Order The complainant filed C.C.No.177 of 1977 on the file of the Additional Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Gudivada, securing a conviction against the accused therein for committing an offence punishable under section 352 of the Indian Penal Code. The trial Court failed to pass any orders of ejectment as provided under section 456(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the complainant filed Crl. M.P.No. 307 of 1978 within a period of one month from the date of the order of conviction of the accused. However, notices were issued to the accused and practically after four months, after the conviction of the accused, the trial Court passed orders under section 456(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, restoring possession to the extent of one-third portion on the Northern side of the house in Motharu village of the petitioner. Aggrieved by the order of restoration under section 456(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the complainant preferred an appeal. The appellate Court allowed that appeal and held that having regard to the provisions of section 456(1) , Criminal Procedure Code, and the proviso thereto, order of the Court is the criteria and that order has got to be passed within one month from the date of the conviction, even though the complainant has filed the application under section 456(1), Criminal Procedure Code, within one month from the date of the conviction. Therefore, it would be noticed that the question involved in this revision is as to whether, having regard to the provisions of the proviso to section 456(1) , Criminal Procedure Code, the trial Court loses its jurisdiction in passing the order under section 456(1) , Criminal Procedure Code, when the period of one month lapses after the conviction of the accused, even though a petition to pass an order under section 456(1) Criminal Procedure Code, has been filed by the successful party within one month from the date of the order of conviction. To my mind, this is an important point of law requiring a decision of a Bench of this Court. I, therefore, refer this revision to a Bench. Papers may be placed before his Lordship the Chief Justice for formation of the Bench. Pursuant to the above order this case came on for hearing before a Division Bench consisting of Punnayya and Ramachandra Raju, JJ. I, therefore, refer this revision to a Bench. Papers may be placed before his Lordship the Chief Justice for formation of the Bench. Pursuant to the above order this case came on for hearing before a Division Bench consisting of Punnayya and Ramachandra Raju, JJ. The judgment of the Division Bench delivered by Ramachandra Raju, J*.- This revision case which came up before our learned brother Muktadar, J., is referred to us to decide the question whether the trial Magistrate ceases to have jurisdiction to make any order concerning possession of immovable property under section 456(1), Criminal Procedure Code, after the lapse of one month from the date of conviction of the accused even in cases where the petition to be restored to possession was filed before him within one month from the date of the conviction. The facts which form the background for this revision can be briefly noticed. The dispute relates to be a one-third share in house property which originally belonged to the petitioner. Sometime prior to 1967, she sold her one-third share to one Ramanujamma, who along with her son, mortgaged that share on 12th December, 1967. Ramanujamma later sold away her share to her brother Narasaiah on 4th July, 1970, and Narasaiah in his turn sold that share to A-1 on 14th May, 1976. Ramanujamma has given a registered notice dated 28th July, 1976, alleging that the sale by her in favour of her brother was nominal, and that notwithstanding the sale still she was continuing to be in possession of the property. A-1 first destroyed the Eastern wall of the house, concerning which Ramanujamma filed a police report. On hearing that Ramanujamma gave such police report, A-1 destroy d the Southern wall of the house as well. When Ramanujamma was away, the petitioner was allegedly assaulted and removed from the house. The petitioner filed C.C. No. 177 of 1977 alleging various offences, but the respondents were convicted only for the offence under section 352, Indian Penal Code, on 13th March, 1978. Consequent on that conviction, the petitioner filed Crl.M.P.No. 307 of 1978 on 5th April, 1978 under section 456(1), Criminal Procedure Code, requesting the Magistrate to direct her to be put back into possession of the property. Consequent on that conviction, the petitioner filed Crl.M.P.No. 307 of 1978 on 5th April, 1978 under section 456(1), Criminal Procedure Code, requesting the Magistrate to direct her to be put back into possession of the property. That petition ultimately came up before the Magistrate for disposal on 7th July, 1978, and the question arose whether after the expiry of one month from the date of conviction, the Magistrate had still jurisdiction to order possession to be restored to the petitioner. The learned Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Gudivada, held that he did not lose jurisdiction and therefore, passed the order dated 7th July, 1978, directing the respondents to restore possession of the one-third portion of the house to the petitioner. The respondents went in appeal before the Sessions Judge, Krishna, in Crl.A. No. 127 of 1978. The learned Sessions Judge held that the application for restoration of possession is barred. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court in revision. As the question involved is one of law, it has been referred to a Bench. 3. The proviso to section 456 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, leaves no doubt whatsoever that such order of restoration cannot be made by the Court more than one month after the date of the conviction. There is no dispute that by 7th July, 1978, the period of one month had already elapsed, and the question is whether because the petition for restoration was filed within one month from the date of conviction the Magistrate had the jurisdiction to pass an order for restoration on any day beyond, the period of one month from the date of conviction. A plain reading of the section leaves no alternative but to hold that the Magistrate has become junctus officio and had no longer any jurisdiction to pass such order of restoration after the expiry of one month from the date of conviction. There was a conflict of views as one time regarding the power of the appellate Court in directing such restorations, when similar orders were passed in disposing of the appeals against convictions. That conflict is now set at rest by the decision reported in HP. There was a conflict of views as one time regarding the power of the appellate Court in directing such restorations, when similar orders were passed in disposing of the appeals against convictions. That conflict is now set at rest by the decision reported in HP. Gupta v. Manohar Lal1 The Supreme Court has expressed the view that so far as the Court of appeal or revision are concerned they can exercise the power to order restoration either while disposing of the appeal or revision or even after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of the appellate order. We are here concerned with the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and, the view expressed in Subrahmaniya v. Ganesan2 which followed an earlier decision of the Madras High Court in Maria Pillai v. Ramanathan Chettiar3 is that so far as the Magistrate is concerned, he ceased to have any jurisdiction to pass an order after the expiry of one month from the date of conviction. The High Courts of Patna, Allahabad, Bombay, and Nagpur have no doubt taken a different view, but having regard to the view expressed by the Madras High Court, by which we are bound, the Magistrate had no longer any jurisdiction to direct restoration after the expiry of one month from the date of conviction. As the point involved in the revision is the same question referred to this Bench, the point is answered accordingly and the revision case is dismissed. G.S.M. ----- Revision dismissed.