JUDGMENT P.N. Goel, J. - This is a plaintiffs appeal against the judgment and- decree dated 19-8-1969 passed by the Civil Judge Bareilly in Civil Appeal No. 141 of 1968. 2. Respondent Gopal Krishna Misra has filed cross-objection. 3. The plaintiff-appellant had filed suit for specific performance of a contract entered into by Gopal Krishna Misra, respondent No. 3 on 29-9-1965 (Ex. I). The respondent agreed to sell the agricultural land for Rs. 1,300. A sum of Rs. 100 was paid as earnest money. The respondent No. 3 executed an agreement. 4. The suit was filed on 17-8-1966. During the pendency of the suit on 31-3-1967 respondent No. 3 executed sale deed of the suit property in favour of respondents 1 and 2. 5. The main question in the case was which of the parties had committed breach of contract. The trial court found that respondent No. 3 had committed breach of contract. Transfer in favour of respondents 1 & 2 was hit by the provisions of Section 52 of the T. P. Act. In these circumstances, the trial court decreed the suit for specific performance. 6. The respondents filed appeal before the District Judge which was heard by the Civil Judge Bareilly. Two points were urged before the lower appellate court : (1) the trial court was in error in holding that time was not the essence of the contract, and (2) instead of allowing specific performance, the trial court should have only allowed damages to the appellant. The first contention was not accepted by the lower appellate Court. The second contention, however, found favour with the lower appellate Court. In the agreement it has been clearly specified that in case of breach by any party, the defaulting party would be liable to pay Rs. 500 as damages. In view of this condition contained in the agreement the lower appellate court set aside the decree for specific performance granted by the trial court, instead it granted a decree for Rs. 500 as damages to the appellant. 7. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant urges that instead of granting decree of Rs. 500 as damages, the lower appellate Court should have maintained the trial courts decree for specific performance. He has referred to .S. 21 (5) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 500 as damages to the appellant. 7. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant urges that instead of granting decree of Rs. 500 as damages, the lower appellate Court should have maintained the trial courts decree for specific performance. He has referred to .S. 21 (5) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 21 (1) lays down that in a suit for specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff may also claim compensation for its breach, either in addition to or in substitution of such performance. Sub-sec. (5) then provides that no compensation shall be awarded under this section unless the plaintiff has claimed such compensation in his plaint. It was pointed out that in the plaint the appellant had only claimed specific performance and not compensation. Therefore it is urged that in view of the provision of sub-sec. (5) the lower appellate Court was not justified in granting compensation as it was not claimed in the plaint. This contention on a plain reading of Section 21 is not correct. The general rule is laid down in sub-sec. (1) of Section 21. It is to the effect that in addition to or in substitution of the relief of specific performance, the plaintiff can claim compensation. This general rule is subject to the exception contained in sub-sec. (5) which is to the effect that no compensation can be awarded unless the plaintiff has claimed the same in the plaint. The position, therefore, is that in a suit for a specific performance the court would not allow compensation either in addition to or in substitution of the relief of specific performance if compensation had not been claimed in the plaint. Thus sub-secs. (1) and (5) are to be read together. In the present case the lower appellate Court has granted compensation because of the agreement executed by the respondent in his favour. Condition I, No. 4 of the agreement is specific and envisages breach of contract on the part of either party. It lays down that if the vendor did not execute the sale deed, the appellant would be entitled to get Rs. 500 as damages and in case the appellant did not get the sale deed executed, the respondent No. 3 would be entitled to get Rs. 500 as damages from the appellant. In this connection reference may be made to Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act. 500 as damages and in case the appellant did not get the sale deed executed, the respondent No. 3 would be entitled to get Rs. 500 as damages from the appellant. In this connection reference may be made to Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act. This section lays down that the specific performance of any contract may, in the discretion of the court, be enforced (a) if there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused by the non-performance of the act agreed to be done, or (b) when the act agreed to be done is such that compensation in money for its non-performance would not afford adequate relief. In the present case, the parties specifically fixed the amount of compensation/damages. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no standard for ascertaining the actual damage. It cannot also be said that the damages for the non-performance of the contract would not afford adequate relief. In these circumstances, Section 10 does not help the appellant. It means that the relief of specific performance is wholly discretionary with the court. In the present case looking to the terms of the agreement, it can easily be said that if the contract is not allowed to be specifically performed, the appellant can easily be compensated in damages which the parties had specifically agreed. In this aspect of the matter sub-sec. (5) of Section 21 is of no help to the appellant. The lower appellate court cannot be said to have exercised discretion wrongly in the matter. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant then pointed out that the appellant was entitled to the return of his earnest money of Rs. 100. In the plaint the appellant did not claim return of his earnest money in case his prayer for specific performance was not allowed. Section 22 (1) of the Specific Relief Act lays down that any person suing for the specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property may, in an appropriate case, ask for any other relief to which he may be entitled including the refund of any earnest money in case his claim for specific performance is refused. Then sub-sec. (2) of this section provides that no relief under cl. (1) or cl. (h) of sub-section (1) shall be granted by the court unless it has been specifically claimed. A bare reading of sub-sec. Then sub-sec. (2) of this section provides that no relief under cl. (1) or cl. (h) of sub-section (1) shall be granted by the court unless it has been specifically claimed. A bare reading of sub-sec. (2) will indicate that the return of earnest money cannot be permitted unless it has been specifically claimed in the plaint. 9. It will be noticed that there is a proviso added to sub-sec. (2) of Section 22. This proviso says that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint, the court shall at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief. In the present case the appellant never thought to amend his plaint with a view to get relief for the return of his earnest money. The question that follows is that as the suit is framed, the appellant is not entitled to the refund of his earnest money. He should remain satisfied with the amount of damages granted to him by the lower appellate court. 10. For what has been discussed above there is no merit in the appeal. 11. With regard to the cross-objection, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 is that the appellant was responsible for the non-performance of the contract, that the breach of contract was on his part and that therefore, he was not entitled even to the sum of Rs. 500 allowed by the lower appellate court. 12. It may be stated at once that this point was not raised before the lower appellate court. On the other hand, the respondent No. 3, who was one of the appellants before the lower appellate court, urged that instead of decreeing the suit for specific performance, the plaintiff-appellant be granted a decree for damages in terms of the agreement. The lower appellate court, as said above, accepted the contention. In view of this, it does not lie in the mouth of respondent No. 3 to urge in this court that the lower appellate court committed an error in granting damages to the appellant. 13. It would further be seen that on 30th July, 1966 the respondent No. 3 gave notice Ex. In view of this, it does not lie in the mouth of respondent No. 3 to urge in this court that the lower appellate court committed an error in granting damages to the appellant. 13. It would further be seen that on 30th July, 1966 the respondent No. 3 gave notice Ex. 4 saying that the village was denotified on 11 - 6-66 and that the appellant did not get the sale deed executed within a month thereof. In the agreement, it was mentioned that the village was under consolidation operations and that the respondent No. 3 would execute sale deed in favour of the appellant within one month of the denotification (vide condition No. 3). Then follows condition No. 4 that if either of the party committed breach of the contract the other party would be entitled to get a sum of Rupees 500 as damages. 14. On the basis of the said notice and condition No. 3 of the agreement it was urged by the counsel for respondent No. 3 that the breach was on the part of the appellant. The trial court has dealt with this question at length. It appears that from 6-7-1966 there was an attempt on the part of the appellant to obtain sale deed from the respondent No. 3, that the respondent No. 3 was evading the matter, and that on 22-7-1966 the appellant had given notice to the respondent No. 3 to execute the sale deed. The appellants notice did reach the respondent No. 3 on 25-7-1966. The strange thing is that in his evidence the respondent No. 3 did not even admit to have received appellants notice dated 22-7-1966. There is a clear finding by the trial court that on the evidence on record it was proved that the breach of contract was made by the respondent No. 3. Before the lower appellate court this finding was not at all assailed by the respondent No. 3 who was one of the appellants in the first appeal. 15. It may be added that the appellant filed suit on 17-8-1966 within about one month of the receipt of the respondents notice dated 30-7-1966 (Ex-4). The respondent No. 3 filed written statement in which he did not show his willingness to execute the sale deed. Assuming for a moment that the respondent No. 3 gave notice first the. 15. It may be added that the appellant filed suit on 17-8-1966 within about one month of the receipt of the respondents notice dated 30-7-1966 (Ex-4). The respondent No. 3 filed written statement in which he did not show his willingness to execute the sale deed. Assuming for a moment that the respondent No. 3 gave notice first the. appellant showed his willingness to obtain the sale deed by filing the suit. Even then the respondent No. 3 did not show his willingness to execute the sale deed. On the other hand he chose to contest the suit tooth and nail. 16. It will not be out of place to mention that agreement (Ex. 1) is a unilateral document executed by respondent No. 3 only. This document was not executed by the appellant. Therefore, the respondent No. 3 is bound by its terms. Its terms do not necessarily bind the appellant. Therefore, the respondent No. 3 cannot complain that because the appellant did not obtain sale deed from him within one month of the denotification, the appellant was not entitled to get damages. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent referred to Section 20 (2) (a) of the Specific Relief Act. Section 20 (1) lays down that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Sub-sec. (2) enumerates cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. Cl. (a) provides that where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant (the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance). Assuming for a moment that cl. (a) is applicable, the lower appellate court has already accommodated the respondent No. 3 by substituting the decree of specific performance by a decree of damages. Therefore, on this ground alone cl. (a) is not helpful to the respondent No. 3. Moreover, cl. (a) is not applicable to the present case. Assuming for a moment that cl. (a) is applicable, the lower appellate court has already accommodated the respondent No. 3 by substituting the decree of specific performance by a decree of damages. Therefore, on this ground alone cl. (a) is not helpful to the respondent No. 3. Moreover, cl. (a) is not applicable to the present case. In the agreement it has been clearly provided that if any party defaulted he would be liable to pay damages. Thus there is no clause in the agreement which gives the appellant an unfair advantage over the respondent No. 3. The position is that cl. (a) of Section 20 (2) does not help the respondent No. 3. 18. For what has been found above, there is no merit in the cross-objection. Both the courts below have clearly found that time was not the essence of the contract. There is no reason to differ from this conclusion. 19. Appeal is dismissed with costs. Cross-objection is also dismissed with costs.