ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. 2. The facts, in brief, are these: The petitioner No. 1 was issued notice under Section 10 (2) and he filed objections. Objections were also filed by the petitioner No. 2 who is the mother of the petitioner No. 1. She claimed one-sixth share in the land measuring 14.85 acres. The Prescribed Authority decided the said objections. Thereafter an appeal was filed and the same was heard and decided by the Additional District Judge, Hamirpur. The appeal was dismissed. Now, the petitioner has come up in the instant petition and in support thereof I have heard Shri R. R. K. Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner. In opposition, the learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions. Learned counsel pressed three contentions before me. Firstly, it was contended that the land has been wrongly treated as single crop land. Secondly, it was contended that the petitioner No. 2 Smt. Bhawani Bai, who is the mother of the petitioner Jagdamba Prasad, had one-sixth share in the land and the same was wrongly included in the holding of the petitioner No. 1. Thirdly, it was contended that there had been reduction of area in the consolidation proceedings and the authorities below erred in not giving effect to the same. I shall deal with these contentions in seriatim. 3. So far as the first contention is concerned, it should be seen that the Explanation to Section 4 of the Act provides as follows: "Explanation. - For the purposes of clause (ii), the expression 'single crop land means any unirrigated land capable of producing only one crop in an agricultural year in consequence of assured irrigation from any State irrigation work or private irrigation work." 4. In Sheoram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Writ Petn. - For the purposes of clause (ii), the expression 'single crop land means any unirrigated land capable of producing only one crop in an agricultural year in consequence of assured irrigation from any State irrigation work or private irrigation work." 4. In Sheoram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Writ Petn. No. 3398 of 1976 decided on 16-2-1979) (All) it has now been laid down as under: "Since it is legitimate to raise a presumption that the statement prepared in C. L. H. Form 3 had been prepared in the manner prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the correctness of the entries in the statement has to be accepted unless shown otherwise In view of the presumption of correctness of the entries contained in the statement the burden of proof lies on the person who challenges the correctness of the particulars. At this stage the tenure-holder has to produce evidence in order to successfully challenge the correctness of the particulars contained in the statement." 5. It should be seen that in the instant petition no consideration of Section 4-A is involved and, therefore, the law laid down in Jaswant Singhs case (1978 All WC 577) is not attracted. 6. In the objections the petitioner No. 2 claimed that the canal which ran through his village was not an assured source of irrigation because it could not supply water in time and in most of the plots water could not be taken. However, in the statement the petitioner No. 1 did not say that the canal was not an assured source of irrigation and did not indicate why any particular plot could not be irrigated from the canal water. He merely made a vague denial that it was not correct that all the plots except Nos. 17, 63 and 65 were within the effective command area of the canal and that they grew one crop in the year. On the other hand, the Lekhpal in his statement affirmed that the statement in Form No. 3 was correct. No question was suggested to him in cross-examination that the canal was not the assured source of irrigation or its water could not be taken into particular plots. On the other hand, the Lekhpal in his statement affirmed that the statement in Form No. 3 was correct. No question was suggested to him in cross-examination that the canal was not the assured source of irrigation or its water could not be taken into particular plots. The appellate court observed: "A scrutiny of the oral evidence will show that the appellant has not alleged any natural obstacle from which it may be inferred that the aforesaid plots having an area of 8.48 acres cannot be irrigated by canal." It has seemed to me that a pure finding of fact has been returned on the basis of the material on the record and no interference can be made in the limited writ jurisdiction. The appellate court was not satisfied that the petitioner No. 1 had discharged the burden of proof which lay on him. 7. However, the learned counsel raised a question of law to the effect that the canal in question was not a scheduled canal and, therefore, it could not be an assured source of irrigation. It should be seen that in the objections it was only stated there that the canal was not an assured source of irrigation. Issue No. 5 which was framed by the Prescribed Authority also did not refer to the canal being scheduled or unscheduled. The issue was to the effect whether the canal was not an assured source of irrigation. In the grounds of appeal, a true copy whereof is Annexure 8, nothing was said about the canal much less that it was not a scheduled canal. From the judgment of the appellate court also it seems that no question was raised that the particular canal was an unscheduled one. Therefore, in my opinion, the very foundation for the argument which has been raised by the learned counsel is lacking in the proceedings. From the judgment of the appellate court also it seems that no question was raised that the particular canal was an unscheduled one. Therefore, in my opinion, the very foundation for the argument which has been raised by the learned counsel is lacking in the proceedings. Even apart from the said aspect, however, I cannot agree with the learned counsel that the expression "irrigation from any State irrigation works or private irrigation works" used in the Explanation to Section 4 is not capable of taking in any canal which according to the learned counsel will be covered by the U. P. Minor Irrigation Works Act, 1920 and not by the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, State irrigation work has been defined in Section 3 (15) as under: "State irrigation work means a canal as defined in the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, or a State Tube-well as defined in the United Provinces State Tube-wells Act, 1936, or lift irrigation work constructed, maintained or controlled by the State Government and operated by diesel or electric power for the supply of water from any perennial water source;" This definition makes the definition of 'canal' in the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 applicable to the ceiling law also. Now, in the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act 'canal' has been defined as under: "(1) "canal" includes (a) all canals, channels and reservoirs constructed, maintained or controlled by the State Government for the supply or storage of water; (b) all works, embankments, structures, supply and escape channels connected with such canals, channels or reservoirs; (c) all water-courses as defined in the second clause of this section; (d) any part of a river, stream, lake or natural collection of water or natural drainage channel, to which the State Government has applied the provisions of Part II of this Act." 8. Learned counsel drew attention to the Preamble of the Act which is as under: "Whereas throughout the territories to which this Act extends, the State Government is entitled to use and control for public purposes the water of all rivers and streams flowing in natural channels and of all lakes and other natural collected waters and whereas it is expedient to amend the law relating to irrigation, navigation and drainage in the said territory, it is hereby enacted as follows:" 9. Learned counsel contended that only the big canals taken out from big rivers were covered by the said Act and minor canals could not be covered by the said Act. In my opinion, there is no basis for the said submission. So far as the canal in dispute is concerned, nothing is known as to from which river or other source it was taken out. The definition in the said Act is absolutely wide. It has not been shown that the particular canal was not constructed or maintained or controlled by the State Government. Indeed this has not been the contention of the petitioner before me. In this situation, it is not clear to me as to why the wide definition of the expression 'canal' in the said Act will not take in the canal in dispute. The preamble in no way restricts or controls the wide definition of the expression 'canal' in Section 3 of the said Act. I have not found any inconsistency in the preamble and the said wide definition. Learned counsel referred to the definition of 'minor irrigation works in the U. P. Minor Irrigation Works Act, 1920, where the said expression has been defined as follows: "Section 2 (2). Minor irrigation work or works means an irrigation, submersion, drainage or protective work or system of such works, natural or artificial of which the construction or maintenance by the State Government appears to that Government to call for action on a smaller scale than that contemplated by the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873." 10. He also referred to the preamble of the Act where it is laid down as follows: "Whereas it is expedient to make provision for the construction, improvement and maintenance by Government of irrigation works on a smaller scale than that contemplated by the provisions of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873; and whereas the previous sanction of the Governor General has been obtained under subsection (2) of Section 79 of the Government of India Act, 1915; It is hereby enacted as follows:" In Section 3 it is laid down: "The State Government may direct the Collector or any other person to make enquiry whether it is desirable to undertake the construction or maintenance of a minor irrigation work of any description in any specified local area." Part II where Section 3 occurs, is headed 'Preparation of Scheme. Part III speaks of Construction and Maintenance. Part IV speaks of Recovery of Expenditure. Part V speaks of Penalties and Preventive Act. Part VI speaks of Jurisdiction and Procedure, Part VII relates to Miscellaneous Matters. It will thus be seen that the U. P. enactment was passed as a special measure to provide for the preparation of scheme and construction and maintenance of minor irrigation works. But there is nothing in the Act which may lead to the conclusion that any minor irrigation work will not come under the definition of 'canal under the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873. It should be seen that the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 is equally applicable to this State and a canal, though it may be a minor irrigation work under the U. P. Minor Irrigation Works Act, 1920, will, still, be covered by the definition of 'canal under Section 3 of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873. In this connection attention may be drawn to Sections 12 and 13 of the U. P. Act. Section 12 provides for the notification in the official Gazette of the draft scheme. Section 13 lays down as under: "13. Operation of a notified scheme as a notification under Section 5 of Act VIII of 1873. - The intimation in a scheme notified under sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the intention to apply or use the witter of any river or stream flowing in a natural channel, or of any lake or other natural collection of still water, for the purpose of the work to which the scheme relates, shall operate as a notification under Section 5 of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 declaring that the said water will be so applied or used on the expiration of three months from the date of the notification." It has, therefore, seemed to me that the learned counsel is not right in thinking that the canal which has been defined in the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 is some one different from the canal which is a minor irrigation work under the U. P. Act of 1820. Even in respect of such a canal, which is constructed as a minor irrigation work, the water of any river or stream flowing in a natural channel or of any lake or natural collection of still water can be utilised and for the said purpose under Section 12 of the U. P. Act a notification under Section 5 of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 may be issued. Learned counsel also referred to the U. P. State Tube-wells Act, 193G and in particular to its preamble and Section 6. In my opinion, they in no way support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Learned counsel also referred to the amendment which was effected by the U. P. Act No. 20 of 1975 whereby Section 4-A was inserted. He, however, himself admitted that no change was effected in the definition of 'State irrigation work. I emphasised above that in this petition we are not concerned with Section 4-A but we are concerned with the Explanation to Section 4. Learned counsel also referred to State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch & Co. ( AIR 1964 SC 1284 ) on the question of repugnancy and to N. Subramania Iyer v. Official Receiver ( AIR 1958 SC 1 ). In my view, these cases are in no way applicable because I have not found any repugnancy inasmuch as I have held that the definition of 'canal in the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 will also cover a canal which may be a minor irrigation work under the U. P. Act of 1920. 11. The first contention of the learned counsel is, therefore, rejected. 12. Learned counsel next contended that one-sixth share of the petitioner No. 2 was wrongly included in the holding of the petitioner No. 1. This question is a pure finding of fact. The appellate court has clearly observed. "In the first place I find that the appellant has not filed any document which may go to show that his holding situate in village Kulharia is Sir and Khudkast land which may be held as coparcenary property. Secondly, I find that prior to 1952, the date of vesting, Bhawani Bai did not claim partition from his sons, and thus get her share separated. Unless widow claims partition and gets her share separated from the coparcenary property she cannot acquire exclusive right in it." 13. Secondly, I find that prior to 1952, the date of vesting, Bhawani Bai did not claim partition from his sons, and thus get her share separated. Unless widow claims partition and gets her share separated from the coparcenary property she cannot acquire exclusive right in it." 13. It should be seen that in his own statement the petitioner No. 1 did not say anything on this controversy. The petitioner No. 2 did not examine herself in support of her contention that she had one-sixth share. It seems to me that in these circumstances no objection can he taken to the finding recorded by the authorities below. No interference can be made in the limited jurisdiction in writs which has to be distinguished from the appellate jurisdiction. 14. The third and the last contention raised is in respect of the reduction in the area during the consolidation proceedings. This point has not been noticed in the judgment of the appellate court. It is difficult to say whether it was raised or not. However, there is clear evidence on the record which shows that there was such reduction. Even the Lekhpal admitted in his statement that there had been such reduction. In view of the law laid down by the Division Bench in the reference in Satyapal Singh v. State (Writ Petn. No. 1590 of 1977) connected with Smt. Bhakashwat v. State (Writ Petn. No. 1481 of 1977), it is now settled that benefit of such reduction in area consequent on the difference in the value of land should be given to the tenure-holder. I accordingly direct that the benefit of such reduction should be given to the petitioner No. 1 and for the said purpose the case is remanded to the Prescribed Authority to recalculate the surplus land after giving the necessary benefit consequent on the reduction of the area in the consolidation proceedings. The order of the Prescribed Authority and the judgment of the appellate court shall accordingly stand quashed to the extent that the benefit of the reduction in the consolidation proceedings was not given to the petitioner No. 1 by the authorities concerned and the writ petition shall stand allowed to the said extent. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.