JUDGMENT : A.N. Verma, J. This is a Plaintiffs' application in revision directed against the judgment and decrees passed by the courts below dismissing the Plaintiff-applicant's suit for recovery of certain sum of money said to have been advanced to the Defendant-opposite party on the basis of promissory note. The suit was filed on 20-1-1976. While the suit was pending before the trial court, the U.P. Regulation of Money Lending Act, 1976 came into force. The Act received the assent of the President on 17-7-1976 and was published in the U.P. Gazette on 20-7-1976. After the coming into force of this Act, the Defendant-opposite party raised a plea that the Plaintiff-applicant's suit was barred by the provisions of the aforesaid Act. An issue was struck on the plea raised by the Defendant-opposite-party as issue No. 3 which was to the effect, whether the suit of the Plaintiff was barred by Sections 18 and 26 of U.P. Act No. 29 of 1976. The trial court held that the provisions of Sections 18 and 26 of the aforesaid Act barred the suit inasmuch as the Plaintiff-applicant had not got himself registered as a money lender within three months of the commencement of the Act. On this finding, the trial court dismissed the Plaintiff-applicant's suit. 2. Aggrieved, the Plaintiff filed an appeal. The appellate court has also held that the suit was barred by Sections 18 and 26 of the aforesaid Act. The lower appellate court has observed that inasmuch as the Plaintiff had not furnished the necessary information to the Registrar about the present loan, the suit was incompetent in law. The lower appellate court has dismissed the appeal of the Plaintiff-opposite-party (?) on this finding without going into the merits of the suit. 3. Aggrieved, the Plaintiff has filed the present revision. Learned Counsel for the applicant has submitted two points for my consideration: (1) The provisions of Sections 18 and 26 Sub-section (4) of the aforesaid Act have no application to the suit which was already pending before the commencement of the Act. (2) The courts below have acted with illegality and material irregularity in non-suiting the Plaintiff-applicant without considering the question whether the Plaintiff-applicant was a money lender as defined under the aforesaid Act. Learned Counsel submitted that it was for the Defendant to establish that the applicant was a money lender within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. (2) The courts below have acted with illegality and material irregularity in non-suiting the Plaintiff-applicant without considering the question whether the Plaintiff-applicant was a money lender as defined under the aforesaid Act. Learned Counsel submitted that it was for the Defendant to establish that the applicant was a money lender within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. Learned Counsel also submitted that the Plaintiff is not a money lender. He urged that an isolated transaction of lending money to the Defendant-opposite-party did not automatically lead to the conclusion that the Plaintiff-applicant was doing the business of money lending as contemplated under the aforesaid Act. 4. Having heard Learned Counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that the Plaintiff-applicant is entitled to succeed on the second point urged on his behalf. So far as the first point is concerned, I am in agreement with the view expressed by the court below. I shall take up these points in serial order. 5. So far as the question whether the suit is barred by Sections 18 and 26(4) of the aforesaid Act is concerned, it would be necessary to consider it in the light of the actual words used in these sections. I am reproducing below the provisions of the aforesaid two sections: Section 18 “Bar of certain suit by moneylender-No suit on the basis of any loan, agreement or security referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 15 shall be instituted by a money lender, unless he at the time of any such loan or agreement made or security taken after the commencement of this Act, holds a valid certificate of registration: Provided that a suit for the enforcement of any loan, agreement or security made or taken before such commencement may be instituted or continued if the money lender applied for registration u/s 7 within a period of three months from the date of such commencement, and a certificate of registration is issued to him. Section 26 reads as follows: 26 Particulars of debts and deposits to be furnished by every money lender-(1) Every money-lender carrying on the business of money-lending from before the commencement of this Act shall submit to the Registrar, a statement in the prescribed form within a period of three months from the date of such commencement. Section 26 reads as follows: 26 Particulars of debts and deposits to be furnished by every money lender-(1) Every money-lender carrying on the business of money-lending from before the commencement of this Act shall submit to the Registrar, a statement in the prescribed form within a period of three months from the date of such commencement. (2) The statement referred to in Sub-section (1) shall contain the particulars of debts due to each moneylender and of deposits made with him and such other particulars as may be prescribed. (3) Every such statement shall be counter-signed, dated and sealed by the Registrar and shall be kept and maintained in the manner prescribed. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, decree or order or any other law for the time being in force, no money-lender shall be entitled to claim any amount from a debtor in, respect of any loan advanced before the commencement of this Act unless the name of such debtor and the amount due from him has been specified in the statement referred to in Sub-section (1). 6. The provisions of Section 18 make it abundantly clear that the bar exists not only to the institution of the suit in respect of loan or agreement or security made or taken before the commencement of the Act but also to the continuance of a suit already instituted. The language of the proviso to Section 18 of the aforesaid Act is explicit and unambiguous. The same conclusion flows from a reading of Sub-section (4) of Section 26. Under Sub-section (4) of Section 26, the bar is that no money lender shall be entitled to claim any amount from a debtor in respect of any loan advanced before the commencement of this Act unless the name of such debtor and the amount due from him has been specified in the statement referred to in Sub-section (1). It is clear, therefore, that with the coming into force of the Act even pending suits in respect of any loan advanced before the commencement of this Act are barred, unless the money lender has the name of the debtor specified in the statement referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the Act. On a reading of the provisions of Sections 18 and 26, there is no manner of doubt that even pending suits are caught by the Act in question. 7. On a reading of the provisions of Sections 18 and 26, there is no manner of doubt that even pending suits are caught by the Act in question. 7. I am, therefore, in agreement with the view expressed by the courts below that the Act applies to pending suits also. Before, however, the Act could be applied it was necessary for the courts below to consider whether the Plaintiff-applicant is a money lender within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. The term 'money lender' has been defined in the Act u/s 3 Sub-section (6) of the aforesaid Act which reads: 'Money lender' means a person who carries on the business of money lending. 8. An isolated transaction of advancing loan to the Defendant will not automatically lead to the inference that the Plaintiff applicant is a money lender within the meaning of the Act. The question to be decided was whether the applicant carries on “the business of money lending.” The burden of proof whether the Plaintiff-applicant is a money lender who was carrying on the business of money lending was obviously on the Defendant-opposite-party who was claiming the benefit of this Act. The courts below have assumed that the Plaintiff-applicant is a money lender and have thereafter applied the provisions of the aforesaid Act. In my view, the courts below have acted with illegality and material irregularity in dismissing the Plaintiff-applicant's suit without considering the question whether the applicant is a 'money lender' within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. Learned Counsel for the applicant has cited a case reported in Gajnan and Others Vs. Seth Brindaban, AIR 1970 SC 2007 , in support of his contention that the Plaintiff-applicant cannot be regarded as a money lender. As, however, I aim remanding the case to the trial court, I am expressing no opinion on the question whether the Plaintiff-applicant is a money lender or not. It will be open to the Plaintiff-applicant to establish that he is not the money lender within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. 9. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the courts below are set aside and the case is directed to go back to the trial court for decision in accordance with the law and in the light of the observation hereinabove. The Plaintiff-applicant will be entitled to his costs.