JUDGMENT - MASODKAR B.A., J.: - This is an appeal of the original plaintiff, who filed the suit on the basis of agreement of sale(Ex.55) of January 17, 1963 seeking specific performance thereof and also praying for relief of declaration that the judgment and decree(Exs. 38 and 39) of July 10, 1962 in Regular Civil Suit No. 50 of 1962, obtained earlier, be declared to be collusive and as such not binding. The suit agreement is admittedly executed by defendant No.1 Baburao. The judgment and decree which was questioned was obtained by defendant No. 2 Parwatibai against defendant No. 1 Baburao. 2. The case of the plaintiff had been that Baburao was the owner of the property, being the suit house which was purchased by his father Dagadu under a registered deed of purchase of May 4, 1933(Ex. 50). After Dagadus death, which occurred in July 1942, Baburao became the sole owner of the property. He had under Ex. 56 initially agreed to convey this property to one Rajaram(P. W. 2) for a consideration of Rs. 9,000 and had received an earnest money of Rs. 2,000. After cancelling that agreement, the suit agreement was entered into for a consideration of Rs. 10,000 and Baburao received Rs. 2,500 as earnest money, out of which Rs. 2,000 were paid to Rajaram whose agreement was duly cancelled. In spite of the fact that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part, Baburao was avoiding the same. With regard to the decree obtained by Parwatibai against Baburao, it was the case of the plaintiff that it was all collusive and was obtained with a view to shield the property. 3. At Exs. 20 and 21 are the written statements of Baburao and Parwatibai. Briefly stated, these written statements disclaimed the plaintiffs assertion. Even Baburaos written statement asserts that the suit house was the joint property of his father Dagadu and Parwatibais husband Shankarrao, Dagadus brother. It is further stated that Dagadu before his death had directed that Parwatibai should be maintained and further that the half share of Parwatibai in the suit house was got recorded in the City Survey Record as per the wish of Dagadu. It was asserted that defendant No. 1 was. It is further stated that Dagadu before his death had directed that Parwatibai should be maintained and further that the half share of Parwatibai in the suit house was got recorded in the City Survey Record as per the wish of Dagadu. It was asserted that defendant No. 1 was. incurring loans for his own vices and, therefore, Parwatibai instituted a suit for the purpose of partition which was not filed in collussion and it was then stated that defendant No. 2 took out Darkhast proceedings and attached the undivided half share in the house and when defendant No. 1 engaged one Zulal B. Patil, Pleader, in that matter, it was that pleader who by practising fraud and holding out false representations with regard to the Darkhast got executed the suit agreement. The said agreement, therefore, was not binding. It was further stated that under that agreement only Rs. 200 were paid and in spite of demand on the said Pleader Patil, the further amounts were not paid. It was asserted that the decree obtained by Parwatibai was valid and binding. 4. Parwatibais written statement asserts that the house property was not exclusively owned by Baburao. Her husband Shankarrao was running the business of motors for about 14 to 15 years prior to his death and had earned lot of profits, while Dagadu was merely a fee clerk and earned very little income and was not even able to maintain himself. They were living in joint family and from the profits earned in the business of motors, her husband Shankarrao purchased the suit house. As Dagadu was elder to Shankarrao, the house was purchased in the name of Dagadu. Her husband Shankarrao died in the suit house. At the time of his death, he had left three motors(passanger service) owned by him. He had similarly left properties in the form of several ornaments of silver and gold. He had also a gold waist chain, rings and buttons. All those ornaments were purchased by Shankarrao from his business profits. All the property was with defendant No. 2 Parwatibai and after the death of Shankarrao, monies were realised by sale of ornaments Jo the tune of Rs. 7,000 to Rs. 8,000 from which the dilapidated suit house was reconstructed. Dagadu, who died in 1942. All those ornaments were purchased by Shankarrao from his business profits. All the property was with defendant No. 2 Parwatibai and after the death of Shankarrao, monies were realised by sale of ornaments Jo the tune of Rs. 7,000 to Rs. 8,000 from which the dilapidated suit house was reconstructed. Dagadu, who died in 1942. before his death had told the wife and defendant No. 1 that one half share in the property should be given to defendant No. 2 Parwatibai and, accordingly, one-half share was entered in the name of the defendant No. 2 Parwatibai. It was further asserted that the value of the suit house was Rs. 20,000 and not Rs. 10,000. In paragraph 9 of her written statement, Parwatibai has asserted that the assertion that Dagadu acquired the property was wrong. So also the exclusive ownership of defendant No. 1 Baburao was denied. Defendant No. 1, according to the written statement of Parwatibai, was addicted to vices like womanizing and drinking and, for that purpose, had sold even the household articles and, therefore, Suit No. 50 of 1962 was filed and the decree in that suit was not taken in collusion and as such was binding. It was further stated that under section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, defendant No. 2 became the absolute owner to the extent of undivided half share. 5. On the basis of these pleadings, the parties went to trial, the plaintiff examining as many as six witnesses, including pleader Patil, while both the defendants examining themselves only as their own witnesses. The trial Court found in favour of the plaintiff, holding that the decree obtained by Parwatibai in Suit No. 50 of 1962 was collusive and as such not binding, Parwatibai had no interest in the property and the decree would not confer any right on her, the suit property was of the sole ownership of defendant No. 1, the suit house was acquired with the joint family funds belonging to defendant No. ls father and defendant No. 2s husband, but the house was built from the funds “belonging to defendant No. ls father, the case that Dagadu had acknowledged Parwatibais half share was not established and was in fact futile and a mere entry in the City Survey Record(Ex. 36) does not confer any right on Parwatibai. 36) does not confer any right on Parwatibai. The trial Court also held that the suit agreement was not obtained by any fraud and misrepresentation and was a valid agreement, under which Rs. 2,500 as earnest money were paid and received by the parties. Avoiding the former decree, therefore, the trial Court decreed the claim for specific performance and directed execution of the sale-deed of the suit property in favour of the plaintiff upon the deposit of the balance of consideration. Against that judgment and decree, First Appeal No. 651 of 1966 was filed in this Court by Parwatibai alone. By the impugned judgment, the said appeal was allowed, holding that the earlier suit filed by Parwatibai was not collusive and the decree made could not be avoided and in view of the provisions of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, Parwatibai would become the full owner of her share in the property and the suit against defendant No. 2 Parwatibai was liable to be dismissed and, therefore, it was liable to be dismissed against defendant No. 1 Baburao. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the judgment and decree of the trial Court was entirely set aside and the plaintiffs suit dismissed with costs. 6. It is pertinent to observe, as was contended for the appellant, that the impugned judgment in the first appeal proceeds mainly on the footing that the earlier decree was binding and further proceeds to apply the provisions of section l4(1) of the Hindu Succession Act without taking into account the respective pleas raised in defence and the evidence tendered by the parties. That has obviously introduced an infirmity in the judgment under appeal and we will have to refer to the evidence tendered by the parties to find out whether the case set out in their pleadings has or has not been established. 7. For the purpose of the present appeal and as the evidence stands, few facts are not now in dispute, though they were stated to the contrary in the written statements to which we have made somewhat detailed reference. Sakharam had two sons by name Dagadu and Shankarrao. Parwatibai is the wife of Shankarrao. Shankarrao died in the year 1931. Dagadu had his wife by name Laxmibai. Dagadu died in the year 1942, while Laxmibai died in the year 1944. Baburao, defendant No. 1, was their son. Sakharam had two sons by name Dagadu and Shankarrao. Parwatibai is the wife of Shankarrao. Shankarrao died in the year 1931. Dagadu had his wife by name Laxmibai. Dagadu died in the year 1942, while Laxmibai died in the year 1944. Baburao, defendant No. 1, was their son. Baburao died during the pendency of the first appeal on June 19, 1968. In relation to Baburao, Parwatibai is paternal aunt, that is, the fathers brothers widow. To this relationship we will have to make a reference a little later for deciding the question whether alter the death of Baburao, Parwatibai had any legal capacity to be the legal representative representing Baburaos interest in the suit cause. Turning to the admitted facts again-, it is not in dispute that the suit house was purchased by Dagadu, two years after the death of Shankarrao, that is, on May 4, 1933 vide Ex.50. It was Dagadu who mortgaged during his lifetime the suit house under deeds of mortgage produced at Ex. 47 of date October 6, 1934 and at Ex.48 of date May 20, 1936. In both these mortgage deeds, Dagadu has declared that the property was of his ownership. Dagadu was by profession a fee clerk in Court. There is no documentary evidence with regard to the profession followed by Shankarrao. There is no documentary evidence with regard to the so-called earnings of Shankarrao or the so-called business of Shankarrao with regard to the motor vehicles or any gold or silver. About the earning capacity of Shankarrao, except the assertions of Parwatibai, it is not in dispute that no other evidence has been tendered. Under Ex. 36, which is a City Survey Record, after the death of Dagadu in July 1942, Parwatibais name has been shown along with Baburao upon an application made by Baburaos mother. Laxmibai. 8. After setting out these undisputed facts, we have to first dispose of the legal submission advanced on behalf of the appellant that after the death of Baburao during the pendency of the first appeal, the entire appeal had abated and the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court is void. Laxmibai. 8. After setting out these undisputed facts, we have to first dispose of the legal submission advanced on behalf of the appellant that after the death of Baburao during the pendency of the first appeal, the entire appeal had abated and the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court is void. This argument is met by the submission that Parwatibai being the paternal aunt of Baburao was on record and, therefore, the appeal would not abate and mere inadvertent omission to bring the fact of death on record and omitting the name of Baburao would not render the judgment of the learned Single Judge as void. We may state that considerable arguments were advanced as to whether paternal aunt could succeed under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act to the interest of the propositus like Baburao. In this regard, the debate is raised on the basis that she does not fall within the definition of agnate or cognate and is not a] person of heirs of Class I and Class II specified under section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. It is submitted that the term “agnate” having been defined only takes in relatives “by blood” or in other words, those who are biologically or genetic-ally related to each other and not those who are related by marriage in the family. Therefore, the submission is that whatever may be the position of law before the Act was made by the Parliament, the female like Parwatibai who gets related to the fathers brother could not be an agnate within the contemplation of section 3(1), (a) of the Act. 9. Giving careful consideration to various facts of law and the position of a widow that becomes a kinsmaid in a Hindu family by marriage, we find it difficult to accede to the submission that the definition as enacted in section 3(1), (a) should be so interpreted so as to exclude a relative of the type like paternal aunt. No doubt, the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act were meant to codify the law relating to intestate succession among the Hindus and to achieve uniformity and certainty about various otherwise nebulous and shifting matters. Need to have legislation doing away and dispelling all uncertainties has, however, to be understood against the back-drop of the existing interpretative system of personal law. Need to have legislation doing away and dispelling all uncertainties has, however, to be understood against the back-drop of the existing interpretative system of personal law. It would not be appropriate to begin with any legislative premise that the term “related by blood” has been introduced in any narrow sense. Effort will have to be made to reach its applicative connotation. Before we closely examine the contemplation of the word “agnate” we may indicate that as far as Mitakshara law applicable to Bombay School was concerned, the position of the paternal aunt was that of the recognised heir, she being the Gotraja-sapinda.(See Lallubhai Bapubhai and others v. Mankunvarbai and others)1, I.L.R. 2 Bom. 388 a t p. 437. affirmed in(Lallubhai Bapubhal and others v. Cassibai and others)2, I.L.R. 5 Bom. 110 p.c. and followed in(Rachava v. Kalingapa)3, I L R 16 Bom. 716. and(Kashibai v. Moreshvar Raghunaih)4, I.L.R. 35 Bom. 389. and also(Raghunath v. Lakshmibai)5, 37 Bom. L.R. 150. and(Pranjivan v. Bai Bhikhi)6, 23 Bom. L.R. 553. 10. In Lallubhai Bapubhai s case(supra), the Privy Council observed that by the Hindu law in force in Western India the widow of a collateral relation, although she is not specified in the texts among the heirs to members of the husbands family may come into the succession as one of the classes of gotraja sapindas of that family. The right to inherit in the classes of gotraja sapindas is to be determined by family relationship, or the community of corporal particles, and not only by the capacity of performing funeral rites. The principle of the general incapacity of women for inheritance did not stand in the way of the widows claim subject, however, to the fact being established that she is the gotraja sapinda of her husbands family. It was further stated that as a result of the marriage, the wife enters the gotra of her husband, and in some sense becomes a sapinda of his family. As to the concept of sapinda, it was approvedly observed that the doctrine depended upon community of corporal particles, and not upon the presentation of funeral offerings to the pitris. 11. Thus, the capacity of the widow and also of the paternal aunt(cases supra) has been founded on distinct principles flowing from the interpretation of the texts governing the personal law of Hindus, being entry into kinship or gotra and partaking into the corporal particles. 11. Thus, the capacity of the widow and also of the paternal aunt(cases supra) has been founded on distinct principles flowing from the interpretation of the texts governing the personal law of Hindus, being entry into kinship or gotra and partaking into the corporal particles. Both these were the resultants of the union brought about by marriage into family. Effect of a Hindu marriage which brings about a holy union of man and woman is to forge distinctly a family relation having regard to the spouse leading to mixing of corporal particles. After the marriage, the wife becomes an integral part of her husbands family. We have the observations of the Supreme Court on this aspect that bring out the distinctive character of Hindu marriage. In the case of(V. Tulsamma v. V. Sesha Reddi)7, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944 at page 1954. it is observed:- “In order to determine this factor we have to look to the concept of a Hindu marriage. Under the Shastric Hindu Law, a marriage, unlike a marriage under the Mohammadan Law which is purely contractual in nature, is a sacrament-a religious ceremony which results in a sacred and -holy union of man and wife by virtue of which he wife is completely trans-planted in the household of her husband and takes a new birth as a partner of her husband becoming a part and parcel of the body of the husband. To a Hindu wife her husband is her God and her life becomes one of selfless service and unstinted devotion to her husband. She not only shares the life and love, the joys and sorrows, the troubles and tribulations of her husband but becomes an integral part of her husbands life and activities. … … … … … … As the wife is in a sense a part of the body of her husband, she becomes cdrowner of the property of her husband though in a subordinate sense. (Emphasis provided) 12. Conceptually, therefore, a Hindu marriage as far as the wife is concerned clearly brings out consanguine results, the wife merging and sharing the particles of the body of her husband and as such that of the common ancestor. Such kinship or consanguinity conceptually as well as physically cannot be less than that of the blood relationship. 13. (Emphasis provided) 12. Conceptually, therefore, a Hindu marriage as far as the wife is concerned clearly brings out consanguine results, the wife merging and sharing the particles of the body of her husband and as such that of the common ancestor. Such kinship or consanguinity conceptually as well as physically cannot be less than that of the blood relationship. 13. Sapinda as understood by the applicative pronouncements and age-old doctrines available under the Hindu Law is clearly epuivalent io the relationship that comes by blood and gotraja is indicative of the kinship of the relatives. Not only juridically but sociologically, relations inter se in a Hindu family have a nuclear appearance, in that it has a male descent and follow the lines traced through the male line. That may emphasise, no doubt, the biological preference towards male than female, but in the matters of law regarding kinship, such preferences will have restrictive application, for incidents flowing from accepted modes of admitting persons into kinship would necessarily add new lines or bonds of equal validity and accepted effectiveness. Marriage is not only social but religious fact to a Hindu. It distinctively brings about union of two persons involving acceptance of a female into the family of the male spouse. Relation that ensues is not restricted to male that marries but to the entire family of the male. Married wife in a family thus becomes related to it wholly through her male spouse. 14. The term “agnate” in common parlance simply indicates relatives whose kinship is traceable exclusively through males or any paternal kinsmen as contrasted, with “cognate” as indicative of those relatives generally on the mothers side. We have little hesitation in holding that a fathers brothers wife would be related to the propositus like Baburao through his father and as such would be “an agnate” in common parlance. Even turning to the definitions enacted by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, we do not find any indication to exclude a fathers brothers widow from agnate by reason of the text of that definition. 15. Even turning to the definitions enacted by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, we do not find any indication to exclude a fathers brothers widow from agnate by reason of the text of that definition. 15. We may usefully extract the following provisions of the Act to understand reasonably the scheme in this regard :- “3.(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires- (a) agnate-one person is said to be an agnate of another if the two are related by blood or adoption wholly through males; … … … … (c) cognate- One person is said to be a cognate of another if the two are related by blood or adoption but not wholly through males; … … … … (j) related means related by legitimate kinship; Provided that illegitimate children shall be deemed to be related to their mother and to one another, and their legitimate descendants shall be deemed to be related to them and to one another; and any word expressing relationship or denoting a relative shall be construed accordingly.” The provisions of section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act along with the relative entry of the Schedule read as follows :- “8. The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provision of this Chapter :- (a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I of the Schedule; (b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon the heirs being the relatives specified in class II of the Schedule; (c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased; and (d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased. 12. Order of succession among agnates and cognates.-The order of succession among agnates or cognates, as the case may be, shall be determined in accordance with the rules of preference laid down hereunder:- Rule 1 :-Of two heirs, the one who has fewer or no degrees of ascent is preferred. Rule 2.-Where the number of degrees of ascent is the same or none, that heir is preferred who has fewer or no degrees of descent. Rule 2.-Where the number of degrees of ascent is the same or none, that heir is preferred who has fewer or no degrees of descent. Rule 3-where neither heir is entitled to be preferred to the other under Rule 1 or Rule 2 they take simultaneously.” The definition of the word “related” shows that to be related, persons could be treated as related to each other only if they belong to lawful or legitimate kinship. It is significant that this definition makes a reference to “kinship”. The accepted modes by which such “kinship” results are clearly implied. Kin-ship is blood relationship. In social unit like family, marriage is an apparent mode of forging such relation. As far as the definition of “agnate” is concerned, the statute contemplates that this relationship should arise firstly, “by blood or adoption”, and secondly, “wholly through males”. As far as “cognate” is concerned, this relationship should arise firstly “by blood or adoption” and secondly, “not wholly through males”. It is enough to observe that as far as cognate is concerned, it is wider term, that is, the relation not required to be wholly through maies, suggesting thereby that it may arise either partly through males and partly through females or wholly through females. The words employed by the defining clauses having reference to “blood” will have to be understood and interpreted so as to further the obvious object of the Act and, as far as possible, to provide uniform system of succession. Law here is not merely a biological text tracing descent and ascent. It is a sociological sanction in favour of those who can claim succession to the deceased. Sociology and history of given law often speak through the legislated words. The choice of the word “blood” in the definitions above along with “adoption” is clearly intended to recognise all social modes resulting in legitimate relation-ship. We cannot be asked to read the words “by blood” as “by birth” and restrict them to genetical incidence of family, for Legislature had it intended, would have surely spoken in that way. 16. The choice of the word “blood” in the definitions above along with “adoption” is clearly intended to recognise all social modes resulting in legitimate relation-ship. We cannot be asked to read the words “by blood” as “by birth” and restrict them to genetical incidence of family, for Legislature had it intended, would have surely spoken in that way. 16. With regard to the female heirs, historically the applicative law was not settled and was riddled with territorial differences about the interpretation and application of holy texts, though, as far as Bombay School and application of Mitakshara were concerned, the position had to be settled by judicial interpretations admitting no doubt that a paternal aunt would be the gotraja sapinda and as such the heirs of agnatic class. In the face of laws past, can it be said that by introducing the definition, it was intended to do away with the class of heirs like the one with whom we are concerned ? No doubt, in the matter of interpretation, mere matters of public policy or mere matter of supposed hardship would not be a valid ground for enlarging its scope, for the letters of the law as enacted will have to be given effect to. If the words “-related by blood” be indicative only of relationship “by birth” in the family and no other, then, obviously, the relation that comes by marriage will have to be excluded. If, on the other hand, the term “related by blood” is capable of yielding meaning in consonance with the concept of a Hindu Marriage and the results thereof as including those that also become related by marriage and acquire kinship in the family, then we would be right in keeping consistency and continuity by including within that term the relationship that results from marriage. 17. What then is the meaning of the word “blood” ? Does it signify only the vital fluid that sustains the life or is it also indicative of relationship which results in kinship by known and accepted modaities ? There are various meanings assigned to the word “blood”, including the one biologically attributed. 17. What then is the meaning of the word “blood” ? Does it signify only the vital fluid that sustains the life or is it also indicative of relationship which results in kinship by known and accepted modaities ? There are various meanings assigned to the word “blood”, including the one biologically attributed. From Websteres Third New International Dictionary, pages 236 and 237, the following relevant meanings can be extracted:- “ Blood: 1 a. the fluid that circulates in the principal vascular system of vertebrate animals carrying nourishment and oxygen to all parts of the body and bringing away waste products for excretion and that consists of a liquid plasma containing dissolved nutrients, waste products and other substances and suspended red blood cells, leukocytes, and blood platelets-see CIRCULATION, RESPIRATION; COAGULA-TION; 2a. blood regarded as a vital principle : LIFEBLOOD; broadly : LIFE, b: human blood regarded as a hereditary differentiating factor typical of and specific to a given family, stock, lineage, or race(English-); esp : the national royal-used with the(a prince of the-), c : whole body of physical traits passed from parent to offspring whether in men, animals, or plant; d : relationship by descent from a common ancestor(the Delaware grape shows a strong strain of vinifera-); KIN-SHIP, CONSANGUINITY(-is thicker than water), e: person related through a common familial or racial descent: KINDRED, LINEAGE, STOCK, RACE : also, obs: KINSMAN, RELATIVE.” The connotation of the word, therefore, is not merely biological but includes familial, racial and other recognised modes of kinship amongst men. It is futile to submit that the words “related by blood” should be equated with “related by birth”, though birth may be the primary incident of relationship between the two human beings. That is, however, not the only incident that brings about human relations into existence. When community of men develops and social relationship evolves, manifold relations come into being and in the context of relations, when the word “blood” is used, it suitably indicates the relationship by descent from a common ancestor or a kinship or consanguinity amongst a recognised social group. When community of men develops and social relationship evolves, manifold relations come into being and in the context of relations, when the word “blood” is used, it suitably indicates the relationship by descent from a common ancestor or a kinship or consanguinity amongst a recognised social group. Marriage is an acknowledged social form bringing two beings together amongst the society of Hindus as a result of which the female enters the family of the male and becomes kindred of the family of the male and as such gets related as a kin of that family having common ancestor in the husbands family. The term “by blood”, therefore, in our view, has no biological or genetic limitation, but, including that, has a wider reach in the context of the personal law of Hindus and takes in female that enters by marriage the family of the male. Only because after the words “by blood”, the Legislature has put the words “or adoption”, thus indicating another legal form by which a person becomes the kin in the family, it is not possible to exclude the marriage from the connotation of the term “by blood”. To have the relationship of the kind of agnate, it follows that that relationship should arise wholly through males and should be a relationship of blood. As we have indicated, even prior to the present enactment, the applicative law held that as a result of marriage, a widow truly became gotraja sapinda in her husbands family. The principle on the basis of which the applicative judgments were rendered was clearly the principle to hold that by marriage the wife shared the community of the common particles of the body and was as such a relative “by blood”. 18. A submission was made that this would lead to enlarging the class of heirs even from wifes side and difficulties would arise in applying Rule 12, for whoever upon this interpretation is related to the wife would also be related to the husband. This submission is fallacious for two reasons. Firstly, we have held that in the case of a female married into the family, relationship by blood arises because of the marriage and secondly, she becomes kin in the family. Her relations in her original family would not answer any of these tests. Hardly, therefore, there is any scope for any such apprehension. Firstly, we have held that in the case of a female married into the family, relationship by blood arises because of the marriage and secondly, she becomes kin in the family. Her relations in her original family would not answer any of these tests. Hardly, therefore, there is any scope for any such apprehension. We have preferred to put this somewhat comprehensive interpretation, for, in our view, that better furthers the scheme available in section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. If we were not to recognise the effect of a Hindu marriage in this manner, obviously the cases will arise and the present one will be one of them where succession would fail, though a nearer relative from the family would be available. When succession is laid down by statutory enactment, we should lean to interpret it so as to avoid such a result. The scheme of section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act shows that with regard to a male Hindu dying intestate, it codifies the rules of succession and, by reference to the Schedule, states the heirs who will take the intestate succession of a male Hindu. The Schedule which is to be treated as part of section 8 describes several relations with reference to the male whose intestate succession is being provided for. Reference to relatives in Class I and Class II clearly shows that the entries therein are qualifying or descriptive entries having references to the relation of the heirs described therein and the person whose succession is being governed. In this regard, the Legislature while describing the heirs in Class I and Class II has not in any manner disregarded the relations that arise because of marriage. On the other hand, not only the relation by birth but also kinship that arises because of marriage appear to be the predominating considerations in the choice of the heirs grouped under Class I and Class II. The heirs in Class I and Class II having reference to clause(a) and clause(b) of section 8 respectively are thus nominated relatives under the statute, but nonetheless are described as relatives. It can, therefore, be safely inferred that in the matter of specification of relatives, the present legislation is based and is not averse to recognise the relation that comes because of the marriage along with the relations that arise because of birth in family. It can, therefore, be safely inferred that in the matter of specification of relatives, the present legislation is based and is not averse to recognise the relation that comes because of the marriage along with the relations that arise because of birth in family. Similarly, it treats the male and female heirs with even-handedness and with a sense of obvious justice. Keeping in view this internal evidence of acceptance of principles of birth and marriage available in the enactment of Class I and Class II along with the provision of sections 8(a) and(b), it will not be unreasonable to understand the provisions of clause(c) of section 8, which provides that when the heirs of Class I and Class II are not available, then the property of a male Hindu dying intestate devolves upon the agnates of the deceased, as also the provisions of clause(d) which provides for similar result, namely, that falling agnates, the property devolves on the cognates of the deceased. The principles of birth and of marriage that go to make relational kinship run through and through the veins of these provisions. What is apparent in Class I and Class II does shed light on what is implicit in Class III having reference to clause(c) of section 8, for the Legislature was well aware of the relations that spring up because of the marriage in Hindu Society. Only because the term “by blood” is capable of having restactive meaning as “by birth”, it will not be proper nor reasonable to attribute to the Legislature an intent to exclude the female heirs who become related because of the marriage ties in a family. It is indeed difficult to conceive such a legislative situation, particularly in the context of the object of the Act itself. The obvious two sociological principles which go to make family as the social unit are the incident of birth and the incident of marriage which unite persons by bond. There may be other relative principles which have the sanction of law, like the modality of adoption, but, as far as the natural principle is concerned, birth is primary principle which is the concomitant result of a marriage of two heterogeneous beings. There may be other relative principles which have the sanction of law, like the modality of adoption, but, as far as the natural principle is concerned, birth is primary principle which is the concomitant result of a marriage of two heterogeneous beings. It is to these primary and basic principles that the law of succession apparently makes a reference to make a scheme for succession and there must be strong evidence to suggest that while interpreting we should exclude application of the same principle that gives rise to relations. 19. Reliance placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in In re P. Kousalya Ammal8, is hardly sufficient. We respectfully find that there are no reasons in support of the reasoning available in the judgment itself nor any discussion with regard to the phraseology which is being debated before us. 20. In the view we have taken, we cannot but hold that Parwatibai, the respondent in the present appeal, being the widow of the brother of the father of Baburao, was the heir available after the death of Baburao, during* the pendency of the first appeal, on June 19, 1968. There is no evidence nor any material has been produced as indicating that Baburao had left any other heir. That being the position, we cannot treat that the Judgment under appeal was a nullity. What was omitted to be done by the appellant Parwatibai in that appeal was merely to put a proper application for deleting the name of Baburao and showing herself as the sole heir representing the estate and interest of the deceased Baburao. As the legal heir was very much on record, the appeal had not abated and was competently continued. [Rest of the judgment is not material for the report.] Appeal allowed. ------