JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the Judgment and decree dated August 25, 1978 passed by Sri A.S. Verma, Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, allowing the appeal of the defendants against the Judgment and decree dated June 18, 1975 passed by the Additional Sub-Divisional Officer, Bindki, district Fatehpur in suit under Section 176, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The appellant Sheo Shankar and respondents Nos. 4, 5 and 6, Gaya Prasad, Sukhnandan and Babulal, who are all sons of one Matadin, had filed a suit claiming to be co-tenure-holders of certain land in village Ghatampur and seeking the division of the holding on the basis of ?th share. Raghunandan and Jainarain, respondents Nos. 1 and 2, contested the suit by claiming that both the contesting parties had one half share in the joint holding. The trial court decreed the suit. The Additional Commissioner has, however, set aside the decree of the trial court and declared that both the contesting parties had one half share each. Only Sheo Shankar has come up in second appeal and has impleaded the remaining plaintiffs as pro forma respondents. 4. The first point taken in the second appeal is that the defendant in the present case was barred by the provisions of Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, and the defendants were bound by the compromise entered into before the consolidation authorities and the admission of their father. How, in the Khatauni both the contesting parties are recorded as co-tenure-holders of the land in suit from before 1360 Fasli. The co-tenancy is not in doubt. It is also on record that the plaintiffs are sons of Matadin and the defendants are sons of Jiyalal, and both Matadin and Jiyalal were brothers and lived together. Their cultivation was also joint. Consolidation has, however, taken place in the village. There is on record the certified copy of an application moved by Jiyalal before the Assistant Consolidation Officer to the effect that in the Bhumidhari Khata Khatauni No. 22 of village Ghatampur, in which this land was recorded in the name of Matadin, his (Jiyalal's) name be recorded on 1/9th share according to the actual possession. There is on record the certified copy of an application moved by Jiyalal before the Assistant Consolidation Officer to the effect that in the Bhumidhari Khata Khatauni No. 22 of village Ghatampur, in which this land was recorded in the name of Matadin, his (Jiyalal's) name be recorded on 1/9th share according to the actual possession. There is also on record the copy of the order of the Consolidation Officer dated April 6, 1958 to the effect that Jiyalal's name will be recorded on ?th share of the joint holding on the basis of their compromise. The question arose whether there had been a compromise between the parties during consolidation and, if so, what the legal effect thereof was? The two courts below have taken conflicting view on this question. The learned Additional Commissioner has propounded the view that neither the compromise nor the order of the Consolidation Officer was binding. In supporting this view, the learned counsel for the respondents has cited certain decisions. The first in Dawar Husain v. Musharrif Ali, 1952 R.D. 226, in which a learned member R.N. Singh has held that 'by the very nature of the joint tenancy the co-tenants co share in the cultivation of a holding. The mere fact that they had divided the actual plots for exclusive cultivation would not affect the fact of co-sharing.' He has further held that 'the admission of a third person by a co-tenant ensure after the letter's death so as to affect adversely the interests of the rightful heir.' 5. The second decision in Lakshman Pande v. Shyam Dei, 1937 R.D. 298, in which it has been held that 'whereas it is a sound principle that a party cannot go behind his pleadings, there are cases in which it is necessary to disregard the pleadings and administer law according to facts. Where, therefore, in a case for a formal partition of a holding a party applies for one third share only but according to law he is entitled to half, the court will give him half.' 6. Where, therefore, in a case for a formal partition of a holding a party applies for one third share only but according to law he is entitled to half, the court will give him half.' 6. The third decision is Ragho v. Babubandan, 1971 R.D. 244, in which a learned Member, C.M. Nigam has held that 'in a suit for partition it is wholly immaterial that the parties are in actual cultivation of specific plots and this would not operate to defeat the joint title of the parties and the right in the land belonging to the parties.' 7. The fourth decision in Lalloo v. Defali, 1972 R.D. 215, in which a learned Member, S.N. Mehrotra has held that 'the case law laying down that a compromise varying the legal share of the co-tenants have got a binding effect in a suit for division of holding under Section 49 of U.P. Tenancy Act will not be applicable to a suit under Section 176 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act.' 8. The learned counsel for the appellant in challenging the above, has cited three decisions. The first is Risal Singh v. Board of Revenue, 1970 R.D. 413, in which a learned Judge of the High Court had held that 'Section 49 bars the adjudication of the rights of the tenure-holders through a suit. A partition can, however, be claimed by co-sharers at any time. In consolidation proceedings the rights of the parties are determined and they are given a common Chak and the co-sharers have a right to claim a partition even after the consolidation proceedings are over on the basis of the rights as determined in the consolidation proceedings in the common Chak allotted to them.' 9. The second decision in Rakesh Kumar v. Board of Revenue, 1972 A.L.J. 769, in which a learned Bench of the High Court has held that 'Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act bars the adjudication of rights through a suit irrespective of the question as to whether plaintiff or the defendant raised the question of title and that the right determined in consolidation proceedings, either after or without contest are final.' 10. The third decision is Bhagwan Swarup v. Dharampal, 1974 R.D. (Suppl.) 235, in which it has been held that 'the consolidation authorities have the right to determine the shares according to the comment of the parties through the process of reconciliation and willing consent of the parties. Such settlement of disputes,' before the consolidation courts, on a matter of public policy should not be allowed to be affected in a regular suit. Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act bars the defence varying the shares already determined in consolidation courts.' 11. I am entirely in agreement with the view propounded in the decision cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. A perusal of the relevant provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act shows that the consolidation authorities have been given the power to determine the tenure rights, including the respective shares of co-tenure-holders in the land. Section 49 of the Act further bars the adjudication of the same question by a revenue court. Whatever may have transpired before Jiyalal, the father of the defendants, moved an application before the Assistant Consolidation Officer claiming only ?th share in the joint holding and the Consolidation Officer thereafter passed an order accordingly, the matter cannot be reopened or re-agitated before the revenue courts. The aggrieved person, if any, should have sought his remedy according to the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act itself. The decision in 1971 R.D. 244 is not applicable to the present case, as it is not merely a question of determination of shares on the basis of actual cultivation. On the other hand, it involves decision of shares on the basis of the determination of a right done by the consolidation authorities. As regards the decision in 1972 R.D. 215, while the learned member did accept that a compromise varying the legal shares of a co-tenant has a binding effect in a suit for division of holding under Section 49 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, he did not consider the question as to what the effect would be if a compromise to this effect has been entered into during consolidation proceedings. 12. The learned Additional Commissioner has, therefore, clearly erred in law in setting aside the order of the trial court under the mistaken view that the determination of shares of a co-tenure-holder by the consolidation authorities was not binding. 13. 12. The learned Additional Commissioner has, therefore, clearly erred in law in setting aside the order of the trial court under the mistaken view that the determination of shares of a co-tenure-holder by the consolidation authorities was not binding. 13. Another ground taken in the second appeal is that the learned Additional Commissioner has not set aside the finding of the trial court that the land in suit was the acquisition of the plaintiffs' father alone. Therefore, the plaintiffs' suit was to be decreed. I find that the trial court has recorded the finding that though the father of the contesting parties were brothers, the land in suit was the acquisition of Matadin, father of the plaintiffs. The additional Commissioner has neither confined nor reversed the finding. Thus, this finding remains untouched. However, since Jiyalal, the father of the defendant-respondents, was brother of Matadin, it is quite obvious that Matadin did not object to ?th share in the holding being given to Jiyalal, and the consolidation authorities determined their shares accordingly. The learned Additional Commissioner has clearly gone astray in not considering this finding of the trial court regarding the origin of the tenancy. 14. I thus hold that the order of the learned Additional Commissioner is perverse and erroneous in law. I hereby allow the second appeal, set aside the order of the learned Additional Commissioner, and restore the order of the trial court.