Judgment S. K. Jha, M. P. Verma, JJ. 1. In this applicatipn under Articles 216 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the issuance of an appropriate writ/direction quashing the order dated 7.12.1978 as incorporated in annexure 3 The impugned order has been passed by respondent No 1, the deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi, under the purported exercise of power under section 36 of the Payment of Bonus act.1965. The further prayer made in the petition is for the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to dispose of the petitioners application under section 36 of the Act in accordance with law. 2. The facts are not in controversy, no counter-affidavit having been filed in this case to the petitioners writ application. The petitioner is an "existing company" within the meaning of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, having been incorporated in the year 1921. It is engaged in extraction of limestone at its quarry at Baulia in the district of Rohtas and in the production of cement in its factory at Japla, within the district of Palamau. The registered office of the petitioner company is at Japla. 3. According to the petitioners case, its financial position is precarious and on account of several other relevant circumstances brought about by factors beyond its control, viz. , old dilapidated machinery, low retention price, high rate of coal and power consumption excessive labour force, high cost of maintenance, repairs replacement of machineries, manual working of the quarry high ratio of over burden in the quarry, leading to the petitioner running into continuous losses since 1968 till 1977. During this period, the accumulated cash loss of the petitioner being company has run to the tune of Rs.4,01,10,720/-. This is quite a number of times larger to the paid up value of the company. In such a situation, the petitioner filed a petition under section 36 of the Payment of bonus Act, 1965, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for exemption from payment of the statutory bonus for the year 1976. Although in the petition, in paragraph two, the petitioner has averred that the application for exemption under section 36 was made for the years from 1976 to 1980. Although in the petition, in paragraph two, the petitioner has averred that the application for exemption under section 36 was made for the years from 1976 to 1980. Shri S. B. Sanyal, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted in course of his argument that the impugned order relates to the year 1976 only. that, however, is of little consequence in so far as the point involved in this case is concerned. 4. The quarry in question is the captive mine of the factory. This is about 56 years old, giving employment to nearly 3500 labourers with obsolate and out dated machineries. Its cost of production per tonne of cement is about rs.227.39 but the retention price per tonne fixed by the Government of India at the relevant time was only Rs.159.16 The petitioner alleges, as it had alleged before the appropriate Government under section 36 of the Act, that it had sustained and is still sustaining heavy cash losses right from the year 1968. It has further been averred in the petition that the Tariff Commission in their report dated 1.8 1974 after having fully gone into the peculiar problems and conditions of the petitioner companys unit, had found the cost of production per tonne of naked cement for the year 1971-72 as the highest amongst the units selected for costing and stood at Rs.134.13 per tonne as against the industrys weight average of Rs.197.42 only. Some more details of the financial aspects of the company have been given in the petition but we content ourselves to the facts hereinbefore recited only. 5. In course of argument, the learned senior standing counsel for the union of India (respondent No.4) also representing the Deputy Secretary (respondent No.1) took us to the concept of "allocable surplus" within the meaning of the Act as it stands amended by the Central Act 23 of 1976. On the contrary, learned counsel for the petitioner addressed us at length with regard to the distinction in the Act between" allocable surplus" and "available surplus. " these are matters which need not detain us for the disposal of the case, for, the point involved is a short one the only question to be determined is as to whether the impugned order as contained in Annexure 3 fulfils the requirements of a quasi-judicial order to be passed under section 36 of the Act. 6. " these are matters which need not detain us for the disposal of the case, for, the point involved is a short one the only question to be determined is as to whether the impugned order as contained in Annexure 3 fulfils the requirements of a quasi-judicial order to be passed under section 36 of the Act. 6. Learned counsel for the parties took us repeatedly to the contents of the impugned order. This is a short order and the relevant portion of it reads thus : "i am directed to say that Government have carefully considered the request made in your letter No.2164, dated 30th August, 1977, to the Ministry of Labour. The financial position of the company, as stated in your letter and as evidenced from the Balance Sheet of the company for 1976, received with the letter, has been taken into account, Government have also taken note of the position regarding bonus liability of the company in the two preceding years as a result of amendments of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, by the Payment of Bonus (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975. Having regard to the financial position of the company and other relevant circumstances, government are of the opinion that no public interest will be served by granting exemption to the company from paying minimum bonus to the entitled employees, for the accounting year 1976. " 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order was not a speaking order which is the least that is required of any quasi judicial order to be passed. Learned senior standing counsel for the Union of India submitted that the scope of section 36 should bo treated as having been whittled down and narrowed by the Central Act 23 of 1976, by which the Parent Act was amended, in so far as the concept of minimum statutory bonus was inserted and the concept of "allocable surplus" underwent a change by such amendment. Learned standing counsel, therefore, argued that ihe speaking nature of the order should not be tested in a manner in which ordinary orders of quasi-judicial tribunals are tested, for this court should take into account the effect of the provisions inserted in the change brought about by Act 23 of 1976 which, we may at once point out here, is merely the continuance act of the Ordinance of 1975 referred to in the portion of the impugned order extracted above. Learned standing counsel could not go to the extent of suggesting that the applicability of section 36 of the Act, which has undergone no change by the Amending Act, should be ruled out completely in case of payment of minimum statutory bonus. He, however, sought to induce us to hold that the standard of test required to sustain an order, although non speaking, purported to have been passed under section 36 ought to be now strictly applied to cases like the instant one. We, however, see no justification for such an order. As we have already noticed above, section 36 of the Act, as it stood in the year 1965, stands in the same terms even today. It is not challenged that an order to be passed under section 36 by the Central Government, Government of India in the Ministry of Labour in this case, is a quasi judicial order. Once that is accepted, it is trite law to say that the principles of natural justice have to be observed and it is now too late in the day to suggest that the principle of natural justice means only the compliance with the principle of audi alterant partem. As has been observed by the supreme Court in the case of The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of india Ltd. V/s. The Union of India, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1785), the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must involve every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its propar spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. Numerous decisions have by now laid it down that by section 36 of the Act the appropriate Government is invested with power to exempt an establishment or a class of establishments from the operation of the Act, provided ths Government is of the opinion that having regard to the financial position and other relevant circumstances of the establishment, it would not be in the public interest to apply all or any of ths provisions of the Act. The condition for exercise of that power is that the Government holds the opinion that it is not in the public interest to apply all or any of the provisions of the Act. And that opinion is founded upon consideration of the financial position and other relevant circumstances mentioned in the section itself. Parliament has clearly laid down the principles and has given adequate guidance to the appropriate Government in implementing the provisions of section 36 of the Act. Such an obssrvation was made by the supreme Court in the case of M/. s. Jalan Trading Co. , Private Ltd. V/s. Mill mazdoor Sabha, (AIR 1967 Supreme Court 691) where it was held that section 36 amounts to a conditional legislation and was not a piece of delegated legislation and as such was not void. Whether in a given case, power has been properly exercised would have to be considered when challenged before a court of law, especially before the High Court or the Supreme Court, by invoking its jurisdiction for the grant of a writ of certiorari. So also in the case of M/s. Travancore rayons Ltd. V/s. the Union of India (AIR 1971 Supreme Court 862) which was a case under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1914, where in the revisional power of the Central Government under section 36 of that Act was under consideration, it was held that whore the order of the Central Government rejecting a revision under section 36 merely stated that the Government had carefully considered the points made by the applicant and saw no reason to interfere with the order of the tribunal below, the order being laconic was held to be vitiated and was set aside by the Supreme Court. The rationable behind the principle that the quasi judicial orders must be speaking orders can hardly be ever emphasised. The rationable behind the principle that the quasi judicial orders must be speaking orders can hardly be ever emphasised. As Harry street has said in his work "justice in the Welfare State" (at page 67-68), it is not uncommon to find that the reasons actually given in many cases by the quasi udiciai authorities are perfunctory. In principle, therefore, in such cases the failure to give adequate and intelligible reasons, has led to resurgence of "speaking orders" doctrine in the case of quasi judicial orders by administrative bodies. When judicial power is exercised by an authority normally performing executive or administrative functions, the court insists upon disclosure of reasons in support of the order on two grounds one, that the party aggrieved in a proceeding before the High Court or the Supreme Court has the opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous ; the other, that the obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrant against the possible arbitrary action by the executive authority invested with judicial power. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of m/s. Travancore Rayons Ltd. (supra ). 8. Indeed, the learned senior standing counsel appearing for the concerned respondents accepted in principle, as he was bound to do in view of the numerous decisions both of the Supreme Court as well as this court, that the exercise of power by the appropriate Government under section 36 of the Act was in exercise of quasi judicial Act, Apart from the decision of the Supreme Court in M|s. Jalan trading Co. Pvt Ltd (supra), there is the decision of a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Srinathpur Tea Co. Ltd. V/s. State of West Bengal, (1971 Labour and Industries Cases 1011) and there are two Bench decisions of this Court in The Sone Valley Portland Cement Co. Ltd. V/s. The State of Bihar, (1977 Bihar Bar Council Journal 121) and The Sone Valley Portland Cement Co. Ltd V/s. The Government of India, 1979 Labour and Industries Cases (N. O. C.)26 February] the last two decisions being the cases of the present petitioner itself for different years. 9. Ltd. V/s. The State of Bihar, (1977 Bihar Bar Council Journal 121) and The Sone Valley Portland Cement Co. Ltd V/s. The Government of India, 1979 Labour and Industries Cases (N. O. C.)26 February] the last two decisions being the cases of the present petitioner itself for different years. 9. Having accepted In principle, as in all fairness the learned senior standing counsel did, that the law required the appropriate Government to make a speaking order we would hold that a test of a speaking order in the purported exercise of a quasi-judicial" at must be satisfied in spirit. The order must not be a mechanical one. It must give specific indications that a judicial and objective mind has been brought to bear upon the facts of a particular case. There is no scope for a speaking order either being laconic or nebulous. The impugned order in the present case, as it may have been noticed from the relevant portion extracted above is merely a mechanical order setting forth what the law requires to be taken into consideration as relevant facts The order amounts in effect, if we may say so, only to this that the government of India, in the Ministry of Labour, having considered (1) the final coal position of the petitioner, and (2) the other relevant circumstances, is of the opinion that "it will not be in public interest" to exempt the petitioner from any of the provisions of the Act. Such an order leads us no where and we are left completely in the dark as to what was the financial position of the company which had weighed with the Government, what was the liability that the government was contemplating in the matter of bonus for the preceding two years and what other relevant circumstances the Government considered for "rejecting the petitioners claim. If these be said to be valid reasons for the purpose of making the impugned order a speaking one, it will frustrate the very necessity of making a quasi-judicial order speaking one, for, the court will remain in dark and not in a position to test as to whether considerations of relevant for, and germane to, the matter have weighed with the appropriate Government or that the government in the guise of exercising the power under section 36 of the Act has merely passed an arbitrary order. So long as the court is left in this predicament where reasons cannot be tested with reference to relevant considerations or germane facts the second reason given by Shah, J. in the case of M/s. Travancore Rayons ltd (supra), viz, that the recording of reasons should operate as a deterrant to arbitrary action of the executive authorities, will stand, if not completely nullified, for all practical purposes stultified. 10. For the reasons aforesaid, as was held in the petitioners two earlier cases referred to above, we are constrained to hold that the impugned order contained in Annexure 3 is not a speaking or a reasonable order in accordance with law. We accordingly quash the impugned order by a writ of certiorari and we issue a rule of mandamus commanding respoadent No.4 the Union of India, and the Government of India through respondents Nos.1 to 3, to consider the matter afresh and pass an order keeping in view the observations made above. 11. The application is accordingly allowed, the impugned order is quashed and the matter is sent back to the Government of India, in the Ministry of labour, through the Deputy Secretary (respondent No.1) for passing appropriate orders in accordance with law and in accordance with the observation/directions contained above. There shall be no order for costs.