JUDGMENT 1. - This is appeal by defendant, proprietors of firm Gopi Kishan Salagram (Gopi Kishan Salagram, Tara Chand and Tikan Chand) against the judgment and decree dated October 3, 1967, passed by the learned District Judge, Jodhpur, by which he set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur, dated September 11, 1964. The learned District Judge has decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 for permanent injunction restraining the Municipal Council, Jodhpur (defendant No. 1) and the defendant-appellants from evicting the plaintiff from the land (Chowkari) in dispute. Defendant No. 3 was Kedardas, who has been impleaded as respondent No. 2 in this appeal and defendant No. 1 has been impleaded as respondent No. 3. 2. Succinctly put the case of the plaintiff was that his deceased father Manraj took the land in dispute on lease from the Municipal Board, Jodhpur on a monthly rent for Rs. 3/9 annas on October, 4/3, 1944 and executed a rent-note (Ex. 1) and that the plaintiff's father Manraj was put into exclusive possession of the land, who occupied in it the capacity of a tenant during his life time. After the death of Manraj, the plaintiff remained in its peaceful possession and paid rent to the Municipal Board upto June 30, 1962. The case of the plaintiff further is that thereafter, the Municipal Board did not accept the rent from him and, therefore, he sent a sum of Rs. 21/56 P. on September 24, 1962 by Money Order but the Money Order was not accepted. The land in dispute was leased out to defendant No. 2 appellant on July 4, 1962 on a monthly rent for Rs. 80/- by the administrator of the Municipal Board. The rent was made payable from November 1, 1961. In these circumstances, it was proved by the plaintiff that the Municipal Board and defendant No. 2 be restrained from disturbing his long and peaceful possession over the land in question. 3. Defendant No. 1 filed a written statement on December 7, 1962. It was pleaded that the land in dispute was allotted to the father of the plaintiff as a Licencee and that the relationship of the landlord and tenant never existed between the plaintiff's father and the Municipal Board. 3. Defendant No. 1 filed a written statement on December 7, 1962. It was pleaded that the land in dispute was allotted to the father of the plaintiff as a Licencee and that the relationship of the landlord and tenant never existed between the plaintiff's father and the Municipal Board. Defendant No. 1 case further was that it had every right to revoke the licence at any time and that the possession of the land in dispute had already been delivered to Salagram and Tara Chand (two proprietors of defendant No. 2's firm) by the Board in support of this, it relied on the application of the plaintiff dated February 29, 1962. The defendant-appellants filed a joint written statement. It was alleged by them that the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 had sold their goodwill of their business for Rs. 2,100/- to them and that had already transferred the possession of the land in dispute. The case of the defendant-appellants was that after delivering the possession of the land in dispute the plaintiff had dishonestly tried to repudiate the contract and submitted a petition by way of objection to the Administrator, Municipal Board with an ulterior objection so that the Municipal Board may not grant fresh lease of the land to them. These defendants supported the stand of the Municipal Board that the plaintiff's father was a mere license. Defendant No. 3 Kedardas filed a separate written-statement on April 27, 1963. He admitted in the written statement that he had transferred the goodwill of the business and the possession of the land in dispute to the proprietors of defendant No. 2 and that the land in dispute was taken by the plaintiff's father for a joint family business on October 1, 1944. He asserted that he, being a member of the joint Hindu Undivided family, was in joint possession of the land in dispute along with the plaintiff. The learned Civil Judge framed issues on April 8, 1963 and an additional issue was framed on May 14, 1963. The learned Civil Judge recorded evidence of the parties and decided issue Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 and 8 against and issue No. 5 was decided against the defendant. By this judgment dated September 11, 1964, he dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 4. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff went in appeal. 5. 1 to 4 and 6 and 8 against and issue No. 5 was decided against the defendant. By this judgment dated September 11, 1964, he dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 4. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff went in appeal. 5. The learned District Judge, by his Judgment dated October 3, 1967, accepted the appeal and decreed the suit of the plaintiff for permanent injunction restraining defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from evicting him from the land in dispute. Being dissatisfied with the appellate-judgment and decree, the defendant-appellants have come in appeal to this Court. 6. I have heard Mr. N.M. Lodha, learned counsel for the appellants. No body has appeared on behalf of the respondents. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised the following points:-1. that the learned District Judge has erred in law in holding that Ex. 1 is a lease-deed;2. that the Municipal Board was authorised to transfer the `Chowkari' in question to the proprietors of defendant No. 2 without giving a notice to quit to the plaintiff.3. that the suit as instituted by the plaintiff is not maintainable and as no notice as required by Section 271 of Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959;4. that agreement Ex. A-1 is proved to have been executed by the plaintiff Narainsingh Dass and his brother Kedardas in favour of Saligram, after obtaining a sum of Rs. 2,100/- for the sale of the goodwill of their business, which they used to transact in the shop, constructed by them on this Chowkari. 7. The first question, therefore, that arises whether there was a relationship of the landlord and tenant between Manraj and Narainsingh Dass and Municipal Board, Jodhpur. The document Ex. 1 has been described as `Bhara Chitthi' and has been executed by Manraj. It contains two attestations. From its perusal, it is clear that one shop No. 28 was taken on rent @ Rs. 3/9/9 P per month from October 1, 1944. The learned Civil Judge, in this connection, found as under:- "The result would be that a lease was never created by Ex. 1. But for the provision of Section 80 of the Act, I would accept that the interpreted, Ex. 1 in substance creates a lease because the possession under it, is taken settled, thirdly the provision of subletting is there and fourthly, of eviction as well. 1. But for the provision of Section 80 of the Act, I would accept that the interpreted, Ex. 1 in substance creates a lease because the possession under it, is taken settled, thirdly the provision of subletting is there and fourthly, of eviction as well. All these things make out a case of lease and not a licence. But the transfer under Ex. 1 is hit by Section 80 sub-sections (2) and (3) the transaction is void. Therefore, it was only a case of licence. The defendant's contention is correct, not on the ground of facts, on what the party intended while executing Ex. 1, but on the ground of operation of law". 8. On appeal, the learned District Judge held that the rent-note Ex. 1 could reasonably be relied upon to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the Municipal Board and the plaintiff. At the time of the execution of the rent-note, the Jodhpur Municipal Act, 1943 was in vogue. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 80 were as under:- "(2) Every transfer of immovable property belonging to the Board shall be made by an instrument in writing executed by the President and attested by the Secretary provided that no transfer of immovable property the value where-of exceeds 500 rupees of above shall be entered into until it has been sanctioned by the Minister-in-charge. (3) No contract or transfer executed otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of this section shall be binding on the Board". According to sub-section (2) of Section 80 of Jodhpur Municipal Act, 1943, a transfer of immovable property, which belonged to the Board, could only be by means of an instrument in writing executed by the President and attested by the Secretary. The learned Civil Judge found that the rent-note (Ex. 1) was never executed by the then President. This finding was not reversed in appeal by the learned District Judge. Therefore, the fact remains that Ex. 1 was not executed by the President of Municipal Board. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 47 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 were similar to sub-sections (2) and (3) of Sections 80 of the Jodhpur Municipal Act, 1943. 9. This finding was not reversed in appeal by the learned District Judge. Therefore, the fact remains that Ex. 1 was not executed by the President of Municipal Board. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 47 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 were similar to sub-sections (2) and (3) of Sections 80 of the Jodhpur Municipal Act, 1943. 9. The aforesaid provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in H.S. Rikhy v. New Delhi Municipality, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 554, Section 18 of the Punjab Municipal Act dealt with the power to enter into a contract and to transfer any property held by the Committee. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in H.S. Rikhy's case (supra), case on the question of the validity of the transfer that the provisions of Sections 47 are essential ingredients of the power contained in Section 18 of the Act. It was, therefore, held in that case that there was no relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties. 10. As the rent-note (Ex. 1), executed in respect of the Chowkari in question, was not executed in accordance with the provisions of Section 80 (2) of Jodhpur Municipal Act, 1943, it is not binding on the Board. It, therefore, follows that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and his father Manraj and the Municipal Board Jodhpur. 11. In para 8 of the written statement by the Board, the plea taken is that the rent-note, which was executed by the plaintiff's father was not in accordance with law and it is not binding on it. Issue No. 1 was to the effect that whether the plaintiff's father, and after his death, the plaintiff was in possession of the Chowkari in question as tenant. 12. In these circumstances the learned District Judge was not right when he held that the rent-note (Ex. 1) can be looked into for determining the question of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It, therefore, follows that Manraj's possession over the Chowakari was that of licences, i.e., his possession was permissive. After the death of Manraj, the licence came to an end. 1) can be looked into for determining the question of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It, therefore, follows that Manraj's possession over the Chowakari was that of licences, i.e., his possession was permissive. After the death of Manraj, the licence came to an end. It is well settled that a licence is a personal right granted to a person to do something upon the immovable property of the grantor, and does not amount to the creation of an interest in the property itself. It is purely a permissive right and is personal to the grantee. It creates no duties and obligations upon the person making the grant and is, therefore, revocable except in certain circumstances expressly provided for in the Easements Act, 1882. The licence has no other effect than to confer a liberty upon the licencee to go upon the land which would otherwise be unlawful.Even otherwise, when the Administrator of defendant No. 1 passed an order on July 4, 1962 renting it from November 1, 1961 @ Rs. 80/- p.m., the Licence impliedly stood revoked. After the death of Manraj or, at any rates after the revocation of the licence, the plaintiff had no right to remain in possession of the Chowkari in question. 13. The Learned counsel next contended that before instituting the suit for injunction, notice under Section 271 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 was not given to defendant No. 1 and, therefore, suit against it was barred under Section 271 of the aforesaid Act. Issue No. 5 was framed by the trial Court, which reads as under:- "Whether the suit can proceed without seeking a declaration as to title and whether a notice under Section 271 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, having not been given, the suit cannot proceed" ? The learned Civil Judge did not specifically decide the question of notice. In appeal, the point regarding notice was canvassed before the learned District Judge, and the point raised was whether the Municipal Board was authorised to transfer the piece of land to the properties of defendant No. 2 without giving notice to quit to the plaintiff and without obtaining a decree for eviction. Learned counsel for the appellant could not show from the memo of appeal that the point regarding notice was taken in the memo of appeal filed on behalf of defendant No. 2 in this Court. Learned counsel for the appellant could not show from the memo of appeal that the point regarding notice was taken in the memo of appeal filed on behalf of defendant No. 2 in this Court. Nobody has appeared on behalf of defendant No. 1 (Respondent No. 3).Section 271 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, amongst others, lays down that no suit shall be instituted against the Board in respect of any act done or purports to have been done in an official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice thereof in writing has been, in the case of a board, left at its office explicitly stating the cause of action the nature of the relief sought the amount of compensation claimed and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. Sub-section (3) of Section 271 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act lays down that nothing in sub-section (1) shall be constructed to apply to a suit wherein the only relief claimed is an injunction of which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the commentment of the suit or proceeding. The suit is for injunction. 14. In these circumstances, it is not open to the learned counsel for the appellant to content that the suit is not maintainable for want of notice under Section 271 of Rajasthan Municipalities Act.The last point that was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the learned District Judge committed an error in holding that the execution of the deed (Ex. A-1) is not proved especially when the attesting witness could have been easily produced to establish that the plaintiff had executed it in their presence. The learned District Judge examined the statement of Tarachand DW-1 and held that Tarachand's assertion is not sufficient to prove the execution of the agreement (EX. A1) EX. A. 1 is an agreement dated November, 1961. It is alleged to have been executed in favour of Saligram son of the Gopikishan. According to defendant No. 2, it bears signatures of the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 Kedardas. The case of defendant No. 2 is that the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 had sold the goodwill of the Chowkari in question for Rs. 2,100/- to it. It is alleged to have been executed in favour of Saligram son of the Gopikishan. According to defendant No. 2, it bears signatures of the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 Kedardas. The case of defendant No. 2 is that the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 had sold the goodwill of the Chowkari in question for Rs. 2,100/- to it. The relevant recital in the agreement (Ex. A-1) is : vc vki bl pkSdM+h ij O;kikj djuk pkgrs gS geus viuh xqMfoy ds:- 2100 v[kjs nks gtkj ,d lkS ysdj ;g pkSdM+h vkidks nsuk Lohdkj fd;k gS A mlls uxjikfydk tks/kiqj esa vki viuk uke iyVuk ysxsa gesa ,srjkt ugha gksaxk A Whether the agreement (Ex. A-1) was executed by the plaintiff or not is a question of fact. The learned District Judge, as stated above, did not believe the statement of D2/DW-1 Tarachand. The finding that defendant No. 2 has not been able to prove the execution of the agreement (Ex. A-1) by the plaintiff is one of fact. It has not been shown that this finding is vitiated on account of any error of law or of procedure. In these circumstances, I am afraid, the contention of the learned counsel that the execution of the agreement (Ex. A-1) is proved by defendant No. 2 cannot be accepted. It may be added that the agreement (Ex. A-1) was produced by defendant No. 2 to show that the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 had sold goodwill of the Chowkari to it. This is not of any significance, for it has been held by me above, that there was no relationship between the landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2. It has also been held by me that, the possession of Manraj, and for that matter, the possession of the plaintiff Narsinghdass, after his Manraj's death, was at the most that of license, which stood revoked when defendant No. 1 ordered to let out the Chowkari in question to defendant No. 2 by its order dated July 4, 1962. The plaintiff, after the revocation of the licence, has no legal right to remain in possession and, thus, is not entitled to issuance of prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant's from disturbing his possession over the Chowkari in question. 15. No other point was pressed on behalf of the appellant in this appeal. 16. The plaintiff, after the revocation of the licence, has no legal right to remain in possession and, thus, is not entitled to issuance of prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant's from disturbing his possession over the Chowkari in question. 15. No other point was pressed on behalf of the appellant in this appeal. 16. The result is that I accept this appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge dated October 3, 1967 and restore that of the Civil Judge, Jodhpur dated September 11, 1964 by which the suit of that plaintiff-respondent was dismissed. 17. As nobody has appeared on behalf of the respondents, I leave the appellants to bear their own costs of this appeal.Appeal accepted. *******