JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - Petitioner assails in this application under Article 226 of the Constitution the promotion of opposite parties 3, 4 and 5 as Assistant Labour Commissioners by overlooking his claim and has asked for a direction to opposite parties 1 and 2 to consider his claim for promotion retrospectively with effect from the date when the impugned promotions were given. He has also challenged the gradation list in Annexure-7 in which opposite parties 3 to 5 have been shown above him. 2. According to the Petitioner be was appointed as Assistant Labour Officer on 5.10.1956 while opposite parties 4 and 6 were so appointed in 1959 and opposite party No. 5 in May, 1959. Petitioner was confirmed as Labour Officer with effect from 7-6-1960 while opposite party No. 3 was confirmed as Labour Officer on 19-7-1960 Opposite parties 4 and 6 were promoted as Labour Officers in August, 1960 and opposite party No. 5 was promoted in December, 1960 In May. 1963, as a result of disciplinary action, opposite party No. 6 was reverted to the post of Assistant Labour Officer. In March, 1966, the post of Labour Officer was declared as Gazetted, in that year, there was a vacancy in the post of Assistant Labour Commissioner which is a promotional post from the rank of Labour Officer. Names of Petitioner, opposite parties 3, 4 and 5 were sent to the State Public Service Commission but the Commission placed the Petitioner below opposite party No. 3 on the basis of the date of appointment as Labour Officer and overlooking the date of confirmation. Petitioner's name was not recommended and opposite parties 3 and 4 were promoted as Assistant Labour Commissioners in July, 1966. Petitioner preferred an appeal on 8-8-1966 against this. On 20th Nov, 1966, opposite party No. 5 was promoted as Assistant Labour Commissioner. Promotion was admissible on the basis of seniority subject to merit. No reasons were given for supersession nor was the matter placed before the Chief Minister of the State as required under the Instructions issued in terms of Rule 14 of the rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution. In December, 1968, Petitioner was promoted as Assistant Labour Commissioner. In July, 1970, he represented for restoration of his seniority in the promoted rank. In December, 1968, Petitioner was promoted as Assistant Labour Commissioner. In July, 1970, he represented for restoration of his seniority in the promoted rank. In January, 1972, a gradation list was published for the first time in which Petitioner was shown as senior to opposite parties 3, 4 and 5. On 7-4-1972, opposite party No. 6 was promoted as Assistant Labour Commissioner. In December, 1975, a provisional gradation a list of officers in the rank of Labour Officers and Assistant Labour Commissioners was published in which Petitioner was shown as junior to opposite parties 3 to 5 in both the ranks. In the meantime, on a representation by opposite patty No. 6, the disciplinary authority himself set aside the reversion ordered in May, 1903 and treated him as senior to opposite party No. 5. As opposite party No. 5 had been treated as senior to Petitioner, opposite party No. 6 was assigned seniority over Petitioner. Petitioner represented against the gradation list in December, 1975, specifically challenging the placement of opposite party No. 6. In June, 1976, the appeals and representation filed by the Petitioner were rejected by a bald order. Thereafter, the writ application was filed on 28-7-1976 asking for the relief already indicated. 3. In spite of service of notice opposite parties 3 to 6 have not appeared in this Court. Opposite parties 1 and 2 filed a joint counter affidavit pointing out Petitioner's laches and asserting that Petitioner's case for promotion had been duly considered along with that of others and Public Service Commission did not consider him suitable for promotion and accordingly he was not promoted. The Gradation list was in the draft stage and objections had been invited. In a rejoinder, Petitioner has reiterated his stand. 4. The following contentions have been advanced on behalf of the Petitioner at the hearing: (i) Opposite parties 3 to 6 as a fact were junior to the Petitioner and in normal course, keeping the rule of promotion in view, Petitioner should have been promoted. (ii) There were uncommunicated adverse remarks in the confidential character roll of the Petitioner which were taken into account by the Commission in overlooking the claim for promotion. Such adverse entries should not have been considered and relied upon to overlook Petitioner's claim for promotion. (ii) There were uncommunicated adverse remarks in the confidential character roll of the Petitioner which were taken into account by the Commission in overlooking the claim for promotion. Such adverse entries should not have been considered and relied upon to overlook Petitioner's claim for promotion. (iii) Under the rules of Business which are statutory, when Petitioner's claim was overlooked, and persons junior to him were promoted, the matter, should have been placed before the Chief Minister hut as a fact it was not so done. (iv) Petitioner's case for promotion was not considered when opposite party No. 6 was promoted. (v) Petitioner's statutory appeal should not have been disposed of in a summary manner. Reasons should have been provided at the time Petitioner's claim for promotion was overlooked and his appeal was dismissed. 5. At the hearing, learned Government Advocate raised a preliminary objection on the ground of laches. Undoubtedly the impugned promotions were granted in 1966 in respect of three of the opposite parties and in 1972 so far as the opposite parry No. 6 is concerned. If the promotions are not open to the challenge on the ground of delay and laches, no challenge with any benefit to the gradation list would be open. According to learned Government Advocate, the writ application having been filed long ten years after the impugned promotions were granted, the same should not be permitted to be challenged at this belated point of time. Ten years is certainly a long period of time by any standard and it would be difficult for any Court to overlook such a gap. Here, however, a statutory appeal had been filed by the Petitioner immediately after he was Overlook both in 1966 and again in 1972. It is conceded by the State's Counsel that the appeals were covered within the ambit of Rule 23 of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1962, framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, The appeals were kept pending for long ten years and disposed of on 18-6-1976 and in July of that year this writ application has been filed. It does not lie in the mouth of State to raise the plea at laches where the have been considered Petitioner's claim for delay in entirely its own and Petitioner has shown all promptitude to bring his matter before the appropriate authority for consideration. It does not lie in the mouth of State to raise the plea at laches where the have been considered Petitioner's claim for delay in entirely its own and Petitioner has shown all promptitude to bring his matter before the appropriate authority for consideration. Learned Government Advocate sought to place reliance on their decisions of the Supreme Court to support his objection, namely, Jagdish Narain Maltiar Vs. The State of Bihar and Others Amrit Lal Berry and Another Vs. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi and Others, and State of Orissa and Others Vs. Shri Arun Kumar Patnaik and Others. We do not think, to the peculiar facts of this case, the ratio of any of these three cases has application. We, therefore, overrule the preliminary objection. 6. Mr. Rath for the Petitioner relying on the observations in several cases con tended that non-compliance of the provisions of the rules of Business vitiated the Supreme Court in the case of Haridwar Singh Vs. Bagun Sumbrui and Others and of this Court in Shri Govinda Chandra Rout v. State Government of Orissa represented by the Secretary to Government, Industries Department and Ors. 40 (1974) C.L.T. 723. Petitioner alleged in the writ application that the matter has not been placed before the Chief Minister and in the counter affidavit it, the plea was accepted by stating that the Chief Secretary had endorsed the file to the Deputy Chief Minister and his orders had been obtained. Sufficient opportunity was given to learned Government Advocate to produce there relevant delegation but nothing could be produced before us to show that Deputy Child Minister had been assigned this business in an appropriate way. 7. It was next contended that when Petitioner was superseded in 1966 and 1972, adequate reasons should have been given as indicated by the Supreme Court in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Mohan Lal Capoor and Others. The rule Indicated in that case turned on the special provision in the statutory rule requiring recording "its reasons for the proposed supersession". While we generally agree that reasons should be given with a view to avoiding arbitrariness and make public actions conform to the Rule of Law, it would be difficult to stoke down the promotions merely on the ground that supersession of the Petitioner was not supported by reasons. 8. Mr. While we generally agree that reasons should be given with a view to avoiding arbitrariness and make public actions conform to the Rule of Law, it would be difficult to stoke down the promotions merely on the ground that supersession of the Petitioner was not supported by reasons. 8. Mr. Rath next maintained that the appeal under the statutory Rule was quasi-judicial and the State Government could not have disposed it of in a bald manner without indicating justifying grounds for the rejection. While it is conceded that the State Government could not be expected to write out a judgment as in a Court of Law, it was obliged to act quasi-judicially and, therefore, the elementary requirement of rendering a fair decision would be satisfied. Petitioner challenged the summary manner of disposal by pleading in paragraph 16 of the writ petition prejudice on that account. Paragraph 14 of the counter affidavit referred to allegations contained in paragraph 16 of the writ petition in a general manner but no specific controverting was made. It is not the case of the opposite parry No. 1 that any detailed and reasoned order was made in the file though a brief order was communicated. Petitioner was intimated the following order In inviting a reference to your letter No. 540 dated 22-1-1976, in the above subject, I am directed to say that the representation and memorial of Shri S.K. Misra (Petitioner), Assistant Labour Commissioner dated 8-8-1966, 2-11-1966; 10-7-1970 and 7-11-1975 have been rejected as the same do not merit any consideration.... (See Annexure-9) In the case of Mahadeb Dash v. Life Insurance Corporation of India ILR 1975 Curt. 1298, a Bench of this Court dealing with disposal of a disciplinary appeal under the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, containing similar provision as in the C.C.A. Rules of 1962 said: The appellate authority is also to examine whether the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority are justified. The appellate authority cannot reach such a conclusion merely by saying that the findings are justified. It has to apply its mind fully to an the materials on record, consider the grounds given in the memorandum of appeal and then come to the conclusion whether the findings are supportable. .... The appellate authority cannot reach such a conclusion merely by saying that the findings are justified. It has to apply its mind fully to an the materials on record, consider the grounds given in the memorandum of appeal and then come to the conclusion whether the findings are supportable. .... All the authorities under the Regulations have been constituted quasi-judicial Tribunals and they have to apply their judicial mind in recording the verdict not only in the matter of the procedure and findings but also on the question of the penalty. .... The essence of the matter therefore is that the Regulation created several quasi-judicial authorities to deal with disciplinary proceedings and the appeals and memorials arising therefrom. The appellate authority under Regulation 46(2) and the Chairman under Regulation 49 are to fully apply their minds to the facts of the case and record conclusions whether the findings were justified and the penalty was proper. To do so, their orders must be speaking orders, otherwise one cannot understand that they observed the mandatory provisions enjoined upon them in Regulations 46 and 49. Undoubtedly this Court was dealing with disciplinary proceedings and appeals against punishment, but In our view the position in regard to administrative appeals and revisions where rights of parties are involved, is not different. Governmental business perforce has to be carried In an impersonal manner and where rights of a person in the employment of Government are involved, unless-orders are objective and conclusions are supported by reasons and there be intrinsic evidence of application of mind by the person charged with the duty to dispose of the matter, arbitrariness is bound to creep in thereby destroying the very foundation of Rule of law. Courts have, therefore, often insisted on reasoned orders being rendered even in administrative appeals. When Petitioner had invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the State Government under a statutory provision, there was no justification for its pendency for ten years and for the ultimate disposal by a bald order exhibiting no application of mind. In order that Governmental business is carried on with promptitude, it is necessary that there be growing realization of the responsibility cast upon every machinery created for the governance of the country, and every limblow or high-must act with circumspection. Higher the body and wider the power, greater is the responsibility to discharge. 9. In order that Governmental business is carried on with promptitude, it is necessary that there be growing realization of the responsibility cast upon every machinery created for the governance of the country, and every limblow or high-must act with circumspection. Higher the body and wider the power, greater is the responsibility to discharge. 9. We are, in the circumstances, obliged to take the view that there has been no proper disposal of the appeals preferred by the Petitioner by which he challenged the promotion of opposite parties 3 to 0 and therefore, the same should be disposed of afresh in accordance with law. Both the parties should be given a personal hearing by the appellate authority and in view of the long delay already caused, the disposal be made within four months from the service of the writ without fail. We have not expressed any view on the merit of the matter as that would embarrass the appellate authority. There shall be no order for costs. P.K. Mohanti, J. 10. I agree.