JUDGMENT P.N. Goel, J. - These three connected appeals arise out of one judgment dated 11-9-1969 passed by Civil and Sessions Judge, Gyanpur, confirming the judgment and decree dated 16-11-1967 in three original suits Nos. 27 of 1967, 29 of 1967 and 30 of 1967. 2. Facts relevant for the disposal of these appeals are these: On 12-10-1964 Lal Chand and Smt. Naurangi executed three sale deeds in favour of the appellants in the three appeals. On that date the sale deeds were presented to the Sub-Registrar, Bhadohi, district Varanasi by the vendees appellants. The vendees appellants did not pay registration fee. The Sub-Registrar returned the sale deeds to the appellants. He made an endorsement-on the back of the sale deeds that as registration fee was not paid by the persons presenting the sale deeds, they were returned. On 10-11-1964, the appellants vendees again presented the sale deeds to the Sub-Registrar for registration. The vendors respondents were not present. Notice was issued to them, but they did not come up. Consequently on 20-1-1965, the Sub-Registrar refused to register the sale deeds and made an endorsement of refusal on the back of the sale deeds. The vendees appellants filed appeal before the District Registrar under Section 72 of the Registration Act, 1908. Their appeals were dismissed on 7-1-1967 on the ground that the return of sale deeds by the Sub-Registrar on 12-10-1964 amounted to refusal and as such the vendees should have preferred an appeal against the endorsement dated 12-10-1964 and as no appeal was preferred against that endorsement, the appeal against the refusal dated 20-1-1965 was not maintainable. Thereafter on 4-2-1967, the appellants filed suits under Section 77 of the Registration Act. 3. The vendors respondents contested the suits. It was held by the trial court that there was no provision for returning these sale deeds, that the Sub-Registrar could either register the deeds or refuse to register them, that the appellants should have filed an appeal against the order dated 12-10-1964 under Section 72 of the Registration Act and that as they did not file such an appeal, suits under Section 77 of the Registration Act were not maintainable. The lower appellate court took the same view. 4. The lower appellate court took the same view. 4. Sri G. P. Bhargava, learned counsel for the appellants urged firstly that on 12-10-1964 the Sub-Registrar had returned the documents because registration fee was not paid by the appellants who had presented the sale deeds for registration, that the Sub-Registrar had specifically made an endorsement of return on the back of the sale deeds, and that subsequently the Sub-Registrar had entertained the sale deeds on 10-11-1964 and that in these circumstances it was a case of return of documents and not a case of refusal to register the sale deeds. 5. Section 71 (1) of the Registration Act simply lays down that a Sub-Registrar refusing to register a document, except on the ground that the property to which it relates is not situate within the sub-district. shall make an order of refusal and record his reasons for such order in his book No. 2. In the present case the property which was sold by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 did not lie beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar no of Bhadohi. Therefore, Section 71 (1) indicates that in the present cases the Sub-Registrar should have either registered the deeds or should have refused to register them. Taking the language of this section, it cannot be said that the Sub-Registrar had a right to return the deeds. 6. In this connection the procedure which a Sub-Registrar has to follow in the matter of registration of documents has to be found in the Registration Manual. Before a Sub-Registrar accepts a document for registration, he has to follow the procedure given in Rr. 284 to 303 of the Registration Manual. Rule 284 prohibits the Sub-Registrar from registering a document in which he is personally interested or otherwise connected. Rule 285 indicates the points which the Sub-Registrar should examine: (1) Whether he has jurisdiction to register the document, (2) whether the document is time-barred, (3) whether the document is free from the objections under Sections 19, 20 and 21, (4) whether the document is properly stamped, (5) Whether the document is presented by a proper person and (6) whether the document was executed by the persons by whom it purports to have been executed. In the present case none of these conditions is applicable. In the present case none of these conditions is applicable. R. 287 clearly provides that if the Registering Officer finds that he has no jurisdiction to register a document presented to him, he should endorse on the documents the words "returned for presentation in the proper office" and return it to the presenter. It will thus be seen that if a Sub-Registrar, does not have jurisdiction to register the document, then only he has a right to return it. Rr. 286, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292,293 and 294 are not applicable in the present case. R. 295 lays down that when a document has been presented to a Sub-Registrar for registration within the period and the executant failed to appear to admit execution within that period, the Sub-Registrar must record a formal refusal to register. In the present case the Sub-Registrar followed this rale on 20-1-1965. Rr. 296 to 301 are not applicable to the present case. R. 302 lays down that if the Sub-Registrar finds that the person presenting the document is not legally authorised to present it, he should endorse on the document "presented by .... who is not legally authorised to present it - returned." It means that the Sub-Registrar can return a deed if he finds that the person presenting the document is not legally authorised to present. R. 303 has application to the present cases. 7. It will be seen from the above that before accepting a document for registration, the Sub-Registrar can return the documents under Rr. 287 and 302 and he can record refusal under R. 295. On 12-10-1964 none of these rules applied and followed by the Sub-Registrar. 8. After having accepted the document for registration the Sub-Registrar has to follow the procedure laid down in Rr. 304 to 322. Relevant R. 304 clearly provides that when a document is accepted for registration the prescribed fee should be levied and the necessary entries made in the fees book. In the present case the Sub-Registrar had accepted the document for registration and had not returned or refused under Rr. 287, 302 and 295. Therefore, he should have asked for the registration fees. It appears that the Sub-Registrar did ask for the registration fees and the present appellants who had presented the document did not pay the same. In the present case the Sub-Registrar had accepted the document for registration and had not returned or refused under Rr. 287, 302 and 295. Therefore, he should have asked for the registration fees. It appears that the Sub-Registrar did ask for the registration fees and the present appellants who had presented the document did not pay the same. There is no rule that if the registration fee was not paid, the Sub-Registrar had a right to return the deeds. It necessarily follows that if the fees are not paid the Sub-Registrar should refuse to register the document. 9. Taking into consideration the rules indicated above along with the provisions of Section 71 (1) it is abundantly clear that in the present case the Sub-Registrar had absolutely no right to return the deeds for want of payment of registration fees. The Sub-Registrar could only refuse to register the document for non-payment of the registration fees. In this aspect of the matter the view taken by the District Registrar in his order dated 7-1-1967 as well as the view taken by both the courts below is fully fortified and cannot be said to be erroneous. 10. The main stress of the learned counsel for the appellants is that on 10-11-1964, the Sub-Registrar had accepted the document again under Section 71 (2) and therefore the endorsement dated 12-10-1964 cannot be taken as refusal to register the document. Section 71 (2) lays down that no Registering Officer shall accept for registration a document upon which there is an endorsement of refusal unless and until under the provisions of Section 72, the document is directed to be registered by the District Registrar in an appeal filed against the refusal recorded by the Sub-Registrar. It is true that on 10-11-1964 the Sub-Registrar should not have accepted sale deeds again. But this does not mean that the law which is clearly applicable to the case should not have taken its course. In the present case the Sub-Registrar not only committed a mistake on 12-10-1964 in returning the deeds, but he also committed another mistake in taking the deeds again on 10-11-1964. The appellants filed an appeal before the District Registrar under Section 72 against the order of refusal dated 20-1-1965. The District Registrar clearly held that the Sub-Registrar was in the wrong and therefore the appellants appeals were dismissed by the District Registrar. 11. The appellants filed an appeal before the District Registrar under Section 72 against the order of refusal dated 20-1-1965. The District Registrar clearly held that the Sub-Registrar was in the wrong and therefore the appellants appeals were dismissed by the District Registrar. 11. The appellants counsel urged that the appellants should not be made to suffer tor the mistake of the Sub-Registrar. Every person must know the law. The appellants should have carefully considered the effect of the return of the deeds by the Sub-Registrar on 12-10-64. Mistake of fact is excusable, but not mistake of law. Had the appellants cared to peruse the relevant rules in the Registration Manual, they could have easily come to know that the Sub-Registrar was in the wrong in returning the deeds to them. They should have understood that this return amounted to refusal to register the deeds. Therefore, they should have filed an appeal under Section 72 against the endorsement dated 12-10-1964. 12. The position that follows is that the appellants cannot take advantage of their own mistake and they cannot base their claim on the basis of the mistake committed by the Sub-Registrar. 13. For what has been discussed above on merits, there is no substance in these appeals. 14. The learned counsel for the appellants then contended that the present suits under Section 77 of the Registration Act be converted into suits for specific performance. No court can convert the suits suo motu. The appellants counsel then urged that he should be allowed time to make an application for converting these suits into suits for specific performance. It will be noticed that the District Registrar dismissed the appeals of the appellants on 7-1-1967. The right of the appellants to file suit for specific performance arose immediately thereafter. Instead of filing suits for specific performance the appellants chose to pursue the speedy remedy provided in Section 77 of the Registration Act. A suit for specific performance is maintainable within 3 years under Art. 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The period of three years is to be reckoned from the date for the performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused. In the present case no date for specific performance of the contract was agreed upon between the parties. The period of three years is to be reckoned from the date for the performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused. In the present case no date for specific performance of the contract was agreed upon between the parties. Therefore, it is urged by the appellants counsel that the suits can lie within 3 years of the date upon which the appellants have noticed that performance was refused. In the present case the position is that on 12-10-1964 both the executant's had gone away. Then the respondents did not turn up in pursuance of the notice given by the Sub-Registrar in or about November, 1964. Therefore the Sub-Registrar had to refuse registration on 20-1-1965. The appellants filed appeals before the District Registrar which was contested by the respondents. It will further be seen that the respondents even contested the present suits under Section 77 of the Registration Act. Thus the appellants should have known Ions back that the respondents were not prepared to perform their part of the contract i. e. they were not prepared to get the sale deeds registered. In this aspect of the matter, the period of 3 years expired long before the hearing of these appeals by this court. In the above circumstances this court will not be justified in allowing the appellants application for converting the suits as urged by the appellants counsel. In the result no useful purpose will be served by prolonging the disposal of the appeals by giving time to the appellants to move application for converting the suits. 15. For all what has been discussed above all the three appeals are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case parties shall bear their own costs incurred in this court.