JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is defendant's revision filed against a judgment of the Second Additional District Judge, Mathura dated 8-1-1976 rejecting a revision filed by the applicant filed under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 2. Suit No. 553 of 1971 was filed by Ashok Kumar the plaintiff-opposite party for ejectment of the defendant-applicant on the ground that the City Board, Mathura, the defendant was his tenant at the rate of Rs. 1/- per month and as the defendant had not paid the rent his tenancy was terminated by notice dated 7-6-1971. The City Board Mathura filed a written statement and claimed that it was a tenant of the premises in question. In the alternative the City Board also claimed that if the claim of the permanent lease settled in favour of the defendant is not accepted the defendant was a licensee having been granted irrevocable licence and as the suit was for arrears of rent and ejectment, the same was liable to be dismissed. 3. After the enforcement of U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972, the aforesaid suit was transferred to the Small Cause Court side. On 21st January, 1974 issues were framed. Thereafter, the hearing of the suit was adjourned. On 21st February, 1974, an application was filed by the plaintiff for striking off the defence on the ground that as the defendant had not complied with the provisions of Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. the defence was liable to be struck off. 4. Under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C., a lessee is liable to deposit the entire arrears of rent for the period due before the coming into force of U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972 on the first hearing. The further requirement is that he should deposit the rent month by month as and when it accrues. On 9-8-1975, the defendant made a representation for the condonation of delay in making the deposit as was required by Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. on the ground that since the defendant had been advised that the aforesaid provision did not apply to the facts and in the circumstances of the case the deposit had not been made within the time allowed. The application was also accompanied with a challan of Rs. 60/-. The application was also accompanied with a challan of Rs. 60/-. On 11-8-75 Judge Small Causes rejected the representation made by the City Board and struck off the defence on the ground that the representation made did not make out a sufficient cause for condoning the delay and for extending the time for making the deposit. The Judge Small Causes also held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to a representation filed under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. Against the said order, the defendant also went in revision. The revision was also rejected. Hence this second revision. 5. Under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C., the defence of a lessee is liable to be struck off. If, therefore, a defendant claims that he is not a lessee, the question that arises for decision is whether defence of such a person is also liable to be struck off inasmuch as the written statement of a lessee alone can be struck off under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. A court would be competent to strike out the defence, if it finds that the plea of a defendant that he had not been a tenant is false. If no adjudication is made on the plea of the defendant that he is not a tenant, the written statement will not be liable to be struck out. It, therefore, appears to me that the plea of a defendant that he was not a tenant should be decided before striking off the defence. In this case this question does not arise inasmuch as although the defendant had pleaded in the alternative that he was a licensee but its main defence was that it was a permanent lessee. That being so, the written statement of the defendant could be struck out. It may, however, be pointed out that the Judge Small Causes committed an error in not maintaining a distinction between a lessee and a licensee. It held that even if the defendant-applicant was a licensee, its written statement was liable to be struck off. There is a clear distinction between a lessee and a licensee. A lease of immovable property is a transfer of right to enjoy such property made for a certain payment express or implied or in perpetuity in consideration of a price paid or promised. There is a clear distinction between a lessee and a licensee. A lease of immovable property is a transfer of right to enjoy such property made for a certain payment express or implied or in perpetuity in consideration of a price paid or promised. A licence does no more than to grant a personal privilege to do something upon the land without conferring any estate in him. Therefore, if the case of the defendant would have been that he was a licensee and was not a lessee, the court below would not have been justified in striking out the defence. It has already been observed above that since the main case of the defendant-applicant was that he was a permanent lessee, this question may not be dilated upon further. 6. Reverting to the point urged by the learned counsel for the applicant, it would be seen that a representation had been made by the defendant City Board on the 9th August, 1975. In the representation the defendant explained the delay and gave the cause for having not made the deposit within time stating that the deposit had not been made because of the wrong advice given to it. The Judge, Small Causes did not believe the case of the Municipal Board as the application had not been supported by any affidavit of any official or officer. In the circumstances it appears that the Judge Small causes was not right in rejecting the representation on this ground. It has come in the judgment itself that the counsel appearing for the defendant-applicant had stated that the deposit had not been made because of the wrong advice given by him. If that was so, the court below should not have insisted upon the affidavit and it should have accepted the statement of the counsel. It is settled that no client should suffer on account of the mistake of a lawyer. Hence the court below should have accepted the representation and also the deposit which had been made on that date. 7. In Sardar Vichitra Singh v. Sardar Jagdish Singh and others 1977 (U.P.) R.C.C. 437. a similar controversy came up for decision before this Court. In that case also the deposit had not been made under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. within the time fixed by the said provision. 7. In Sardar Vichitra Singh v. Sardar Jagdish Singh and others 1977 (U.P.) R.C.C. 437. a similar controversy came up for decision before this Court. In that case also the deposit had not been made under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C. within the time fixed by the said provision. The defendant filed a representation and expressed his helplessness on the ground of a wrong legal advice. The Judge, Small Causes had not accepted the ground on the basis that it had no power to accept the same. The defendant took the matter in revision. The Revising Authority held that the Explanation for non-deposit was reasonable and the trial court should have accepted the same. Against this matter the plaintiff filed a second revision in this Court. The revision was dismissed. This court observed that on the facts and in the circumstances, the Judge Small Causes committed an error in holding that the explanation offered by the defendant could not be accepted. Accepting the law laid down in the aforesaid case, I find that the Judge, Small Causes should have accepted the revision of the defendant. 8. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The orders of the Second Additional District Judge, Mathura dated January 8, 1975 and that of the Additional Munsif Mathura dated 11-8-1975 are set aside. The Judge Small Causes is directed to proceed with the suit in accordance with law. As the suit was filed in 1971, the Court concerned is directed to decide the suit expeditiously. There shall be no order as to costs.