JUDGMENT M. N. Shukla, J. - This is a claimant's appeal against the order dated 31-1- 1972 passed by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation. Saharanpur dis- missing an application filed by him under Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. It was claimed by the appellant that he was a workman employed by the respondents for the last one year for the purpose of thrashing wheat in village Bongla. Pargana and police station Jamalpur, district Saharanpur, that on 6-5-1971 at about 9 a. m. he received personal injuries during the course of his employment from a thrasher which was run by a tractor belonging to the respondents, that on the date of the accident when the wheat of the respondents was being thrashed by the appellant his right hand below the elbow was crushed in the machine and the same had to be amputated later on. The appellant claimed the loss of earning capacity to the extent of 80 per cent and demanded a lump sum of Rs. 7,340/- as compensation on the basis that he was being paid Rs. 150/- per month as pay. The respondents resisted the application and contended that the appellant was never in their employment nor was the injury sustained by him during the course of any such was however, rejected by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner on the preliminary ground that the appellant was not a workman covered by the definition contained in 'the Workmen's Compensation Act. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant was fully covered by the. definition of the term "workman" and the contrary view of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was erroneous. He further urged that this was a substantial question of law involved in the case. In order to appreciate the contention raised on behalf of the appellant as to whether he was a workman within the meaning of the term as used in Section 2 (1) (n) of the Act it is necessary to examine the definition and its applicability to the facts of this case. The material part of it so far as applicable to the present case is quoted below :- "(n) 'Workman', means any person other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the poses of the employer's trade or ness........ ""(emphasis added)' 4. The material part of it so far as applicable to the present case is quoted below :- "(n) 'Workman', means any person other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the poses of the employer's trade or ness........ ""(emphasis added)' 4. It will be manifest from the above definition that in order to exclude a person from the above definition two conditions have to be satisfied namely, (a) he must be a person whose employment is of a casual nature and (b) he should have been employed otherwise than for the purpose of the employer's trade or business. The use of the preposition in the above definition is significant and it needs to be emphasised that the word 'and' occurring therein indicates that the two limbs thereof cannot he dead disjunctively in the sense that the first exception relating to a person's employment being of a casual nature is in- dependent of the second exception of such person being employed otherwise than for the purpose of the employer's trade or business. The entire clause must be read conjunctively and then it will become obvious that in order to take a person out of the definition both conditions must be fulfilled. It follows that if an employer has employed a person for the purpose of his trade or business, then even though the employment he of a casual nature, he would still fall within the category of 'workman' provided other conditions of the statute are satisfied. I am inclined in this con alleged employment. The application, "(Emphasis not indicated - Ed.) text to adopt the phraseology of Lord Birkhenhead L. C., who while dealing with the definition of 'workman' under the English statute in Manton v. Cantwell 1920 AC 781 observed :- "My Lords, the language of the passage I have just read is perhaps some- what open to criticism on the question of draftsmanship, but the effect of it is nevertheless plain. The meaning of the limb of the sentence is that if a man be employed for the purposes of the trade or business the employer is liable to him even though the employment be of a casual nature." The same view is endorsed by a catena of authorities. See Gorelal v. Dropadibai, AIR 1963 Madh. Pra. The meaning of the limb of the sentence is that if a man be employed for the purposes of the trade or business the employer is liable to him even though the employment be of a casual nature." The same view is endorsed by a catena of authorities. See Gorelal v. Dropadibai, AIR 1963 Madh. Pra. , Popat Lal v. Bai Lakhu Jetha, AIR 1952 Sau , Bachia Mistri v. Shanti, 1946 All LJ 231,, Sitharam v. Ayyaswami, AIR 1956 Mad & Ghasiram v. Smt. Nannibai, AIR 1960 Madh Pra. 5. The Commissioner Workmen's Compensation, Saharanpur lost sight of this essential requirement postulated in the definition of 'workman' in the Act and rejected the application on the sole ground that the appellant was only a casual employee. He was greatly influenced by the fact that the very notice issued by the claimant on the opposite parties recited that he was employed at Rs. 5/- per day for the last one year. On account of this situation the Commissioner observed:- "The natural conclusion to be drawn from this is that the employment of the applicant was of casual nature and not permanent or on monthly basis. He came within the category of daily labourer". It appears at first sight tempting to say that a remuneration on the basis of Rs. 5/- per day cannot constitute a regular and permanent employment as contrasted with employment of a casual nature and that it is sufficient to clinch the point against the claimant but on closer reflection it appears that even assuming that his employment was of a casual nature, the application could not be dismissed unless the second of the conditions stated in the definition was also satisfied. Even though the applicant may have been a casual employee, he was entitled to have his claim adjudicated on merits if it could be demonstrated that he was not an employee "otherwise than for the purpose of the employer's trade or business." In my opinion the term 'casual' has an implication which has reference to the length of time or duration. In other words, the transient or protracted nature of an employment is the criterion for determining as to whether the employment is of a casual nature or regular or permanent. In other words, the transient or protracted nature of an employment is the criterion for determining as to whether the employment is of a casual nature or regular or permanent. It is repugnant to the rules of interpretation that the Legislature intended to indulge in tautology and employed two clauses in the definition of the term 'workman' for ex- pressing a single condition. The first clause relates to the casual nature of the employment and the second clause- refers to the employment being for purposes other than those of the employer's trade or business. These two different modes of expression and phraseology must be construed as connoting not identical but two distinct conditions. Where a business or employment can be reasonably and normally spread over some time considering the nature of such business, it would not be consistent with the description 'casual'. On the other hand, if it is very brief and transitory, it may generally share the characteristic of a casual employment. The dictionary meaning of the word 'casual' is "accidental, fortuitous, depending on, or produced by chance."This is evidently rooted in the time factor or the extent of duration. I am, therefore, not inclined to endorse the view expressed in some authorities that the casual character of an employment would also depend on the general' character or nature of the type of employment in which a person is engaged. As I have already observed above, the two limbs of the definition are not in dependent of each other. Hence, even though a person may be employed in a casual employment, he can still be regarded as a 'workman', provided he comes within the purview of the second limb of the definition. In the instant case, however, I am inclined to hold that the appellant was covered by the first part of the definition also. He came with the definite case that he had been employed by the opposite parties for the purpose of thrashing wheat for a period of one year and this case had not been disbelieved by the Commissioner. Hence, it appears that the activity of the appellant according to the very term of the employment was not of a fleeting nature but was spread over considerable Mime It, therefore, par took of the character of a regular as contrasted with a mere casual employment. 6. Hence, it appears that the activity of the appellant according to the very term of the employment was not of a fleeting nature but was spread over considerable Mime It, therefore, par took of the character of a regular as contrasted with a mere casual employment. 6. The question whether the employment is of a casual nature is essentially one of evidence. The trend of modern progressive thinking in a welfare State is in favour of raising a presumption to the effect that the employee is not a casual employee unless the contrary is proved. The judicial pronouncements are, therefore, at one in holding that the onus in such cases is on the employer to prove the conditions which are necessary for the purpose of excluding a person from the category of 'workman.' Naturally in such disputes the most important piece of evidence can be the muster-roll of the employer. An employee his p.o access to that document which remains in the custody of the employer and hence it is the latter's duty to produce the same in order to conclusively satisfy the Compensation Commissioner that the applicant was not a regular worker of the employer on his rolls. In the present case the opposite parties did not produce the rolls. The non-production of the rolls of the employees would certainly raise a presumption against the employer on the point and it may be presumed in favour of the applicant that he was not a casual worker. See Jagannadham v. Smt. Padmabati, AIR 1962 Orissa 7 and Ebrahim v. Jainibi, AIR 1933 Bom 270. 7. It is also an erroneous approach to which the Compensation Commissioner succumbed when he based the conclusion that the applicant was a casual worker merely on the ground that his remuneration was fixed on a daily basis. It is true that in the instant case the applicant was employed on payment of Rs. 5/- per day but the mode or the time of payment is not at all conclusive on the question of the casualness of the employment. It is only a matter of convenience and mutual adjustment as to how and at what interval of time shall a worker be paid by the employer. There are ,other factors such as the time factor principally which would indicate that the employment was casual. It is only a matter of convenience and mutual adjustment as to how and at what interval of time shall a worker be paid by the employer. There are ,other factors such as the time factor principally which would indicate that the employment was casual. The principle was pregnantly summed up in Hughes v. Walker (1926) 19 BWCC 79, at p. 85 (C.A.) in these words :- "In the present case it appears to me that there evidence before the County Court Judge which would justify him in holding that a an employed to build a wail at. a rate of wages, whether determined by the hour, by the week or by the day I care not, but employed to build a wall, might well be found to be engaged in an employment that was not of a casual nature." See also Gorelal v. Dropadibai, AIR 1963 Madh Pra 24. 8. Now I proceed to examine the: second ingredient of the definition with regard to which, it must be clearly stated, the time factor or the duration of employment has no relevance. If on facts of a case it can be established that there is a nexus between the duty which the employee is called upon to perform and the employer's 'trade and business' then he would come within the definition of 'workman', even though the duration of an employment may be extremely brief. It cannot he too strongly stressed that for the purposes of applying the second part of the definition the length or duration of the employment is wholly irrelevant; it does not enter into consideration at all. Even if the employment lasts for a single day, the employee shall be deemed to be a workman if he was employed for the purposes of the employer's 'trade or business'. Hence, it is the nature of the employment which is the decisive factor and not its duration. In the cast, of Alimohamed v. Shankar, AIR 1946 Bom 169, it was held on evidence that the labourer was employed for the purpose of the employer's trade and business and consequently compensation was awarded to that female labourer, even though she had been employed merely for a day. In the cast, of Alimohamed v. Shankar, AIR 1946 Bom 169, it was held on evidence that the labourer was employed for the purpose of the employer's trade and business and consequently compensation was awarded to that female labourer, even though she had been employed merely for a day. It is only where the employment of the claimant is for some purpose which is entirely remote from or wholly extraneous to the trade or business of the employer as such that the employee would be excluded from the definition of workman. Hence, the question is as to whether the duty of thrashing wheat for which the claimant was employed constituted an employment in the opposite parties' 'trade or business.' On facts it was not denied that the opposite parties were 'farmers' or agriculturists and the applicant had been employed by them for the purpose of thrashing wheat. The only objection raised on behalf of the respondent was that their farm was not a mechanised one and was not covered within the definition given in Section 2 (1) (n) of the Act. In my opinion Clause (xxix) of II Sch. of the Act is not exhaustive is only illustrative of the persons wl: , are deemed to be workmen within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (n). Clause (xxix) thereof reads:- "Employed in farming by tractors or other contrivances driven by steam or other mechanical power or by electricity." I am of the view that the appellant's case comes squarely within the ambit of the above clause as well as Section 2 (1) (n) of the Act. Section 2 (1) (n) advisedly uses the expression "employed for the purpose" and not "employed in." The words used in the definition are wider in their content and are not limited. The Legislature chose to employ the broader phraseology. Hence, even if certain work is incidental to the main employment and is not altogether outside its scope, it would be covered within the definition and must be regarded as done for the purposes of the employer's 'trade or business'. The expression "employed for the purposes of the employer's trade or business" may be capable of a wider as well as a narrower construction. The question is as to whether we should adopt a narrower or wider construction. The expression "employed for the purposes of the employer's trade or business" may be capable of a wider as well as a narrower construction. The question is as to whether we should adopt a narrower or wider construction. If we look at the preamble of the Act it is clear that it is designed to provide for the payment by certain classes of employers to their workmen of compensation for injury by accident. Having regard to the scope and intention of the Act it is the wider construction which should be preferred to the narrower. In interpreting an enactment like the one before me preference must always be given to a construction which promotes the implementation of the benefits intended by the Legislature. The rule was aptly summed up by Earl of Halsbury L. C. in the House of Lords cases of Lysons v. Knowles (Andrew) & Sons Ltd., Stuart v. Nixon & Bruce, 1901 AC 79 at p. 84:- "My Lords, the broad proposition of course was that the Legislature intend- ed that there should be compensation given to every workman in certain trades when an injury happened to him in the course of his employment, subject to certain exceptions which are not relevant to the question now under debate. The language in which the right was even must be looked at. I think. with care to see whether the language was (as it appears in the first instance) intended in its universality, or was intended to be cut down, as is contended. to a very limited right by sections or phrases in the schedule. Certainly, whatever other difficulty there may be in construing the language as it stands. it would be, I think, more difficult still if we were to introduce these qualifications upon the right". The same broad interpretation must also be applied to the construction of the language used in the various para- graphs of the schedule to the Act and in that view of the matter the provisions of clause (xxix) are fully attracted in the present case. The appellant was a person 'employed in farming by trace tor driven by mechanical power'. Admittedly the employers (opposite parties were engaged in the business of 'farming' or agriculture, which is a compendious term and embraces within its purview the entire gamut of agricultural operation, including thrashing of grain. The appellant was a person 'employed in farming by trace tor driven by mechanical power'. Admittedly the employers (opposite parties were engaged in the business of 'farming' or agriculture, which is a compendious term and embraces within its purview the entire gamut of agricultural operation, including thrashing of grain. There was also evidence in the case that the opposite parties used a tractor which was being utilised for the purpose of operating the instrument for thrashing wheat. Thus, at all events, the act of thrashing with the aid of a device which was worked by means of a tractor driven by mechanical power was ancillary to farming or agriculture. In dealing with the Workmen's Compensation Act the Courts have always leaned in favour of a liberal interpretation which would result in conferring the benefit of the legislation on the class for whose advantage it was enacted. Thus, in the House of Lords case Manton v. Cantwell (supra) Lord Birkhenhead L. C. ruled that a person employed by a farmer for thatching the roof of the farmhouse was a person employed for the purpose of the farmer's trade or business and came within the definition of 'workmen' in Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. A few words from the eloquent speech of the Lord Chancellor in that decision bear extraction. "It is necessary to observe very closely that it would not be possible to carry out the business of farming without the provisions of either a farmhouse or some substituted premises ............... The result therefore in that we find a man who is earning his living by the processes of agriculture, finding himself compelled by his own rustic arts to effect a reparation in the roof of the office which is necessary for his business, and without the decent convenience of which he could not carry out his business ............... He does not, as he has often done be- fore and as many of his neighbours the local farmers did, carry out the repairs himself. He employs the deceased man to effect these repairs. My Lords, I am not able to conceive how the argument can be successfully put forward that a man who employs another in a task of this kind is not employing him for the purposes of his trade or business." 9. He employs the deceased man to effect these repairs. My Lords, I am not able to conceive how the argument can be successfully put forward that a man who employs another in a task of this kind is not employing him for the purposes of his trade or business." 9. Thus, on the facts of the present case it is not possible to eschew the conclusion that the appellant was employed by the respondents for the purpose of their trade or business and consequently the second ingredient necessary for excluding persons from the definition of 'workmen' was completely absent. Therefore, the appellant was a workman within the definition of the term in the Act and the contrary finding of the Commissioner was erroneous and it must be held that he was entitled to compensation. 10. After a careful appraisal of the material on record, I have not the least doubt that the appellant was a work- man and that the personal injury was caused to the appellant by an incident arising in the course of his employment and consequently his employers (respondents) were liable to pay compensation to him. A question has now arisen as to what is the amount of compensation to which the appellant was entitled. I have already mentioned that as a result of the injury sustained by the appellant his right hand below the elbow was crushed in the machine and had to be amputated. In my opinion such injury in only one of the hands which had to be amputated comes with- in the category of 'permanent partial disablement' mentioned in Section 4 (1) (c) of the Act and the compensation to be awarded in such case would be governed by sub-cl. (i) of Clause (c) of Section 4 (1). To be more specific, Item (3) of Part II of Sch. I of the Act will be fully applicable to such injury which provides for "amputation from 8" from tip of acromion to less than 4" below tip of olecranon." According to schedule I read with Section 4 (1) the percentage of compensation payable in such case would be for 70% of loss of the earning capacity. According to Sch. IV of the Act where the monthly wages of the workman are not more than Rs. 150/- (calculated at the rate of Rs. According to Sch. IV of the Act where the monthly wages of the workman are not more than Rs. 150/- (calculated at the rate of Rs. 5/- per day) the amount of compensation payable in case of permanent total disablement is 1980 Lab, I, C./20 IV . Rs. 9,800/- and in the case of permanent partial disablement suffered by the workman in the instant case it would be according to the provisions noticed earlier; 70% of this amount which works out at Rs. 6,860/-. The Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation. Saharanpur was patently in error in holding otherwise, his statement of the law was incorrect as well as its application to the facts of the case and a substantial question of law was involved in the present appeal. 11. Therefore, this appeal is allowed with costs. The order of the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Saharanpur is set aside and the claimant's application under Section 3 of the Act is allowed and it is held that he is entitled to a compensation of Rs. 6,860/-.