JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the order and decree dated March 20, 1972, passed by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, confirming the decree dated June 11, 1968 passed by the Assistant Collector, Ist Class, district Farrukhabad, in a suit under Section 176, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. An application has been moved by the learned counsel for the appellant on December 8, 1978 praying that Triveni Sahai, respondent No. 1 had died in the trial court and in application for substitution bringing the names of Burmadin and Sewadin, sons of Triveni Sahai, was filed in the court within limitation and notices were served to them. However, in the decree papers the names of the deceased respondent Triveni Sahai was shown and as such in the second appeal also the deceased respondent Triveni Sahai was impleaded instead of the heir and legal representatives. This mistake was detected on December 7, 1978. The learned counsel for the appellant prayed that the name of the deceased respondent, Triveni Sahai be deleted and his heirs Burmadin and Sewadin be impleaded in his place. This has been opposed by an application moved on March 20, 1969 by the learned counsel for Burmadin and Sewadin sons of the deceased who have prayed that the appeal has now become barred by time. I am constrained to remark that the correct facts have not been stated in the application dated December 8, 1978, moved by the learned counsel for the appellant. The trial court's order against which the present appellant had filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, is dated June 11, 1968. The respondent Triveni Sahai did not die in the trial court as wrongly stated in the application of the learned counsel for the appellant. He died on May 25, 1970 during pendency of the first appeal and and application for his substitution was moved by the learned counsel for the appellant in the court of the Commissioner on August 14, 1970. This application, which is accompanied by the affidavit of the appellant himself, fully establishes that both the appellant and his learned counsel fully knew the fact of the death of the deceased Triveni Sahai on May 25, 1970. It cannot, therefore, be said that they discovered the fact for the first time on December 7, 1978. This application, which is accompanied by the affidavit of the appellant himself, fully establishes that both the appellant and his learned counsel fully knew the fact of the death of the deceased Triveni Sahai on May 25, 1970. It cannot, therefore, be said that they discovered the fact for the first time on December 7, 1978. In spite of their knowledge they impleaded the deceased Triveni Sahai as the respondent in the second appeal and further did not take any step to get the mistake corrected for more than six years. The learned counsel for the respondent has cited Surat Singh v. Manohar Lal, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 240 in which in almost identical circumstances, a learned Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- "Where the son of the plaintiff with other persons was brought on record on the death of plaintiff during pendency of appeal before the High Court and the fact that he was represented by a counsel was clearly shown in the certified copy of order of the High Court but he was not impleaded as a party in appeal before Supreme Court, the fact that he was so impleaded admittedly being within knowledge of appellants, and the appellants failed to show any good ground for not impleading him, the appeal was liable to be dismissed for want of necessary party to the appeal. An application filed on the date of decision to implead him as party-respondent, held being highly belated could not be entertained." In Kadhora v. Mangua, 1973 R.D. 57 also a learned Member has taken the view that the principle is that if the appellant had knowledge of the fact that a party was impleaded and he is a necessary party, he cannot take the stand that the decree of the court did not show the name. The learned counsel for the appellant has, on the other hand, cited Abdul Gaffar v. Gavas Singh, A.I.R. 1967 Patna 360 in which a learned Bench of the Patna High Court has dismissed a revision petition allowing an application filed by the appellants for impleading one plaintiff whose name has been left out due to an inadvertence of the respondent and observed as follows :- "The question which now arises for consideration is whether this order should be revised by this Court. Our attention was properly invited by counsel for the opposite party to the certified copy of the decree of the trial Court which was filed in the appeal, and we find there that the name of Serajuddin is completely omitted. Apparently the mistake was committed while preparing the certified copy, and as is well known the Court's action should not prejudice anybody. Though the opposite party have not expressly stated that the omission of the name of Serajuddin in the certified copy of the decree was mainly responsible for their omission to implead him as a party, nevertheless, on going through the records we find that the learned lower Appellate Court's observation to the effect that the omission of the name of Serajuddin was due to inadvertence, was fully justified. In such circumstances, merely because the reasons for condoning the delay have not been fully set out in the order, it will not be proper for us as a revisional Court to interfere with the finding of a competent court on the main question as to whether the delay should be condoned on an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or not. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the order of the learned First Subordinate Judge." 3. Another decision cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is decision of the Allahabad High Court in Narain and others v. Board of Revenue and others, Civil Misc. Writ No. 1743 of 1973, in which the following view has been taken:- "As has been seen the appeal was not filed merely against dead persons. Living persons were also impleaded as respondents, namely, Abbai Kumar and Sunil Kumar. The only extraneous name mentioned in the memorandum of appeal was that of Dal Chand whose name should have been scored out. The proper course for the Board of Revenue was to send down the decree for correction because obviously the names of Dal Chand and Nihal Chand had been wrongly mentioned because their names had been scored out and substituted by the heirs under the order of the Court. So long as the decree, its copy was not corrected the defendant could file an appeal against the persons whose names were mentioned in the copy of the decree supplied to them. So long as the decree, its copy was not corrected the defendant could file an appeal against the persons whose names were mentioned in the copy of the decree supplied to them. In the circumstances the Board of Revenue should have allowed the application for addition of parties, namely addition of two minor sons of Dal Chand, who were the only persons left out, the other heirs persons left out, the other heirs having been impleaded. The application, though headed as for substitution, was in law an application for addition of the parties under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. for which the is no prescribed period of limitation. There was hence no question of condonation of delay involved." I find that the present case is distinguishable from the above case (Narain and other v. Board of Revenue and others (Supra)). In that case the appeal was not filed merely against dead persons but living persons were also impleaded as respondents, namely, Abhai Kumar and Sushil Kumar. In the present case, however, no living person has been impleaded and the sole respondent is Triveni Sahai who is long dead (Gaon Sabha is merely a proforma respondent). The second distinguishing feature is that in the above case the names of Dal Chand and Nihal Chand were extraneous and were to be scored out as the names of the heirs had been already impleaded. In the present case, however, it is not enough to score out the name of Triveni Sahai as in that case no respondent would be left. On the other hand, in the present case the names of the heirs had got to be impleaded. The third distinguishing feature is the enormous delay. The second appeal was filed on June 12, 1972 and the appellants had taken six and half years to apply for impleadment. There can be no justification for condoning the enormous delay. 4. The Patna case does not help the appellant as in that case the matter of condonation of delay was left to the discretion of the court and the High Court merely refused to interfere with that discretion in exercise of its powers in revision. Thus, to my mind, the present case would be governed by the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1971 (S.C.) 240. The facts of the two cases are almost identical. Thus, to my mind, the present case would be governed by the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1971 (S.C.) 240. The facts of the two cases are almost identical. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the appellants must suffer the consequence of their negligence and cannot derive any benefit from the fact that the name of the deceased respondent continued to be shown in the decree prepared in the court of the learned Additional Commissioner. The appellants were challenging that decree and they should have been careful to implead the proper parties. Even if by mistake the name of deceased respondent was shown in the memo of appeal, the appellants should not have taken more than six and half years time to correct the mistake. Particularly during this period the appeal came up for hearing on five occasions in the year 1974. 5. I, therefore, hold that the second appeal has been filed against a dead person. The application moved on December 8, 1978 on behalf of the appellants is rejected as being time-barred. The appeal is hereby dismissed as being incompetent.