JUDGMENT Ramachandra Raju, J.- This petition filed under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, arises on the following material facts. The petitioner is the wife of the respondent. She filed M.C.No.5 of 1977 on the file of the Additional Judicial Magistrate of 1st Class, Anantapur, claiming maintenance under section 125, Criminal Procedure Code, and was awarded maintenance of Rs. 250 per month from 6th February,1978, the date of the order in the said M.C.No. 5 of 1977. The said order was confirmed by an order of this Court dated 28th September,1978 in C.R.C. No. 211 of 1978. Even before the petitioner filed M.C.No. 5 of 1977 the respondent divorced her on 12th September, 1976. The Meher amount of Rs. 500 was remitted by the respondent and because the maintenance payable for the period of Iddat was not paid to the petitioner, the petitioner was held entitled to maintenance even as a divorced Muslim wife. The respondent deposited the Meher amount and the maintenance amount due for the period of Iddat into Court and filed Crl. M.P.No. 300 of 1978 in M.C. No. 5 of 1977 under section 127 (3) (b) and sought for cancellation of the order of maintenance passed in M.C.No. 5 of 1977. The Magistrate, by his order dated 19th January, 1979, cancelled the order of maintenance earlier passed in M.C.No. 5 of 1977 in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner carried the matter in revision in Crl.R.P.No. 6 of 1979 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Anantapur, before whom was contended, on the basis of the decision in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli1 that unless the amount deposited is reasonable substitute for maintenance and sufficient to provide the wife with wherewithal to maintain herself until she gets remarried, the deposit of Rs.500 towards Meher and Rs. 750 towards maintenance for three months Iddat period does not absolve the respondent from his liability to pay the monthly maintenance to the petitioner. The Additional Sessions Judge besides making a passing remark that, as in the instant case, there is absolutely no evidence let in this regard to for consideration, did not Say anything as to how the Said Supreme Court decision stands, if at all, explained or distinguished. He dismissed the revision petition on loth May, 1979. The Additional Sessions Judge besides making a passing remark that, as in the instant case, there is absolutely no evidence let in this regard to for consideration, did not Say anything as to how the Said Supreme Court decision stands, if at all, explained or distinguished. He dismissed the revision petition on loth May, 1979. A second revision to this Court on the same point being barred under section 399 (3), Criminal Procedure Code, the petitioner has come forward with this petition under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to cancel the order in Crl.M.P. No. 300 of 1978 passed by the Magistrate in M.C.No. 5 of 1977 as there has been miscarriage of justice by the Additional Sessions Judge not properly applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above in securing the payment of maintenance to the petitioner who is a divorced Muslim wife. 2. Mr. R.V. Subba Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has made the following main submissions. Whatever be the decisions that were rendered by the various High Courts prior to 6th October, 1978, the Supreme Court has since interpreted section 127(3)(b), Criminal Procedure Code, and in terms of that interpretation, no Muslim husband can claim under section 127(3)(b) absolution from his obligation under section 125, towards a divorced wife except on proof of payment of a sum stipulated by customary or personal law whose quantum is more or less sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance. In the present case, the deposit of Rs. 500 towards Meher and Rs. 750 towards maintenance for the three months period of Iddat is not a sufficient substitute. A mere deposit of Meher and iddat amounts into Court is not a sufficient Compliance and there should be proof of actual receipt of those amounts by the divorced wife. 3. Mr. Bali Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, has countered these submissions, by stating that Rs. 500 was the Meher amount agreed to between the parties. The amount of Rs. 750 deposited towards maintenance for Iddat period is arrived at adopting the monthly maintenance of Rs.250 fixed by the Courts as reasonable maintenance. 3. Mr. Bali Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, has countered these submissions, by stating that Rs. 500 was the Meher amount agreed to between the parties. The amount of Rs. 750 deposited towards maintenance for Iddat period is arrived at adopting the monthly maintenance of Rs.250 fixed by the Courts as reasonable maintenance. The observations made by the Supreme Court have only reference to the facts of that particular case where the Supreme Court held that the amounts paid to the divorced Muslim wife were not sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance. When once the maintenance, as fixed by the Court, was deposited, the respondent has no further obligation to maintain the petitioner according to the Muslim personal law by which the parties are governed. There is no need for the respondent to prove the actual receipt of the amounts by the wife. The amount was deposited into Court because the wife refused to receive the amount and the deposits were made to the knowledge of the petitioner and such deposits are sufficient compliance of section 127 (3) (b), Criminal Procedure Code. 4. Mr. Bali Reddy has also raised a preliminary objection that this petition is not maintainable under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. This objection has, however, to be rejected by virtue of the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Puritipati Jagga Reddy. In re1 In terms of that Full Bench decision the petition will be maintenable under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, if on merits, it is to be held that there has been miscarriage of justice in not following the law as laid down by the Supreme Court. 5. The facts on which the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fassalli2 become material for appreciating the submissions made in this case by either Counsel. Ali Hussain married Bai Tahira as a second wife in 1956. They had a son by that marriage, but around July, 1962, Bai Tahira was divorced. Bai Tahira was living in a flat during her married status and when material disputes manifested themselves in a civil suit relating to that flat, the husband transferred the flat to the wife along with the shares of the co-operative housing society which built the flat concerned. There was a reference made in that compromise that Rs. 5000 towards Meher and Rs. There was a reference made in that compromise that Rs. 5000 towards Meher and Rs. 180 towards Iddat was adjusted by the compromise terms and a clause in the compromise provided that the wife has no longer any claim or right whatsoever against the husband or against the estate and the properties of the husband. Subsequent to this compromise, both the quondam wife and the quondam husband lived together for some time, but thereafter when their relations became estranged they separated, and the wife claimed maintenance under section 125, Criminal Procedure Code. The Magistrate, after taking into consideration the cost of living in Bombay and the circumstance that residential accommodation was provided to the wife in terms of the compromise decree, awarded monthly maintenance of Rs. 300. This order was questioned before the Sessions Judge, who held that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction at all to consider whether Bai Tahira was a wife, and allowed the appeal filed by the husband. The matter was taken to the Bombay High Court in Crl. A. No. 1375 of 1979 which was summarily dismissed on 20th October, 1975. Bai Tahira carried the matter to the Supreme Court by special leave. The Supreme Court held that Bai Tahira, even as a divorced wife, can apply for maintenance and her application cannot be dismissed as was done by the Sessions Judge. There was no specific plea based upon section 127 (3) ( b) set up in the Courts below and the Supreme Court proceeded to consider the case whether the liability to pay maintenance had ceased on account of the payment of Meher and that there was neglect established as against the husband to maintain the wife. The Supreme Court also held that if the wife lived apart because she was divorced, it does not amount to proof that the wife agreed to live separately by mutual consent. The Supreme Court also held that if the wife lived apart because she was divorced, it does not amount to proof that the wife agreed to live separately by mutual consent. The Supreme Court then proceeded to consider the effect of the compromise decree of 1962 vis-a-vis the right of a Muslim divorced wife to receive maintenance till such time as the whole of the sum which under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties was paid to the wife and held that this new statutory fight created by the Code of 1973 as a projection of a public policy in favour of a Muslim divorced wife could not have been in the contemplation of the parties in 1962 and that therefore, the compromise entered into in 1962 cannot operate to negate the statutory right which the quondam wife has obtained for the first time by the Code of 1973. The Supreme Court then considered whether the sum of Rs. 5,000 referred to above as Meher money and as adjusted in terms of the compromise was a sufficient provision towards maintenance and held that the interest therefrom could not have been a sufficient provision for maintenance. The Supreme Court did not consider the effect of the payment of Rs. 180 referred to as Iddat Money paid in terms of that compromise nor did they have any occasion to consider the effect of the payment of the maintenance for the Iddat period of three months at the rate fixed by the Court itself. That decision also did not lay down any principle of law as to how long the divorced Muslim wife has to be paid maintenance and whether the husband had the liability to pay the future maintenance even after paying the Meher amount and the reasonable maintenance as fixed by the Court For the three months period of Iddat. In the present case, there is no dispute that the amount of Rs. 500 was the Meher amount payable to the petitioner. The amount of Rs. 250 per month is considered by the Courts to be sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance and the sum of Rs. 750 due for the Iddat period of three months has been deposited by the respondent. 500 was the Meher amount payable to the petitioner. The amount of Rs. 250 per month is considered by the Courts to be sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance and the sum of Rs. 750 due for the Iddat period of three months has been deposited by the respondent. If therefore, the whole of the sum which under the Muslim Personal Law was payable to the petitioner, has been paid, the maintenance earlier granted in favour of the petitioner ceases to be payable from March, 1978, the period till which respondent paid to the petitioner the maintenance at Rs. 250 per month. 6. In Mohamedan Law, Meher is the sum of money which the wife is entitled to receive from the husband in consideration of the marriage. If the marriage was consummated, the wife is entitled to immediate payment of the whole of the unpaid Meher. After divorce, the wife is entitled to maintenance during the period of Iddat. The scope of sections 125 and 127, Criminal Procedure Code, has been considered in Ruksham Parvin v. Shaik Mohammed Hussain1 A Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the sections 125 and 127(3), Criminal Procedure Code, have to be harmoniously construed and section 127(3)(b) should be read as a proviso to section 125, Criminal Procedure Code, and that if they are so read, a Muslim divorced wife does not have any subsisting right of maintenance if the whole of the sum which was payable to her on such divorce has been paid to her. To a similar effect is the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Kamalakshi Vasantha Kumari v. Sankaran Sadasivan2 which considered the analogous provision arising under the Travancore Ezhava Act. A bench of this High Court in A. Sambaiah v. Shaik gahirabi3 and Gangadhara Rao, in Crl.R.C. Nos. 467 and 468 of 1977, dated 16th February, 1978, have taken a similar view. 7. In Khurshid Khan Aminkhan v. Husnabanu Mahimood Shaik4 the Bombay High Court has considered a case where a Muslim divorced wife was given maintenance because the husband did not pay anything or provide any maintenance to the wife, after he divorced her. In Sirajulmondal. 467 and 468 of 1977, dated 16th February, 1978, have taken a similar view. 7. In Khurshid Khan Aminkhan v. Husnabanu Mahimood Shaik4 the Bombay High Court has considered a case where a Muslim divorced wife was given maintenance because the husband did not pay anything or provide any maintenance to the wife, after he divorced her. In Sirajulmondal. v. Samejanechha Bibi1, a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court was dealing with a case where only the amount fixed as Den Meher was paid to the wife but not the amount payable to her as maintenance for the period of Iddat. In Mohammad Khan v. Mehrunnisa2 a single Judge of the Karnataka High Court was dealing with case where the divorce pleaded by the husband was not proved. These cases, do not, therefore, assist the petitioner in any manner. 8. True, a Muslim divorced wife is at a disadvantage not only because she could be easily divorced but also she cannot claim maintenance till her remarriage if the amounts payable to her under her personal law, consequent on the divorce have been paid to her. So long as the parties are governed by their personal law, the remedy lies with the Legislature and not with the Court. The deletion of section 127(3)(b), Criminal Procedure Code, would place the Muslim divorced wife on a par equal to other divorced wives in the country, but then such deletion is a power vested only with the Legislature. 9. The decision in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fasalli3 is to be confined only to the facts of that case. It falls to be distinguished for the following reasons: (i) the compromise of 1962 referred to therein was construed as not affecting the rights of a Muslim divorced wife in seeking to recover maintenance under section 125, Criminal Procedure Code (ii) what was considered to have been paid to the Muslim divorced wife was only the Meher amount and not the maintenance amount payable for the Iddat period; (iii) the Meher amount paid revealed at rate of interest which for a person residing in Bombay was held to be wholly inadequate to do duty for maintenance allowance; (iv) there was nothing in that case to show that the amount of Rs. 180 paid towards Iddat represented the payment of a sufficient maintenance amount for the three months period of Iddat: and (v) the husband in that case did hot raise any plea based on section 127(3)(b), Criminal Procedure Code. 10. We do not find any substance in the last submission by Mr. Subba Rao that the Meher and maintenance for the Iddat should be received voluntarily by the divorced wife and that it is not enough if those amounts are deposited into Court. In Hajuben Sukman v. Ibrahim4 a Bench of the Gujarat High Court, no doubt, expressed themselves supporting this submission, but Gangadhara Rao, J. in the decision referred to above as also Muktadar, J, in Crl. P. C. No. 635 of 1977 dated 7th December, 1977, have held that it is sufficient compliance if these amounts payable to the Muslim divorced wife are deposited and an actual receipt of these amounts by the Muslim divorced wife need not be proved. If the view expressed by the Bench of the Gujarat High Court is to prevail, the Muslim husband, who divorced his wife, will be at a disadvantage if the divorced wife refuses to accept the amounts payable to her on her divorce. Gangadhara Rao, J. and Muktadar, J., are right in observing that the requirements of section 127 (3) (b) are satisfied even when the amounts payable to the Muslim divorced wife are tendered or deposited into Court. 11. There is, therefore, no miscarriage of justice established in the case which requires our interference in exercise of our inherent powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. 12. The petition is, accordingly dismissed. 13. An oral request is made to grant a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. As a substantial question of law of general importance arises for consideration by the Supreme Court, the certificate is granted under Article 134 (c) of the Constitution. G.S.M. ----- Petition dismissed.