck and then forcibly removed the Balis from both of her ears as a result of which the lobule of one of her ears was torn. According to the further version of this witness, the appellant then gave her fist blows and also blows with the axe Ex. P. 1. which he picked upon from the spot and next removed the gold Tili and long from her nose. She was confident about the identity of the appellant whom she claims to have seen in the village selling cloth on earlier occasions also. She was frank enough to admit that she had not herself purchased any cloth from the appellant but at the same time was positive that she had seen him in the village. She duly identified the appellant when he was shown to her. In fact in her statement made to the police under section 154, Cr. P. C. this witness had declared that she could positively identify her assailant whom she had been seeing on earlier occasions. She had also given a detailed account of the description of the appellant and further stated that at the moment she could not recollect his name suggesting thereby that the appellant was known to her not only by face but also by name, though she was not in a position to recollect his name. She had also given a detailed account of the description of the appellant and further stated that at the moment she could not recollect his name suggesting thereby that the appellant was known to her not only by face but also by name, though she was not in a position to recollect his name. We should bear in mind that this statement of this witness was recorded next day of the occurrence in the Hospital when she must be still feeling the agony of her injuries. To me there appears to be no manner of doubt that she was in a position to identify her assailant and that she did identify the present appellant as the person who trespassed into her house and robbed her of her ornaments. I can imagine of no reason why this old and simple lady should intentionally accuse the present appellant for the offence committed on her in case he was not the real culprit. The solitary statement of this witness under the circumstances could be considered sufficient to sustain the conviction of the appellant. In this case, however, the statement of this witness finds ample corroboration from other evidence as well P. W. 4 Shrimati Savitri who is also from the same village testified that on the day of occurrence the appellant had visited her house and in fact had taken his meals from there. This witness, thus, proved the presence of the appellant in village Dyara on the day and immediately before the hour of occurrence. 6. On the point whether the appellant robbed P. W. Kaulan of her ornaments, there is again the evidence of P. W. Kaulan herself which inspires full confidence. On this point Shrimati Kaulan gets full corroboration from the subsequent recovery of the stolen ornaments at the instance of the appellant in pursuance of the disclosure statement made by him under section 27 of the Evidence Act while in police custody. The disclosure statement which is found at Ex. P. 1 was made by the appellant before the A. S. I. Shri Goverdhan Dass and in the presence of P. W, 6, Shri Lachhi Dutt and one Jaissi Ram. A. S. I. Goverdhan Dass who appeared as P. W. 16 and Lachhi Dutt who appeared as P. W. 6 fully proves the factum of this statement having been made by the appellant. A. S. I. Goverdhan Dass who appeared as P. W. 16 and Lachhi Dutt who appeared as P. W. 6 fully proves the factum of this statement having been made by the appellant. Later in pursuance of this statement A. S. I. Goverdhan Dass accompanied by two police constables, and Shrimati Kaulan, P. W. 3, and her son Jagat Ram P. W. 5 proceeded to village Ghumman where he joined two local witnesses P. W. 9 Krishan Singh and one Aladitta. In the presence of these witnesses the appellant led the police party to the house of Charan Singh who produced all the aforesaid ornaments in the presence of these witnesses and the same were identified on the spot by P. W. Kaulan as her ornaments. Charan Singh who appeared as P. W. 8 deposed that these ornaments had been pledged with him for Rs. 150 by the appellant by two or three months before the same were recovered by the police from him, Charan Singh P. W. 8, is a relation of the appellant inasmuch as his cousin is married to the sister of the appellant. There is no reason, whatsoever, as to why this witness should have been interested in falsely implicating the appellant in this case. Again there is no reason to assume that the ornaments produced by this witness were plainted as none could be interested in supplying these ornaments which are of considerable value. The safe conclusion is that they were recovered from P. W. Charan Singh in pursuance of the disclosure statement made by the appellant and that Charan Singh had received them from the appellant as claimed by him. The evidence of P. W. 1. Kaulan read with the evidence of recovery of stolen ornaments as narrated above, justifies the conclusion drawn by the Court below that the appellant had forcible removed the two silver Balis as also the gold Long and Tili from the person of P. W. Kaulan. The third point also stands established from the medical evidence as also from the statement of P. W. Kaulan herself that in the process of committing robbery the appellant caused grievious hurt to Shrimati Kaulan. The conviction of the appellant on all the counts as recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge thus, deserves to be sustained and there is no scope for interference with the same. 7. The conviction of the appellant on all the counts as recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge thus, deserves to be sustained and there is no scope for interference with the same. 7. Coming next to the question of sentence, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that although the learned Sessions Judge did observe the procedure as laid down by the New Criminal Procedure Code (section 235) (2) in hearing the appellant after pronouncing his judgment of conviction, he had not properly applied his mind while dealing with the question of sentence. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Additional Sessions Judge did not at all consider the advisibility of allowing the appellant the benefit of section 360, Cr. P. C. as is apparent from his order. While considering the question of punishment the learned Judge in the concluding portion of his judgment observed as under:— "I have heard the learned counsel for the parties on the point of sentence. The learned P. P. has argued that since the accused has committed a heinous offence which took Shrimati Kaulan to brinks of death he must be meted out deterrent sentence. The learned defence counsel on the other hand has argued that since the accused is a young man and this is his first offence, a lenient view be taken in the matter. I have taken into consideration these respective submissions and feel that since this is the first offence of the accused he must be meted out the minimum punishment prescribed by Law. I, therefore, sentence the accused Mohinder Singh to undergo........." 8. It is apparent from the manner in which the learned Judge dealt with the question of sentence and as referred to above that he never applied his mind on the point whether the appellant should have been allowed the benefit of section 360, Cr. P. C It is most probably due to the fact that the learned Judge was of the view that provisions of section 360, Cr. P.C. cannot be attracted to this case for the reason that the law prescribes a minimum sentence of seven years for an offence under section 397, 1. P. C It is most probably due to the fact that the learned Judge was of the view that provisions of section 360, Cr. P.C. cannot be attracted to this case for the reason that the law prescribes a minimum sentence of seven years for an offence under section 397, 1. P. C. It is true that section 397, I. P. C. does provide that a person found guilty of this offence shall be sentenced to imprisonment which shall not be less than seven years but this by itself would not imply that the provisions of section 360, Cr. P. C. cannot be attracted to a person convicted of this offence even though he answers all the requirements laid in that section. A plain reading of the language of sections 360 and 361, Cr. P. C. suggests inter alia that whenever a person under 21 years of age is convicted of an offence net punishable with death or imprisonment for life and no previous conviction is proved against him, the Court is bound to consider the advisibility of releasing him on probation keeping, of course, in view of his age, character or antecedents and the circumstance in which the offence was committed and in case the court does not feel inclined in releasing such a convict on probation then it must record its reasons for not doing so. The language of this section does not suggest that it would not apply in case of offences for which a minimum sentence has been prescribed under the Law. The legislature while enacting section 360, Cr. P. C. must be presumed to have been aware of the fact that in case of certain specified offences a minimum sentence has been prescribed under the Law and in case the intention was to keep this class of offences outside the purview of section 360 Cr. P. C. it should have been specifically and clearly indicated in the language of this section. The fact that no exception has been made in the language of section 360, Cr. P. C. in case of offences punishable with a minimum sentence of imprisonment, shows that this is no criterion for determining whether the provisions of section 360, Cr. P. C. can or cannot be attracted to this class of offences. On the other hand it is clear from the language employed in section 360, Cr. P. C. in case of offences punishable with a minimum sentence of imprisonment, shows that this is no criterion for determining whether the provisions of section 360, Cr. P. C. can or cannot be attracted to this class of offences. On the other hand it is clear from the language employed in section 360, Cr. P. C. that the only criteria which need be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining wether the provisions of this section can be attracted in a particular case are : (1) the age of the offender (2) the maximum punishment prescribed for the offence of which he is found guilty (3) previous conviction of the offender, if any, proved. 9. In my view, therefore, on a proper consideration of section 360, Cr. P. C. a first offender, provided the other provisions of this section apply, is entitled to the benefit of this section even though in the absence of such a provision, the court would have no option but to pass the minimum sentence of imprisonment provided for the offence committed by him. Any other construction would entirely nullify the effect of the provisions of section 360, Cr. P. C. in a large number of cases which apparently was never the intention of the Legislature. 10. Inasmuch as the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not considered at all the advisibility or desirability of allowing the benefit of section 360, Cr. P.C. to the present appellant who admittedly is a young boy of 13 years of age and is a first offender, there are two courses open for this Court, either to remand the case to the trial court with directions to apply its mind afresh in the matter of imposition of sentence after taking into consideration the provisions of sections 36) and 361, Cr. P.C. or to consider this question in this appeal itself. Since the first course would entail avoidable delay and especially when sub-section (4) of section 360, Cr. P.C. empowers this Court also to make an order under that provision, I would prefer to adopt the second course. 11. P.C. or to consider this question in this appeal itself. Since the first course would entail avoidable delay and especially when sub-section (4) of section 360, Cr. P.C. empowers this Court also to make an order under that provision, I would prefer to adopt the second course. 11. The Law does provide different punishments for different kinds of offences and in certain cases it provides for a minimum sentence as well but at the same time a wide discretionary jurisdiction has been conferred on the Courts to release the convicts, not involved in very heinous offences, on probation, instead of incarcerating them to prison. It would certainly require a great sense of responsibility on the part of the court to decide as to how to deal with a convict more especially when he happens to be a youthful offender. The main object of awarding punishment to an offender is two-fold : the prevention of crime and reformation of the offender. In some cases a deterrent punishment may be called for to achieve the aforesaid objects, while in others infliction of such punishment may have just the reverse effect and it may convert an otherwise harmless offender into a hardened criminal thus making him a potential danger for the Society. Release on probation may be a more appropriate remedy in such like cases. It is in this sphere that the Court is required to exhibit its sense of responsibility and decide as to which course it should adopt in a particular case. The age, character and antecedents of the offender, the circumstances in which he committed the offence and the environments in which he has been brought up are some of the circumstances that deserve consideration in deciding as to which of the tvvo courses, namely, sending the offender to jail or releasing him on probation would be conducive in achieving the laudable object of reforming the offender and preventing the crime. Normally a youthful offender whose character and antecedents are not shown to be bad, should not be committed to jail as this course is very likely to convert him into a hardened criminal in the Society of other similar criminals. This would certainly frustrate the very object of awarding the punishment. 12. The appellant in the instant case is a young boy of only 18 years. This would certainly frustrate the very object of awarding the punishment. 12. The appellant in the instant case is a young boy of only 18 years. No previous conviction is attributed to him and the present occurrence is alleged to be his first lapse in life. He is not shown to have ever exhibited a tendency towards crime. There is no suggestion if he is of undersirable character or with bad antecedents. On the other hand the prosecution evidence itself shows that the petitioner had been in the past earning his livelihood by selling cloth as a hawker. It may be that compelled by certain impulses or circumstances he had to indulge in this crime. There is thus every possibility that if given an opportunity he might reform. In any case it is worthwhile to afford the appellant a chance to reform himself. Considering all the aspects of this case I am of the view that it is desirable to release the appellant on probation rather committing him to jail thereby exposing him to the risk of being turned into a hardened criminal in the company of other such criminals. 13. I would accordingly while maintaining the conviction of the appellant for all the offences recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, set aside the sentence imposed upon him by the Court below and instead direct that the appellant be released on his furnishing a bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000 with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court, undertaking to receive sentence whenever called upon to do so within the period of three years from the date of execution of the bond and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. Order accordingly.-