ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 960. 2. The facts, in brief, are these. The petitioner No. 1 Jujhar Singh was issued the notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act and he filed his objections. The objections were decided by the Prescribed Authority. Thereafter, an. appeal was filed and the same was heard and decided by the Additional District Judge, Jhansi. Now the petitioners have come up in the instant writ petition, and in support thereof, I have heard Sri Yotindra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners. 3. A contention has been raised in the petition that the sale-deed dated 14th September, 1970 should have been accepted. In my view the said contention. cannot be accepted in the writ jurisdiction of this court. The authorities below have given their reasons for ignoring the said document. I am not exercising the appellate jurisdiction, and the finding of fact recorded by the authorities below cannot be interfered with. The learned counsel for the petitioner emphasises certain observations made in the Division, Bench pronouncement of this court in Yadunath v. State (1979 All WC 187). It should be seen that in the said case the Division, Bench clearly held that the Ceiling authorities were entitled to look into the validity of the transfer deeds which were executed before 24-1-1971. The Division Bench emphasises the approach of a prudent person in the matter of appreciating the evidence. In this connection the Division Bench referred to Section 3 of the Evidence Act. In paragraph 14 the Division Bench observed as under: - "He may discharge that burden by producing before the Prescribed Authority the copy of the registered sale-deed showing that he had for some consideration, transferred the plots to a third party before 8-6-1973. In such a case unless there is something else on the record that a prudent man would act on the supposition that title to the plot covered by the sale-deed was, before 8-6-1973 transferred to the third party and the person to whom the notice was issued, had ceased to hold the same." It must be emphasised that it will be utterly wrong to interpret the authority of Yadunaths case in a rigid manner. The basic position is that under the ceiling law the Prescribed Authority and thereafter, the District Judge have been constituted final authorities in the matter of deciding findings &i facts. It is important that under Section 13 (2) of the Act the decision of the District Judge, has been made final and conclusive and not to be questioned in any court of law. This provision clearly emphasised the anxiety of the legislature that the judgment of the District Judge should not toe questioned in any manner. It is not suggested that this court is bound by or inhibited in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the 'Constitution of India, it is permissible to take the said provision, into consideration showing the legislative anxiety. In AIR 1964 SC 477 Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishna it was held (at pp. 479-480): - "There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence, cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings..... ...... ......It may be conceded that it would have been better if the Appellate Tribunal had indicated why it rejected the case of respondent No. 1. in regard to his alleged workshop at Chidambaran, but we do not think that the failure of the appellate Tribunal to give a reason in that behalf, or to refer specifically to the evidence adduced by respondent No. 1 would, by itself, constitute such an error in its decision, as to justify the issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226." It should be seen that in the instant case the sale-deed was made in favour of the own son and grand sons. The Division Bench in Yadunath Singhs case emphasised that if the sale-deed was in favour of a third party then a prudent man in the absence of other circumstances may believe that the deed is a genuine one. Even, on the said observations of the Division Bench, this document cannot be catalogued as one which the Division Bench had in contemplation. Even, on the said observations of the Division Bench, this document cannot be catalogued as one which the Division Bench had in contemplation. I would again like to emphasise that the Division Bench merely laid down certain broad guidelines and indicated certain approaches but whether a deed should be ignored or should be accepted, is basically a finding of fact and the same cannot be decided on the basis of precedents but will be dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Learned counsel then emphasises certain, observations made in paragraph 20 of the said Division Bench judgment but they were made with reference to gift-deed. Here we are concerned with a sale-deed which had been purported to have been executed for consideration. The learned counsel emphasise that the mutation had been effected in, pursuance of the sale-deed. Even if that be so, that does not rule out the application of Explanation to Section 5 (1) of the Act. It is obvious that the anxiety of the legislature is that mere execution of documents followed by mutation in the revenue records should not be decisive in the matter. If that were so, then it would be impossible to implement and effectuate the Ceiling Law. I, therefore, cannot agree with the contention that because mutation had been effected, therefore, the enquiry was shut out in respect of the real nature and genuineness of the document concerned. 4. Learned counsel also placed reliance on Jai Singh v. Salek Chand (1969 Rev Dec 497) which is a decision of the Board of Revenue. It was observed there: - "D. W. 5 is village Lekhpal who has said about the possession of the parties .............He has further admitted that there was no entry in his paper to corroborate his statement. A Lekhpal minus his papers is nothing." 5. Again it should be seen that no cast-iron proposition of law was intended to be or could be laid down. It was only emphasised that in the normal circumstances the oral statement of the Lekhpal has to be seen in the context of the revenue record entries. A Lekhpal minus his papers is nothing." 5. Again it should be seen that no cast-iron proposition of law was intended to be or could be laid down. It was only emphasised that in the normal circumstances the oral statement of the Lekhpal has to be seen in the context of the revenue record entries. There can be no dispute with that proposition but in the special context of ceiling law with its Explanation to Section 5 (1), it should be seen that the legislative injunction is that the matter should not be allowed to rest with the revenue record entries or documents but the factual position should be found out. It cannot be disputed that the question of possession is absolutely relevant in such controversy and the Lekhpals statement is material. The Division Bench, in Yadunaths case (1979 All WC 187) also recognised this aspect of the matter. 6. The learned counsel next contended that there was no evidence in respect of the possession. In my opinion again it is a matter of the appraisal of evidence. The Lekhpal in his statement deposed to the correctness of the statement prepared by him. This statement clearly showed that the sold land was being included in the holding of the petitioner No. 1. He clearly stated that the names of other persons were merely ostensibly there. No question was put to him in cross-examination that the petitioner No. 1 was not in cultivatory possession. It may also be emphasised that the vendees themselves did not enter the witness-box to claim their possession. All this, of course, I again wish to emphasise, is really in the realm of the appreciation of evidence. In my opinion, it is not the case where it can be said that there was no evidence for the finding recorded by the authorities below. The first contention, therefore, is rejected. 7. The learned counsel next contended that certain land was wrongly treated as irrigated. In my view inasmuch as the authorities below did not have the benefit of having the guidance which was subsequently given in Jaswant Singh v. State, 1978 All WC 577: (1979 All LJ 25), therefore, the said controversy was not legally decided. 8. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and the order of the Prescribed Authority and the judgment of appellate Court are hereby quashed so far as the plots have been treated as irrigated. 8. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and the order of the Prescribed Authority and the judgment of appellate Court are hereby quashed so far as the plots have been treated as irrigated. The case is remanded to the Prescribed Authority with a direction that the parties shall be allowed opportunity to lead additional evidence on the said controversy in the light of the law laid down in Jaswant Singhs case (1979 All LJ 25) and therefore, the Prescribed Authority shall deal with each separate plot and state how both the requirements laid down in an.y of the three categories of Section 4-A of the Act stand satisfied or do not stand satisfied and thereafter the particular plot shall be held to be irrigated or un-irrigated on the basis of the law laid down in Jaswant Singh's case. It is made clear that no other controversy shall be allowed to be raised before the Prescribed Authority or before the appellate court in case an appeal is filed against the fresh decision of the Prescribed Authority. The surplus land shall be redetermined thereafter. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.