JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the order and decree dated June 30, 1972 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, confirming the order and decree dated February 4, 1972 passed by the Assistant Collector, First Class, Lucknow in a case under Section 209, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Respondent No. 1, Srimati Durga Dei, filed a suit claiming to be the Sirdar of plot No. 3043/2 village Sahara, district Lucknow and seeking the ejectment of the defendant appellant Srimati Bishun Dei as a trespasser. Srimati Bishun Dei contested the suit claiming to be Sirdar herself. The courts below have decreed the suit. 4. The first ground taken in the second appeal is that an earlier suit had been withdrawn by the plaintiff-respondent with the permission of the court but no permission to file a fresh suit was granted. Thus, the present suit is barred under order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant has cited Raj Shatranja Ji v. Gumant Ram 1941 R.D. 375 in which it has been held that 'the withdrawal of a suit for ejectment without permission to bring a fresh suit, bars a fresh suit involving identical issues.' The learned Member Satha went on observing as follows: "I am further of opinion it is not by mere accident that R.I. (3) of O. XXIII is not confined to cases where the causes of action are identical. For if in a suit a defendant puts in his defence and raises various pleas, he is entitled to have a judicial pronouncement thereon so that it may operate as res judicata and save him from all harassment in future on the same issues. A plaintiff who therefore prevents such a judicial pronouncement from being given by withdrawing the suit without permission of the Court must be penalised and laced in the same position in which he would have been if that judicial pronouncement had been given against him. He cannot be allowed to defeat the rights of a defendant to have a judicial pronouncement on the issues raised by him merely by adopting the device of withdrawing the suit without permission of the court. He cannot be allowed to defeat the rights of a defendant to have a judicial pronouncement on the issues raised by him merely by adopting the device of withdrawing the suit without permission of the court. In my opinion, the words used to O. XXIII, R. 1(3), C.P.C. must have been deliberately chosen and are justifiable in themselves." 5. Another Judgment to the same effect is Lallu v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1973 Allahabad 195 in which the following view has been taken: "The court is empowered to grant the liberty to institute a fresh suit only after finding that the suit must fail by reason of some formal defect or that there are other sufficient grounds for granting the liberty. After recording these findings, the court must pass a specific order granting liberty to institute a fresh suit. If no such specific order is passed granting liberty to institute a fresh suit, it is not permissible to infer such an order by "constructive interpretation" as the Board has done. Where two reliefs are prayed for and the court specifically grants one relief, the only inference that can be drawn is that the other relief, has been refused. That being so, it must be taken that the trial court in the earlier suit refused to grant permission to file a fresh suit. In the absence of such a permission, the present suit is clearly barred by sub-rule (3) of the Rule I or Order XXIII, C.P.C. The present suit being clearly barred, the Commissioner as well as the Board of Revenue have not only committed a manifest error of law in holding that suit was not barred, but have also committed an error of jurisdiction in entertaining the suit and in decreeing the same." 6. I am wholly in agreement with the above view. The provisions of Order 23, Rule I of the Civil Procedure Code are very specific and admit of no doubt. The Legislature has deliberately empowered the Court. (1) to grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw a suit, and (2) to grant permission for instituting a fresh suit after it is satisfied. It is, therefore, the authority of the Court either to grant both permissions or none or to withhold granting the second permission. The Legislature has deliberately empowered the Court. (1) to grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw a suit, and (2) to grant permission for instituting a fresh suit after it is satisfied. It is, therefore, the authority of the Court either to grant both permissions or none or to withhold granting the second permission. It is not open to a plaintiff to harass a defendant endlessly, and the defendant is in fact entitled to get the matter decided expeditiously in the first suit itself without being bothered with a second suit on the same cause of action. 7. In the present case, it is on record that the plaintiff-respondent had earlier filed a suit on the same cause of action against the defendant appellant and thereafter had withdrawn the suit. The trial court had then passed the following order: "Allowed to withdraw the suit subject to payment of Rs. twenty five only to the defendants, Rs. 5/- only for each defendant." This order does not grant the permission to file a fresh suit, and the present suit is, therefore, barred under Order 23, Rule 1(3) of the Civil Procedure Code. 8. Another ground taken in the second appeal is that the suit is bad for non joinder of parties and the view of law taken by the courts below is erroneous. This ground is also correct. The impleadment of a party is not a mater of discretion for a plaintiff. On the other hand, the law requires that all necessary parties must be impleaded. The defendant appellant had taken a plea in her written statement that Jaichand Singh, Mertiman Singh, Suresh Singh, Nanhen Singh and Nand Kishore were necessary parties being co-Bhaumidhars of the land, and thus the suit was bad for non-joinder of parties. The courts below have clearly erred in law in propounding the view that it is open to the plaintiff to implead or not to implead any necessary party. 9. As the suit itself is barred under Order 23, Rule 1(3) C.P.C. I hereby allow this second appeal and set aside the orders of the courts below.