JUDGMENT B.N. Sapru, J. - This is a defendants appeal arising out of a suit for eviction. 2. The facts relevant for the decision of the appeal are that Nanhak Chand along with the respondents Nos. 16, 17 and 18 was owner of the land in suit. On 15-9-1972 Saiga executed a document which has been treated as a lease deed. It cannot be a lease as it was not registered and is signed by Saiga lessee. The kabuliat inter alia provides that Saiga had agreed to take the land on a fixed rent for carrying on a coal business. The document also provided that the lessee could make permanent constructions on the land. It was a further condition that Saiga would hand over the possession if the owners required the land for their own use on payment of price of the construction. There was also a provision to the following effect - "Kisi surat me vai ya rahan ya aar vagaraih na kar sakunga". 3. In other words it meant that Saiga undertook that he would neither sell, mortgage nor encumber (meaning to do any similar act) the property in any manner. 4. On 16-9-1976 Saiga admitted the present appellants as his sub-lessees or sub-tenants who made permanent constructions on the land. Saiga died and was succeeded by Shyam Lal defendant No. 1 who was his adopted son. 5. On 6-5-1959 Nanhak Chand and some of the other co-sharers in the tenancy rights, transferred the land in suit in favour of the present plaintiffs. 6. Thereafter the plaintiffs gave a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and determined the lease (or tenancy rights) of Shyam Lal defendant No. 1. 7. In the notice it was stated that the plaintiffs required the land for their own use. 8. As the persons in possession did not vacate the land in question the present suit was instituted for their ejectment. 9. The suit was decreed by the trial court and an appeal was filed by Shyam Lal and the sub-lessees. The appeal filed was numbered Civil Appeal No. 397 of 1972. The plaintiffs put the decree into execution. During the pendency of the proceedings Shyam Lal conveyed all his rights and title in the disputed property by a registered sale deed executed by Shyam Lal in favour of the plaintiffs on 6-11-1962. The appeal filed was numbered Civil Appeal No. 397 of 1972. The plaintiffs put the decree into execution. During the pendency of the proceedings Shyam Lal conveyed all his rights and title in the disputed property by a registered sale deed executed by Shyam Lal in favour of the plaintiffs on 6-11-1962. In the sale deed it is recited that Shyam Lal had conveyed all his property rights in the constructions made on the property for Rs. 2,700. It was also recited in the deed that the constructions which were made by the sub-tenants had come to belong to Shyam Lal as the cost of the constructions had been adjusted against the rent payable by the sub-tenant to Shyam Lal. The sale deed went on to recite that in this way Shyam Lal had become owner of the construction raised by the sub-tenant. 10. In view of the document executed by Shyam Lal referred to above the lower court set aside the decree passed by the trial court and remanded the matter to the trial court to consider - 1. Implication of the act of surrender by Shyam Lal in favour of plaintiff. 2. what was the status of the sub-lessees after the surrender? The trial court again decreed the suit. The sub-lessees filed an appeal which has been dismissed and it has been held that after the sale deed or what may be called the surrender by Shyam Lal in favour of the plaintiff the sub-lessees have no locus standi under which they can challenge the decree of eviction as the rights of Shyam Lal under whom they held had been extinguished. The view of the lower appellate court is that on the determination of the lease in favour of Shyam Lal who is the heir of original lessee Saiga the rights of sub-lessees automatically came to an end. 11. Aggrieved by the order of the lower appellate court the present second appeal has been filed. 12. The first submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the lower appellate court committed an error of law when it held that the rights of the sub-tenant extinguished on the execution by Shyam Lal of the document of sale or surrender. 12. The first submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the lower appellate court committed an error of law when it held that the rights of the sub-tenant extinguished on the execution by Shyam Lal of the document of sale or surrender. His argument is that the rights of the under lessees or sub-tenants cannot be pre-judicially affected on the express or implied surrender by the lessee in favour of the lessor. In this connection the learned counsel for the appellant has referred to two decisions, the first being the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case reported in M. S. Ram Singh v. Bijoy Singh ( AIR 1972 Cal 190 )(B). In that case the lessee has created a sub-lease. Thereafter there was a surrender by the lessee of his rights under the lease deed. One of the questions for consideration before the court was as to the effect of the surrender by the lessee in favour of lessor on the rights and possession of the under-lessees. 13. In paras 9, 10, 11 and 12 the learned Judges observed as follows: - "9. Surrender under the statute, is the yielding up by the lessee of his interest to the lessor. In Woodfall's 'Landlord and Tenant Twenty Seventh Edition Vol. 13. In paras 9, 10, 11 and 12 the learned Judges observed as follows: - "9. Surrender under the statute, is the yielding up by the lessee of his interest to the lessor. In Woodfall's 'Landlord and Tenant Twenty Seventh Edition Vol. I pages 860-1, while considering surrender by express terms it is observed in Art. 1854, "A surrender is the yielding up of an estate for life or years to him who has the immediate estate in reversion or remainder wherein the estate for life or years may merge by mutual agreement It differs from a release in this respect, that the release operates by the greater estate descending upon the less, whereas a surrender is the falling of a less estate into a greater." Further in Art. 1859, stating the requisites of a good surrender it is observed again, "That the surrenderee has a higher and greater estate in the thing surrendered than the surrenderor hath, so that the estate of the surrenderor may be drowned therein." The Privy Council in Ram Churan Singh, (1898) 25 Ind App 210 (PC)(H) .observed: "The right of relinquishment is privilege given to the tenants, by means of which they may restrict the lease and establish their tenure upon a new basis, or may extinguish the lease altogether." It will thus appear that the surrender in law is the yielding up by the lessee of his interest in the lease and it thereby brings an extinction to the lease, so that the relationship of the parties to the lease comes to end. There is thus no subsisting interest of the lessee after its extinguishment by surrender, which may devolve or come on the lessor. If it were a question of devolution of interest of the lessee unto the lessor, the legal under-lessee will automatically be the lessee immediately under the lessor. This is however not so, and as otherwise the interest of the under-lessee will determine with the determination of the original lease, the under-lessee is given statutory protection of his interest under his new landlord, the lessor, on the same terms and conditions of his original tenancy. This is however not so, and as otherwise the interest of the under-lessee will determine with the determination of the original lease, the under-lessee is given statutory protection of his interest under his new landlord, the lessor, on the same terms and conditions of his original tenancy. It is obvious therefore the under-lessee becomes a lessee directly under the lessor with all incidents of his sub-lease and such relationship comes into existence under the operation of the statute, or surrender of the head lease and not by devolution or assignment by the lessee of his interest in the lessor. 10. It will be of interest to note that the reversion to which the lessor becomes entitled by surrender in respect of the under lease upgraded to the direct lease under him, is not the reversion on the underlease to which the lessee was entitled before surrender. As was observed in Hill and Redmans "Law of Landlord and Tenant" (15th Edition) Article 386 page 508. "Surrender of the term does not destroy the right of the underlessees. As regards them, and as regards third parties generally, the surrender operates only as a grant subject to their rights and the term is treated as continuing so far as is required for preservation of such rights. This principle makes it necessary to provide for the substitution of a new reversion for the leasehold reversion has been surrendered and also, in the case of a surrender and renewal for the validity of the renewed lease as against the under lessees. Under the Law of Property Act, 1925 (S. 139), the estate of the head lessor is deemed to be the reversion on the under-lease to the extent and for the purpose of preserving such incidents to and obligations on the surrendered leasehold reversion as, but for the surrender thereof, would have subsisted." Under Section 115 of Transfer of Property Act, a substituted reversion on the under-lease in place of its reversion to the lease has been provided in favour of the lessor as the lessor has been made entitled to the rent and benefits of contracts binding on the underlessee, on surrender of the lease by the lessee. It is a reversion created by statute and not the reversion to the lease which became extinct on surrender. 11. It is a reversion created by statute and not the reversion to the lease which became extinct on surrender. 11. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that no interest of the original plaintiff-lessee devolved on the lessor, and it was accordingly not competent for the lessor to continue the pending ejectment suit instituted by the lessee against the underlessee. There can be no dispute that the lessor, on surrender, has become by operation of law the lessor of the under-lessee now upgraded as lessee with the same terms and conditions as the original lease and such right carries with it the right to institute suit of eviction by the lessor against such underlessee. The lessor can carve out his interest as lessor of this lease in favour of someone as was done in favour of the substituted plaintiff, who, in turn, will be entitled to sue in ejectment on determination of this lease in a regular manner. Such interest again will be an independent and separate interest altogether created in favour of the intermediate lessee. That however does not mean that the lessees interest devolved on the lessor and through him to the substituted plaintiff so as to enable her to continue the ejectment suit. As we have seen by the surrender the interest of the lessee became extinct and there was thus no interest in existence which could devolve on the lessor and through him to the substituted plaintiff. The suit accordingly is not maintainable by the substituted plaintiff. 12. Mr. Ghosh contended that the surrender was accepted and acted upon and the defendant as underlessee had no concern or right to challenge such surrender. On such surrender, accepted and acted upon the lessor, the Trustee, became entitled to the interest of the lessee and by the subsequent lease in favour of the substituted plaintiff, there was a creation of intermediary interest in her favour, so that she was entitled to be brought on record and entitled to proceed with the suit. This contention found favour with the first appellate court while decreeing the suit. As already seen the position in law is that by surrender the interest of the lessee is completely obliterated, so that no interest of the lessee subsists after surrender. This contention found favour with the first appellate court while decreeing the suit. As already seen the position in law is that by surrender the interest of the lessee is completely obliterated, so that no interest of the lessee subsists after surrender. The said lessor on surrender by operation of law becomes the immediate landlord of the defendant and by the new lease, the substituted plaintiff in turn becomes such landlord in respect of the tenancy, which needs be determined before the suit for eviction could be instituted by the intermediary lessee. It has been observed in Foas "General Law of Landlord and Tenant" (8th Edition) Art. 1001 (page 639) as follows: - "Art. 1001. Position of underlessee - Underlessees not being parties or privies to the lease, their rights are not disturbed by the surrender of the lessee's interest. Hence, where the lessee underlets a portion of the demised premises and afterwards surrenders his lease to the lessor, the latter cannot dispossess the underlessee without determining his interest in a regular manner........ There is accordingly nothing contradictory in the finding of the trial court that though the substituted plaintiff had become the landlord of the defendant, she is not entitled to proceed with the suit as the interest of the original plaintiff was destroyed by surrender and no interest devolved on the lessor and through him, to the substituted plaintiff." 14. The legal position as explained in the above-mentioned Calcutta case is obvious and there is no difficulty in accepting the proposition laid down by the Calcutta High Court. 15. However in the instant case, the position is that lease in favour of Shyam Lal had been determined by a notice served on Shyam Lal by plaintiff. S. III T. P. Act provides for determination of the lease and one of the modes is provided in Cl. (h) thereof. It provides that the lease of immovable property is determined on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease duly given by one party to the other. On the date of sale or surrender by Shyam Lal in favour of plaintiff on 6-11-1962 his lessee rights stood determined as a notice to determine the lease had been served on him and there was a decree for eviction passed against him by the trial court though there was an appeal against that pending in the lower appellate court. On the date of sale or surrender by Shyam Lal in favour of plaintiff on 6-11-1962 his lessee rights stood determined as a notice to determine the lease had been served on him and there was a decree for eviction passed against him by the trial court though there was an appeal against that pending in the lower appellate court. The Calcutta High Court has explained that the lessee in surrendering cannot act in derogation of the right of under lessee. It is for this that it has been held that when there is a surrender express or implied by the lessee the underlessee comes into direct relation with the lessor. When the lessor serves a notice to quit under Section 106 of the T. P. Act and the lease determines by operation of law there is no act done by the lessee which can be said to be a voluntary act by the lessee in derogation of the rights of the sub-lessees or the under-lessees. In this view of matter the two decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants do not help appellants. 16. In the alternative the counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant urged that under the provisions of law of Section 108 of T. P. Act the lessee was entitled to create a sub-lease in favour of defendant. His submission is that the sub-lease being valid it did not determine on the service of the notice to quit on or on the sale or surrender by Shyam Lal. In this connection he relied upon the decision of a Full Bench of this Court reported in Manzoor Husain v. Mir Khan (1974 All LJ 274)(A). What had happened in that case was that the owners of an urban house property had mortgaged the property. The mortgagee had let out the property on rent. Thereafter the mortgage was redeemed and after redemption the mortgagor sued the sub-tenant for ejectment. It was held that under the provisions of Section 76 (a) of the T. P. Act the mortgagees could in the exercise of prudent management of the mortgaged property re-let it out. It was further held that the provisions of Section 76 (a) of the aforesaid Act apply not only to agricultural but also to urban landed property. 17. The court observed as follows in paras 13, 14 and 15. 13. It was further held that the provisions of Section 76 (a) of the aforesaid Act apply not only to agricultural but also to urban landed property. 17. The court observed as follows in paras 13, 14 and 15. 13. "The Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision given in Hari Har Prasad and Mahabir Gopes cases (F) and (G) and held: "It must be remembered that those observations were made by reference to the normal relationship between the mortgagor and the mortgagee and their respective rights and obligations as determined by relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Having made these observations, however, this Court has taken the precaution to point out that even in regard to tenants inducted into the land by a mortgagee cases may arise where the said tenants may acquire rights of special character by virtue of the statutory provisions which may, in the meanwhile, come into operation. A permissible settlement by a mortgagee in possession with a tenant in the course of prudent management and the springing up of rights in the tenant confer-led or created by statute based on the nature of the land and possession for the requisite period, it was observed, was a different matter altogether. Such a case is clearly an exception to the general rule prescribed by the T. P. Act. It will thus be seen that while dealing with the normal position under the T. P. Act, this Court specifically pointed out that the rights of the tenants inducted by the mortgagee may conceivably be improved by virtue of statutory provisions which may meanwhile come into operation. That is precisely what has happened in the present case. During the continuance of the mortgage Section 15 of the Act came into operation and that made the respondents Ghatedars who are entitled to claim the benefit of Section 161 of the Act." 14. In that case the Supreme Court accepted the finding of the High Court that the act of letting by the mortgagee in possession was a prudent act and having found so, held that the respondents of that appeal were not liable to eviction. The Supreme Court had occasion to deal with similar controversy again in All India Film Corporation Ltd. case(C). The Supreme Court had occasion to deal with similar controversy again in All India Film Corporation Ltd. case(C). Hidayatullah, C. J. referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court given in Mahabir Gopes case (G) and Asha Ram's case (E) and stated the law in these words: "A general proposition of law is that no person can confer on another a better title than he himself has. A mortgage is a transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing repayment of a loan. A mortgagees interest lasts only as long as mortgage has not been paid off. Therefore, on redemption of the mortgage the title of the mortgagee comes to an end. A derivative title from him must ordinarily come to an end with the terminating of the mortgagees title. The mortgagee by creating a tenancy becomes the lessor of the property but his interest as lessor is conterminous with his mortgagee's interest. S. III (c) of the T. P. Act provides that a lease of immovable properly determines where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on, or his power to dispose of the same, extends only to the happening of any event - by the happening of such event. The duration of the mortgagee's interest determines his position as the lessor. The relationship of lessor and lessee cannot subsist beyond the mortgagees interest unless the relationship is agreed to by the mortgagor and, or a fresh relationship is recreated. This the mortgagor or the person succeeding to the mortgagors interest may elect to do. But if he does not, the lessee cannot claim any rights beyond the terms of his original lessors interest. These propositions are well understood and find support in the rulings of this court in Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain Singh (G) and Asha Ram v. Mst. Ram Kali (E). 15. To the above propositions there is, however, one exception that flows from Section 76 (a) which lays down the liabilities of a mortgagee in possession. It is provided there that when during the continuance of the mortgage the mortgagee takes possession of the mortgaged property, he must manage the property as a person of ordinary prudence would manage if it were his own. It is provided there that when during the continuance of the mortgage the mortgagee takes possession of the mortgaged property, he must manage the property as a person of ordinary prudence would manage if it were his own. From this it is inferred that action done bona fide and prudently in the ordinary course of management, may bind even after the termination of the title of mortgagee in possession. This principle applies ordinarily to the management of agricultural lands and has seldom been extended to urban property so as to tie it up in the hands of the lessees or to confer on them the rights under the special statutes. To this again there is an exception. The lease will continue to bind the mortgagor or persons deriving interest from him if the mortgagor had concurred to grant it." These observations of the Supreme Court in the above case lay down the same law as in the Division Bench of this Court in Habib Seths case (D). We are unable to find anything in this decision which may be said to be contrary to the law laid down by our High Court in Habib Seth's case (D). The Supreme Court has again accepted the exception to the general rule which flows from Section 76 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is a different thing that the Supreme Court did not find that the lessee, admitted by the mortgagee was entitled to derive the benefit of Section 76 (a) T. P. Act as in its opinion that letting was not a prudent act." 18. The above-quoted observations can be of no assistance in deciding the dispute in the present case. Section 76-A of the T. P. Act is to be found is Chap. 4 of that Act which deals with mortgages of immovable property and charges. The decision referred to by the learned counsel is a decision relating to the law of mortgages. It is not possible to extend the decision which interprets the provisions of Section 76-A to cases of lease. Chap. 5 of the T. P. Act deals with leases of immovable property. No provision parallel to Section 76-A is to be found in Chap. IV of the T. P. Act. Thus, a decision which relates to interpretation of that provision, can be of no assistance in deciding the present dispute. 19. Chap. 5 of the T. P. Act deals with leases of immovable property. No provision parallel to Section 76-A is to be found in Chap. IV of the T. P. Act. Thus, a decision which relates to interpretation of that provision, can be of no assistance in deciding the present dispute. 19. Sri Radha Krishan appearing on behalf of the respondents has urged that in case the appellants cannot get the benefits of Section 76-A of the T. P. Act as the qabuliat or the rent note contained conditions restricting mortgage (sic). Sri K. M. Sinha on the other hand submitted that there was no express prohibition against sub-letting and the words in Hindi which have been quoted above only restrain acts of sale, mortgage, creation of charges and transactions of a like nature. He has pointed out that there is no express prohibition on sub-letting, which is permissible in view of the provisions of Section 108 (j) of the T.P. Act. It was further pointed out that till the institution of the suit the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest had never objected to the sub-letting in favour of the appellants. The argument of Sri K. M. Sinha that there being no express provision against sub-letting the lessee had a right to sublet, must be accepted. The words in the restrictive clause cannot be extended by implication to cover those acts which were permissible under the T. P. Act. The T. P. Act entitled the lessee to sublet, and if he did so, the act of sub-letting cannot be held to be illegal and beyond the scope of his authority. 20. It was next urged that the sublessee appellants having made constructions, the lease in their favour became irrevocable. This argument also cannot be accepted because when Saiga took the lease it was expressly provided that he could make constructions, but the owners could at any time ask Saiga to vacate on payment of the cost of the constructions made. As Saiga was himself bound to vacate the premises on the demand of the owners, his sub-lessees were equally bound. 21. As noticed earlier Shyam Lal by a deed of sale or surrender purported to transfer all the constructions made on the land in suit to the plaintiff on payment of Rs. 2,700. As Saiga was himself bound to vacate the premises on the demand of the owners, his sub-lessees were equally bound. 21. As noticed earlier Shyam Lal by a deed of sale or surrender purported to transfer all the constructions made on the land in suit to the plaintiff on payment of Rs. 2,700. The averments made by Shyam Lal in the document executed by him cannot obviously bind the sub-lessee appellants. It is admitted that they made the constructions. They would thus obviously be entitled to receive the price of the constructions from the plaintiff. 22. In the result, the appeal succeeds in part. The decree of the lower appellate court is modified to the extent that the defendants shall be evicted from the property in suit on the payment by the plaintiff to the defendant appellants of a sum of Rs. 2,700 (to which figure learned counsel for both the parties have agreed). This amount will be deposited by the plaintiffs in the execution court to be paid over to the defendant appellants. The defendant appellants can withdraw the same. 23. The decree for eviction may be put into execution after three months from the date of the deposit in the executing court. In view of their divided success, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.