JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the decree dated March 29, 1972 of the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Dismissing the First Appeal No. 295 and confirming the order dated February 27, 1970 of the Assistant Collector decreeing Suit No. 28/64 under Section 209 of the U.P. Z.A. and I.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Respondent No. 1, Srimati Sumirta had filed a suit claiming to be the tenure-holder of certain plots and seeking the ejectment of the defendant-appellant Chheda Lal and respondent No. 4, Raghunandan Lal as trespassers. Her case was that she was an old, illiterate and 'Pardanashin' widow and that she had been tricked into signing some deed regarding the land in suit, which was not binding on her. Cheeda Lal, who is her son-in-law, has contested the suit by claiming that Srimati Sumirta needed some money for going on pilgrimage and she had, therefore, willingly executed a sale-deed in his favour on February 4, 1967. Raghunandan Lal contested the suit by claiming that Chheda Lal had executed a sale-deed in his favour. Both the courts below have decreed the suit of Srimati Sumirta. Chheda Lal has come up in second appeal. 4. The grounds taken in the second appeal are, firstly, that while the learned Additional Commissioner is of the opinion that it is the relief which determine the jurisdiction, the appellant's contention is that it is the cause of action; and secondly, that if the learned Additional Commissioner be correct that the revenue court had jurisdiction, then he should have also recorded a finding about the validity of the sale deed. 5. Both the courts below have recorded the finding that Srimati Sumirta did not execute any sale-deed and her signature was obtained on a sale-deed by deception and without telling that she was executing a sale-deed, and that the sale-deed dated February 4, 1967 in favour of the defendant-appellant is invalid. As the defendant-appellant did not acquire any right himself, the sale-deed executed by him in favour of Raghunandan Lal was automatically invalid. This finding has not been challenged in second appeal. Only the plea has been taken that the revenue court had no jurisdiction to decide about the validity of the sale-deed on the question of fraud and misrepresentation. As the defendant-appellant did not acquire any right himself, the sale-deed executed by him in favour of Raghunandan Lal was automatically invalid. This finding has not been challenged in second appeal. Only the plea has been taken that the revenue court had no jurisdiction to decide about the validity of the sale-deed on the question of fraud and misrepresentation. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the sale-deed was not void but voidable, and that this question could have been determined by the Civil Court. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent Srimati Sumirta, has, however, contested this view, and has cited a number of rulings on this point. The first is Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1206, in which a learned Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: "In India Pardanashin ladies have been given a special protection in view of the social conditions of the times; they are presumed to have an imperfect knowledge of the world, as, by the Pardah system they are practically excluded from social intercourse and communion with the outside world. In Farid-un-Nisa v. Mukhtar Ahmad, 52 Ind. App. 342 at p. 550 : A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 204, Lord Summer traces the origin of the custom and states the principle on which the presumption is based. The learned Lord observed: "In this it has only given the special development, which Indian social usages make necessary, to the general rules of English law, which protect persons, whose disabilities make them dependent upon or subject them to the influence of others, even though nothing in the nature of deception or coercion may have occurred. This is part of the law relating to personal capacity to make binding transfers or settlements of property of any kind." The learned Lord also points out: "Of course fraud, duress and actual undue influence are separate matters." "It is, therefore, manifest that the rule evolved for the protection of Pardanashin ladies shall not be confused with other doctrines, such as fraud, duress and actual undue influence, which apply to all persons whether they by Pardanashin ladies or not." 7. The next decision cited is Sattadeo Prasad v. Chanderjoti, A.I.R. 1966 Pat. The next decision cited is Sattadeo Prasad v. Chanderjoti, A.I.R. 1966 Pat. 110, in which the following principle has been laid down: "Those who want to take advantage of a document executed by a Pardanashin lady must prove that she knew its contents and executed it with full knowledge of its effects and consequences and that she had independent advice in the matter. In such a case the burden is always, in the first instance, on the person founding on that document to show that the grant or intelligently understood the deed, and if they fail to establish that point, then the document is not binding on the executant or anyone else and is void ab initio. A.I.R. 1933 Pat. 306 and A.I.R. 1941 Oudh 172 and A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 147, Foll." 8. The third decision cited is Kundan v. Lala, 1971 R.D. 159 in which a learned Member of the Board of Revenue has held that 'in a suit for the declaration of Sirdari rights, the revenue courts while considering the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration sought for could take cognizance of the validity or otherwise of the registered sale-deed relied upon by a party in support of his title to the disputed land, and the trial court was justified in taking the view that the Review Courts were competent to consider all the questions incidental to the relief claimed.' 9. Thus, the legal position is quite clear. A sale-deed executed by an illiterate Pardanashin widow on the basis of fraud and misrepresentation is not voidable but void ad initio. Further, the revenue court which is the competent forum for granting the relief under Section 209, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, is also quite competent to record the finding that such a sale-deed is a void document. The judgments of the courts below, therefore, do not suffer from any perversity or error in law. 10. I find no force in this second appeal and hereby dismiss it.