Judgment :- 1. Dissatisfied with the compensation paid on 27 41964 under S.10(d) of the Telegraph Act, 1885 read with S.51 of Electricity Act, 1910 the respondent on 1101969 made, an application before the lower court to determine that dispute under S.16(3) of the first mentioned statute. The revision petitioner, the Kerala State Electricity Board, contended that the application is barred by limitation under Art.137 in the Schedule to the Limitation Act. 1963 besides opposing the claim for enhancement. The lower court decided the question of limitation preliminarily on 3-1-1973 against the Board. Thereafter, on 8-8-1973 the lower court held that the respondent is entitled to Rs. 8,590/- more as compensation. The Board impugned both the findings in C.R.P. 109 of 1974. Without expressing any view on the merits on the question of limitation for the reason that the case has to be remanded on the other, this Court remitted back the case to the lower court. After remand the Board again raised both the points before the lower court. The lower court held that the Board is concluded by the order of 3-1-1973 on the first question, and again awarded Rs. 8,590/- as additional compensation. Hence this revision by the Board challenging both the findings, that is, on the question of limitation and as regards the quantum of compensation. 2. The contention that found favour with the lower court so far as the question of limitation is concerned is that the preliminary finding was not taken up in revision before the case was decided on 8-8-1973, and therefore that finding concludes the Board. 3. A party to a proceeding before a subordinate Court is not obliged to question every order passed therein before a superior court as and when the same is passed. He can, so far as very many orders are concerned, wait till the proceeding terminates and final decision is rendered therein, and when, on being aggrieved by the final decision, he challenges it before the superior court, also can canvass the correctness of any order passed by the subordinate Court, if the same has affected the final decision. He can, so far as very many orders are concerned, wait till the proceeding terminates and final decision is rendered therein, and when, on being aggrieved by the final decision, he challenges it before the superior court, also can canvass the correctness of any order passed by the subordinate Court, if the same has affected the final decision. Such are orders which constitute only a step towards the final decision or the final order and do not have the force of a decree: This is so, whether an appeal lies from such orders or not, provided if it is an appealable order, no appeal had been preferred therefrom. An order of remand from which an appeal lies is an exception to this rule. See Maharajah Moheshur Singh v. Bengal Government (1865) 7 Moo.Ind. App.283) and Satyadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Debi (AIR. 1960 SC. 941). These principles find expression in S.105 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 so far as appellate jurisdiction of the superior court is concerned, and in my view, these wholesome general principles would with much more force govern revisional jurisdiction of the superior court in relation to non-appealable final decisions of the subordinate courts. 4. A preliminary finding on an issue which turns out to be insufficient for final disposal of the proceeding is as much a necessary step towards its final disposal as when the same is sufficient for final disposal, for while in the latter case the proceeding is disposed of solely in accordance with the preliminary finding, in the former, the other issues are tried and decided because the final decision cannot be rested on the preliminary finding. The decision in Pichu Ayyangar v. Ramanuja (AIR. 1940 Mad. 756) supports the view that a preliminary finding entered can be challenged before the superior court in an appeal against the final order or decree. In that case the trial court over-ruled the defendant's preliminary objection that the court had no power to frame a scheme for which the suit had been instituted. The High Court in revision upheld this objection, and also dismissed the suit itself. In that case the trial court over-ruled the defendant's preliminary objection that the court had no power to frame a scheme for which the suit had been instituted. The High Court in revision upheld this objection, and also dismissed the suit itself. Leach C.J. on behalf of the Division Bench held that the order in revision was only an interlocutory order falling under S.105 (1) of the Code, and the correctness of the same can be challenged in appeal against the decree passed by the trial court since that order affected the decision of the lower court dismissing the suit. In Radha Krishna v. Natmal Bubna (AIR. 1963 Raj.193) the question arose whether a preliminary order holding that proceedings under S.33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is not barred by limitation can be impugned in an appeal against the final decision filed under S.39 of that Act, and it was held that it can be. This decision further said that as laid down in I. Swarupnarain v. Gopi Nath (AIR. 1953 Raj. 137) (F.B.) S.I15 of the Code would not be attracted to such an order since the same can be challenged in an appeal preferred from the final decision wherefore it cannot be said to be a case decided 'in which no appeal lies thereto'. 5. In view of what is stated above, there is no merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the respondent that the order of 3-1-1973 entering a finding on the preliminary question of limitation, has become final because that order was not sought to be revised as and when it was passed, and that the revision petitioner-Board is precluded from canvassing its correctness before this Court in a revision petition against the final decision of the case. 6. It is however necessary to caution, that such orders and such findings, are final so far as the subordinate Court is concerned, and parties to a proceeding are precluded from agitating a question once decided over again in that court, unless a competent superior court sets aside the said decision and directs the lower court to consider the question afresh. The point for consideration is therefore whether this Court has set aside the preliminary finding in the earlier revision, C.R.P. 109 of 1974. The point for consideration is therefore whether this Court has set aside the preliminary finding in the earlier revision, C.R.P. 109 of 1974. Adverting to the question of limitation, my learned brother Namboodiripad J. who heard that revision petition said: 'I am not deciding that contention on merits because the matter has to go back on another ground'. This Court declined to go into that question on merits but however remanded the case for fresh disposal. One thing is certain, and that is this Court did not confirm the preliminary finding. One of two things can be said to be the consequence of this Court's order in CRP. No. 109 of 1974, namely, either this Court set aside both the findings, thereby enabling the parties to re-agitate both the questions before the lower court, or in the alternative, this Court directed the lower court to examine afresh the question of enhancement of compensation on the assumption (without deciding) that there is no limitation, thereby implicitly reserving freedom to the Board to agitate that question before this Court, if and when, it becomes necessary, depending upon the final decision after remand. I do not think it necessary to decide as to which of the two consequences arises in this case, in so far as, assuming that the remand order did not enable the parties to re-agitate the question of limitation before the lower court, in the view expressed above, this Court can in this CRP. examine that question, and I propose to follow that course. 7. It is not disputed before me that Art.137 in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 governs the case, and fairly so, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T. P. K. (1976 KLT. 810). If so the application is barred by limitation. I hold so. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent requests that his client may be given an opportunity to seek condonation of delay by filing an application under S 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 It is submitted that till the decision of the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P.K. (1976 KLT. 810), the view expressed by this Court was, as seen from Kerala State Electricity Board v. Parvathi Amma (1973 KLT. 1004), Art.137 does not govern applications of this nature. 810), the view expressed by this Court was, as seen from Kerala State Electricity Board v. Parvathi Amma (1973 KLT. 1004), Art.137 does not govern applications of this nature. It appears to me that it would be just and fair to afford an opportunity to the respondent to seek condonation of delay. 9. I set aside the order under revision including the findings therein both on the question of limitation and the question of quantum of compensation, and remand the case for fresh disposal by the lower court after disposing of application, if any, filed by the respondent under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 within the time to be fixed by that court after receipt of records by that court, or such, further time as it grants in that behalf, and dependant upon the decision thereon, or, if no such application is filed within such time or such further time as it grants in that behalf, in the light of the finding entered hereinbefore that the application is barred by limitation. This Civil Revision Petition is allowed to the above extent. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed.