BANGALORE UNIVERSITY v. ST. JOHNS MEDICAL COLLEGE — 1979 DIGILAW 48 (KAR)

RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ appeal is presented by the bangalore University aggrieved by the final order made by a single judge in w. P. No. 639 of 1979 declaring an ordinance made by the Syndicate of the University, empowering the Vice-Chancellor to issue a direction to any affiliated college to admit an eligible candidate to any course if, in his opinion, admission was unjustly denied notwithstanding the availability of a seat within the sanctioned intake, as also an order made thereunder. ( 2 ) THE facts and circumstances leading to the presentation of the writ petition out of which this appeal arises are: The 1st respondent St. John's Medical College, Bangalore is a private medical college affiliated to the Bangalore University. It is established, by the Catholic Bishops of india through a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960, called the C. B. C. I Society for medical Education, who is the 2nd respondent in the appeal. The 3rd responde it is the Principal of the college. During the academic year 1978-79 the college invited applications for admission to the medical course. In response to the said invitation, the 4th respondent submitted her application to the said course. Though she was rot selected, her name was included at SI. No. 2 in the waiting list. The sanctioned intake for the course was 60. The course commenced on 2nd August 1978. About the middle of September 1978, a candidate, who had been admitted to the course, withdrew from the college. Thereafter by letter dated 22nd Sept. 1978 (Ex-C), the Dean of the college sought the permission of the University to admit the 4th respondent as against the vacancy so caused, as another candidate, who was placed at SI. No. 1 in the waiting list, had informed that she was not interested in joining the course. The University gave its concurrence tor the admission by its letter dated 25th Sept. 1978 (Ext-D ). Though such permission was given, the fourth respondent was not admitted. No. 1 in the waiting list, had informed that she was not interested in joining the course. The University gave its concurrence tor the admission by its letter dated 25th Sept. 1978 (Ext-D ). Though such permission was given, the fourth respondent was not admitted. On the other hand by letter dated 12th October 1978 (Ex.-E) the dean informed the University that it was not possible to admit the 4th, respondent to the course as it was not practicable for her to satisfy the attendance requirement and as the medical council had clearly stated that no student shall be admitted to appear for the I Year MBBS examination unless the concerned student completes 18 months' course. Aggrieved by the non-admission to the medical course by respondents 1 to 3, the 4th respondent presented W. P. 11513 of 1978 before this Court seeking for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the 1st respondent college to admit her to I year M. B. B. S. , during the academic year 1978-79. The said writ petition was dismissed on 31-10-1978 (Ext-F) holding that no writ of mandamus could be issued to the 1st respondent college, whicn is a private medical college. As regards the contention of the 4th respondent that the University had the authoriy to compel the 1st respondent college to admit the 4th respondent, no opinion was expressed on the ground that it was not germane to the said writ petition. Alter the disposal of the aforesaid writ petition, the Syndicate of the university made an Ordinance in its meeting held on 25th Nov. 1978. The said Ordinance made it obligatory for every head of a college to ensure that admissions are made upto the limit of sanctioned intake. It also empowered the Vice-Chancellor to issue directions to the head of a college to admit an eligible candidate if he was satisfied on enquiry that such candidate has been denied admission in spite of the fact that a seat was available. The ordinance also made it obligatory on the concerned principal to comply with any order issued by the Vice-chancellor under the Ordinance. The ordinance was published on 5th Dec. 1978 (Ex-J ). The ordinance also made it obligatory on the concerned principal to comply with any order issued by the Vice-chancellor under the Ordinance. The ordinance was published on 5th Dec. 1978 (Ex-J ). Exercising the power under the said Ordinance, the Vice-Chancellor made an order dated 5th january 1979 (Ext-K) directing the 1st respondent college to admit the 4th respondent to I year M. B. B. S. during the academic year 1978-79. Challenging the legality of the ordinance and the order made thereunder by the Vice-Chancellor, respondents 1 to 3 presented W. P. No. 639 of 1979 During the pendency of the writ petition, the Syndicate in its meeting dated 24th March 1979 fixed 5th Dec. 1978 as the date of commencement of the impugned ordinance in exercise of its power under S. 38 (4) of the Karnataka state Universities Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Art') and a notification was also issued to that effect on the same date (Annevure-I to the statement of objections by the University ). The said writ petition was allowed. The Ordinance made was struck down as having been made in contravention of the provisions of the act and consequently the order made by the Vice-Chancellor was also set aside. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned single judge, the University has presented this writ appeal. ( 3 ) SRI S. Vijayashankar, learned counsel for the counsel for the University, urged the following contentions. (I) The Ordinance impugned was made by the Syndicate and not by the vice-Chancellor as held by the learned single judge. (ii) The Ordinance came into force from the date of publication. (iii) It was competent for the syndicate to fix a retrospective date for the commencement of the Ordinance, as such a power is expressly conferred on it under S. 38 (4) of the Act he submitted that the view taken to the contrary in the order under appeal is erroneous. ( 4 ) SRI J. A. Sequeira, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3, strongly supported the view taken by the learned single judge He, however, submitted that if we are inclined to disagree with the view taken in the order under appeal on the questions held in favour of respondents 1 to 3, their other contentions which were not considered, as unnecessary by the learned single judge, may be considered. He urged the following contentions to sustain the order. (I) The ordinance was beyond the ordinance making power conferred on the Syndicate under S. 37 of the Act. (ii) Even if the Ordinance was within the competence of the Syndicate and was validly made, it could not be enforced against respondents 1 to 3, as it would amount to, an infringement of their right conferred under Arc 30 of the Constitution (iii) Even if the Ordinance is vaild, as the impugned order was made by the Vice-Chancellor without holding an enquiry after giving opportunity to the 1 st i espondent, the order was bad as it contravened the Ordinance itself as also the principles of natural justice. ( 5 ) THE first contention urged for the appellant. University is that the view taken by the learned single Judge to the effect that the Ordinance impugned was made by the Vice-Chancellor and not oy the Syndicate is erroneous there is no dispute that the meeting of the Syndicate was held on 25th november 1978 and in the said meeting the Syndicate considered the draft of the impugned Ordinance. The typed copy of the resolution passed by the Syndicate available in the records reads-"item No. 21: Draft Ordinances regarding admission of students to the various courses in the university. The Ordinances proposed by the vice-Chancellor was discussed. Dr. H. L. Thimme Gowda gave a draft of ordinance which was drafted by him. After discussion, the Ordinance an propospd by the Vice-Chancellor was accepted with several changes. The Vice-Chancellor was requested to see whether a sentence can be added stipulating that the college will be disaffiliated if the order is not complied with. The Vice-Chancellor said he would consult the Legal Advisor and issue the ordinance. This was agreed to. "thereafter the Ordinance was published on 5th December 1978. In the writ petition it was contended for respondents 1 to 3 that by its resolution, dated 25th Nov. 1978 the Syndicate itself did not make any Ordinance, but it only authorised the Vice-Chancellor to issue an appropriate ordinance in consultation with the legal Advisor. It was also contended that is the several changes said to have been made to the draft Ordinance prepared by the Vice-Chancellor were not available in the original records, it can lot be said that the Ordinance was made by the Syndicate. It was also contended that is the several changes said to have been made to the draft Ordinance prepared by the Vice-Chancellor were not available in the original records, it can lot be said that the Ordinance was made by the Syndicate. This contention of respondents 1 to 3 was upheld by the learned single judge. In coming to the said conclusion, the learned judge relied on the office note put up before the actual issue of the ordinance on 5th Dec. 1978. It reads:"extract item No. 21 of the minutes of the meeting of the Syndicate held on 25-11-78 is placed below. Minutes of the Syndicate held on 25-11-1978 on item No. 21 may be seen. Tho Ordinances as proposed by the Vice-Chancellor are stated to have been accepted with 'several changes'- The 'changes' incorporated to the Ordinances proposed in the reference note is not forthcoming. Before issue of the Ordinance, the legal Advisor must also be consulted in the matter of adding a sentence, stating that the College will be disaffiliated if the order of the University is not complied with. It is therefore submitted to indicate that the several changes made in the ordinance for reference of the office and for taking needful action. For perusal. ID/5. 12. Sd/- 5-12-78. Registrar, I was told that an amended Ordinance as approved by the Legal authorities has been received. Please send it to the registrar. P. S. to V. C. Id/- 5-12. " (underlining (italics) by us) the above note disclosed that the several changes effected were not forthcoming. Learned single Judge took the view that the Ordinance as published on 5th December 1978 did not really reflect the Ordinance as made by the Syndicate and it was only made by the Vice-Chancellor, who had no competence to make an Ordinance. In support of the submission that the ordinance was in fact made by the syndicate and not by the Vice-Chancellor as held by the learned judge, the learned counsel for the University referred to the original records which were also produced at the time of hearing of the appeal. The original records disclose the following facts. (i) In substance there is no difference between the draft ordinance prepared by the Vice-Chancellor which was considered by the Syndicate in its meeting held on 25th November 1978 and the Ordinance published as per notification dated 5th Deer. 1978. The original records disclose the following facts. (i) In substance there is no difference between the draft ordinance prepared by the Vice-Chancellor which was considered by the Syndicate in its meeting held on 25th November 1978 and the Ordinance published as per notification dated 5th Deer. 1978. The contents of the same are as follows :"draft Ordinance considered by the syndicate. Every Principal ot an affiliated college of the Bangalore University and every Head of a University college or department of the University shall ensure that admissions are made to all courses upto limit of the sanctioned intake. Such admissions shall be made taking into account the qualifications prescribed in the regulations. If in any case it has come to the notice of the Vice-Chancellor that, the sanctioned intave is not filled up and the Vice-Chancellor has reasonable cause to believe that an eligible applicant to the College has been denied admission, he may after conducting such enquiry as he may consider necessary in the circumstances of the case, order admission of such, applicant to the college or Dept. , and the applicant shall be deemed to have been admitted to the college or department from the date of the order. Ordinance as published on 5-12-1978. (1) Every Principal of an affiliated college of the Bangalore University and every Head of a University college or a Department of the university shall ensure that admissions are made to all courses upto the limit of the sanctioned intake. Such admissions shall be made taking into account the qualifications prescribed in the regulations. (2) If in any case it has come to the notice of the Vice Chancellor that the sanctioned intake is not filled up and the vice Chancellor has reasonable cause to believe that an eligible applicant to the college has been denied admission though seats are available, he may after conducting such enquiry as he may consider necessary in the circumstances of the case order admission of such applicant entitled to such admission to the college/department. (3) The Principal or Head of the depatment shall comply with such order from the date of the order. "underlining (italics) by us the difference between the draft ordinance and the ordinance is, whereas, the draft is in one paragraph the ordinance is in three paragraphs and for the underlined portion in the draft, paragraph-5 is substituted. The rest is similar. "underlining (italics) by us the difference between the draft ordinance and the ordinance is, whereas, the draft is in one paragraph the ordinance is in three paragraphs and for the underlined portion in the draft, paragraph-5 is substituted. The rest is similar. (II) The word 'several' found in the typed copy of the resolution of the syndicate dated 25th November 1978 is a mistake. The resolution stated that the draft Ordinance prepared by the vice-Chancellor was accepted with. relevant changes. Similarly the office note made to the effect that the several changes made in the Ordinance by the syndicate was not forthcoming, was also made on account of the mistake which had crept into the typed copy of the resolution of the Syndicate. (iii) The Vice-Chancellor certified the wording of the ordinance as approved by the Syndicate on 25th nov. 1978, on 5th Dec. 1978. Thereafter the Notification dated 5th Deer. 1978 was issed. (iv) The Ordinance published as per notification dated 5th Dec. 1973 was communicated inter alia to all ihe members of the Syndicate. (v) Thereafter in the meeting of the syndicate dated 27th January 1979 one of the subjects was the confirmation of the proceedings of the meeting of the Syndicate held on 25th Nov. 1978 and the Syndicate affirmed the said proceedings. ( 6 ) ON the basis of the above facts, learned counsel for the University submitted that the view that the impugned ordinance was not made by the Syndicate and was only made by the Vice-Chancellor is erroneous. He submitted that the only question which was left for the consideration of the Vice-Chancellor was to find out by consulting the legal Advisor as to whether a sentence could be added to the ordinance stipulating that a defiant college would be dis-affiliated if an order made by the Vice-Chanceller under the Ordinance is not complied with. He pointed out that even assuming that the Syndicate could not have asked the Vice-Chancellor a add a sentence, to the Ordinance as approved by the Syndicate in consultation with the legal Advisor, the said circumstance would not vitiate the Ordinance as no such sentence was added to the Ordinance. ( 7 ) ON consideration of the original records, we are satisfied that the ordinance in question was made by the syndicate. ( 7 ) ON consideration of the original records, we are satisfied that the ordinance in question was made by the syndicate. As stated earlier, the draft ordinance prepared by the Vice-Chancellor was placed before the Syndicate for its consideration in its, meeting held on 25th Nov. 1978. One of the members ot the Syndicate Dr. H. L. Thimme Gowda, also gouel a, draft of an ordinance prepared by him. However, after discussion, the Ordinance as proposed by the Vice-Chancellor was accepted with relevant changes and not with several changes as found in the typed copy of the resolution of the Syndicate. Shortly thereafter the Vice-Chancellor certified the wardings of the Ordinance as approved by the Syndicate on 5th december 1978 and it was also published on the same date. In this behalf it is necessary to point out that under s 12 of the Act, the Vice-Chancellor is the principal executive of the university and he is also the Chairman of the Syndicate. Sub-sec. (4) of S. 12 of the Act reads as follows:"12 The Powers of the Vice-Chancellor.- (4) He may, either himself or through any officer of the university authorised in writing by him convene the meetings of the senate, the Syndicate, the Academic council and the Finance Committee and shall perform all such acts as may be necessary to carry out and give effect to the decision of the said authorities,"the above sub-section empowers the vice-Chancellor to perform all such acts as may be necessary to carry out and give effect to the decision of the said authorities and he presides over the meeting of the Syndicate. Therefore it is clear that when the Ordinance drafted by him was approved by the syndicate with certain relevant changes and the Vice-Chancellor certified the wordings of the Ordinance as approved by the Syndicate, in the absence of any other material, it is difficult to take the view that the vice-Chancellor changed the wording of the Ordinance as approved by the syndicate. ( 8 ) THERE are also other circumstances which go to show that the Ordrinance was made by the Syndicate. They are:- (I)THE Ordinance published on 5th Dec. 1978 was forthwith sent to all the members of the Syndicate. (ii) The proceedings of the meeting dated 25th Nov. ( 8 ) THERE are also other circumstances which go to show that the Ordrinance was made by the Syndicate. They are:- (I)THE Ordinance published on 5th Dec. 1978 was forthwith sent to all the members of the Syndicate. (ii) The proceedings of the meeting dated 25th Nov. 1978 which included the acceptance of the Ordinance published came up for confirmation before the meeting of the Syndicate on 27th january 1979 and was confirmed by it without any objection. (iii) Again on 21th March 1979, the Syndicate itself fixed the date of the commencement of the Ordinance as 5th Dec. 1978. The two circumstances, namely, that a typographical mistake had occurred in the typed copy of the Syndicate proceedings wherein for the word 'relevant', the word 'several' was used and the circumstance that the Ordinance published as per notification dated 5th December 1978 was sent to all the members of the Syndicate and the proceedings of the meeting held on 25th Nov 1978 was confirmed thereafter in the meeting of the Syndicate held on 27th January 1979 has not been considered in the order under appeal. Learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 submitted that the above facts were not relied on by the university at the time of hearing of the writ petition. Learned counsel for the university also did not dispute the same. He submitted that as directed by the Court he produced all the original records and he did not invite the attention of the learned judge to the aforsaid two circumstances. The fact that the Ordinance as drafted by the Vice-Chancellor was approved with only 'relevant' changes as is clear from the original records and not with 'several' changes as shown in the typed copy of the proceedings, indicates that changes approved were minimal and or minor character. Further the syndic its also confirmed the proceedings of 25th Nov. 1978, on 27th january 1979 by which time the ordinance had already been published and communicated to the syndicate members, without any objection. Learned Judge has also observed that the Ordinance published or, 5th Dec. 1978 broadly conforms to the Ordinance placed before the syndicate, in its meeting dated 25th nov. 1978. 1978, on 27th january 1979 by which time the ordinance had already been published and communicated to the syndicate members, without any objection. Learned Judge has also observed that the Ordinance published or, 5th Dec. 1978 broadly conforms to the Ordinance placed before the syndicate, in its meeting dated 25th nov. 1978. On a comparsion of the draft Ordinance considered by the syndicate and the Ordinance as finally published, as extracted earlier, it may be seen that the only change that is incorporated is the last part of the draft ordinance which proceeded, to state that on the issue of the direction of the Vice-Chancellor that the applicant concerned shall be deemed to have been admitted to the college was omitted and a separate sentence was added to the effect that the principal or head of the department shall comply with such order from the date of the order and in substance there is no difference. This is in conformity with the original proceedings which state that the Ordinance was accepted with relevant changes only. Taking all the circumstances into account, we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned Ordinance was nade by the Syndicate in exercise of its power under the Act. ( 9 ) WE must however observe at this stage that the manner in which the records of the proceedings of the syndicate, which is the executive authority of the University, are maintained, is far from satisfactory. A proper recording of the proceedings of every meeting incorporating all the details in a regularly maintained proceedings book and the authentication, of the proceedings of each meeting by the presiding authority, immediately after the meeting, is of utmost necessity. We are, sure that the authorities will take note of the shortcomings and take steps for their removal. ( 10 ) THE second contention urged for the University is that the Ordinance came, into force from the date of publication. This contention was negatived by the learned single Judge pointing out that sub-sec. (4) of S. 38 of the Act specifically provided that the Ordinances made by the Syndicate shall have effect from such date as it may direct and therefore unless a date was fixed, the ordinance would not come into effect on the date when it was merely published. (4) of S. 38 of the Act specifically provided that the Ordinances made by the Syndicate shall have effect from such date as it may direct and therefore unless a date was fixed, the ordinance would not come into effect on the date when it was merely published. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned single Judge that a dace from which the Ordinance shall have effect should be fixed. While sub-sec. (1) of S. 38 of the Act prescribes the procedure to make Ordinances, sub-sec. (4) theteof specifically provides that all Ordinances made by the syndicate shall have effect from such date as it may direct. In view of the clear wording of S. 38 (4) of the act, the act of fixing the date for commencement of an Ordinance is an act independent of making an Ordinance and unless the Syndicate in exercise of that power fixes a date for the commencement of the Ordinance, it does not come into force. In this behalf, we may refer to the observations of the supreme Court in the case of university of Mysore v. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC. 491 while considering analogous provisions of the Mysore University Act, 1956. The relevant observations read:". . The statutory rules, thus framed and approved, come into force on the date of the publication of the Mysore Gazette, and the ordinances come into force from such date as the Chancellor may direct (vide S. 42 (5) of the Mysore University act No 23 of 1956 ). "hence we reject the second contention. ( 11 ) THE third contention pertains to the competence of the Syndicate to fix a retrospective date for the commencement of an Ordinance made by it. The Syndicate is a creature of the act and it derives its power to make ordinance from the Act. It is well setled that power to make a law with retrospective effect is an attribute of a soverign legislature and that a delegated or subordinate legislative authority has no power to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effect unless such a power is conferred. (See: india Sugars and Refineries Ltd. , v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 Mys. 326 = 1960 Mys. LJ 635 and Income-Tax Officer, Alleppy v. M. C. Ponnoose, AIR 1970 SC. 385 . (See: india Sugars and Refineries Ltd. , v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 Mys. 326 = 1960 Mys. LJ 635 and Income-Tax Officer, Alleppy v. M. C. Ponnoose, AIR 1970 SC. 385 . Very rightly the learned counsel for the University did not contest this position in law. But he maintained that the power to give retrospective effect to an Ordinance is specially conferred on the Syndicate under S. 38 (4) of the Act. He argued that the view taken to the contrary by the learned single Judge is erroneous. 12a. In order to appreciate the third contention urged, for the University, it is necessary to refer to the provisions pertaining to the commencement of statutes, regulations and rules found in S. 36 (5), 39 (3) and 40 (4) of the Act. S. 36 of the Act regulates the making of statutes by the senate, S. 37 regulates the making of the Ordinances by the Syndicate, S. 39 (3) regulates the making of regulations by the academic Council and S. 40 regulates the making of rules by the authorities of the University empowered to make rules under the Act. The relevant part of the clauses in these sections which regulate the date of commencement of statutes, ordinances, regulations and rules, respectively, are "36. The Statutes - Their making.- (5) No statute passed by the Senate shall have validity until assented to by the Chancellor. 38. Ordinances - Their making.- (4) All Ordinances made by the syndicate shall have effect from such date as it may direct. 39. Regulations.- (3) Every regulation shall come into force on the date it is approved by the Chancellor or on such other date as the Chancellor may direct. 40. Pules.- (4) Every rule made under this section shall come into force on the data it is approved by the Syndicate. " as can be seen from the above provisions a statute comes into force when. it receives assent from the Chancellor. Ordinance takes effect from such date as the Syndicate directs, Regulation comes into force in the date when it is approved by the chancellor or on such other date as the Chancellor may direct. Rules come into force on the date it is approved by the Syndicate. The Legislature has prescribed, different conditions for the commencement of statutes, ordinances, regulations and rules. Rules come into force on the date it is approved by the Syndicate. The Legislature has prescribed, different conditions for the commencement of statutes, ordinances, regulations and rules. It is only in respect of ordinance the wording used is shall have effect from such date as it may direct'. 12b. Lfarned counsel for the University placed strong reliance on the aforesaid wording of S. 38 (4) of the act in support of his third contention and made the following two submissions : (1) The Syndicate has the power to give retrospective effect to an ordinance made by it. (ii) In any event in respect of an ordinance made by it, which is not given effect to immediately by fixing the date, the Syndicate has th,e power to fix any date for the commencement of the Ordinance i. e. , either the date on which the Ordinance was made or any subsequent date and as in the present case the Syndicate had made the Ordinance on 25-11-1978 and it was published on 5-12-1978, it was competent for thr Syndicate to fix 5-l2-1978 as the date of commencement of the Ordinance as it did by notification dated 24-3-1979. 13. In support of the submission, learned counsel for the University relied on the decision of the Supreme court in B. S. Vadere v. Union of india, AIR 1969 SC 118 . In the said case the question for consideration was as to whether the President or the Governor, as the case may be, had the power to give retrospective effect to the rules which he was empowered to make under the proviso to Art-309 of the. Constitution. The Supreme Court held that there was nothing in the wording of Art-309 of the Constitution, on the basis of which it could be held that there was no power to give retrospective effect to the rules framed under the proviso to Art 309 of the Constitution. The relevant portion of the observation on which the learned counsel for the university relied on reads: "24. It is also significant to note that the proviso to Art 309, clearly lays down that 'any rules so made shall have effect, subject to the provisions of any such Act'. The clear and unambiguous expressions used in the Constitution, must be given their full and unrestricted meaning unless hedged-in-by any limitations. It is also significant to note that the proviso to Art 309, clearly lays down that 'any rules so made shall have effect, subject to the provisions of any such Act'. The clear and unambiguous expressions used in the Constitution, must be given their full and unrestricted meaning unless hedged-in-by any limitations. The rules, which have to be 'subject to the provisions of the Constitution' shall have effect, subject to the provisions of any such act'. That is, if the appropriate legislature has passed an Act, under article 309, the rules, framed under the Proviso, will have effect, subject to that Act but, in absence of any Act, of the appropriate Legislature on the matter, in our opinion the rules, made by the President or by such person as he may direct, are to have full effect both prospectively and retrospectively. Apart from the limitations pointed out above there is none other imposed by the proviso to Article 309 regarding the ambit of the operation of such rules. In other words the rules unless they can be impeached on grounds such as breach of part III or any other constitutional provision, must be enforced if made by the appropriate authority. " he argued that by applying the ratio of the said decision it should be held that the Syndicate has the power to give retrospective effect to the ordinance made by it under S. 38 of the Act. He pointed out that the wording of sub-sec. (4)of S. 38 of the act was similar to that of Art 309 of the Consititution as it states that all ordinances made by the Syndicate shall have effect from such date as it may direct. ( 12 ) IN support of the second submission made, the learned, counsel for the University relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in t. K. Masaliar v. Venkatachalam, AIR, 1956 SC. 246. In the said case sub-sec (3) of S. 1 of the Travancore Taxation, on Income (Investigation Commission) Act provided that the Act shall come into force on such date as the Government may by notification appoint. The Act came into force on 22-7-1949. The notification contemplated by S. 1 (3) of the said Act was issued by Government on 26-7-1949 bringing the Act into operation with effect from 22-7-1949. The Act came into force on 22-7-1949. The notification contemplated by S. 1 (3) of the said Act was issued by Government on 26-7-1949 bringing the Act into operation with effect from 22-7-1949. The Validity of the notification, was questioned on the ground that the government had no authority to fix the date of commencement of the Act retrospectively as there was no express provision empowering the Government to do so. The said contention was repelled by the Supreme Court. The relevant portion of the judgment on which reliance was placed is contained in para 39 which reads:"39. RE. (2): It is urged that the notification issued on 26-7-1949 was bad in that it purported to bring the act into operation as from 22-7-1949. The reason relied upon is that the government could not in the absence, of express provision authorising it in that behalf fix the commencement of the Act retrospectively. The reason for which the Court disfavours retroactive operation of laws is that it may prejudicially affect vested rights. No such reason is involved, in this case. S. 1 (3) authorises) the Government to bring the Act into force on such date as it may by notification appoint. In exercise of the power conferred by this section the government surely had the power to issue the notification bringing the Act into force on any date subsequent to the passing of the Act. There can therefore be no objection to the notification fixing the commencement of the Act on 22-7-1949 which was a date subsequent to the passing of the Act. So the Act has not been given retrospective operation, that is to say it has not been made to commence from a date prior to the date of its passing. It, is true that the date of commencement as fixed by the notification is anterior to the date of the notification but that circumstance does not attract the principle disfavouring the retroactive operation of a statute. Here there is no question of affecting vested rights. The operation of the notification itself is not retrospective. It only brings the Act into operation in and from an earlier date. In any case it was in terms authorised to issue the notification bringing the Act into force on any date subsequent to the passing of the Act and, that is all that the Government did. The operation of the notification itself is not retrospective. It only brings the Act into operation in and from an earlier date. In any case it was in terms authorised to issue the notification bringing the Act into force on any date subsequent to the passing of the Act and, that is all that the Government did. In this view of the matter the further argument advanced by the learned Attorney General and which found favour with the Court below, namely that the notification was at any rate good to bring the Act into operation as on and from the date of its issue need not be considered. There is no substance in this contention also. "relying or the above observation learned counsel tor the University submitted that all that the Syndicate had done in the present case also was to fix 5-12-1978 as the date of commencement of the Ordinance which had already been made on 25-11-1978 and published on 5. 12-1978 and such a power is expressly conferred on the syndicate under S. 38 (4) of the Act. ( 13 ) BOTH haying regard to the language of S. 38 (4) of the Act and the ratio of the decision in the case of Musaliar (5), it appears to us that the second submission made in support of the third contention is well founded. In our view it was competent for the syndicate to fix either the date on which the Ordinance was made or any subsequent date for the commencement of the Ordinance even though such date was anterior to the date on which the Syndicate decided to fix the date for the commencement of the ordinance. Therefore disagreeing with the view taken by the learned single judge we hold that the notification dated 24-3-1979 issued pursuant to the decision of the Syndicate fixing 5-12. 1973 as the date for the commencement of the Ordinance was valid and consequently the Ordinance did come into force with effect from 5-12-1978. Therefore disagreeing with the view taken by the learned single judge we hold that the notification dated 24-3-1979 issued pursuant to the decision of the Syndicate fixing 5-12. 1973 as the date for the commencement of the Ordinance was valid and consequently the Ordinance did come into force with effect from 5-12-1978. As the acceptance of the second submission made in support of the third contention is sufficient to hold that the notification dated 24th March 1979 fixing the date of commencement of the ordinance as 5th December 1978 is valid, we consider it unnecessary to decide the larger question, arising out of the frst submission i. e. as to whether the Syndicate has the power to make an Ordinance with retrospective effect, in that with effect from any date even earlier to its making. ( 14 ) AS we are inclined to take a different view on the two contentions which were decided against the university in the order under appeal, the further question for our consideration is whether we should go into the other contentions urged, for respondents 1 to 3 including the one based on Article 30 of the Constitution. Though in the statement of objections filed on behalf of the University in the writ petition the plea of respondents 1 to 3 that the 1st respondent institution is established and administered by a 'minority' was disputed, having regard to the sufficient materials placed by respondents 1 to 3 in support of their plea, learned counsel for the appellant and respondent-4 conceded that respondent-1 institution is an institution established by a minority and therefore respcndents 1 to 3 could rely on the right conferred on minorities under article 30 of the Constitution. However we find it unnecessary to decide the other contention urged for respondents 1 to 3 as the impugned order has become unenforceable by efflux of time. This was also the position even before the writ petition was disposed of by the learned single judge as is clear from para-8 of his order which reads :-"8. The factual position is that the academic year for which the direction was issued by the Vice-Chancellor has expired and that respondent No. 3 has not so far been admitted to the college. For these reasons prima facie the order has become incapable of compliance. The factual position is that the academic year for which the direction was issued by the Vice-Chancellor has expired and that respondent No. 3 has not so far been admitted to the college. For these reasons prima facie the order has become incapable of compliance. But both sides did not take that stand and argued their respective cases on merits on the assumption that the order of the vice-Chancellor is capable of compliance. "as stated earlier the impugned order of the Vice-Chancellor directed the 1st respondent to admit the 4th respondent to the I Year M. B. B. S. course during the academic year 1978-79. The academic year came to an end even before the writ petition was disposed of on 8-8-1979. Learned Counsel for the university as also the learned counsels appearing for respondents 1 to 3 and 4 did not dispute that the order has become unenforceable by efflux of time. In the circumstances as the writ petition has to be dismissed as having become unnecessary we express no opinion on the correctness of the other contentions urged for respondents 1 to 3. ( 15 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid we make the following order : (1) Writ appeal is allowed and the order of the learned single judge in W. P. 639 of 1979 is set aside. (ii) The writ petition is dismissed as having become unnecessary. (iii) No costs. --- *** --- .