ORDER Mishra, J. - 1. This is plaintiff's revision aggrieved against order dated 13-4-1976, whereby further examination of plaintiff's witness G.D. Garg, Advocate, has been disallowed by applying S. 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 2. Facts essential for decision of this revision are as under: (1) Plaintiff-applicant holds a money decree in execution, where of he attached a house stating that it belongs to non-applicant No.1. Kailashchand. (2) Omprakash, non-2 applicant No.2, claiming to be purchaser of the said house under a registered sale-deed dated 8-10-1969. preferred objection under Order 21 rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the said house is not attached in execution of decree against Kailashchand, Devi Prasad the plaintiff-applicant, opposed the said application on the ground that the sale was made in order to defraud the creditors and is not a real sale at all. The objection preferred by non-applicant No.2, however, succeeded. Thereafter, the plaintiff applicant has brought the suit under Order 21 rule 63 CPC on the ground that the impugned sale-deed is a fictitious and sham transaction, having been entered into in order to defraud the creditors. Therefore, the house in question is liable to be attached and sold in execution of the decree. (3) The defendant-non applicant No. 2 Omprakash contested the suit and alleged that the transaction of sale in a genuine transaction. (4) After framing of the issues the plaintiff his evidence. During the course of examination of P.W. Shri G.D. Garg, Advocate, the plaintiff wanted to ask him questions in respect of the matter already Slated by the plaintiff on cross-examination by the defendant in para 20 of his deposition, as mentioned in para 2 of the impugned order. The defendant objected to such questions being asked by the plaintiff and answered by Shri Garg Privilege under S. 126 of the Evidence Act was claimed. This objection has found favour with the trial Judge and by the impugned order, it has been held that no questions can be asked in respect of the communications in terse Shri Garg, and the defendants. (5) aggrieved by this order, the plaintiff has preferred this revision. 3. This objection has found favour with the trial Judge and by the impugned order, it has been held that no questions can be asked in respect of the communications in terse Shri Garg, and the defendants. (5) aggrieved by this order, the plaintiff has preferred this revision. 3. In this revision, Shri Swami Saran, learned counsel for the plaintiff-applicant has contended that the impugned order is illegal; and that the provisions of S. 126 of the Evidence Act do not enact a prohibition against disclosure of communications between Shri Garg and the defendants prior to examination of the sale-deed dated 8-10-1969, executed by non-applicant No. 1 in favour of non-applicant No.2, Mr. R.K. Patni, advocate for the non-applicant No.2, argued in support of the impugned order. 4. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I have reached the conclusion that the revision deserves to be dismissed. 5. S. 126 of the Evidence Act runs as under: "126. No barrister, attorney. pleader or vakil shall at any time be permitted, unless with his client's express consent, to disclose any communication made with him in the course and for the purpose of his employment as such barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil by or on behalf of his client, or to state the contents or condition of any document with which he has become acquainted in the course of and for the purpose of his professional employment, or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the course and for the purpose of such employment: Provided that nothing in this section shall protect from disclosure- (1) any such communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose; (2) any fact observed by any barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil in the course of his employment as such, showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his employment. It is immaterial whether the attention of such barrister pleader, attorney or vakil was or was not directed to such fact by or on behalf of his client. It is immaterial whether the attention of such barrister pleader, attorney or vakil was or was not directed to such fact by or on behalf of his client. Explanation: - The obligation stated in this section continues after the employment has ceased." By the use of the words," no barrister, attorney, pleader of vakil shall at any time be permitted, unless with his client's express consent to disclose any communication made to him in the course of and for the purpose of his employment," prohibition is enacted against disclosure of any communication made to barrister, attorney, pleader of vakil, provided the communication in question is made to him in the course and for the purpose of him employment. Use of the word, "shall" indicates that the prohibition is of mandatory character. 5. It is only within the rights of his client (that is the person making communication) that he can waive the privilege. For such purpose, even implied consent is not enough. What is required is express consent. In the instant case, Mr. G.D. Garg has drafted the sale-deed dated 8-10-1969. All the communications alleged to have been made to him by defendant-non-applicants are indicated in para 20 of his deposition by the applicant. The alleged communications of the nature so deposed by the applicant and con-densed in para 2 of the impugned order by the trial Judge, were made in the course of and for the purpose of employment of Shri G.D. Garg, as an advocate for drafting the sale-deed. 6. The communication need not relate to any actual or prospective litigation, but the matter of the communication will be within the mischief of the prohibition enacted by S. 126 of the Evidence Act, if it is shown to be made within the ordinary scope of professional employment, e.g. sale, purchase and conveyance of estates, or negotiations of loan. The law on the point has been succinctly condensed in Woodroffe & Amear Ali's 'Law of Evidence', 13th. Edition (l975 Vol-. 4) at page 3113, which reads as under: ‘13. In the course and for the purpose of his professional employment. The communication need not, as has been seen relate to any actual or prospective litigation, but the matter of the communication must be within the ordinary scope of professional employment, e. g. the sale. Edition (l975 Vol-. 4) at page 3113, which reads as under: ‘13. In the course and for the purpose of his professional employment. The communication need not, as has been seen relate to any actual or prospective litigation, but the matter of the communication must be within the ordinary scope of professional employment, e. g. the sale. purchase and conveyance of estates, or negotiations for a loan but not communications to a solicitor acting merely as under-sheriff rent collector patent agent, or trustee, nor communications in furtherance of a fraud or crime, whether the solicitor is a party to or ignorant of the illegal object, nor probably are forged documents, though entrusted to the solicitor in professional confidence, privileged In AIR 1918 All. 38 (Gopilal v. Lakhpat Rai), Piggott and Walsh, 11, have expressed themselves on the point thus: "for the purpose of S. 126, it is immaterial whether the communication which is sought to be protected was verbal, that is to say, by word of mouth, or by demonstration". "In a suit for the revocation of a patent in which the question for decision was the formation and process of working of a stove owned and used by the defendant, the plaintiff tendered in evidence a vakil who had been employed by the defendant in some previous proceedings and had, in the course and for the purpose of his employment, visited the defendant's premises at the latters invitation, in order to make himself acquainted with the working of the stove Held: that the knowledge acquired by the vakil as to the formation and process of working of the stove amounted to a communication made to him by his client in the course and for the purpose of his employment and that therefore his evidence was inadmissible under section 126." 7. It is true that the applicant has deposed on the same matter in para 20 of his statement; but the plaintiff being a person not within the pale of the prohibition enacted by S. 126 of the Evidence Act, is not disable for the purpose and can depose and be cross-examined with reference to the point. By virtue of S. 126 prohibition is enacted against disclosure of the communication made to an advocate by his client in the course of and for the purpose of his professional employment. By virtue of S. 126 prohibition is enacted against disclosure of the communication made to an advocate by his client in the course of and for the purpose of his professional employment. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the non-applicants waived the privilege, when the plaintiff was permitted to depose or was cross-examined on the matter. The question of waiver could arise only if by express consent of the defendant-non-applicants Shri Garg would have been permitted or made to disclose the alleged communications. 8. Mr. Swami Saran, learned counsel for the plaintiff relied on the ratio of Kalikumar v. Rajkumar, AIR 1932 Calcutta 148 which runs as under:- "On general principles and under S. 126 there is no privilege to communications made before the creation of the relationship of pleader and client. Further, where two persons have a dispute about claim made by one of them upon the other and both seek the help of a pleader and one of them makes a statement to the pleader, the statement so made to the pleader by one of the parties is certainly admissible. The question is whether the communication or admission was made by the party to the pleader in the character of his own exclusive pleader or legal adviser; if it was so, the bond of secrecy is upon the pleader; if not the communication is not privileged." In the facts and circumstances of that case, Guha, J. held that the communication in question was made to D. W. 4 Hari Krsishna Bhatta, muchless as a pleader, who was employed by the plaintiff, nor was there any indication that the communication was made to the witness in the course of and for the purpose of his employment as a pleader. Accordingly, that case is distinguish-able on facts. But, on point of law, the case does not run counter to the view I am taking. On the contrary, it supports me in the aforesaid view. The main test laid down in the case of Kalikumar (supra) is "the question is whether the communication or admission was made by the party to the pleader in the character of his own exclusive pleader or legal adviser. If it was so, the bond of secrecy is upon the pleader; if not, the communication is not privileged." 9. The main test laid down in the case of Kalikumar (supra) is "the question is whether the communication or admission was made by the party to the pleader in the character of his own exclusive pleader or legal adviser. If it was so, the bond of secrecy is upon the pleader; if not, the communication is not privileged." 9. Applying the aforamaid test to the present situation, it is clear that the alleged communication, regarding which the plaintiff wants Shri Garg to depose was made by the non-applicants to him (Shri Garga), as their legal adviser ill the course of and for the purpose of his professional employment. Employment of a lawyer for drafting a sale-deed is certainly a professional employment. As such, the bond of secrecy in the matter is upon Shri Garg, 10. In this view of the matter, Shri Garg cannot be permitted to disclose the communication in question, express consent to that effect being with held by the non applicants. 11. In this view of the matter, the revision fails and is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.